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HANS-ALBRECHT SCHWARZ-LIEBERMANN VON
WAHLENDORF (1922-2011)
In the fall of 1976, when he was a fourth-year law student
at the Université Jean Moulin in Lyon, the author of this note
discovered a course mysteriously called Droit comparé, taught by
a tall, lean, and elegant grey-haired German professor, who spoke
perfect French and used words and phrases in Greek and Latin,
English, German, and Russian, and seemed to know several other
languages. He instructed his students on the foundations of
comparative law and the history of this discipline, and gave a
fascinating introduction to the history and the spirit of English law.
The ‘disciple to be’ received this teaching like sand absorbing
unexpected rain, as he had been fed all these years with dry
legislative positivism. The following semester, he was his student
in legal philosophy, and it became clear that the desert would
blossom into fertile land. The aspiration to become a scholar of
comparative law kept germinating in the mind of a student who
just a few months earlier was questioning his aspiration to become
a jurist.
A former Lutheran partly of Jewish descent and converted
to Roman-Catholicism, the master led his disciple to the Promised
Land. The year after, the disciple majored in the D.E.A. de droit
comparé (a graduate program in comparative law) of which the
master was the director. Despite the latter’s warning that he was a
foreigner and an outsider, and therefore not the best leader on the
path to a French academic career, the disciple insisted on having
him as his Doktor Vater or doctoral supervisor. The master
adopted his disciple and the disciple elected his spiritual father.
“Law is right reason,” he was fond of saying, and this sounded like
a mantra. The ideas of coherence and reasonableness, the
ontological connection between law and morals, the legal necessity
to objectivize purely subjective relationships and communication,
the meta-legal foundation of responsibility and its transcendental
connection to freedom, the need to mediate and the unique
function of the judge in this respect, the notion that comparative
legal studies amount to applied legal philosophy; all these and
many other ideas would fuel the disciple’s research and teaching.
His constant focus on coherence led the disciple to elect estoppel
and the protection of reasonable reliance as the topic of his
doctoral dissertation. The nine hours spent in the graduate program
discussing Lord Atkin’s neighbor principle in Donoghue v.
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Stevenson 1 would turn the author of this note into a scholar of
English law and the law of obligations, among other things.
This personal testimony is a pale reflection of the master
and his teaching. Here is a short resume. Born in Berlin, in 1922,
son of a Prussian diplomat, Hans-Albrecht Schwarz-Liebermann
von Wahlendorf received an aristocratic education. He was
homeschooled in the leading European languages and graduated
from the Bismarck-Gymnasium. He escaped the Nazi persecutions,
and studied Russian and philosophy. Immediately after World War
II he joined the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), and studied
law in Tubingen where he got his doctorate. He did academic work
at the Hague Academy of International Law, at the University of
Cambridge (he later sent me to Sydney Sussex College, his home
in Cambridge, where I met my wife, who is from Swabian
Southern Germany, like his mother), and at several law schools in
the United States, including the University of Michigan. From
1952 onwards, he worked at European integration projects at the
German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in close cooperation with
Heinrich von Brentano, Walther Hallstein, and later joining future
Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger and Chancellor Konrad
Adenauer’s efforts on international and security issues. He
contributed to the drafting of the first European treaties. In 1957,
he became NATO’s Associate Director for political affairs. After
having lectured all around the world (1960-1961), he was made
Director for research and university cooperation for the Council of
Europe (Strasbourg, 1962-1967).
A man of action, he remained a scholar. In 1968, he was
made an Associate Professor at the University of Nice, and in
1974, he joined the law faculty of Université Jean Moulin in Lyon,
where he was made full professor, teaching comparative law and
legal philosophy. He left Lyon with the title of Professor Emeritus
in 1982 and also gave up his position as Associate Director (de
facto director) of the Lyon Institute of Comparative Law, in which
I would succeed him in 1985. Back in Germany, he resumed with
his political life in Hamburg, and also sat on the board of the Max
Planck Institute for Foreign and International Law (Hamburg,
1984-1992). He was very active in Germany’s foreign policy all
these years, with important missions in the Soviet bloc, whilst
working to convince German students of the necessity of
deploying Pershing missiles in West Germany, to oppose the SS20 missiles deployed in countries of the Warsaw Pact, and
ultimately end the Cold War. He travelled extensively during the
chancellorship of Helmut Kohl, the German federal government
1. Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.).
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sending him to the United States, Russia, India, Japan, South East
Asia, Australia, and New Zealand. He was President of the Robert
Schuman Institute for Europe (1984-1994) and was made
Honorary Director of the Édouard Lambert Institute of
Comparative Law (Lyon, 2001).
In 1989, he moved to Rheinbreitbach, near Bonn, where my
family and I visited him several times. He was a man of great
cordiality and aristocratic courtesy, expressing all thoughts, simple
or complex, in subtle language and long-winded sentences. His
diction was slow, with sentences ending softly, in what he
described as Berlin laziness. In 1955, he married Denise Kerdilès,
from France (he described her as rocher de Bretagne, Lumière du
Ciel), 2 who left this world two years before him. She used to
receive us with grace and simplicity, in this aristocratic mansion
adorned with art you usually see only in the finest museums. He
was also a poet and a painter. He gradually lost the support of both
legs in the final years, and no longer left his bedroom upstairs,
where I saw him on my last visit. His intellect was intact, and I
never saw a man so prepared to appear in front of his Creator. He
died peacefully at home on August 6, 2011, four days after his 89th
birthday.
Hans-Albrecht Schwarz-Liebermann von Wahlendorf
published extensively between the early 1950s and 1990s, in
German, in French, and also in English. His publications in
German discuss NATO, Germany’s foreign politics, and include
significant works in International Law. 3 Publications in English are
not many, but combine scholarship in international and
comparative law. 4 During his years in Nice, he published two

2. Dedication page, HANS-ALBRECHT SCHWARZ-LIEBERMANN VON
WAHLENDORF, RÉFLEXIONS SUR LA NATURE DES CHOSES ET LA LOGIQUE DU
DROIT-CONTRIBUTIONS À L’ONTOLOGIE ET À L’ÉPISTÉMOLOGIE JURIDIQUES
(Paris, La Haye, Mouton 1973).
3. HANS-ALBRECHT
SCHWARZ-LIEBERMANN
VON
WAHLENDORF,
VORMUNDSCHAFT UND TREUHAND DES RÖMISCHEN UND ENGLISCHEN
PRIVATRECHTS IN IHRER ANWENDBARKEIT AUF VÖLKERRECHTLICHER EBENEEINE STUDIE ZUR STRUKTURPROBLEMATIK DES VÖLKERRECHTS (Tübingen,
J.C.B. Mohr 1951); MEHRHEITSENTSCHEID UND STIMMABWÄGUNG-EINE STUDIE
ZUR ENTWICKLUNGES VÖLKERVERFASSUNGSRECHTS (Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr
1953); STRUKTUR UND FUNKTION DER SOGENANNTEN ZWEITEN KAMMER - EINE
STUDIE ZUM PROBLEM DER GEWALTENTEILUNG (Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr 1958).
4. HANS-ALBRECHT SCHWARZ-LIEBERMANN VON WAHLENDORF, SOME
ASPECTS OF THE INFLUENCE OF PROCEDURE AND COMPOSITION ON THE
MATERIAL ACHIEVEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL AND SUPRANATIONAL EUROPEAN
ORGANIZATIONS (Bonn 1954); THE FORMS OF ACTION AT INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Birmingham 1981).
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fundamental books in French on legal philosophy, 5 to be followed
by remarkable volumes published in the prestigious Bibliothèque
de philosophie du droit, at the Librairie générale de droit et de
jurisprudence. 6 Droit comparé - Théorie générale et principes and
Introduction à l’esprit et à l’histoire du droit anglais are gems,
awaiting to be reprinted. 7 Positions internationales de la Russie
soviétique 8 shows his familiarity with the Russian language,
Russian culture and literature (large excerpts are cited, translated
by the author), and unique expertise in Russian foreign policy over
many centuries, describing Moscow as the third Rome. It must be
read again, more than twenty years after the ending of the Soviet
Empire. Three other books, written during the Lyon years, convey
the author’s faith in the development of Europe and are worth
being read in this period of doubt as to the political future of the
European continent. 9
I cannot but cite Regards et réflexions, published in 1987. 10
Not only does it reveal the author’s philosophical thoughts and
spiritual depth–he was a man of faith–but it gives a poetical
glimpse of a magnificent soul that rejected the collective
monstrosity of the past century and generated powerful moral and
legal thoughts as to the only way to resurrect human dignity and
ensure its protection in the centuries to come.
These bibliographical notes are by no means exhaustive
and omit a number of significant articles, monographs, and
5. HANS-ALBRECHT
SCHWARZ-LIEBERMANN
VON
WAHLENDORF,
FONDEMENTS ET PRINCIPES D’UN ORDRE JURIDIQUE NAISSANT–ESSAI DE
PHILOSOPHIE EMPIRIQUE DU DROIT (Paris, La Haye, Mouton 1971); RÉFLEXIONS
SUR LA NATURE DES CHOSES ET LA LOGIQUE DU DROIT, supra note 2.
6. HANS-ALBRECHT
SCHWARZ-LIEBERMANN
VON
WAHLENDORF,
ÉLÉMENTS D’UNE INTRODUCTION À LA PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT (1976); LES
DIMENSIONS DU DROIT (1978); IDÉALITÉ ET RÉALITÉ DU DROIT–LES DIMENSIONS
DU RAISONNEMENT JUDICIAIRE (1980); POLITIQUE, DROIT, RAISON–RECUEIL
D’ÉTUDES (1982).
7. HANS-ALBRECHT SCHWARZ-LIEBERMANN VON WAHLENDORF, DROIT
COMPARÉ–THÉORIE GÉNÉRALE ET PRINCIPES (Paris, L.G.D.J. 1978);
INTRODUCTION À L’ESPRIT ET À L’HISTOIRE DU DROIT ANGLAIS (Paris, L.G.D.J.
1977).
8. HANS-ALBRECHT
SCHWARZ-LIEBERMANN
VON
WAHLENDORF,
POSITIONS INTERNATIONALES DE LA RUSSIE SOVIÉTIQUE–TRADITION ET
IDÉOLOGIE (Paris, Librairie des cinq continents 1977).
9. HANS-ALBRECHT
SCHWARZ-LIEBERMANN
VON
WAHLENDORF,
DÉMOCRATIE EUROPÉENNE (Lyon, L’Hermès 1977); QUELLE EUROPE?
MÉDITATIONS D’UN CHRÉTIEN DÉMOCRATE (Lyon, L’Hermès 1979); RÉSISTEZ!
UN MANIFESTE POUR L’EUROPE (Paris, La pensée universelle 1983).
10. HANS-ALBRECHT
SCHWARZ-LIEBERMANN
VON
WAHLENDORF,
REGARDS ET RÉFLEXIONS–FRAGMENTS PHILOSOPHIQUES ET POÉTIQUES (Paris,
Bière 1987).
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speeches. They are an invitation to discover or rediscover an
immense legal mind who transcends the limits of legal thinking
and questions who we are, confronting us on every page with our
limited and unlimited dimension. He is not honored here for his
reverence for the civil law: though educated in the law at one of
the hubs of the Pandectist School and more familiar than many
with the dynamism of Roman law, he rather preferred the English
common law and its focus on the judge. 11 Without his seminal
influence, however, the Journal of Civil Law Studies would not
exist and may not have been conceived as a forum for comparative
legal studies.
Olivier Moréteau

11. See his comments on Right Reason, Case v. Code, in POLITIQUE, DROIT,
RAISON, supra note 6, at Part II.

PREFACE
“You’re right . . . We’re Mediterranean. I’ve never
been to Greece or Italy, but I’m sure I’d be at home
there as soon as I landed.” He would, too, I
thought. New Orleans resembles Genoa or
Marseilles, or Beirut or the Egyptian Alexandria
more than it does New York, although all seaports
resemble one another more than they can resemble
any place in the interior. Like Havana and Port-auPrince, New Orleans is within the orbit of a
Hellenistic world that never touched the North
Atlantic. The Mediterranean, Caribbean, and Gulf
of Mexico form a homogeneous, though interrupted,
sea. 1
Juris Diversitas was founded informally at the periphery of
the Second International Congress of the World Society of Mixed
Jurisdiction Jurists (Edinburgh, 2007). We had two related aims.
The first was to expand comparative scholarship to cover not only
the explicit Western legal hybrids referred to as the ‘classical
mixed jurisdictions’, but both more exotic legal hybrids and
legal/normative hybrids more generally. The second, related aim is
the encouragement of interdisciplinary dialogue between
comparatists and others. For a few years, our ‘members’—from
Cyprus, France, Italy, Louisiana, Quebec, etc—formed little more
than an online discussion group. We expanded very slowly, by
invitation. In 2009, following a chance remark at a conference
dinner in Ireland about the need to find funding to pursue our
themes, we were given the opportunity to co-organise, with the
Swiss Institute of Comparative Law, a symposium on comparative
law and hybrid traditions. That symposium was held in September
2009. A formal Executive Committee was established at the same
time. 2 In early 2010, we created a blog to alert both members and
1. A.J. LIEBLING, THE EARL OF LOUISIANA 87 (1961).
2. The Executive Committee includes President Seán Patrick Donlan
(Limerick) and Vice-Presidents Ignazio Castellucci (Trento and Macau) and
Olivier Moréteau (Louisiana State). More recently, Lukas Heckerdorn-Urschler
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others about related events, materials, and associations. 3 Our logo
is, appropriately, a bowl of gumbo. At the same time, we
established a distinguished Advisory Board. 4 Subsequently, a
collection of articles inspired by our Swiss symposium was
published in 2010. 5
A few years earlier, I had the good fortune to visit the
University of Malta in 2008. I was eager to learn more about
Malta’s mixity, a combination of Anglo-British and Italocontinental laws (as well as other modern European laws) that was
little-known beyond its shores. In my lectures and research there, I
paid special attention to whether the jurisdiction fit the ‘third legal
family’ model that Vernon Palmer—founder and President of the
World Society of Mixed Jurisdiction Jurists—proposed in his
Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide: the Third Legal Family (2001). 6
In this research, Dr. David Zammit, Head of the University of
Malta’s Department of Civil law, was my ally. 7 A lawyer and legal
anthropologist, he became a member of Juris Diversitas. He also
saw the possibility of combining the study of ‘legal hybridity’ and
‘normative hybridity.’ Legal hybridity includes explicit mixed
systems. Recognizing, however, that all traditions are mixes, it
extends to both covert hybrids and more complex, diffuse
influences on the law. Normative hybidity combines the mix of
these diverse state laws and other, inform ‘unofficial’ norms. Dr.
Zammit and I subsequently co-taught a class on Comparative Law

(Swiss Institute of Comparative Law) has become our Treasurer and Salvatore
Mancuso (Macau), our Secretary.
3. http://jurisdiversitas.blogspot.com (Last visited December 9, 2011).
4. Including Patrick Glenn (McGill), Marco Guadagni (Trieste), Roderick
Macdonald (McGill), Werner Menski (SOAS, London), Esin Örücü (Emeritus,
Glasgow), Vernon Palmer (Tulane), Rodolfo Sacco (Emeritus, Turin),
Boaventura de Sousa Santos (Coimbra, Wisconsin, and Warwick), William
Twining (Emeritus, University College London and Miami), and Jacques
Vanderlinden (Emeritus, Free University of Brussels and Moncton).
5. COMPARATIVE LAW AND HYBRID LEGAL TRADITIONS (Eleanor
Cashain-Ritaine, Seán Patrick Donlan, and Martin Sychold eds., Shulthess for
the Institute Suisse de droit compare, 2010).
6. Professor Palmer has, however, since begun a second edition. Malta
will be included.
7. With the addition of Biagio Andò (Catania), we eventually completed A
Happy Union: Malta’s Legal Hybridity 27 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. (forthcoming
2012).
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and Legal Pluralism. We also began to discuss the possibility of
hosting a Juris Diversitas event on these themes.
With the help of Dr. Zammit and Dr. Simon Merceica,
Head of the Mediterranean Institute at the University of Malta, a
second symposium was organized to take place in Malta in June
2010. That event focused on the legal and normative traditions of
the Mediterranean. It was hosted by the Department of Civil Law
of the Faculty of Law of the University of Malta and the
Mediterranean Institute. Professor Olivier Moréteau (Louisiana
State University) delivered our plenary presentation. We also
launched, thanks to Professor Palmer, the ‘Mediterranean
Hybridity Project’ of Juris Diversitas. That Project also owes
much to conversations with Dr. Zammit. It is the subject of my
paper included in this issue. As a native Louisianan and a graduate
of the Paul M. Hebert Law Center, I am pleased, too, to be
publishing the articles inspired by the Maltese symposium in the
Journal of Civil Law Studies. Contributors include jurists from
Malta and beyond, including the current Dean of the Faculty of
Laws of the University of Malta. The Executive of Juris Diversitas
is grateful for the efforts of Dr. Merceica and all those who helped
to organize and administer the symposium. We are grateful, too, to
Professors Moréteau and Palmer. Finally, a special and personal
thanks is due from me to Dr. Zammit for his organizational efforts
and, still more, for his vision. 8
Juris Diversitas has not rested, of course. After meeting in
Malta, we organized a follow-up workshop on our Mediterranean
Project. That meeting was held, appropriately, at the University of
Catania in October 2010. We held our 2011 Annual General
Meeting at the Third International Congress of the World Society
of Mixed Jurisdiction Jurists in Jerusalem (Israel), continuing our
close association with that organization. More recently, we coorganized, again with the Swiss Institute of Comparative Law, a
conference on The Concept of Law in Comparative Context:
8. Note that the Protection Project at The Johns Hopkins University
School of Advanced International Studies has organized, in cooperation with the
World Society of Mixed Jurisdiction Jurists and the Tulane University Law
School Eason Weinmann Center for Comparative Law, an international
conference on Mixed Legal Systems, East and West: Newest Trends and
Developments. The conference will be held in Malta on 14-15 May 2012.
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Comparative Law, Legal Philosophy and the Social Sciences. In
addition to a plenary address by Werner Menski (SOAS),
contributors included, among others, Mauro Bussani (Trieste),
Baudouin Dupret (CNRS), Andrew Halpin (Singapore), Emmanuel
Melissaris (LSE), David Nelken (Cardiff and Macerata), and Mark
van Hoecke (Ghent). That conference was held in October 2011
and will result in another collection in 2012. A future conference is
also being organized with Professor Dupret and the Centre
Jacques-Berque (Rabat, Morocco). Scheduled for June 2012, it
will focus on ‘Doing Justice: Official and Unofficial “Legalities”
in Practice’. I also look forward, one day, to bringing our members
to Louisiana. They’ve heard a lot about the gumbo.
Dr. Seán Patrick Donlan *

* Lecturer, University of Limerick (Ireland). President, Juris Diversitas;
Vice-President, Irish Society of Comparative Law; Secretary General, World
Society of Mixed Jurisdiction Jurists; Secretary General, European Society for
Comparative Legal History; Honorary Member, International Academy of
Comparative Law.

THE ROLE OF JUDGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT
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ABSTRACT
Mixed jurisdictions that are a historical by-product of the
convergence of common and civil law traditions may give the
impression of entities with stable and fixed traits. Upon a closer
look however, this impression is found to be inaccurate. An
analysis of court judgements is the best way to evaluate how these
legal systems develop. This paper focuses on Maltese private law,
* Lecturer in Private Comparative Law, Faculty of Political Sciences,
University of Catania, Italy.
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which is firmly rooted in the French legal tradition. Some issues
concerning private law will be discussed solely because they are
significant examples of the relevance that judgements have for the
development of the system, notwithstanding the fact that the
doctrine of binding precedent is not followed in Malta. Through an
inquiry of specific issues not expressly provided for by the
legislature, one can see if the legal system has evolved in a way
which is coherent with the models that lie at its foundations or
from which, and in what way, it has departed from them. In the
case of Malta, foreign influences are incorporated to the extent that
they are consistent with the Maltese legal tradition.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper I will discuss how Court decisions may
change the law in a mixed jurisdiction such as Malta. After an
overview of the legal history of the system, I will address two
closely connected points. The first concerns gaps in written law, or
lacunae, and the ways in which they are filled by judges. The
second point concerns how general rules such as the concept of
‘good faith’ have been used by Courts to rule in situations that are
not expressly provided for by law. The difference between the two
points is one of degree, as in the first case the rule is created by
judges within a wide space, whereas in the second there are
provisions covering situations which are not expressly mentioned.
In the first case, judicial discretion has as its result the introduction
of a new rule. This approach allows a more detailed insight into
mixed legal systems and allows us to understand the sense in
which these jurisdictions can be classified as ‘mixed.’ In this
respect, the formation of the legal system as a mixed one is very
important.
From the outset it has to be said that the most significant
features of the Maltese system are: 1) the presence of codes; 2) the
absence of the doctrine of binding precedent; 1 and 3) the absence
of a theoretical approach to law in the sense that a doctrinal
1. However, many examples can be found in which certain important
judgements are followed very closely by Courts in later cases: a clear example
of this can be found in the field of tort law, as to the computation of damage, in
Butler v. Christopher Heard (Court of Appeal, December 22, 1967).
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formant nowadays is basically non-existent. 2 The ambit of this
study is limited to private law.
II. THE MALTESE LEGAL SYSTEM AS A MIXED JURISDICTION:
A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
Malta falls among those systems resulting from the mixture
between the civil law family and the common law family, which is
a specific mix that is sometimes called ‘Anglo-civilian.’ 3 An
eminent scholar, in fact, has observed that within mixed
jurisdictions, these two legal traditions separately affect different
areas of law. English law affects public, commercial and
procedural law, while civil law affects the field of private law. 4
These two traditions do not give rise to a ‘melted’ legal
system, as is the normal result among nearly all legal systems, but
in fact, each tradition operates within a distinct field of the legal
system.
According to one of the most eminent Maltese private
lawyers, 5 public law, maritime law and company law are oriented
towards English common law whereas private law is based on a
continental model. The fact that the models underlying both
Maltese private law and public law are different has not been a
2. A foreign observer may be rather puzzled by the presence of two
elements, indicated above as no.1 and 3, that usually do not fit well together.
Usually, in codified systems academics serve the function of rationalizing their
legal system through the interpretation of written law and by pointing out the
flaws of the latter, as well as legal reforms that are necessary. However, in the
Maltese legal system academics do not play this role.
3. V.V. PALMER, MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE: THE THIRD LEGAL
FAMILY (Cambridge University Press, 2001); J. Du Plessis, Comparative Law
and the Study of Mixed Legal Systems, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 478 (Reimann & Zimmermann, eds., Oxford University
Press, 2006).
4. PALMER, supra note 3, at 8-9.
5. J.M. GANADO, BRITISH PUBLIC LAW AND THE CIVIL LAW IN MALTA,
CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 195 (1950) (Maltese law has succeeded in making a
happy union between British public law and its own private law, which belongs
to the legal system derived from the Roman or the civil law. Even a cursory
examination of the Maltese Civil Code reveals its close connection with the
Code Napoleon, with the Italian Code and with other codes of Southern
European nations. The combination of these two laws has been a feature in
Maltese affairs for the last 140 years); see also, J.M. Ganado, Malta: A
Microcosm of International Influences, in STUDIES IN LEGAL SYSTEMS: MIXED
AND MIXING 225 (Örűcű et al. eds., Kluwer Law International, 1996).
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significant hurdle for the efficiency of the Maltese legal system,
because both traditions are, “built upon an individualistic basis.” 6
As to maritime law, 7 the British model was adopted during
the first period of British rule, initially by establishing a ViceAdmiralty Court presided over by an English judge and, then by
adopting the Admiralty Courts Acts of 1840 and 1860, and the
Colonial Courts of the Admiralty Act in 1890, all of which clearly
influenced by British legislation. The adoption of the English
model brought into the Maltese system rules which were
completely foreign to its legal tradition. For example, the Merchant
Shipping Act of 1973 introduced maritime mortgages in a system
which, up to that point, had only recognized hypothecs as the
primary type of security interest. This was a particularly relevant
change because the hypothec, being a civil law security, favours
the debtor by requiring registration through a public notarial deed
and does not rise to the level of a possessory right, whereas the
mortgage favours the creditor and allows the mortgagee the right to
take possession and sell the ship without recourse to the courts.
In the field of carriage of goods by sea, the 1952 Carriage
of Goods by Sea Act is a carbon copy of its English counterpart.
Furthermore, in the fields of carriage of goods and marine
insurance, the Maltese courts also follow English sources of law to
solve disputed points of law. However, within these fields, the
application of the British model is not pure, and it is also of note
that contract of carriage and bills of lading are governed by
continental rules.
Some fields are jointly affected by civil and common law.
Within company law, for example, commercial partnerships en
nom collectif and en commandite are based on French and Italian
law, while limited liability companies follow English law, except
with regard to issues of dissolution and liquidation, in which cases
French law is followed. 8

6. GANADO, supra at note 5, at 201.
7. Id. at 223-224.
8. Id. at 243-244.
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III. A HISTORICAL SKETCH OF SOURCES OF LAW IN MALTA
Because Malta has become ‘mixed,’ as previously defined,
under British rule, it is necessary to understand how British law
was received in Malta and the effects it produced on the preexisting Maltese legal tradition. It is generally believed that, rather
than having been subsumed by British law, the Maltese legal
tradition has instead been preserved because of the significant
degree of autonomy the Maltese people enjoyed under British rule.
The Maltese legal élite has always supported the idea that the
Island was neither conquered, nor ceded, nor sold but that it chose
to be governed by the British Empire. 9
Before detailing some of the legal changes brought about in
Malta by British rule, some brief remarks are necessary to describe
the period prior to that time. The Knights of the Gerosolimitan
Order, also known as the Knights Hospitaller, had gained control
over Malta in 1530, and it was during this period that the first
corpus of purely Maltese laws was enacted. 10 Before their arrival,
Malta was a political appendage of Sicily and the laws enacted by
the Sicilian rulers also applied ipso facto to Malta. The model of
legislation was based on Roman law, and during the period when
the Knights were in power, which ended in 1798 with the arrival of
the French, the Code of Master de Rohan (1784) was of crucial
importance. A distinguished Maltese author has described this
code as “a cornerstone of our legal edifice” 11 for various reasons.
9. This position is clearly developed by P. DE BONO, STORIA DELLA
MALTA 382-384 (1898). As to court judgments, a clear
example of this attitude can be found in Cassar Desain v. Forbes (Court of
Appeal, January 7, 1935), reported in W.PH. GULIA, GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY
IN MALTA 128 (1974). The political aim lying at the basis of this position was
that of obtaining the acknowledgement on behalf of Malta of a status different
from that of an ordinary colony. On the contrary, the British government
considered Malta a conquered colony or part of the ‘settled colonies’ as those
founded by English people abroad which enjoyed wider autonomy. The British
government refused at first to recognize the status of colony sui generis to Malta
with the 1865 Colonial Laws Validity Act, which ruled the position of the
Constitutions of the colonies in the frame of the English legal system. The
Maltese position within the British Empire changed after the enactment of the
Maltese Constitution of 1921, see F. CREMONA, STORIA DELLA LEGISLAZIONE
MALTESE (1936).
10. See, H.W. HARDING, HISTORY OF ROMAN LAW IN MALTA (Malta
University Press 1950).
11. CREMONA, supra note 9, at 75.
LEGISLAZIONE IN
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First, it is the summa of the whole of legislation enacted during the
Knight’s rule, secondly because it was the basis of modern law
developed from the nineteenth century onwards, and finally,
because various institutions ruled based on this Code, which has
never been repealed, and form part of the laws still in force.
At its foundation, one can find clear indications of the
influence of Sicilian law and Roman Law, as indicated in the law
of persons, specifically regarding status, family maintenance,
dowry, succession, property, the laws of organization, procedure
and in the setting up for commercial causes of a special court
known as the Consolato del Mare.
The influence of Roman law did not end with the Knight’s
rule, and the civil code still in force today draws from Roman law
the fundamental taxonomies on which it is built. It is important to
note that in speaking of Roman law, we do not refer only to ‘pure’
Roman law, but also to Roman law modified by customs, feudal
law and, perhaps more importantly, Canon law, a Roman law that
can be called ius commune because it is common to most of the
continental nations.
Roman law has influenced Maltese law in several ways,
and not only gave Maltese private law its fundamental taxonomies,
but in the past also served another function, that of a
supplementary or suppletive law, to which recourse was made in
cases not provided for by Maltese law. 12 The Roman law as ius
commune is recognizable in many rules of the above mentioned
Code de Rohan dealing with specific proceedings, contracts, dowry
and wills. Further, under British Rule there were several cases that
were decided according to Roman law principles, most notably the
Steven’s case (1833) 13 and the Concorso di creditori della eredità

12. On the role of Roman law as ius commune in the evolution of Maltese
legal system, see HARDING, supra note 10, at 55.
13. Steven and Chiappe were indicted for forgery and for the writing of a
public notarial act of enrolment and were found guilty by the Court of Special
Commission. Stevens then presented a memorial in which he observed that the
Court was instituted to hear crimes punishable with death or life imprisonment
but which had no jurisdiction in cases where it was found that the offence
charged in the indictment against the accused did not merit either of the said
higher punishment. The case was remanded to His Majesty’s Criminal Court.
His Majesty’s Government in London, acting on this opinion, released Stevens.
Maltese Judges did not concur in this opinion because it was
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di Edward Watson case (1840). 14 More recently, recourse has been
made to Roman law in many other cases. 15 The function of Roman
law of regulating casi omissi has notably whittled down in modern
times. Nowadays, it still retains the function of source of
interpretation. 16
IV. THE ADVENT OF BRITISH RULE
AND THE PROCESS OF CODIFICATION
This, then, was the existing framework of law at the
moment in which the British Empire took control of Malta. The
British period in Malta started de facto in 1800. However, it began
de iure only in 1814. Malta, until 1814, had not been formally
annexed to the British Empire. A Royal Order of 1801 stated that
English laws and courts of judicature had no jurisdiction over
Malta, and Maltese law in primis, the Code de Rohan remaining in
force until annexation. Because of this, institutions were not
affected. The change of status from Protectorate to Colony was
effectuated some months before the Treaty of Paris, on October 5,
1813 through notice given by the British government to the
Maltese people. Thomas Maitland was appointed Governor of the
Island and legal reforms based on the English common law were
introduced concerning the organisation of courts, commercial law,
bankruptcy and the registering of vessels.
Since the main focus of this article is the development of
Maltese private law under British rule, due care has been paid to

contrary . . . to the common (civil) or Justinian laws by which
in cases not provided for by the municipal enactments the
decisions of criminal cases in these Islands are to be regulated
. . . and in fact, as has always been, and is now the practice
constantly observed from time immemorial in all the Tribunals
of Malta and Gozo, which of itself would constitute in these
islands a law of custom (common law) which is no less
binding than the written law.
14. In this case, the interest was declared usurious, and Roman legislation
(Lex 27 Cod.de Usuris) suspending the interest ‘ultra duplum’ was found to be
still in force in Malta.
15. See, Dr. Messina v. Galea, (1881); D’Agata vs. Drago, (1884); De Piro
v. Delicata, (1885); Zammit v. Scicluna (1864); Concorso dei creditori del Conte
Manduca (1897).
16. HARDING, supra note 10, at 73.
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the process of codification, given the importance that codes, and
especially the civil code, had in the evolution of the Maltese legal
system.
The process that led to codification is rather long and
complex. 17 It begins with the mission given by King George IV to
the British lawyer John Richardson in 1824 to enquire into the
administration of the law in Malta. This report was aimed at
determining which reforms oriented towards common law were
possible in Malta.
In 1831, King William IV appointed a Commission made
up of four British and three Maltese jurists for the drafting of civil,
commercial, and criminal codes and of codes of civil and criminal
procedure. Each code had to be drafted in Italian and to conform to
the most accredited foreign codes. In 1831, the Commission was
repealed and replaced by a different Commission. However, in
1843, that Commission was officially dissolved without having
done anything significant. Another Commission was formed which
was composed only of Maltese jurists, because the presence of
British jurists made it difficult for the new laws to be modelled on
continental legislation. This Commission also failed, and it was not
until after 1850 that the process of codification of law came to be
realized, finally to be accomplished in 1873.
The British Government gave to the Crown Advocate Sir
Adriano Dingli 18 the task of codifying Maltese law, and this article
focuses particularly on the Civil Code. Dingli was a profound
scholar of both Roman law and continental law, having spent a
long period in Bologna and Heidelberg. He chose to proceed
gradually by single ordinances, which afterwards were
consolidated within Ordinance VII 1868 relating to things,
promulgated on February 11, 1870, and in Ordinance I of 1873
relating to persons, promulgated on January 22, 1874. These two
Ordinances cover the whole field of private law, with the exception
of citizenship and intellectual property rights which were governed
by English law, and marriage, which is governed by Canon law.

17. For an interesting account on this topic, see, G. BONELLO, 5 HISTORIES
190 (2004).
18. For a portrait of Dingli, see J.M. Ganado, Sir Adrian Dingli, 1 L.J. 9
(1943).
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The backbone of Dingli’s Civil Code is the Code Napoléon,
which was not only the most important model among those
employed for outlining its framework 19 but also a highly
significant source of law. In this regard, specific institutions and
rules were introduced into Maltese law through the influence of
French law, such as indivisible obligations, the relevance ipso iure
of legal compensation, the diligence of bonus pater familias as an
objective standard, the principle possession vaut titre and so on.
Furthermore, there has also been, as previously observed, a
remarkably widespread influence of Roman law covering the law
of property and succession, except in some parts of the Code
dealing with the acquisition of ownership of movable property, the
transfer of ownership following agreements and the effect of
partition. 20 Dingli made detailed notes regarding the foreign
sources of law he looked at. This manuscript gives precious insight
into Dingli’s methodology since it allows an understanding of the
conceptual background of the Civil Code. Some provisions were
completely new while others are deeply rooted in Maltese legal
customs.
From that time, the Maltese Code has remained one of the
most faithful codes to the original Code Napoleon when compared
with the civil codes of other civil law systems which have
undergone revision. In fact, the Maltese Code has remained fairly
stable.
V. LACUNAE AND JUDGE-MADE LAW
To have a more accurate idea of the way in which the
Maltese legal system has been influenced and developed through
case law, one has to examine some instances in which judges have
filled a gap in the law. The examples I will consider in the
following pages are related to the law of obligations and to rights
over things or iura in re. I will start from the field of property and
then briefly consider an example in tort law, that of moral

19. Apart from the French Code, other codes were consulted such as the
civil Codes of Austria, Parma, Two Sicilies, Canton of Ticino, and Albertino.
20. HARDING, supra note 10, at 40.
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damages. 21 I will finally turn to the issue of pre-contractual
liability. While the first two are examples of how courts deal with
lacunae because a statutory norm is absent and therefore a rule is
introduced through case law in the legal system, the latter is a
different example of how judges deal with general rules and
address cases that are not expressly provided for by written law.
As to the law of obligations, actio publiciana will be
considered. In the field of iura in re, the main division is that
between ownership and possession. The different protection
afforded by the Maltese Civil Code to owners and possessors is the
by-product of the sharp distinction between the two positions
based on substantive grounds. This distinction, deeply rooted in the
civil law tradition, is predicated on the fact that the owner has a
right over the thing, whereas the possessor, who is not also owner,
exercises a power de facto over it. This difference also generates
separate remedies.
Actio publiciana, which is not provided for by the Civil
Code, but admitted by judges, removes the requirement that the
owner demonstrates the proof of his right, and therefore blurs the
difference between owner and possessor.
Judge-made law also has added to the actions provided by
the Civil Code for the protection of ‘proprietary rights’ in this
remedy. Only actio rei vindicatoria is ruled as a petitory action
protecting the right of ownership. It must be kept in mind that an
action with the same name has been acknowledged in Roman law
since 67 B.C. An actio in rem given by the judge was the actio
praetoria to the buyer of a res mancipi, when the thing was
transferred not through mancipatio, which is the correct mode of
transferring those things, but through traditio which was used for
less valuable goods. Through actio publiciana, Roman law
protected the buyer from third parties claiming a right which may
be deemed incompatible, as if he had acquired the thing through
mancipatio. It is uncertain if, and to what extent, Maltese actio
publiciana is similar to the Roman law remedy with the same
name. It is still debatable whether in Maltese law this action
consists of a mitigation of the rigorous proof of ownership that
21. For a detailed treatment of this topic see the paper by Claude MicallefGrimaud in this same volume of the J. CIV. L. STUD.
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must be given by those claiming to be the owners for the upholding
of actio rei vindicatoria, or whether it is a completely autonomous
action from the actio reivindicatoria.
The first alternative would allow the plaintiff, who claims
to be the owner and who has acted with reivindicatoria, to change
his previous claim and act with actio publiciana, when not able to
prove his title of ownership by simply proving that his title is better
than that of the defendant under the so called theory of better
title. 22 Under the second option, the plaintiff could directly resort
to actio publiciana without being compelled to act first with rei
vindicatoria. However, it is difficult to find cases in which judges
are favourable to this second option. 23
It is worth citing two recent judgements discussing actio
publiciana where favour was shown for the first option. In Frank
Pace et v. Kummissarju ta’L-Artijiet (First Hall Civil Court,
February 19, 2004), the main issue discussed before the Court was
who had title to the land. A part of the land was occupied by a
company and another part by a public road. The plaintiff was
neither able to prove his title, nor that his title was better than
others claimants. His claim was consequently rejected both under
the label of actio reivindicatoria and under that of actio
publiciana. In Jane Spiteri v. Nicholas u Maria Concetta konjugi
Camilleri (First Hall Civil Court, November 20, 2006), there was
uncertainty about a portion of the property because the plaintiff
and the defendants had both bought property from the same seller.
The seller sold to the plaintiff in 1983 and the defendants bought in
1985. The seller’s contract of sale with the plaintiff, contained a
declaration regarding the part of property that was being
challenged, that it “is part of the roof of the property sold by me.”
This, however, for the Court was not sufficient for the plaintiff to
exercise actio rei vindicatoria. The Court accepted his plea on the
different grounds of actio publiciana because the title of the
plaintiff was better than that of the defendant.

22. It can be open to doubt if this theory as applied by Maltese courts can be
traced back to Roman law or rather it is influenced by common law doctrines
acknowledging the ‘better title’ rule.
23. P. Bezzina, The Actio Publiciana (LL.D. thesis, University of Malta,
2007).
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The following example, taken from the field of tort law,
concerns a rule created by Maltese judges, notwithstanding the
absence of a true gap, concerning the relevance at law of moral
damages. In the Maltese Civil Code, there is not an express
provision concerning the issue of recoverability for moral
damages. 24 However, under a general rule stated in art. 1031,
“every person . . . shall be liable for the damage which occurs
through his fault.” 25 This provision does not limit the
recoverability of damages to a specific kind of harm, and could be
considered good grounds for an award of moral damages. To the
contrary, however, Maltese judges make recourse to art. 1045,
entitled “Measure of damages,” subsection 1, provides that:
The damage which is to be made good by the
person responsible . . . shall consist in the actual
loss which the act shall have directly caused to the
injured party, in the expenses which the latter may
have been compelled to incur in consequence of the
damage, in the loss of actual wages or other
earnings and in the loss of future earnings arising
from any permanent incapacity, total or partial,
which the act may have caused.
This grounds a restrictive rule of recoverability of moral
damages. 26 I will not attempt to delve into the rationale of this
restrictive rule that does not have support either in the literal
provisions on tort or in the French civil code used as a model for
the drafting of tort rules.
The interesting point is that while both instances are rules
made by Courts, in the latter, judges limit their rulings to the
24. R. Borg, Moral Damage: A Comparative Study (LL.D. thesis,
University of Malta, 2008); C. Micallef-Grimaud, The Rationale for Excluding
Moral Damages from the Maltese Civil Code: A Historical and Legal
Investigation (LL.D thesis, University of Malta, 2008).
25. Art.1032 states that “a person shall be deemed to be in fault if, in his
own acts, he does not use the prudence, diligence and attention of a bonus pater
familias.”
26. In the Maltese legislation, however, specific instances of recovery of
moral damage can be found in the Consumers Affairs Act, in the Press Act, in
the Promise of marriage law and in the Enforcement of intellectual property
rights (regulation) Act. A judge-made rule of recovery of this kind of damages
exists in human rights cases.

2011] THE ROLE OF JUDGES IN MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS 249
restrictive rule concerning moral damages. They disguise the fact
that they have created new law and present it as the result of the
direct application of art. 1045.
VI. GOOD FAITH IN CASE-LAW
Under this paragraph some issues will be analysed relating
to the concept of good faith, which is widely debated among
scholars of the main legal systems of the western tradition. These
issues are interesting examples of how Maltese judges address
situations not expressly provided by the legislature through the
broad interpretation of existing provisions.
A. The Controversial Issue of Pre-Contractual Liability
Pre-contractual liability is not expressly provided for and
its existence is still highly controversial. 27 It is interesting,
therefore, to see how Maltese judges cope with the issue of
awarding damages for damaging conduct occurring during the
negotiations stage. The most frequent case dealt with by Courts
under the label of pre-contractual liability is that of the abrupt
interruption of negotiations. Maltese judgements have adopted two
opposite approaches to this issue. 28 In some cases, courts show
their disfavour of pre-contractual liability in the light of the
doctrine of the freedom of will, according to which before the
conclusion of contract no obligation can arise on behalf of the
parties to a negotiation. Damages can be claimed only if a contract
is concluded. 29 When this has not occurred individuals cannot
27. See Alfred Attard v. Paolo Xuereb (First Hall Civil Court, October 13,
2003); V.J. Bisazza, Precontractual Responsibility (LL.D. thesis, University of
Malta, 1971); G. Xuereb, A Comparative Study of the Theory of Precontractual
Responsibility IX ID DRITT L.J. 806 (1978): J. Scicluna, Pre-Contractual
Liability: Comparative Perspectives (LL.D. thesis, University of Malta, 2003);
and S. Vassallo, The Principle of Good Faith in the Negotiation and
Performance of Contracts: A Comparative Perspective (LL.D. thesis, University
of Malta, 2010).
28. For a clear analysis of the two approaches see, T. Mallia, Precontractual Liability in Malta, in LAW & PRACTICE 25 (2000).
29. “An obligation can only arise with the free and definite consent of the
individual and if the said individual did not so express his consent, he was not
bound.” Id. at 26.
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claim damages against the party who had interrupted negotiations,
because otherwise no one would negotiate for the fear of being
held liable for damages. 30
In other cases, judges have found for the victim of precontractual unfairness. These judgments are usually justified in one
of three ways. First, they may argue for the existence of precontractual agreements, 31 in the sense that although a final
agreement has not been reached yet, negotiations are so advanced
that a sort of intermediate agreement has been reached. Therefore,
the interruption of negotiations constitutes a breach of a
contractual duty. This approach, rather than expressly and directly
acknowledging pre-contractual liability as such, allows
recoverability for pre-contractual damages by treating them as
contractual damages. Alternately, they make recourse to tort law,
qualifying unfair conduct held during negotiations as an abuse of
rights, which is expressly provided for by art. 1030. 32 This latter
provision states that “any person who makes use, within the proper
limits, of a right competent to him, shall not be liable for any
damages which may result therefrom.” Reasoning a contrario, the
owner of a right is liable when he exceeds the boundaries of the
right, and in these cases, pre-contractual liability arises because the
party who acts in bad faith infringes upon the other party's
30. This is the rationale underlying Carmel Cassar v. Thomas Colin Ernest
Campbell Preston noe et (Commercial Court, November 1, 1971); Carmelina
Busuttil pro et noe et v. Salvatore Muscat noe et, (First Hall Civil Court,
October 28, 1998): this case is mentioned in Mallia, supra note 28, at 27.
31. Mallia explains clearly this approach:
[A] new general principle was introduced in the law. Not only
should contracting parties perform their obligations in good
faith, but the protection of the other party's legitimate
expectations became paramount. Thus, an agreement could be
inferred from deeds and attitudes, independently if consent, if
the other party legitimately and in good faith interprets those
deeds and actions as meaning an agreement has been reached.
Id. at 26.
32. This provision is drafted in a very general way. Its ambit of application
has been defined through case law. It was used in the field of the property to fix
boundaries between neighbours, in the field of abuse of power by public
authorities and also as limitation on the exercise of a contractual right, in the
field of human rights. For an example of the application of this doctrine to the
field of pre-contractual liability, see Bezzina noe vs Direttur tal-Kuntratti (First
Hall Civil Court, October 12, 2006; confirmed on Appeal, June 26, 2009), that
awards damages to the victim to the extent of negative interests.
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legitimate expectations. The tort approach is the approach that had
gained widespread success in several European countries during
the twentieth century. 33 Finally, the courts extend the ambit of the
provision of art. 993 of the Civil Code, which states that contracts
must be carried out in good faith up to the stage of negotiations.
Several judgements support this view. 34 The best way to
understand the different approaches to pre-contractual liability is
through examining case law, and the cases that follow are among
the most significant in this field. In Dr. Biagio Giufridda pro et
noe v. Onor. Dott.Giorgio Borg Olivier et, 35 the Maltese
government and a private individual entered into negotiations
concerning two different contracts, the first being a contract of
emphyteusis and the second a contract of financial grant for the
construction of a hotel. The government put an abrupt end to
negotiations. The other party, therefore, requested a judicial
declaration that the revocation was ineffective and specific
performance of the contracts mentioned above, but did not ask for
pre-contractual damages. Although the Court stated that agreement
on the essential elements of the contract had not been reached, it
stated the general principle that an unjust or capricious revocation
makes its author liable for damages incurred by the counterparty in
the measure of ‘negative interest.’ So in this case, the Court
implicitly admitted pre-contractual liability and used a well-known
German theory to quantify damages suffered by the plaintiff
although it did not qualify this form of liability expressly as precontractual. The reason which led the Court to find in favour of the
Government is that pre-contractual liability was not claimed by the
plaintiff and the contracts were not concluded with the defendant.
In Pullen v. Matysik, 36 the plaintiffs entered into
negotiations with defendants for the concession of the Hilton
33. Maltese courts have imposed particularly higher degrees of proof than
those required in other national Courts working in other European systems, J.M.
GANADO, AN INTRODUCTION TO MALTESE FINANCIAL SERVICES LAW 49 (2009).
34. GANADO supra note 33 at 50, quotes a number of judgments which are
on this position: Debattista v. J.K. Properties Ltd (Court of Appeal, December 7,
2005); Baldacchino v. Chairman of Enemalta (First Hall Civil Court, October
11, 2006); Scicluna Enterprises (Gozo) Ltd v. Enemalta Corporation (Court of
Appeal, May 2, 2007).
35. Court of Appeal, March 3, 1967.
36. Commercial Court, October 20, 1969.
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Boutique of the Malta Hilton. All the essential elements of the
agreement were fixed but the final contract was never sent and the
contractual relationship with the previous concessionaires was not
terminated. The Court found the defendants liable under the
heading of liability in tort, holding that the defendants had acted
abusively. This conduct on the part of the defendant, “amounts to
‘culpa’ in terms of art.1074 of the Civil Code which in turn renders
them liable because there was, “at least negligence or imprudence
on this part . . . when [t]he[y] assured the plaintiffs that they would
unfailingly have the boutique, when in fact they w[ere] not in a
position to give it to them.” As to damages, they were restricted to
the actual losses suffered by the plaintiffs and consisted of
expenses incurred and depreciation of materials, but did not
include lost profits.
In Elia Grixti v. Mark Grech, 37 the plaintiff stated that he
had agreed to look for an apartment for the defendant, an estate
agent, and on finding such an apartment, he was to inform the
defendant so that the latter would purchase it. Sometime after
having informed the defendant that he had found the apartment,
the plaintiff found out that, following a conversation between the
parties, the defendant had bought the apartment directly from the
owner. Thus, the plaintiff sued him on the grounds that the
defendant disrupted the transaction that he was about to enter into
with him. The Court, while stating that the remedy of damages is
generally awarded for pre-contractual liability when the party
withdraws capriciously or in bad faith, or the negotiations are in
such an advanced stage because there is agreement on the
essential elements of the bargain to create a legitimate expectation
on the conclusion of the contract, dismissed the action of the
plaintiff because none of the requisites for the action were met.
In Caroline Ebejer v. Joseph Frendo, 38 there was a promise
for the sale of land for which the buyer had given a deposit. The
seller mala fide was silent regarding the fact that he was only the
co-owner of the land and that therefore he could not transfer the
ownership of the land without the consent of the other owner. The
Court excluded the possibility of a transfer of the ownership, but
37.
38.

First Hall Civil Court, April 3, 1998.
Court of Appeal, April 18, 2002.
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found for pre-contractual liability by the seller, if not expressly
qualified in this way, on the grounds of the abuse of rights.
Liability was therefore based on tort law rules.
In Café Bar (Malta) Limited v. Alfred Caruana, 39 a
company sought to employ a person, but before formal
employment, sent him to Holland to follow a training course.
When the worker came back to Malta he decided to return to his
previous employer. In this case, the contract of employment had
not been concluded. The company sued him for damages resulting
from travel expenses, which occurred before the contract of
employment was concluded, thus suggesting a theory of precontractual liability. The First Hall of the Civil Court and the
Court of Appeal, however, dealt with the issue on the ground of
contractual liability stating that a sort of agreement, different from
the contract of employment and concerning only the training
course in Holland, had been concluded and found for the liability
of the private party by awarding damages to the company for a
partial amount of the expenses incurred by the latter. Although a
final contract of employment had not been signed, a legitimate
expectation had been created towards the conclusion of contract.
The Court did not make express reference to pre-contractual
liability, nor there was any reference to good faith.
In Attard v. Xuereb, 40 the parties had agreed between
themselves to assign the property of the defendant on a contract of
lease to the plaintiff for use as a confectionery shop. All elements
having been defined, the contract had only to be signed. The
plaintiff took several people to see the tenement in order to carry
out works on it and applied for planning permission. The
defendant, after having refused to give the keys to the plaintiff
saying that the contract was not still concluded, entered into an
agreement with third parties notwithstanding the fact that the date
for the final contract with the plaintiff had been fixed. 41
The plaintiff claimed damages for expenses incurred during
negotiations. The Court stated that for pre-contractual liability to
39. Court of Appeal, May 24, 2002.
40. First Hall Civil Court, October 13, 2003.
41. It has to be clarified whether a previous date had been fixed, but the
contract could not be concluded because the plaintiff's wife, whose signature
was necessary, was not present.
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be established, the negotiations had to be terminated in order for
one of the parties to have acted with dolus. Damages would be
limited to necessary expenses incurred during negotiations and
would not include loss of future earnings. Although the Court
stated that the termination of negotiations was unjustified, it did
not award damages because the expenses incurred by the plaintiff
were not necessary.
Baldacchino noe v.Chairman tal-Korporazjoni Enemalta
42
et, concerned a call for tender for the supply of sulphuric acid.
The plaintiff received two offers and after notification that their
offer was declined, the company instituted a court action. The
Court admitted damages, holding that it is possible to award
damages prior to the creation of a contractual relationship, basing
its reasoning on good faith as a standard of conduct at the precontractual stage as well as in the conclusion of contract.
Presently, none of these approaches regarding the issue of
pre-contractual liability has widespread prevalence, and the
approach based on the theory of will has not yet been definitely
abandoned. However, what can be said is that allowing an action
for pre-contractual damages produces a restriction on the freedom
of the will of the individual, in as much as one can be held bound
towards another person when not tied by a contract, if the latter has
been damaged by having relied in good faith on the conduct of the
other party. This shift from the theory of will to the theory of
reliance has been explained in this way, “people began to abuse of
the will theory and juggle their consent to the detriment of the lone
individual consumer, who was easily led astray and had little
protection from the law.” 43
B. Good Faith in the Performance of Contracts as a Tool of
Redressing Contractual Obligations
The third approach followed by Courts regarding the
recoverability of pre-contractual damages based on the concept of
good faith can be seen as evidence of the continued favor for this

42. First Hall Civil Court, October 11, 2006.
43. Mallia, supra note 28, at 26.
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principle in general. 44 Pre-contractual liability is not the only
example in which judges make use of this principle, and it has
been recently considered in various situations, including being
used as a tool to redress the obligations taken by parties through
contract. This would seemingly lead to lack of good faith not only
in the case of fraud, but also in the case of inequitable behaviour.
In Pace v. Micallef, 45 the issue was the exorbitant measure of a
penalty clause and whether judges could reduce it. The Court
found on the basis of the principle of good faith in that the penalty
was disproportionate to the delays of which one of the defendants
was charged and reduced the amount notwithstanding the lack of
an express provision. The clause of good faith would impose an
evaluation of the behaviour of the parties in the light of what is
thought to be fair according to social standards, normi stabiliti tassocjeta, and to legal logic, logika guridika. In this case, good faith
was used by Courts to reduce the entity of the burden lying on the
defendant arising from the contract.
In Psaila v. Spiteri, 46 the concept of good faith was used in
a commercial partnership formed for the sale of beer and other
products by Simonds Farsons Cisk Ltd. The defendant, the
administrator of the commercial partnership, without the
knowledge of the other partner, concurrently accepted agency for
Coca Cola. The Court found that, without excluding the
defendant's liberty to commit to other commercial practices, it was
the nature of the contract between plaintiff and defendant to forbid
44. According to Teubner, good faith displays three functions: 1) expansion
and establishment of contractual duties such as the duties of performance, of
information and of protection; 2) limitation of contractual rights. This function is
deeply entrenched within the doctrine of abuse of rights; 3) transformation of
contracts, when there are supervening events producing imbalance of the
equivalence, or frustration of contractual purpose. The legal transplant of the
clause of good faith from civil law to common law systems is not easy because
the principle is linked in continental countries to processes of economic
production based on cooperation that are totally different from those featuring in
common law countries based on market competition. The transplant would have
as a result not the enhancement of cooperation but simply an increase of the
judiciary intervention in the sphere of individuals. See G. Teubner, Legal
Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law ends up in New
Divergences, in THE EUROPEANISATION OF LAW: THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 244 (F. Snyder ed., Hart, 2000).
45. Court of Appeal, June 15, 2001.
46. Court of Appeal, Commercial, February 12, 1965.
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other commercial activities that could damage the partnership.
Damages were awarded, but loss of profits was not included.
Good faith has also been used by Maltese Courts as a tool
to pierce the veil of separate corporate personality when a juridical
personality is used with the aim of committing abuses or
committing illegal acts. In Avukat Dr.Herrera et v. Tabone et
noe, 47 the defendants attempted to hide behind a company in order
to evade contractual obligations. This was considered an
infringement of the principle that all contracts must be performed
in good faith. In this case the defendant formed a company simply
to evade the obligations taken towards the plaintiff not to employ
employees from the plaintiff’s company. The Court of Appeal
found for the plaintiff and ordered the payment of the penalty
contained in the clause which was breached. In absence of legal
provisions, good faith can also serve as a source for ruling on the
duties and rights of the parties to a contract.
These concepts are also applied to contracts of insurance.
Although the Maltese insurance business is a highly regulated area
of trade, the law regulating insurance contracts inhabits a legal
vacuum. There is only one law concerning marine insurance
enacted in 1858 and later inserted into the commercial code, but in
any case, the Maltese commercial code cannot be considered the
source for the general regulation of contracts of insurance. In fact,
whereas the Maltese Civil Code is the general law applying in all
cases unless expressly excluded by a specific law, the Commercial
Code is specific law that is limited in its scope to regulating
“objective acts of trade” and situations involving traders acting in
the pursuit of their business. The acts of insurance are not
considered by Courts to be acts of trade, 48 so section 3 of the
Commercial Code cannot be applied to the contract of insurance in
general. 49 Trade practices cannot be considered the source of law
regulating the contract, so insurance contracts theoretically should
fall under the Civil Code, which does not include express
47. Court of Appeal, January 22, 1992.
48. To this regard, see Frendo Azopardi v Colborne England (Commercial
Court, October 2, 1907).
49. The Commercial code provides that “in commercial matters, the
commercial law shall apply. Provided that where no provision is made in such
law, the usages of trade or, in the absence of such usages, the civil law shall
apply.”
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provisions on that matter. Therefore, the source to deal with the
contracts of insurance has to be found elsewhere.
Courts have filled this gap by referring primarily to English
jurisprudence. From this case law, Maltese Courts have drawn the
doctrine of utmost good faith, and although English law exerts a
considerable influence on Maltese law, the latter is not a carbon
copy of the former. It must be stressed that, since the general
principles of Maltese private law have to be found in the civil
code, the doctrine of utmost good faith in Maltese law should be
interpreted in the light of the civil code. So although Maltese law
understands the duty of utmost good faith, this duty is rationalised
from the perspective of vitiation of consent, of error and fraud.
Furthermore, Maltese insurance law departs from English
law under various aspects such as the materiality of the
information, 50 the concept of error, 51 the extent of fraud and the
requirements of diligence and inducement. From the combination
of these doctrines, both parties, not only the insured, would be
subject to heavy contractual duties concerning the disclosure of all
the information regarding the subject matter of the contract but in
practice the party on which the burden rests in a more significant
way is the insured. The example of the contract of insurance is an
interesting example both because it shows the importance of good
faith but also because it reveals Maltese judicial attitudes regarding
the use and adaptation of foreign models to the Maltese legal
environment.
VII. CONCLUSION
At this point, some conclusions can be made. In Malta, the
important role of ‘system-builder’ is played by judges,
notwithstanding the absence of a doctrine of binding precedent. As
to whether or not private law presently follows continental law, the
short examination of the evolution of some areas of private law has
shown that it has not necessarily changed away from its continental
foundation. The way in which judges deal with the issues outlined
50. Zammit v. Micallef (Commercial Court, January 31, 1952); Tanti v.
O.F. Gollcher (Civil Court, April 30, 2002).
51. Briffa v. Camilleri (Court of Appeal, February 9, 2001).
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above reveals that they do not necessarily follow continental law,
exclusively, but rather are pragmatic. It is possible to find
references to civilian theories, but also to original solutions that are
deeply rooted in the Maltese legal tradition.
Maltese judges do not necessarily address private law
issues by making recourse to the same legal traditions which guide
the legal field to which the issue is related. Furthermore, foreign
law that has been accepted as a source of Maltese private law does
not always repeal Maltese common law.
One of the most eminent law scholars of the end of the
nineteenth century, Judge Paolo De Bono in his work on the
history of Maltese legislation, observed that the rule of Code de
Rohan concerning a situation which cannot be resolved with regard
to local laws so must be determined by application of common
law, was never repealed as to private law and therefore has to be
applied. Also, customs fall within the “local laws,” and are
interpreted in their widest meaning. They are acknowledged by
Roman and Sicilian law, and are also nowadays legally binding. 52
This passage has been quoted by later jurists many times and has
exerted considerable influence on them. In support of the
aforesaid, De Bono referred to parr.37, capo VIII, and 27, Capo
IX, Libro I of Code de Rohan, ruling respectively the ‘Supremo
Magistrato di Giustizia’ and the President of the latter in which
reference was made to what he considered as Maltese sources of
law. 53 But upon a more careful reading of these provisions, one
52. DE BONO, supra note 9, at 383. The original text in Italian reads:
Il precetto del codice de Rohan, che qualora una controversia
non possa essere decisa con una disposizione delle leggi
municipali, si deve avere riguardo alle leggi comuni, non fu
mai per le materie civili abrogata, e tuttora si applica. Sotto la
espressione leggi municipali, presa nella sua ampia
significazione, viene anche la consuetudine, la quale,
riconosciuta dal diritto romano e dal diritto siculo, continua
pure oggidì ad essere ritenuta come una norma giuridica.
53. Par. XXVII states that the President of the Supremo Magistrato di
Giustizia “userà ogni diligenza, perché fia a tutti con prontezza e celerità
possibile amministrata la giustizia, a tenore del prescritto in questa nuova
Compilazione di Prammatiche, ed in loro difetto da quello che preferivano le
leggi dette comuni; ed in affari marittimi, dagli usi e stabilimenti del Consolato
generale del mare, e ne'casi controversi dalle oppinioni de' Supremi e più
accreditati Tribunali.” In English this passage reads: “Will take every care so
that the administration of justice will be as most effective as possible, in
accordance to this legislation, and in the case of lack of an express provision,
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discovers that, when these provisions make reference to leggi
municipali, that is Maltese written law pre-existing to the
enactment to the Code de Rohan, leggi comuni, common laws and
as extrema ratio to opinioni abbracciate ne' supremi e più
accreditati Tribunali or judgements of foreign courts, they
probably do so with a different aim from that of the eminent
Maltese author. These provisions intend to avoid, or rather, to
reduce, the risk of an arbitrary, capricious and inefficient exercise
of the power of administering justice, so that the references are
aimed at individuating some binding criteria for judges. However,
De Bono goes much further by giving to the provisions, and
especially to the leggi municipali, a wider meaning which is
relevant not only for judgements but, more generally, for the entire
legal system. The aim of De Bono is to create a bar to legal
developments driven by foreign influences which are not coherent
with the fundamental principles rooted in Maltese legal history.
The key to understanding De Bono’s book is most probably
evidenced by the emphasis put on the degree of resistance by the
Maltese legal tradition to foreign influences. This is due to the fact
that the Maltese system has kept its own identity, notwithstanding
the fact that subsequent foreign powers have gained control of
Malta in the past. 54 We can say then that his ‘history,’ far from
being merely a neutral account of the legal changes that have
affected the Island, has a ‘political’ background. When he speaks
about French domination, he explains the reasons for its failure,
and bases his contention on the fact that the French people wanted
to impose their law through strength by challenging the role played
by the Church and through the introduction of reforms that,

according to common law in shipping business, from the usage of the Consolato
generale del mare and in controversial cases from the opinions of the Supreme
and most authoritative Courts;” par.XXXVII states that the judges of the
Tribunale Collegiato “né potranno servirsi di veruna potestà arbitraria, quante
volte non sarà regolata da quello che si dispone dalle leggi municipali, ed in loro
difetto dalle leggi comuni, e ne'casi controversi e dubbi dalle oppinioni
abbracciate ne' Supremi e più accreditati tribunal.” In English this passage reads:
“Cannot administer justice arbitrarily when their power is not ruled by the laws
of the Island, and in case of the absence of common law, and in controversial
cases from the opinions of the Supreme and the most authoritative Courts.”
54. The same aim inspired the work of A. MICALLEF, NOTES TO CODE DE
ROHAN (1843).
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although advanced for the time in which they were proposed, were
not in harmony with Maltese society. 55
In my opinion, Maltese judges also have this attitude. In
some cases, as previously discussed, foreign law has been
followed, while in others, an original solution has been adopted.
Even when reference is made to foreign models, this has not
produced an all-encompassing acceptance of the same models.
Judges have acted to make the external sources consistent with the
local legal framework. This could be a clear sign of a rooted
attitude tending towards the preservation of the legal tradition of
the island.

55. It could seem paradoxical that while French domination was rejected,
French legal culture was absorbed. The Civil Code is the most evident proof of
this.
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ABSTRACT
Although Maltese Law is traditionally classified as a mixed
system of Civil Law and Common Law, this paper suggests that it
is more appropriate to do away with this designation, which is not
entirely exact, and instead call it what it really is, namely, a
‘European’ legal system.
The paper proposes a typology of the Maltese legal system
divided into nine distinct phases which contain traces of Civil Law,
* Associate Professor, Department of Public Law, Faculty of Law,
University of Malta, Malta.
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Common Law, Customary Law, Canon Law, Maltese
Autochthonous Law, European Union Law, Regional Law
(Mediterranean Law and, in its widest sense, European Law),
Public International Law and elements of foreign national law. To
a very large extent, all these traces are European in origin even if
tinged with Mediterranean and International Law.
The historical evolution of Maltese Law in the nine distinct
phases demonstrates that the nature of the Maltese legal system has
shifted over time. For instance, when Malta was administered by
the Knights of St. John, it was the Civil Law tradition that
dominated the legal system. During the British period, it was
Common Law that had the upper hand. Following independence,
Maltese Law became more autochthonous whilst after European
Union accession the law in Malta has become more European
Unionised. All these periods are also interspersed by Public
International Law influences.
The nature of Maltese Municipal Law has changed from
period to period reflecting the colonizers’ laws and, under selfdetermination, the will of the Maltese, but there has been one
common trend throughout the history of the Maltese legal system:
it has been heavily dominated by European Law, be it Civil Law,
Canon Law, or Common Law. However, this does not mean that
Maltese Law is purely European in the wide sense of the term:
there are some slight traces of non-European Common Law
influences taken from the US, New Zealand and Australia.
Nevertheless, that said, the paper concludes that the common
denominator and undoubtedly the most predominant in Maltese
Law was and remains European Law in the widest sense of the
term in all its diversity and richness.
I. INTRODUCTION
Although Maltese Law is classified as a mixed system of
Civil Law and Common Law, this paper suggests that it is more
appropriate to do away with this categorization, which–in today’s
fast evolving and dynamic world and in the light of the existence
of myriad legal systems each with its own characteristic
peculiarities–is no longer precise. If at all, the Maltese mixed legal
system should now be reclassified as a Common Law system with
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a Civil Law underlying layer. This is because the portion of
Maltese Law which is Common Law inspired, by far outnumbers
the amount of Maltese Law which is Civil Law inspired. However,
these percentages have changed and continue to change over time
because the legal system is dynamic rather than immutable.
Indeed, with European Union (EU) accession, Maltese Law is now
moving in the direction of an EU legal system with underlying
layers of Common Law and Civil Law. On the other hand, if one
were to burden oneself with the task of classifying the Maltese
legal system as it stands in the year 2010, and bearing in mind the
historical evolution of Maltese Law, it is more appropriate to
classify the Maltese legal system as a European mixed legal system
with a plurality of layers composing it.
The paper proposes a typology of the Maltese mixed legal
system divided into nine variegated phases which contain layers of
Civil Law, Common Law, Customary Law, Canon Law, lex
mercatoria, 1 Maltese Autochthonous Law, European Union Law,
Regional Law (Mediterranean Law and, in its widest sense,
European Law), Public International Law and elements of foreign
national law–irrespective of whether in the latter case such foreign
law is derived from the Civil Law or the Common Law legal
systems. In the main, all these layers are European in origin even if
tinged to a lesser extent with Mediterranean and International Law.
All these layers of chthonic and exogenous elements combine to
depict a characteristic dimension to the Europeanised Maltese
mixed legal system.
II. THE NATURE OF THE MALTESE MIXED LEGAL SYSTEM
The historical evolution of Maltese Law in nine distinct
phases demonstrates that the nature of this legal system has shifted
over time: for instance, when Malta was administered by the Order
of the Knights Hospitallers of St. John of Jerusalem it was the
Civil Law tradition that dominated the legal system; during the

1. Gunther Teubner refers to lex mercatoria as “the transnational law of
economic transactions … the most successful example of global law without a
state.” Gunther Teubner, Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World
Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3 (Gunther Teubner ed. 1997).
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British period it was Common Law 2 that had the upper hand in
Public Law with the Civil Law influence starting to decline
progressively even in Private Law (mainly in Commercial Law);
following independence Maltese Law became more autochthonous
whilst after European Union accession it has become more
European Unionised. All these periods are also interspersed by
Public International Law elements which have contributed
immensely to the development of an enriched Maltese mixed legal
system.
Colonisation of the Maltese Islands has undoubtedly been
the principal contributing factor, prior to independence, to our
choice for the adoption of a source of law. History has it that the
legal system was imposed by the colonial power 3 ruling Malta–be
it the Romans, Arabs, Normans, Knights Hospitallers, French or
British–as a layer on top of the Maltese indigenous legal system.
The nature of our national law has changed from period to period–
mainly depending on which foreign power colonized the Maltese
Islands–but there has been one intrinsic common trend throughout
the chequered history of Malta during these nine historic-legal
periods succinctly discussed below: overall Maltese Law has been
heavily dominated by European Law, be it Civil Law, Canon Law,
Common Law, Law Merchant, Council of Europe Conventions or
European Union Law. However, this does not mean that Maltese
Law is a purely European legal breed: there are some slight traces
of non-European influences as well such as the doctrine of judicial
review of legislative acts contained in the Constitution of Malta
which is taken from the US, the Ombudsman Act which is
modelled on New Zealand Law or article 637 of the Code of
Organisation and Civil Procedure which has its source in the
Australian Freedom of Information Act, just to cite a few
illustrations. Nevertheless, the common denominator and
undoubtedly the most predominant feature in Maltese Law, both
before and after Independence and European Union accession, was
2. Although Common Law in Malta was English Statutory Law, there
were also judgments of British courts that had to be applied in Malta which
related to English Statutory Law either extended to Malta or incorporated into
Maltese Law as well as the judgments of the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council in the case of appeals to the Judicial Committee originating from Malta.
3. See Paul S. Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 SO. CAL. L. REV.
1155, 1156 (2007).
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and remains European Law in the widest sense of the term in all its
diversity and richness. Indeed, as this paper argues, the end result
of all these historic-legal periods can be summed up in the sense
that the Maltese legal system is both a mixed legal system and a
European legal system 4 where, to borrow a phrase from Esin
Örücü, “the ingredients work cumulatively and interactively” 5 and
where originally the implantation of English Law in a Civil Law
legal system and subsequently the transposition of European Union
Law and the incorporation of International Law in the said legal
system has worked out to be beneficial to the Maltese mixed legal
system. It has also changed the nature and sources of Maltese Law
to make the legal system the mixture that it is today.
III. THE NINE PERIODS OF MALTESE LEGAL HISTORY
I divide the legal history of Malta into nine distinct legal
epochs.
Period
st

1 : Roman Malta
2nd: Arab Malta
3rd: Norman Malta
4th: Hospitallers Malta
5th: French Malta
6th: British Malta
7th: Independent Malta
8th: European Union Malta
9th: Codification Revival in Malta

Years
218BC-870
870-1090
1090-1530
1530-1798
1798-1800
1800-1964
1964-2004
Since 2004
Since 2009

4. V.V. Palmer states that all the great legal systems of the world
‘originate in Europe and within the European Union’. See Vernon V. Palmer,
Two Rival Theories of Mixed Legal Systems, 2.1 ELECTRONIC J. COMP. L. 4
(2008) available at www.ejcl.org/121/art121-16.pdf (Last visited November 7,
2011).
5. See Esin Örücü, What is a Mixed Legal System: Exclusion or
Expansion?, 2.1 ELECTRONIC J. COMP. L. 4 ( 2008) available at
www.ejcl.org/121/aet121-15.pdf (Last visited November 7, 2011).
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A. Roman Malta (218 B.C.-870)
The Maltese islands were originally populated by the local
Bronze Age population. 6 They were inhabited for the first time
around 5,000 B.C., or even earlier, by farmers originating from
Sicily. 7 They were then occupied by the Phoenicians in 700 B.C,
by the Greeks in 500 B.C. and by the Carthaginians in around 480
B.C. 8 Malta was subsequently occupied by Rome in 218 B.C., at
the outset of the Second Punic War, where the Carthaginians were
replaced as political masters. 9 Unfortunately, there is no
documentary evidence that during this period Roman Law was the
law of Malta. Nonetheless, it seems that the position in Malta was
similar to that in Sicily. A Maltese historian states that during those
times Malta was subdued by the Romans and was governed by the
same laws of Sicily. 10 Cowdy states that “to ingratiate the
inhabitants [,] their ancient usages were tolerated, and the Roman
Consul, Titus Sempronius, raised the place to the dignity of a
municipality.” 11
At the initial stage of the Roman occupation there were
those who enjoyed Roman citizenship–being either Roman settlers
or having acquired Roman citizenship–and the provincial subjects.
The former were governed by pure Roman Law, subject to local
custom. The latter were subjects sic et simpliciter and considered
by the Romans as aliens (peregrini), had their own laws and
customs, and to them “Roman law was primarily inapplicable…
6. ANTHONY BONANNO, MALTA: PHOENICIAN, PUNIC AND ROMAN 22
(Midsea Books Ltd., 2005).
7. DAVID H. TRUMP, MALTA PREHISTORY AND TEMPLES 55 (Midsea
Books Ltd., 2002).
8. Anthony Bonanno, Malta’s Changing Role in Mediterranean CrossCurrents: From Prehistory to Roman Times in MALTA: A CASE STUDY IN
INTERNATIONAL CROSS-CURRENTS 1 (S. Fiorini & Victor Mallia-Millanes eds.,
1991); BONANNO, supra note 6 at 38; PAOLO DEBONO, SOMMARIO DELLA
STORIA DELLA LEGISLAZIONE IN MALTA 11, 16, 26 (Tipografia del Malta,
1897).
9. See BONANNO, supra, note 6 at 131.
10. GIOFRANCESCO ABELA, DELLE DESCRITTIONE DI MALTA ISOLA NEL
MARE SICILIANO, CON LE SUE ANTICHITA ED AL TRE NOTIZIE, LIB. QUATTRO,
564 (Malta, 1647) (of the same view is Judge Paolo Debono, supra note 8, at
36).
11. Samuel Cowdy, Malta and Its Knights, 3 TRANSACTIONS ROYAL HIST.
SOC. 395, 396 (1874).
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because it seemed unnatural to apply the private law of one city
community to the citizens of another.” 12 Cicero states that the
Maltese were given the appellation of socii thereby implying that
they enjoyed some form of participation in the rights of Roman
citizenship.13 As a result of the Edict of Caracalla in 212 A.D.,
Roman citizenship was extended to the bulk of the population of
the Roman world: 14 “the Maltese became Roman citizens and, as
such, subject to Roman Law.” 15 One author states that “until the
seizure of the Island by the Arabs in 870 B.C., Malta must have
been governed not only by the old Roman Law and by the law as
laid down in the Corpus Juris of Justinian but also by the
legislation of Justinian’s successors.” 16 Hence this period appears
to have been characterised by Roman Law and Maltese native
customs because the Romans did not, on conquest, as a policy
measure, suppress local customs: “the Romans bore no national or
racial feelings towards the Maltese, as they also did not mind their
local customs or religious beliefs as long as these did not interfere
with loyalty to the authorities.” 17 In the meantime, between 456
and 464 A.D. Malta was occupied by the Vandals and the Goths,
before it was taken over again by the eastern part of the Roman
Empire and thus came once more under Byzantine rule. 18
B. Arab Malta (870-1090)
As to the Arab occupation of Malta, once again little is
known. That said, the Maltese language spoken today is a product

12. JAMES BRYCE, THE ANCIENT ROMAN EMPIRE AND THE BRITISH EMPIRE,
IN INDIA: THE DIFFUSION OF ROMAN AND ENGLISH LAW THROUGHOUT THE
WORLD: TWO HISTORICAL STUDIES 84 (Oxford University Press, 1914). V.V.
Palmer argues that even Roman Law was a mixed system of law: the ius civile
and the ius gentium. See Palmer, supra note 4, at 19-21.
13. HUGH W. HARDING, HISTORY OF ROMAN LAW IN MALTA 7 (Progress
Press 1950).
14. BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 65 (Clarendon
Press 1962).
15. Joseph M. Ganado, Malta: A Microcosm of International Influences, in
STUDIES IN LEGAL SYSTEMS: MIXED AND MIXING 225 (Örűcű et al. eds., 1996).
16. See HARDING, supra note 13, at 11.
17. JOSEPH ATTARD, MALTA: A HISTORY OF TWO MILLENIA 23 (Progress
Press 2002).
18. Id. at 24; DEBONO, supra note 8.
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of Arab rule for it started as a Semitic language 19 before being
exposed to Romance influence. Due to their geographical
proximity, Malta and Sicily shared historical paths, and when
Malta was liberated from the Arabs by the Normans, the latter also
freed Sicily. Ever since the Normans conquered Sicily, the
situation in Malta was similar to that of Sicily. 20 The Arab period
started on 29 August 870. During these times, Malta was
administered by an Emir, and Muslim Law and customs were
applied in Malta. 21 The Maltese consequently lost the selfgovernment they enjoyed under Rome.
C. Norman Malta (1090-1530)
In 1090, Count Roger the Norman conquered Malta, which
subsequently became part of Sicily. In 1266, Charles of Anjou
became King of Sicily, and the Maltese Islands passed under
French Angevine rule. 22 In 1283, the Spanish Aragonese captured
Malta, and the Maltese were given their own Parliament, the
Università, which gave autonomy to Malta even if the Maltese
Islands continued to be given in fief. 23 The laws enacted for Sicily
applied to Malta. During this period there was also the influence of
Canon Law on Roman Law. Schupfer maintains that: “although
most of the laws of this period were inspired by the general
conceptions of Roman Law, many modifications were introduced
by custom as well as under the influence of the Church in order to
meet the great social changes of the time.” 24 Although Roman Law
reigned supreme in Malta, Maritime Law was governed by
maritime usages. 25 Hence this period is characterised by Roman
Law, the influences of Canon Law thereon, international maritime
usages and Maltese local customs.
19. A. P. VELLA, 1 STORJA TA’ MALTA: MILL-PRE-ISTORJA SA L-ASSEDJU
64, 69 (Klabb Kotba Maltin, 1974); LAWRENCE CACHIA, ILSNA SEMITICI 34
(Veritas Press, 2004).
20. HERBERT GANADO, 1 MY CENTURY 141 (Trans. and adapted Refalo,
2004).
21. DEBONO, supra note 8, at 94, 96, 99. ATTARD, supra note 17, at 29.
22. ATTARD, supra note 17, at 41.
23. Id. at 43-47.
24. FRANCESO SCHUPFER, MANUALE DI STORIA DEL DIRITTO ITALIANO: LE
FONTI, LEGGI E SCIENZA (153rd ed., E. Loescher & Co. 1904).
25. HARDING, supra note 13, at 27.
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D. Hospitallers Malta (1530-1798)
It is in the fourth period of legislative history that Maltese
Law starts to develop as a law in its own right and not as a law of
another country–Sicily–which was applied to it as a natural
adjunct. 26 This notwithstanding, Roman Law still continued to
prevail as the Order of St. John of Jerusalem adopted it for the laws
it made for the Maltese Islands: “The legislation enacted by the
Knights in Malta had the hallmark of European, mostly Italian,
influence and was of quite a varied nature.” 27 The 1681
Prammatiche–a compilation of laws introduced by Grandmaster
Gregorio Carafa–was the first homogenous set of laws
promulgated by the Knights. 28 The Code de Rohan, 29 the last piece
of legislation made by the Order, is modelled on Roman Law and
“partakes of all the merits and demerits of its great original. With
the exception of some modifications and additions rendered
necessary by local circumstances, we may consider it as a
compilation of the same Law by which the greater part of the
Continent of Europe continues to be governed.” 30 Harding
considers this 1784 Code to be “nothing else than a consolidation,
with some amendments, of the previous legislation of the Order”
with “positive signs of Roman Law influence.” 31 Hence the first
period, as the second period, continues to be influenced by Roman
Law, Canon Law, maritime usages (now codified in the Consolato
del Mare di Malta 32 of 1697) and local customs (codified also in
the Code de Rohan) 33 with the sole–though extremely important–
26. The first code of laws enacted by the Order of St. John is the Maltese
Statuti e Ordinamenti of 1533. See W. D. Barz, The Maltese Statuti e
Ordinamenti of 1533, 15 ID-DRITT L.J., 5 (1990).
27. Ganado, supra note 15, at 226.
28. Id. at 227.
29. Mark A. Sammut, The Place of the Codice Municipale di Malta in
European Legal History, 20 ID-DRITT L.J., 330 (2009).
30. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION (National Archives, Kew Garden,
London, Colonial Office 1812).
31. HARDING, supra note 13, at 31.
32. This was modelled, as it clearly stated, on the Consolato del Mare of
Messina, Sicily. Ganado states that, “a provision was retained in the sense that in
the absence of an express provision of the law, the Consolato del Mare of
Messina was to be followed.” GANADO, supra note 15, at 227.
33. Named after the Grandmaster of the Order of St. John, Emmanuel de
Rohan.
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difference that the fourth period brings with it the advent of
Maltese Law, and Malta is no longer dependant on Sicily for its
law-making.
E. French Malta (1798-1800)
Not much legislative activity took place when Napoleon
Bonaparte occupied Malta. 34 This is because the French stayed in
Malta for a very short period–from 11 June 1798 to 2 September
1800. Furthermore, in this period the French had very few days of
peace while being confronted by an insurgency led by the Maltese
and later, with the assistance of the British, aimed at ousting them
from Malta. 35 The French authorities, on 2 September 1798,
ordered that in so far as the maritime and commercial tribunal (the
Consolato del Mare) was concerned, “lawyers were forbidden to
appear before it or to submit written pleadings since such persons
complicated even the simplest point of law.” 36 Hence, although
there has been a fifth period, as a matter of fact it was only in the
initial part of the French conquest of the archipelago that the
French had the time to address lawmaking issues. 37 Nevertheless,
these laws were considered to be null and void in view of the fact
that the French occupying government did not enjoy legislative
authority once it was a de facto government. 38 The French, as the
new occupying power, could not exercise a right greater than that
bestowed on the Knights of St. John: nemo plus iuris quan ipse
habet transferre potest–no one can transfer to another a greater
right than he himself possesses.
34. Dennis Castillo, “. . . The Knights Cannot Be Admitted:” Maltese
Nationalism, The Knights of St. John, And The French Occupation of 17981800, 79 (3) CATH. HIST. REV. 434 (July 1993). For references to laws made
under the French occupation, See id. at 443-445.
35. G. V. ELLUL, THE FRENCH INVASION OF MALTA: AN UNPUBLISHED
ACCOUNT 1 (1978).
36. CARMEL TESTA, THE FRENCH IN MALTA 1798–1800 142 (Midsea Books
Ltd. 1997).
37. For Napoleon Bonaparte’s first Instructions regarding Malta’s
government on 13 June 1798, see MALTESE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 17981964: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 9 (Frendo ed., Interprint Ltd., 1993). For
French Law making in Malta, See TESTA, supra note 36, at 141.
38. 10 KOLLEZZJONI TA’ DECIZJONIJIET TAL-QRATI SUPERJURI TA’
(Collection of the Decisions of the Superior Courts of Malta) 663 at 669 (Court
of Appeal, 7 January 1885).

2011]

RETHINKING MALTESE LEGAL HYBRIDITY

271

Indeed, although Malta’s five codes 39 are influenced by the
Civil Law system, it was certainly not under the French period that
we got our codes. Ironically enough it had to be under British rule–
which still had to follow the French occupation of Malta–that the
five Civil Law inspired Maltese codes were promulgated by a
British colonial ruler who represented Common Law in its purity
and who had ousted from Malta Napoleon’s forces thereby
bringing on an end the direct penetration of French Law in Malta. 40
Hence, the French period, extremely short when compared to the
rest, bore no fruit of its own.
F. British Malta (1800-1964)
Following the French occupation of Malta and their
expulsion, the Maltese returned to the legal system extant before
the French invasion. Sir Adriano Dingli, the Chief Justice of Malta,
states so in Nobile Giuseppe di Marchesi De Piro v. Monsignor
Don Salvatore Grech Delicata: 41
Durante le ostilità tra il Governo Provvisorio,
stabilito della popolazione Maltese, e la
guarnigione Francese, si osservarono le antiche
leggi . . . come se nessun cambiamento fosse stato
fatto dal Governo creato dal Generale Bonaparte, e
dopo la capitolazione del 1800 quelle leggi
ripresero l’antico rigore, sin anche nella Valletta,
senza alcun atto espressamente revocatorio delle
disposizioni date dal Governo del Generale
Bonaparte, e come se questo avessero mai avuto
luogo. 42
39. These are the Criminal Code (Chapter 9 of the Laws of Malta), the Code
of Police Laws (Chapter 10 of the Laws of Malta), the Code of Organization and
Civil Procedure (Chapter 12 of the Laws of Malta), the Commercial Code
(Chapter 13 of the Laws of Malta) and the Civil Code (Chapter 16 of the Laws
of Malta).
40. For a narrative of the historical evolution of these five codes, see, H. I.
Lee, British Policy Towards the Religion, Ancient Laws and Customs in Malta,
Part II. The Revision of the Codes of Law, 4 MELITA HISTORICA 1 (1964).
41. PATRICK STAINES, ESSAYS ON GOVERNING MALTA 1800–1813 77
(Publishers Enterprises Group Ltd., 2008).
42. See supra note 35.
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It is this sixth period of Maltese legislative history that introduced
Malta to English Law. This is indeed the period of reception of
English Statutory Law into Maltese Law. It is also during this
period that Malta began to shed its pure Civil Law system in order
to commence its movement towards a mixed legal system of Civil
Law and Common Law influences. The Civil Law origins of the
Maltese legal system became–to quote Moréteau–‘contaminated’ 43
or, rather better, enriched, by English Statutory Law (the latter
forming part of the Common Law legal system). At the end of this
period, not only was Common Law received into Maltese Law but
it even gained supremacy over the Civil Law influences on Maltese
Law because: (a) the sources used for new Maltese Law–apart
from the exceptional case of the said Codes–was no longer Civil
Law but English Law; (b) the Civil Law influence over Maltese
Law remained static and stopped developing; and (c) although by
‘Maltese Law’ I understand both Civil Law and Public Law, 44 it
was Common Law that was to have the predominant influence
over Civil Law during this sixth phase of the legal history of
Malta. In addition, when the influence was not Common Law it
was Chthonic Law inspired, and Civil Law was substantially
abandoned as a source for new Maltese Law. Hence, the
supremacy of Common Law during this period—and subsequent
periods as well—over Civil Law not only in Maltese Public Law
(where Common Law reigned supreme) but also in the evolution of
Maltese Private Law especially in the realm of Commercial Law,
in particular, Company Law, Maritime Law, Insurance Law and
Banking Law not to mention also Private International Law.
When the British arrived in Malta, Patrick Staines stated
that in 1801 Captain Alexander Ball observed the state of Maltese
Law to be as follows: 45
In Malta they have their Civil Law, Statute Law,
Common Law and Canon Law. To this last they adhere
in all their Ecclesiastical concerns. The usages of the
43. For a discussion of contamination, See Olivier Moréteau, An
Introduction to Contamination, 3 J. CIV. L. STUD. 9 (2010).
44. Indeed, the tendency in the past in the writings of comparativists was to
exclude Public Law influences from their studies and focus mainly on Private
Law.
45. Id. at 91.
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country constitute their Common Law; and the
Ordinances of the Grand Masters their Statute Law.
But the Roman Law is the rule of their procedure in all
Civil and Criminal cases. All their Statute or Municipal
laws are comprised in one folio volume, and form a
clear and well digested system. 46
Codification was already a characteristic trait of Maltese
legislation under the period of the Order of St. John. But there is of
course nothing strange in this once till that time Maltese Law was a
purely Civil Law system, codification being a characteristic trait of
Civil Law. 47
In addition, it is at the beginning of this period that the
Maltese drew up their Declaration of Rights of 15 June 1802, an
attempt at promulgating Autochthonous Law. 48
The British period begins, strangely enough, with the
strengthening of Civil Law influences on Maltese Law rather than
with the imposition of Common Law thereon. The five Codes
mentioned above are all modelled to a very large extent on the
Civil Law tradition. 49 However, there are instances in these Codes
where an English Law factor can be found. Hence, Common Law
inroads are observable in the Civil Law inspired Codes. For
46. Ball’s dispatch of 6th March 1801, National Archives, Kew Gardens,
London, War Office (WO) file 1/291.
47. See, e.g, M. L. Murillo, The Evolution of Codification in the Civil Law
Legal Systems: Towards Decodification and Recodification, 11 FLA. ST. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1 (2001); J. H. Drake, The Justinian Codification
Commission of 528 A.D., 27 2 MICH. L. REV. 125 (1928); Rev. A. Keogh, S.J. ,
The Codification of the Canon Law, 10 J. OF COMP. LEG. & INT. L. 14 (1928).
48. The text of the Declaration is printed in Frendo, supra note 37, at 55-56.
See also, K. Aquilina, The Legislative Development of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms in Malta: A Chronological Appraisal, in 1 SERVING
THE RULE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR
DAVID JOSEPH ATTARD 225, 226 (Martinez Gutierrez ed, Mare Nostrum
Publications 2009); J.J. Cremona, From the Declaration of Rights to
Independence and The French Declaration of Rights and its Maltese Derivative,
in 1 SELECTED PAPERS 1946-1989 76, 264 respectively (Publishers Enterprises
Group Limited 1990); G. Bonello, The “Declaration of Rights” 1802 and
William Eton, in “INSERVI” HIDMA POLITIKA 1969–2009: GABRA TA’ KITBIET
F’GIEH EDDIE FENECH ADAMI 293 (Schiavone and Callus eds.,
Pubblikazzjonijiet Indipendenza 2009); Staines, supra note 41, at 135.
49. Codification is a characteristic trait of Roman Law and the Civil Law
system. Italy, France, Germany, Austria and Switzerland, just to mention a few
examples of Civil Law jurisdictions, adopted a system of codification for their
civil laws.
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instance, the Scotsman Andrew Jameson had made significant
comments on the draft versions of the Criminal Code 50 and the
Code of Organisation and Civil Procedure 51 which were based on
English Law and which were incorporated into these Codes. Albert
Ganado sums up the making of the Criminal Code in 1854 as
follows:
The Code of 1854 combined the advanced
philosophical thought of European legislation with
the best liberal principles British law could offer,
both applied in keeping with Maltese customs and
traditions. It is important to note that the
accusatorial system was adopted for the institution
of proceedings. 52
The Criminal Code has been supplemented, during the British
period, by various other criminal laws which are still on the statute
book and which reflect English Law. 53 Some of these laws
currently have or have had their counterparts in various
Commonwealth countries. 54
The legal system’s mixture of our Commercial Code is
illustrated as follows:
When the draft Commercial Code was presented in
1853 it was quite clear that the French Code had
been followed. The Secretary of State disapproved
the second book of the Code . . . The first, third and
50. ANDREW JAMESON, REPORT ON THE PROPOSED CODE OF CRIMINAL
LAWS FOR THE ISLAND OF MALTA (Government Press, Malta, 1844) and D.
Gourlay, Andrew Jameson and the Origins of the Criminal Code of Malta, 15
MELITA HISTORICA 109 (2009); MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENT OF
MALTA 29 DECEMBER 1835 TO 13 AUGUST 1849, xxxvi, lxii, (Malta University
Press 2009).
51. ANDREW JAMESON, OBSERVATIONS ON THE PROPOSED CODE OF LAWS
OF ORGANIZATION AND CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE ISLAND OF MALTA
(Edinburgh, 26 December 1850) (National Archives, Kew Gardens, London,
Colonial Office, file 163/38).
52. A. Ganado, The Maltese Criminal Code of 1854–2, in THE SUNDAY
TIMES OF MALTA, December 14, 2003 at 55.
53. See The Official Secrets Act–Chapter 50; Public Meetings Ordinance–
Chapter 68; Seditious Propaganda (Prohibition) Ordinance–Chapter 71; Conduct
Certificates Ordinance–Chapter 77.
54. Typical examples are the Official Secrets Act and the Seditious
Propaganda (Prohibition) Ordinance.
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fourth books were enacted in 1857 while several
ordinances on maritime law were promulgated in
1858. These ordinances were in harmony with
British principles and they were therefore
acceptable to the Secretary of State. 55
Writing in 1950, Ganado holds that, “the strong links which Malta
has had with the European Continent for many centuries have
resulted in the retention of the Roman civil law system; and, on the
other hand, the British Administration since 1814 has introduced
principles of British public law.” 56 In fact, our courts maintained
that “the public law of Britain is the Public Law of Malta where
the latter has a lacuna.” 57 But the judgment which set out this
principle was delivered when Malta was still a colony of the
United Kingdom. 58 On becoming independent Malta was no longer
bound stricto jure by that principle. That said, however, British
Public Law is still relevant to Maltese Law in so far as it is the
source of Maltese Public Law, foremost amongst which is our
written Westminster Constitution. Therefore, it is not that easy to
sever ties with English Public Law even after independence not
only in so far as Maltese legislation enacted during colonial times
is concerned and which still forms part of Maltese Public Law but
also in so far as new developments taking place in English Public
Law are concerned, which also serve as a source for the
development of Maltese Public Law. For instance, in 2010, the
office of Parliamentary Assistant was created in Malta along the
lines of the equivalent English concept.
Even the Code of Organisation and Civil Procedure is
influenced by Common Law. Once again this is through the
contribution of Andrew Jameson who provided significant
comments to the final redaction of this Code. The five Maltese

55. J. M. Gando, British Public Law and the Civil Law in Malta, 3 C. L. P.
195 (1950).
56. Id. at 195.
57. W. PH. GULIA, GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY IN MALTA 15 (Malta
University Press, 1974).
58. Marquis James Cassar Desain v. James Louis Forbes, C.B.E., nomine,
His Majesty’s Court of Appeal, 7 January 1935.
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Commissioners who were entrusted with the formulation of the
Code took on board amendments proposed by Jameson. 59
Not only was English Law incorporated directly into
Maltese Law during this period but certain English Law was
extended to Malta through an express provision to that effect by an
enactment of the United Kingdom. The UK Colonial Laws
Validity Act, 1865, explicitly provided so in section 1. Section 2
thereof then provided that:
Any Colonial Law which is or shall be in any
respect repugnant to the Provisions of an Act of
Parliament extending to the Colony to which such
Law may relate, or repugnant to any Order or
Regulation made under Authority of such Act of
Parliament, or having in the Colony the Force and
Effect of such Act, shall be read subject to such Act,
Order or Regulation, and shall, to the Extent of such
Repugnancy, but not otherwise, be and remain
absolutely void and inoperative. 60
So even United Kingdom Acts of Parliament were part and parcel
of Maltese Law, that is, those Acts of Parliament which were so
extended by the United Kingdom Parliament to Malta in addition,
of course, to the laws made by the Maltese legislature. In the latter
case, there were instances in Malta where there existed two
concurrent legislatures under a dyarchical system of government:
the Maltese Imperial Legislature and the Maltese Legislature. 61
G. Independent Malta (1964-2004)
This period starts with the independence of Malta gained
on 21 September 1964. Malta became independent through an Act
of the British parliament–the Malta Independence Act of 1964. 62
59. See supra note 48, letter dated 10 May 1851.
60. 28 & 29 Vict., c. 63.
61. DOMINIC FENECH, RESPONSIBILITY AND POWER IN INTER-WAR MALTA,
BOOK ONE: ENDEMIC DEMOCRACY (1919–1930) 51, 327 (Publishers
Enterprising Group Limited, 2005).
62. All the constitutions, which Malta had during the British period, were
English Law influenced. For a discussion of these constitutions see J.J.
CREMONA, MALTA AND BRITAIN: THE EARLY CONSTITUTIONS (Publishers
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The Constitution of Malta, Malta’s highest law of the archipelago,
was granted to the Maltese through an Order-in-Council made by
the Queen of Great Britain under the said 1964 enactment. 63 The
Maltese Constitution is a Westminster Constitution although it has
transplanted the American Constitution’s doctrine of judicial
review of the acts of the legislature whereby the Constitutional
Court can declare an act of parliament null and void if it
contravenes the Constitution of Malta. 64
The vast majority of the laws enacted during this sixth
period of Maltese legislative history are English Law inspired. In
this respect, legal coloniality (that is, the enduring vestiges of
English Law colonialism in post-colonial Malta) is preserved. 65
European Community Law begins to raise its head in our statute
book but this has happened indirectly, in so far as the United
Kingdom had transposed European Community Law in its national
law and such transposed law formed an English statutory source of
law to the Maltese mixed legal system. For instance, our
Broadcasting Act 1991 is modelled on the British Broadcasting
Act, 1981 66 which in turn transposes the EEC Television without
Frontiers Directive. 67 Of course, there are some glaring exceptions
in this period where English Law is not followed such as the
Condominium Act 68 which is to a large extent modelled on the
condominium provisions of the Italian Civil Code with minor

Enterprises Group, 1996); J.J. CREMONA, THE MALTESE CONSTITUTION AND
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY SINCE 1813 (Publishers Enterprises Group, 1994).
63. See J.J. CREMONA, Recollections of Constitution-Making in supra note
48, at 270.
64. Article 6 of the Constitution of Malta provides that: ‘ . . . if any other
law is inconsistent with this Constitution, this Constitution shall prevail and the
other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void.’
65. For an explanation of the concept of coloniality, see Kjell Å. Modéer,
Mixed Legal Systems and Coloniality: Parts of the Construct of a Global Legal
Culture, 1 at 5-6, available at www.ivr2003.net/idc/literature/kam01.pdf (Last
visited November 7, 2011).
66. Broadcasting Act, 1981 c.68 (UK).
67. Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 3 October 1989 on the coordination of
certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in
Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities, 1989
O.J. (L 298) 23.
68. Condominium Act, 201, c.398 (Malta); See, Stefan Z. Azzopardi, The
Scope of the Condominium Act, 3 L. & PRAC. 24 (Chamber of Advocates Malta,
December 2001).
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adaptations to the local scenario; the Ombudsman Act which is
modelled on New Zealand Law; and article 637 of the Code of
Organisation and Civil Procedure which lists the cases where the
court cannot have access to government documents which has its
inspiration in the Australian Freedom of Information Act. However
the latter two examples fall within the Common Law family of
legal systems. Otherwise there is considerable Municipal Law
incorporating International Law but very few traces of Continental
Law influences. The Environment Protection Act, 1991 (now
repealed since 2001) had traces of Canadian Law. 69 Hence,
elements of Commonwealth countries’ national laws (England
included) are an influencing factor on the development of Maltese
Law during the seventh period of legal history. This is the period
of the consolidation of Comparative Law when studies are
conducted when drafting Maltese legislation by looking not only at
English Law but at the laws of other Commonwealth Common
Law jurisdictions. It also constitutes the beginning of the
introduction of European Community Law in Malta. 70
During this period, the five Codes were amended
substantially. The Commercial Code has lost various provisions to
special commercial laws; the Code of Police Laws is practically in
the process of repeal; 71 the Criminal Code has been considerably
amended to take on board international crimes not hitherto
contemplated and to update Maltese criminal procedure in the light
of recent English criminal laws; whilst the Code of Organisation
and Civil Procedure has been amended to give effect to various
autochthonous provisions. Perhaps it is only the Civil Code which
remains the bastion of the Civil Law influence on Maltese Law and
which has withstood the Common Law assault during the passage
of time even though a handful of English Law provisions have
managed to seep into this Code. Such is the case with the Code’s
substituted provisions on adoption introduced in 1962. Were it not
69. Canadian Environmental Protection Act 1988, R.S. c.16, 4th
Supplement.
70. The comparative process in Maltese Law was embarked upon when the
Five Codes were being drawn up.
71. See VANNI BRUNO & MARILU GATT, REPORT ON THE CODE OF POLICE
LAWS (Justice Unit, Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs, Malta, presented to
the House of Representatives Select Committee on the Re-Codification of Laws
during its sitting of 7 April 2010).
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for the British stewardship of the Islands, the five Codes would not
have been polluted by what was hitherto an alien legal system to
Maltese Law–Common Law. But, on the other hand, were it not
for the British occupation of Malta, these codes would not have, in
all probability, been promulgated at all.
H. European Unionised Malta (Since 2004)
The seventh period of Maltese legal history starts on 1 May
2004 when Malta acceded to the European Union. 72 Although
following independence, Malta continued to rely as a source of its
legislation on English Statutory Law, which did transpose
European Community Law in its legislation from 1 January 1973
onwards. It was only after European Union accession that Malta
was legally bound to receive all the EU acquis communautaire into
its fold. This was a lengthy and complex process that required all
the Laws of Malta to be revisited to be brought in unison with
European Union Law. 73 Malta adopted a national programme for
the adoption of the acquis 74 whilst the European Commission drew
up a report updating its opinion on Malta’s application for
membership of the European Union 75 and regular reports on
Malta’s progress towards accession. 76 All these brought about a
72. The iter of European Union accession is illustrated by Richard C.
Caruana, Id-dhul ta’ Malta fl-Unjoni Ewropea, in SCHIAVIONE & CALLUS,
supra note 45, at 515-546.
73. David Fabri, Transposition Tables, Toil and Tears … True Tales from
the Accession, in MALTA IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: FIVE YEARS ON AND
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE 85 (Xuereb ed., European Documentation and
Research Centre, University of Malta, 2009).
74. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MALTA: NATIONAL PROGRAMME FOR
THE ADOPTION OF THE ACQUIS (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Valletta, January
2002).
75. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, REPORT UPDATING THE COMMISSION OPINION
ON MALTA’S APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP (European Commission, Brussels,
17.02.1999 COM 69 final).
76. In all there were four regular reports. These were as follows: (a) 1999
Regular Report From the Commission on Malta’s Progress Towards Accession
(European Commission, Brussels, 13 October 1999); (b) 2000 Regular Report
from the Commission on Malta’s Progress Towards Accession (European
Commission, Brussels, 8 November 2000); (c) 2001 Regular Report on Malta’s
Progress Towards Accession (European Commission, Brussels 13 November
2001, SEC(2001) 1751; (d) 2002 Regular Report on Malta’s Progress Towards
Accession (European Commission, Brussels, 9 October 2002), Com(2002) 700
final. The European Commission also produced a Comprehensive Monitoring
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drastic upheaval in Maltese Law during the first four years of this
century as it also did, for instance, to English Law both at the time
of UK accession to the EEC and subsequently as well. 77
Since EU accession, quite a substantial chunk of Maltese
Law is European Union Law. In the transposition of EU directives
Malta usually transposes the acquis literally with very few
rewording or adaptation. Regulations and Council Decisions apply
to Malta without the need of actual transposition into Maltese Law:
they are directly applicable and automatically received into
Maltese Law. The European Union Act, is an adaptation of the
English European Communities Act 1972 78 to the case of Malta.
EU Law is also supplemented by judge-made rules of the Court of
Justice of the European Union and the Court of First Instance (redesignated by the Lisbon Treaty of 13 December 2007 as the
General Court). 79 Article 5(1) 80 of the European Union Act makes
provision to this effect and so does article 5(3) 81 of the same
enactment.

Report of the European Commission on the State or Preparedness of EU
Membership of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania,
Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia (European Commission,
Brussels, 5 November 2003) Com (2003) 675 final; and the Comprehensive
Monitoring Report on Malta’s Preparation for Membership (European
Commission, Brussels, 5 November 2003).
77. In the UK, the continental principle of good faith irritated the system in
which it was introduced. See Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in
British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences 61 M. L. R. 11
(1998).
78. European Communities Act 1972, c.68 (UK).
79. Koen Lenaetrs & Kathleen Gutman, “Federal Common Law” in the
European Union: A Comparative Perspective from the United States, 54:1 AM.
J. COM. L. 1 (2006).
80. Article 5(1) reads:
For the purposes of any proceedings before any court or other
adjudicating authority, any question as to the meaning or
effect of the Treaty, or as to the validity, meaning or effect of
any instruments arising therefrom or thereunder, shall be
treated as a question of law and if not referred to the Court of
Justice of the European Communities, be for determination as
such in accordance with the principles laid down by, and any
relevant decision of, the Court of Justice of the European
Communities or any court attached thereto.
81. Article 5(3) reads:
Evidence of any instrument issued by an institution of the
European Union, including any judgment or order of the Court

2011]

RETHINKING MALTESE LEGAL HYBRIDITY

281

I. Towards a Revival of Codification? (Since 2009)
The ninth period of Maltese legal history starts with the
presentation by the Hon. Dr. Tonio Borg, Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister of Foreign Affairs, of a motion requesting the House
of Representatives to appoint two Select Committees, one of which
concerned the Re-Codification and Consolidation of Laws. 82 The
Select Committee on Re-Codification and Consolidation of Laws
was appointed on 14 December 2009 by the House. The Deputy
Prime Minister’s motion noted that through the passage of time,
the amount of legislation grew considerably and covered various
diverse subjects. Hence the Statute Book required carrying out a
process of re-codification and consolidation in view of the fact that
the laws over time were not always inserted in their logical and
natural place but were spread over all the Statute Book. The laws
also needed simplification both as to content and appearance.
Hence he requested the House to approve the appointment of such
a Select Committee with the following terms of reference:
(a) that anachronistic laws and irrelevant laws be
repealed;
(b) that, as far as possible, civil, criminal and
commercial laws are codified in one law so that
these laws form part of the Civil Code, the Criminal
Code and the Commercial Code;
(c) that laws on the same subject matter be
consolidated into one law.
The Select Committee is still in its initial stages but, if it carries out
its terms of reference as mandated by the House of

of Justice of the European Union or any court attached thereto,
or of any document in the custody of an institution of the
European Union, or any entry in or extract from such a
document, may be given in any legal proceedings by
production of a copy certified as a true copy by an official of
that institution; and any document purporting to be such a
copy shall be received in evidence without proof of the official
position or handwriting of the person signing the certificate.
82. Motion No. 11.114 was presented by the Deputy Prime Minister on
October
21,
2009.
Its
text
is
available,
in
Maltese,
http://parliament.gov.mt/motion11114%20 (Last visited November 7, 2011).
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Representatives, it will end up codifying and consolidating Maltese
Law (both Civil Law and Common Law inspired) into a simple,
readily accessible, clear, uniform, consistent and certain
legislation. All such Codes will end up a fusion of diverse layers
composing the Maltese legal system working harmoniously side by
side.
IV. CONCLUSION
Legal systems change over time. This applies to Maltese
Law which started as a pure Civil Law system but has ended up as
a mixed legal system. Indeed, whilst it kept its Civil Law
characteristics it moved on to absorb English Law, more statutory
law than anything else, but still Common Law. So the Maltese
legal system became a composite or hybrid legal system. Different
colonial powers brought with them their own legal system which
left their trail in Malta. As it happened in the case of Malta, there
has been a “historic superimposition of a common aw framework
on a pre-existing layer of civil law.” 83 This could not have been
otherwise bearing in mind that the Civil Law tradition pre-dated
the Common Law tradition and the Roman Empire had lost its
domination over legal systems to the benefit of the British
Empire. 84 Nevertheless, the superimposition of Common Law in
Malta has moved to dominance.
When Malta gained independence it not only began to
enact its own Autochthonous Law but became influenced by
Public International Law and European Law whilst still continuing
to be inspired by English Law, what has been referred to above as
‘coloniality.’ 85 New elements entered into the Maltese legal system
83. Vernon V. Palmer, Introduction to the Mixed Jurisdictions, in MIXED
JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE: THE THIRD LEGAL FAMILY 8, 10 (Palmer ed.,
Cambridge University Press, 2001).
84. Common Law traces its origins principally to the Norman Conquest in
1066. Roman Law dates back to the Twelve Tables c. 451 B.C.
85. Whilst Jonathan M. Miller identifies four typologies why legal
transplants occur (these are: the cost saving transplant; the externally-dictated
transplant; the entrepreneurial transplant; and the legitimacy-generating
transplant), he does not identify coloniality as a fifth typology of legal
transplants which, although it can be subsumed under one or more of the
typologies identified should perhaps be included as a category in its own right
due to its overarching influence it has had on national legal systems over time.
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which has now shifted from a hybrid system in the sense of a
mixed eclectic model between the Civil Law and Common Law
into a mixed system since it is encompassing other legal systems
such as the EU and international ones and it is applying them all in
unison as though they were one.
Maltese Law has managed, during these periods, to adapt
itself to the legal systems of its diverse colonizers and, more
recently, to that of the European Union and Public International
Law. Such adaptation does not seem to have brought about any
specific difficulties. Foreign law was healthily grafted onto
Maltese Law in a harmonious way to such extent that Maltese Law
ended up being a combination of diverse sources of law, the most
predominant being Civil Law, including Canon Law, in the early
stages, followed by common law from 1800 onwards, to Maltese
Autochthonous Law and, very recently, to European Law. Public
International Law remains a common ingredient to all these
periods. It is therefore all these layers of law which make the
Maltese legal system a hybrid one, that is, a healthy grafted
European mixed legal system.

See Jonathan M. Miller, A Typology of Legal Transplants: Using Sociology,
Legal History and Argentine Examples to Explain the Transplant Process, 51:4
AM. J. COMP. L. 843 (2003).
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ABSTRACT
In the nineteenth century, justice in the Ottoman Empire
appeared to international jurists deeply corrupted and far from the
Western model. European consular jurisdictions, as in the past,
solved this embarrassment in the prevalent and private interest of
Western States in order to control the Mediterranean area. This
perpetrated abjuration to recognize an autonomous and sovereign
Ottoman administration of justice in civil or criminal cases in
which foreigners were involved continued, in spite of the fact that
the Porte provided excellent examples of intersection, reception
and appropriation of foreign models to construct a new legal
system, and to transform society. This process of “westernization”
* Research Associate, University of Salento, Italy.
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or “modernization” formally started in 1839, by the Hatt Hümayün
of Gülkhâne. In order to halt the contradictions derived from the
coexistence of the last (French and English) treaties of commerce
of 1838 and their confirmation of privileges and consular
jurisdiction with the driven effort of Ottoman juridical reforms of
Tanzîmât period, in 1840 in both Turkey and Egypt, mixed traders
councils composed of local and foreign traders were established. In
1840 the “commercial board” was born in Turkey and, in 1848,
European Powers holding capitulary privileges negotiated the
formal recognition of mixed tribunals (which were regulated in
1873 and formally inaugurated in 1875). This embarrassing
situation was getting worse and accumulating contradictions when
in 1856, at the Congress of Paris, the Ottoman Empire was
“admitted to participate in the advantages of European Public Law
and system” (art. 7 of the Treaty). Thanks to those words, the
logical preamble of consular jurisdictions and their
extraterritoriality (mitigated by the “monstrous” compromise of
mixed tribunals), formally failed. There was a need to investigate
and redefine the paradigmatic declensions of sovereignty in the
relations between European Powers and the Ottoman Empire
during the nineteenth century.
I. A SOVEREIGNTY IN ABEYANCE: PREMISE
Between the seventeenth and eighteenth century,
sovereignty was perceived as a mutually recognized right of the
states to exercise exclusive authority over particular territories.
This was the Westphalian model, successively qualified by the
jurists as the “ideal type” of sovereignty. It suggested the respect of
the other state’s sole authority in domestic affairs, the control over
the flow of goods and bodies within each state’s borders, and the
establishment of relations as among equal states in the
international system. It would be the reference paradigm for the
later principle of non-intervention.
However, as Stephen Krasner underlined in 1999, this
model often worked as an “organized hypocrisy,” when there was
no accurate correspondence to many of the entities that have been
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regarded as states. 1 In several cases, states’ sovereignty had been
compromised by contracts and conventions, impositions and
interventions. This was particularly clear, and paradoxically
palpable, for the Sublime Porte: in the nineteenth century there was
something invalidating and compromising the declension of the
“ideal type” of the Ottoman sovereignty. 2
Antoine Pillet, in 1899, summarized his general perceptions
on this topic in an interesting, and as yet not very well-known,
essay on Les Droits Fondamentaux des États dans l’ordre des
rapports internationaux. The work opened with a precise statement
which showed traces of James Lorimer’s attitude: 3
Il semble que . . . une question préalable s’impose
d’abord à l’examen: les États ont-ils, dans leur
rapports fondamentaux, des droits qui existent par
eux-mêmes, . . . des droits qui résultent . . . de la
seule coexistence d’États civilisés (car nous ne nous
occuperons que de ceux-là) . . . ?
Only civilized states were owners of fundamental rights, and
parts of the family of nations. In particular, about the “droit
d’égalité,” Pillet added:
Les États ne sont pas égaux entre eux . . . D’abord,
il n’existe aucune égalité de droits entre les États
civilisés et les États non civilisés ou moins civilisés.
Les premiers se gèrent constamment dans leurs
rapports avec les seconds comme des supérieurs
chargés de la mission de les faire entrer de gré ou de
1. STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 69
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1999).
2. See id. at 20; Aida A. Hozic, The Paradox of Sovereignty in the
Balkans, in THE STATE OF SOVEREIGNTY: TERRITORIES, LAWS, POPULATIONS
245 (Douglas Howland & Luise S. White eds., Indiana University Press,
Bloomington, 2009) (on the Westphalian sovereignty); Amin Saikal,
Westphalian and Islamic Concepts of Sovereignty in the Middle East, in REENVISIONING SOVEREIGNTY: THE END OF WESTPHALIA 75 et seq. (Trudy
Jacobsen et al. eds., Ashgate Publishing Limited, Aldershot 2008) (about the
difference between the Westphalian meaning of the concept and the complex
Islamic understanding of the phenomenon of “sovereignty”).
3. JAMES LORIMER, 1 THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: A
TREATISE OF THE JURAL RELATIONS OF SEPARATE POLITICAL COMMUNITIES 101
(W. Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh and London 1883).
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force dans les voies de la civilisation : à ce titre ils
s’arrogent envers eux certains droits de direction, de
contrôle et parfois d’administration que ceux-ci ne
possèdent en aucune façon à leur égard. Entre la
condition des uns et la condition des autres, il y a
inégalité fragrante et cette inégalité est en la matière
la véritable base de leurs relations. 4
States are not equal. Civilization is the measure of this nonequality. There are civilized and uncivilized states: the gap of
civilization conditions the real nature of their relations based on a
true dimension of non-equality. Civilized states have rights of
direction, control and administration over uncivilized states: this is
their mission in order to lead the latter to civilization.
This idea, shared also by John Westlake and Thomas
Joseph Lawrence, 5 clashed with the regulative ideal of an inclusive
political pluralism of the international society and built, instead, its
assumptions on a hierarchical ordering of it. 6 The constitution of
the different legal status of an “uncivilized state,” in fact, definitely
solved the conflict between formal juridical equality of sovereign
states and persistent power inequalities, also legitimating the
unequal juridical language of the relations among them. 7 The
“uncivilization” caused a deminutio of sovereignty for the
uncivilized states and, consequently, permitted (in front of a silent
international law) the interference of civilized states in their
domestic and foreign affairs. Evidently, this was not a reciprocal
and consensual process. The so-called “development” of the
international law of the twentieth century removed the
4. ANTOINE PILLET, RECHERCHES SUR LES DROITS FONDAMENTAUX DES
ÉTATS DANS L’ORDRE DES RAPPORTS INTERNATIONAUX ET SUR LA SOLUTION DES
CONFLITS QU’ILS FONT NAITRE 6 (Paris, 1899).
5. JOHN WESTLAKE, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 321-322, (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge 1910); THOMAS JOSEPH LAWRENCE, THE
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 59 (Macmillan, London, 1905).
6. GERRY SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS AND OUTLAW STATES: UNEQUAL
SOVEREIGNS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 25 (Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge 2004).
7. See Hozic, supra note 2, at 255; SIMPSON, supra note 6, at 336 et seq.;
Arnulf Becker Lorca, Universal International Law: Nineteenth-Century
Histories of Imposition and Appropriation, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 476, 518
(2010); Gustavo Gozzi, The Particularistic Universalism of International Law in
the Nineteenth Century, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 73, 76-77 (2010).
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subordination of sovereignty and the absence of reciprocity as
marking dimensions of that non-equality, and only underlined this
aspect of the duress of the relations. 8 Consequently, in line with
nineteenth century European colonial politics, an automatic
equation of colonial projects with the formal assumption of
sovereignty by European Powers over non-European territories and
peoples began to work. 9
Next to the deficit of civilization, as Aida Hozic has
recently noticed, one of the reasons for the paradox of a “nonsovereign sovereignty” of the Ottoman Empire in its unequal
relations with European Powers in the nineteenth century was that
it had been frequently violated in the name of the sovereignty
itself. 10 Carl Schmitt said that the sovereign was the one who
decided on the exception. 11 According to Giorgio Agamben and
his suggestions on the logical antinomies of sovereignty, the
sovereign’s ability to suspend laws created those “juridically
empty” states of exception. The states of exception had two
essential criteria of individualization: the absolute necessity and
the temporary state. 12 Since there were two levels of sovereignty—
one, artificial and anomalous, of the civilized states over the
“uncivilized” Ottoman Empire, and the other, original and
inadequate, of the Ottoman Empire itself over its own territory—
two suspensions of the Ottoman order were possible.
First, the Ottoman Empire, as a “geographical exception” of
a Christian and civilized Europe, underwent a deminutio majestatis
which determined a corresponding sovereign extension (garentia)
of European Powers’ sovereignty on it. The absolute necessity was
to grant peaceful trade and judicial protection for the Western
8. Matthew Craven, What Happened to Unequal Treaties? The
Continuities of Informal Empire, 74 NORDIC JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
335, 380 (2005).
9. The modern idea of unequal treaties was an “integral part of
‘imperialism’ and ‘colonialism.’” GERRIT GONG, THE STANDARD OF
CIVILIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 66-67 (Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1984).
10. Hozic, supra note 2, at 247.
11. See Carl Schmitt, LE CATEGORIE DEL “POLITICO.” SAGGI DI TEORIA
POLITICA (Gianfranco Miglio & Pierangelo Schiera eds., Il Mulino, Bologna,
1972).
12. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATO DI ECCEZIONE 19 (Bollati Boringhieri,
Torino, 2003).
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peoples in transit or resident in the Ottoman territories; the
temporary state of this necessity was determined by the Porte’s
process of gradual appropriation of international rules and its
adequacy to the Western standard of civilization. The presence of
both criteria provoked a suspension of the Ottoman juridical
order: 13 those “juridically empty” states of exception were resolved
by European intervention and consular jurisdiction.
In the second place, the absolute necessity to manage the
matter of Christian subjects and foreigners, resident or in transit on
its territories, and the temporariness of the gradual process of their
assimilation, led the Ottoman Empire itself to act on its residual
sovereignty and to operate a suspension of its juridical order. By a
“truce,” such as a temporary suspension of the political system
towards the idolaters, the Ottoman sultans could grant Christians
all the benefits of dialogue. This was the meaning of the old
system of capitulations, of which the unequal treaties of the
nineteenth century were the direct legacy. 14
In my opinion, this dualistic representation is the final
aspect of an Ottoman “fantastic” sovereignty that needs to be
investigated in relation with the jurisdiction problem: 15 how was
Ottoman sovereignty still held believable in face of the flagrant
violations of its norms and in face of the logical antinomies of its
constitutive principles operated by capitulations and unequal
treaties? How was it possible to reconcile this state of
subordination with the activation of the formal procedures for
admission and participation of the Ottoman Empire to the
European Concert of the nineteenth century? And what was the
role of international law?

13. This was a temporariness induced by the encouraged notion that only
by emulating Western modes of governance polities on the periphery might be
admitted into the family of nations. Cf. EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISMO.
L’IMMAGINE EUROPEA DELL’ORIENTE 78 et seq. (Stefano Galli ed., Feltrinelli,
Milano, 2006).
14. See Craven, supra note 8, at 344; Eliana Augusti, The Christian Matter
and the Ottoman Empire: the Language of Compromise in the 19th Century, in
TURNING POINTS AND BREAKLINES 64 (Szabolcs Hornyák et al. eds., 4 Jahrbuch
Junge Rechtsgeschichte, M. Meidenbauer, München, 2009).
15. Hozic, supra note 2, at 248.

2011]

EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION

291

II. DIALOGUE BY CAPITULATIONS
“As a corollary of the principle of sovereignty, states are
deemed to have jurisdiction over their own territory.” 16
“Extraterritorial jurisdiction is a provisional system which should
be abandoned as and when the conditions justifying its adoption
and application have ceased to exist.” 17 In these two passages,
Aida Hozic and Alexander Wood Renton, in different times and
places, locate all the elements of the matter of extraterritorial
jurisdiction in the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century
(sovereignty, jurisdiction, territory). The two criteria of
extraterritoriality (temporariness and necessity) implicitly appear
as states of exception.
In the nineteenth century international trade was the
ancillary route towards the consolidation of old, and the
construction of new, international relationships among states in the
Mediterranean area. On the one side European, and Christian,
Powers; on the other side the inevitable Muslim interlocutor, the
Ottoman Empire and its differences. The foreign merchants had
uncertain status within the Ottoman dominions where strategic
Mediterranean places were. To move in this area under suitable
conditions and security guarantees, European Powers needed
common useful provisions. This jus commune of the
Mediterranean-trade-foreigner was first based on the old regime of
capitulations. Since the sixteenth century, Western states obtained
these unilateral concession acts, by which privileges were
recognized, from sultans. 18 Normally, capitulations included a
grant of immunity from the local jurisdiction and subjection to
one’s consular jurisdiction as long as the foreign–and above all
Christian–merchants lived in small communities in the ports (the
so-called “farms”) 19 and made proper provisions for the regulation
16. Hozic, supra note 2, at 255.
17. Alexander Wood Renton, The Revolt against the Capitulary System, 15
J. OF COMP. LEG. & INT’L L. 222 (1933).
18. See GABRIEL BIE RAVNDAL, THE ORIGIN OF THE CAPITULATIONS AND
OF THE CONSULAR INSTITUTION (Books LLC, New York, 2009).
19. Normalmente erano designate le città e i porti, dove i cristiani
potevano impiantare le loro fattorie e risiedere per ragioni di
commercio. Queste fattorie erano zone o quartieri distinti dalla
città, talora chiusi, dove si trovavano le abitazioni degli
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of their affairs. 20 As George Williams Keeton noticed in 1948, the
feature of “unilateralism” of conceded privileges was not
surprising: when, in fact, the first capitulations were granted by the
Porte, the possibility of Turkish Muslim traders visiting or residing
in European countries did not seem to have been considered.
There was thus no real need of reciprocal recognitions. The state of
things seemed to change in 1740, when France attained the
attachment of capitulary privileges in an international treaty, also
signed by the sultan. In this way, and for the first time, France
turned the concessions into a contract binding in a synallagmatic
way the Porte to it. 21 Then, thanks to an extensive clause, the so
called most-favourite-nation clause, not only France, but all
European nations could enjoy contractual (and sanctioned) benefits
of the imported capitulary text.
Far from being contrary to other bilateral treaties or grants
of European international law, capitulations hence became and
remained until the twentieth century a common and normal
incident of commerce with countries of non-Christian and nonEuropean civilization. 22 European Powers accepted and
consolidated capitulary exceptional regimes as functional to their
aims, because they obtained the juridical guarantees for their
citizens; capitulations protected their merchants, trade, contracts
and cases; they established in the strategic specific places of
Mediterranean Western presence and controlled, from a privileged
inner position, their Muslim interlocutor. But even if capitulations

stranieri ed erano costruiti i loro stabilimenti commerciali,
magazzini, con chiesa, cimitero e il consolato. Ogni Nazione
aveva la sua fattoria, e questa era una specie di Stato nello
Stato, quindi ognuno nel proprio recinto godeva la più ampia
libertà di culto, di commercio, di giurisdizione.
FRANCESCO FERRARA, MANUALE DI DIRITTO CONSOLARE 17-18 (Cedam,
Padova, 1936).
20. “Capitulations désignant les conventions consulaires avec l’empire
ottoman et, par extension, avec les autres états de l’Orient.” ALPHONSE RIVIER, 2
PRINCIPES DU DROIT DES GENS 37 (A. Rousseau, Paris, (1896).
21. PAUL PRADIER-FODÉRÉ, 2 TRAITÉ DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
EUROPÉEN & AMÉRICAIN SUIVANT LES PROGRÈS DE LA SCIENCE ET DE LA
PRATIQUE CONTEMPORAINES 689-691 (A. Durand & Pedone-Lauriel eds., Paris,
1885).
22. George Williams Keeton, Extraterritoriality in International and
Comparative Law, 72 RECUEIL DES COURS 283, 351-352 (1948).
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were an irremissible instrument for praxis and commercial intents,
they were a taboo for European scholarship, which remained silent
and did not give space to an in-depth study on them, their regime,
and on the connected subject of consular jurisdiction, where the
cases regulated by capitulations also fell.
The complex task to reconstruct and understand was left to
nineteenth and twentieth century scholarship, which inserted these
evaluations into the more complex phase of the building of
International Law as a discipline. It had to find an answer to the
origin, the need to maintain and the impossibility to abolish this
privileged system of provisions for foreigners (merchants or not),
called capitulations, still in force in the Muslim lands. I want to
propose and briefly analyze three argumentative criteria used by
scholars,
and
their
correlative
contradictions:
a)
immiscibility/personality; b) extraterritoriality; c) nationality.
III. UNDERSTAND AND LEGITIMIZE: THE IMMISCIBILITY,
EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND NATIONALITY CRITERIA
As natural consequence of the so-called principle of
immiscibility or of the personality of law, 23 Western and nonMuslims foreigners were considered “outsiders” of Shar’ia, in
which only the believers could participate. 24 In a Christian state,
i.e., in a state belonging to the European civilization, a foreign
resident, merchant or not, was subject to local courts like the
indigenous peoples (with only the exception of diplomats): there
was a kind of jus commune on the ground of which the foreigner
was like a subditus temporarius and, for this reason, he was put on
the same level as a state citizen to exercise his civil rights and
enjoy his administrative protection. He was excluded only from the
enjoyment of political rights and duties. Instead, in the Ottoman
dominions, by capitulations, he possessed a privileged status. He
23. Edgar Turlington, Treaty Relations with Turkey, 35 YALE L.J. 326, 330
(1926). The main feature of the siyar, i.e., the rules for the Muslims/nonMuslims foreigner relations, was its nature of personal and non-territorial law.
MAJID KHADDURI, THE ISLAMIC LAW OF NATIONS. SHAYBANI’S SIYAR 62, (The
Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1996).
24. Enid Hill, Comparative and Historical Study of Modern Middle Eastern
Law, 26 AM. J. COMP. L. 279, 290 (1978).
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had to comply with his own national laws, he was exempt from the
jurisdiction of the Ottoman courts and he referred to his own
consular one; he was, in other words, treated differently from
Ottoman subjects. 25 This fact was not, at the time these
“agreements” were made, deemed to be in any way derogatory to
the sovereignty and dignity of the sultans. Sovereignty and
jurisdiction were at that time generally regarded–in Europe
scarcely less than in the Levant–as personal rather than territorial;
and, particularly in view of the Islamic doctrine of the
immiscibility of Moslem and Christian communities and the
radical divergence between the legal system of the Ottoman
Empire and the Western Powers, it was considered to be the most
natural and proper arrangement for foreigners in the Ottoman
territories to be subject exclusively to the laws and jurisdiction of
their own sovereigns, acting through their ministers and consuls.
The capitulary “gracious” system was thus definitely a
substantial part of the public law of the Ottoman Empire, because
it was applied to all foreigners in the country and also regulated
Ottomans’ contacts with foreigners within the Empire. It was also
confirmed as an atypical part of the positive law of Western
states: 26 the sultans awarded capitulations only on the applicants’
explicit promise to keep peaceful relations with them, and on the
understanding that any violation of the promise might lead to a
unilateral revocation of the privileges. 27
When from this original position Western juridical tradition
started moving towards a state dimension of law and a territorial
dimension of sovereignty, however, it became more complex to
justify and legalize the need to maintain these personal privileged
agreements, resorting to confessional (and in this sense, personal)
argumentations. From the fracture produced by the Protestant
Reform and the Westphalia Acts, confessional aspects had been

25. ÉDOUARD PHILIPPE ENGELHARDT, LE DROIT D’INTERVENTION ET LA
TURQUIE 13, (A. Cotillon & Co. ed., Paris, 1880).
26. Maurits H. Van den Boogert, The Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal
System. Qādis, Consuls and Beratlıs in the 18th Century, in 21 STUDIES IN
ISLAMIC LAW AND SOCIETY 6, (Rudd Peters & Bernard Weiss eds., Brill,
Leiden-Boston, 2005).
27. Id. at 7.
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put out of the international discourse: 28 international law was
among sovereign states; each state was sovereign on its own
territory; states recognized themselves and each other as sovereign
states on their territories. 29 Common religion was not anymore a
remarkable and conditioning connotation of international relations
among states and, for this reason, it was replaced by a more
convincing paradigm of a shared civilization. The Muslim
principle of immiscibility and of the personality of law did not
work well anymore, but contradictions remained. 30
Even if the open transition in seventeenth-nineteenth
centuries from the Jus Publicum Europaeum to international law
had started changing the way in which the international relations
among proclaimed non-confessional states had to be defined, and
even if the growth of commercial demand looked for new criteria
to be regulated, in the nineteenth century religion still influenced
the European approach to Muslim states, and all the doubts about
their “un-civilized” systems of justice remained. 31 The Ottoman
system, in particular, appeared deeply corrupted and far from the
Western model. Its theocratic system negatively conditioned
European perception of the Porte, and let one conclude for an autoexclusion, an auto “mise au ban de la civilisation” of the Empire. 32
The rights of presence, control, police, inspection and
28. Luigi Nuzzo, Un mondo senza nemici. La costruzione del diritto
internazionale e il controllo delle differenze, 38 QUADERNI FIORENTINI PER LA
STORIA DEL PENSIERO GIURIDICO MODERNO 1311-1335 (2009).
29. Parlare di rapporti internazionali fra subbietti senza sovranità
territoriale, è accozzare parole senza significato. Non sarebbe
esatto dire: lo Stato ha la sovranità territoriale; è sufficiente
dire: lo Stato è persona del diritto internazionale; l’analisi di
questa persona poi ci dimostra la esistenza di una sovranità
territoriale.
CARLO GHIRARDINI, LA SOVRANITÀ TERRITORIALE NEL DIRITTO
INTERNAZIONALE 53 (,P. Fezzi & C. Cremona, 1913).
30. But see NASIM SOÜSA, THE HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE
ORIGIN OF THE CAPITULATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE (J. Hopkins University
Press, Baltimore, 1930).
31. Le bon sens suggère tout d’abord la supposition que sans
doute en Turquie la magistrature n’offre point les garanties
d’intégrité, d’impartialité et de lumière qui pour tout individu
éloigné de son pays sont la première sauvegarde de sa liberté,
de sa fortune, de son honneur et de sa vie.
Édouard Engelhardt, La Turquie et les Principautés Danubiennes, 13 REVUE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE LÉGISLATION COMPARÉE 535 (1881).
32. Id. at 537.
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administrative intervention of the consuls’ jurisdictional power as
provided by conventions and used in the Christian countries, could
not assure a “distribution tolérable de la justice.” 33 For this reason,
despite the general rule of a “pouvoir judiciaire des consuls
nécessairement restreint, par le principe de la souveraineté
territoriale, aux droits résultant des stipulations conventionnelles
ou de l’usage consacré,” in the Ottoman territories the consulars’
power became something more: they could solve the
embarrassment of the inadequate justice system in the prevalent
and private interest of Western states. 34 The foreign consuls had
jurisdiction over cases between their nationals as capitulations
consecrated in the past “dans des termes si catégoriques que le
gouvernement ottoman n’a jamais essayé de la contester.” It was a
datum de facto and de jure. Article 26 of the French Capitulation
of 1740 said: “S’il arrive quelque contestation entre les Français,
leurs ambassadeurs et leurs consuls en prendront connaissance et
en décideront, selon leurs us et coutumes, sans que personne puisse
s’y opposer.” 35 The incompetence of the Ottoman tribunals for
civil or criminal disputes between foreigners of the same
nationality was absolute, i.e., independent from the will of the
parties; it was, André Mandelstam underlined, “d’ordre public.” 36
The common and shared Western policy was confirmed: no
renunciation of the old privileges was planned; consular
jurisdiction had to keep working.
Facing the raising of territorial sovereignty, the old
principle of personality seemed to transmit in a principle of
extraterritoriality. In the rhetorical construction of international
law, the consulates became “closed political centers” on foreign
territory, just like states within the state. This exceptional regime
was supported by the old ratio to find guarantees for foreigners
where they were lacking. According to the principle of
33.
34.

Id. at 535.
William Beach Lawrence, Étude sur la juridiction consulaire, 13
REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE LÉGISLATION COMPARÉE 45 (1881).
35. Translated from the Turkish text by ANDRÉ MANDELSTAM, LA JUSTICE
OTTOMANE DANS SES RAPPORTS AVEC LES PUISSANCES ETRANGÈRES 217 (A.
Pedone, Paris, 1908). WILHELM G. GREWE, 2 FONTES HISTORIAE IURIS GENTIUM
72-73 (Walter de Gruyter, Berlin-New York, 1988) (In the same way the text of
the first Franco-Turkish Capitulation of 1535, art. III).
36. MANDELSTAM, supra note 35, at 218.
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extraterritoriality: first, foreigners enjoyed extraterritoriality in the
sense that even if they were on the Ottoman territory, they were by
fictio out of it, i.e., extra territorium; second, they were considered
as in their country, even if in fact they were not. In the twentieth
century, this conception was deeply criticized when, among many
exceptions, scholars noticed that the foreigner remained subject to
the local laws anyway. 37 In despite of extraterritoriality, the
privileged condition of a foreigner (and consular jurisdiction) was
qualified as an exceptional status by which he remained under the
territorial power of the residency state, but free from its coercive
power. This was possible thanks to an express waiver of the state
territorial sovereignty on him, and the consequent concession to
the foreign national state to continue personal sovereignty over
him. 38 In this sense, as someone said, already at the end of the
nineteenth century, capitulations appeared as “negative servitudes”
which connected the exceptional condition of foreigner from the
old system of the personality of law, to the new one of nationality.
“Les Capitulations et traités conclus avec la Turquie, le Japon, la
Chine, la Perse et autres États asiatiques, consacrent ou établissent
des servitudes négatives, lorsqu’ils disposent que les nationaux
européens y seront soumis, non pas à la justice locale, mais à leurs
propres consuls qui leur font l’application des lois de leur patrie.” 39
In the Ottoman Empire, like in other non-Christian states, the
principle of extraterritoriality was known and could work, granting
to foreigner ministers and consuls a more or less extended civil and
criminal jurisdiction. This grant did not undermine Ottoman
foreign independence, but, as William Beach Lawrence stressed,
“déroge à la règle universellement établie parmi les nations
civilisées que ‘les lois de police et de sûreté obligent tous ceux qui

37. About the relations between consular and local tribunals in the Ottoman
Empire cf. FRANCESCO PAOLO CONTUZZI, 2 TRATTATO TEORICO-PRATICO DI
DIRITTO CONSOLARE E DIPLOMATICO NEI RAFFRONTI COI CODICI (CIVILE,
COMMERCIALE, PENALE E GIUDIZIARIO) E CON LE CONVENZIONI INTERNAZIONALI
IN VIGORE 701 (Utet, Torino, 1911).
38. FERRARA, supra note 19, at 232.
39. PRADIER-FODÉRÉ, supra note 21, at 682.
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habitant le territoire.’” 40 It was confirmed as an international
exception limited to the Oriental case.
The phenomenon of foreigners’ privileges in the Levant
could be justified by international law with a third argumentative
solution, too. As noted earlier, foreigners (and consuls) were
privileged people subject to the territorial power of the state where
they resided, but released from its coercive force. 41 This was
possible because the Oriental state had waived its right of
territorial sovereignty over them, allowing by capitulations or
commercial treaties that personal sovereignty of foreigners’
national state went on. According to this conceptualization, there
was no need to simulate that the foreigner was where he was not,
but that there was a national state which “followed” its citizens
wherever they went, wherever he was (we can hear the echo of
Pasquale Stanislao Mancini and of the principle of nationality). 42
The logical preamble to strengthen the suspension of Ottoman
juridical order towards European citizens, the filter to move from
the territoriality to nationality criteria was, once again,
“civilization.”
IV. FROM CAPITULATIONS TO UNEQUAL TREATIES:
THE LITERARY PLACES OF THE EXCEPTION
The basic principles of new international relations
concerned the right of nations to independence, self-determination
and equality. The latter, especially, was of particular importance to
modern International Law: all states had “the same right to
participate in the process of formulation of international law.” 43
The states had to be entitled to take part in the drafting and
conclusion of agreements that were of interest to them. This
concept of equality was, of course, inferred from the idea of
40. LAWRENCE, ÉTUDES SUR LA JURIDICTION CONSULAIRE EN PAYS
CHRÉTIENS ET EN PAYS NON CHRÉTIENS ET SUR L’EXTRADITION 105 (F.A.
Brockhaus, Leipzig, 1880).
41. FERRARA, supra note 19, at 231-232.
42. Nuzzo, Da Mazzini a Mancini: il principio di nazionalità tra politica e
diritto, 14 GIORNALE DI STORIA COSTITUZIONALE 174-180 (2007).
43. Ingrid Detter, The problem of Unequal Treaties, 15 INT’L & COMP.
L.Q. 1069 (1966).
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sovereignty. For sovereignty implied, inter alia, not equality of
power, but legal equality, such as–as Ingrid Detter pointed out in
1966–that “states shall have had the same capacity to exercise their
rights and to assume obligations.” 44 In this respect, one did not
always individuate the equality of states. There might a time that a
state might find itself compelled into treaties with more
dominating states, treaties which only favor the stronger of the
parties, treaties which even sometimes are in conflict with the
long-term national interest of the weaker state. Such treaties were
often referred to as being “unequal.” 45 This qualification of
inequality was not accepted with favor by International Law, and
this, as Matthew Craven has underlined, is for two reasons: the
first was that the question of inequality in the context of treatymaking appeared incoherent. If on the one hand, in fact, every
treaty could be a manifestation of inequality (in terms of a
substantive lack of equilibrium in the respective burdens and
benefits, and in terms of an unequal bargaining power of the
contracting parties), on the other, a presumption of equality might
exist, since equal “contractual” capacity of the parties was there. 46
The second reason was the passive and acquiescent assumption in
the rhetorical construction of the International Law of the
nineteenth century of the unequal relations between European
Powers and non-European territories and peoples in the gradual
process of empire building. Until that moment, the international
relations among states were not equal, because of the effect of nonrenounceable “colonial power” suggestions. 47 It was a society
where many subjects were under the colonial protected nations
systems, or they were formally independent, but substantially
suffering the consequences of unequal treaties with the imperial
44. Id. At 1070.
45. Id. According to Richard Horowitz, “Unequal treaties formed the
international legal mechanism for defining semi-colonial relationships.” They
were unequal in several senses: “they were forced at gunpoint; they expressed
the economic and political interests of [European Powers]; the key provisions,
including extraterritoriality and restrictions on tariffs on foreign trade” and, they
“were not reciprocal.” Richard S. Horowitz, International Law and State.
Transformation in China, Siam, and the Ottoman Empire during the Nineteenth
Century, 15 J. WORLD HIST. 455 (2004).
46. Craven, supra note 8, at 337-338.
47. In this way also GUSTAVO GOZZI, DIRITTI E CIVILTÀ. STORIA E
FILOSOFIA DEL DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 139 (Il Mulino, Bologna (2010).
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powers. It was an “unequal” society. 48 Therefore, with the logical
preamble that those treaties might be the best juridical literary
place to regulate and safeguard the lives of nationals in countries
lacking common standards of civilization, the more civilized states,
as Pillet said, transferred the old capitulations’ text into these
special agreements on jurisdiction in countries where institutions
were “inferior” or “different” from the civilization of most
European and American States. 49 These ideas were reflected, in
particular, in a series of agreements of an overtly non-reciprocal
nature between the Great Powers and the “less civilized” Ottoman
Empire. Confirmed as a state in an “Oriental sense,” 50 it was not
allowed to participate in the European Concert and to share a
common juridical conscience, but thanks to private treaties it could
dialogue with Western Powers. 51 Where there was no common
language, there was still the language of the strongest state, i.e., the
language of its policy, economy and moral obligations. 52
Transferring the capitulations’ text into these treaties, status quo
did not change and all the old conceded immunities, now
guaranteed by enforceability of bilateralism, ended in the
exception. Although capitulations were, as concession acts of the
sultan’s liberality, always potentially revocable and, for this
reason, uncovered, 53 the system of agreement by unequal treaties
48. Onuma Yasuaki, When was the Law of International Society Born?–An
Inquiry of the History of International Law from an Intercivilizational
Perspective, 2 J. HIST. INT’L L. 64 (2000).
49. Detter, supra note 43, at 1075-1076.
50. AUGUST WILHELM HEFFTER, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE L’EUROPE,
(fr. trans., Cotillon et fils, Paris, 1873), distinguished between Oriental and
European State: “l’état oriental est celui de la résignation et du servage, dans le
quel le despotisme ou l’oligocratie s’est alliée à la hiérarchie.” Id. at 38.
51. This in accordance with the doctrinal shared principle by which:
Le droit des gens . . . il ne s’applique dans toute sa plénitude et
avec l’entière réciprocité qui est de sa nature qu’entre ces
mêmes peuples [chrétiens]. Il est du reste aisé de comprendre
qu’entre nations reconnaissant des dogmes religieux
identiques ou sensiblement analogues, il se forme des idées
communes de justice qui rendent possible la reconnaissance
d’un ensemble de droits et de devoirs mutuels.
Antoine Pillet, Le droit international public, ses éléments constitutifs, son
domaine, son objet, 1 REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT INT’L PUB. 24 (1894).
52. Nuzzo, supra note 28, at 1335.
53. Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns, Le droit international et la phase actuelle
de la Question d’Orient, 7 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE LÉGISLATION
COMPARÉE 304 (1875).
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would have guaranteed the contracting parties the enforceability of
its terms and, in default of their execution, the application of a
penalty to the transgressor. They were treaties of commerce and
establishment, the treaties by which European Powers completed
their good opportunity to improve the mechanism.
Related to the Ottoman Empire, the different way of
Westerners to stuff the category of “sovereignty” with fluid
contents clearly supplied a concrete need: their consciousness to
work with something different persisted and legitimated the choice
of suspension of a legal international order, to guarantee the best
condition for foreigners residing or traveling in a territory which
was outside the borders of the European juridical space.
V. OTTOMAN EMPIRE:
THE ELUSIVE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE GREAT EXPECTATIONS
Turan Kayaoğlu, in a provocative way, recently wrote of
the “Ottoman Empire’s elusive dream of sovereignty.” 54 The
perpetrated abjuration to recognize a real sovereign role of the
Porte within the family of nations and an autonomous and
sovereign Ottoman administration of justice in civil or criminal
cases in which foreigners were involved, justified this “elusive”
dimension of the dream. This was particularly difficult to support
in consideration of the excellent examples of intersection and
reception of foreign law with the construction of new legal systems
and transformations of society that the Ottoman Empire realized in
the nineteenth century. 55 I allude to the period of reforms,
“modernization,” and “westernization” of the Ottoman legal order
(Tanzîmât period), conventionally started in 1839 by the Hatt
Hümayün of Gülkhâne, the year after the signing of the unequal
French and English treaties of commerce of 1838 (which
confirmed foreigners’ privileges and consular jurisdiction).
Some signs of Western distrust towards Ottoman justice
were already present in 1820. Before the establishment of the
consular tribunals, in fact, under a “convention verbale” among the
54. TURAN KAYAOĞLU, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: SOVEREIGNTY AND
EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN JAPAN, THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, AND CHINA 104
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010).
55. Hill, supra note 24, at 288.

302

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 4

powers, a Mixed Judicial Committee (Commission Judiciaire
Mixte) was instituted to try the civil disputes between foreigners of
different nationalities. This was not a permanent committee, but it
met every time a dispute arose. It was organized and convened by
the Mission of the defendant which designated two judges. The
third was appointed by the claimant. The decisions of the
committee were not immediately enforceable, but needed the
homologation of the consular tribunal of the defendant. This mixed
system worked until 1864, when the Court of Appeal of Aix, in
Provence, undermined its authority. The pronunciation, using the
article 52 of the 1740’s Capitulation and the reason of the absence
of a written text to prove the real existence of the convention of
1820, declared that there was no obligation for the French to
submit to the jurisdiction of the Mixed Committee. Then, there had
been a misinterpretation of article 52 and its juridical value: it did
not officially organize any ambassadors’ jurisdiction to try the
disputes between foreigners of different nationalities. Therefore,
the Court pronunciation of 1864 gave a death blow to the Mixed
Committees in favour of the consular tribunals. 56
On the other hand, the reform period of the Empire could
not be so seriously considered if in 1840 the commercial board of
mixed traders councils was established in Turkey, and in 1848
European Powers holding capitulary privileges negotiated the
formal recognition of them, composed of foreign, Muslim
Ottoman, and non-Muslim Ottoman citizens. 57 After the
introduction of the French Commercial Code as Ottoman Code of
Commerce (1850), in 1873, at the Conference of Constantinople,
the Règlement d’Organisation Judiciaire was adopted and mixed
tribunals found their own Charter of regulation within the
Empire: 58 they would be formally inaugurated in 1875, on June 28.

56. MANDELSTAM, supra note 35, at 230-231.
57. About the institution of the tribunals cf. the references in Roma,
10.07.1890, Letter of the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador
in Constantinople, n. 24390: Nel 1848 la Porta istituì i Tribunali, Archivo
Storico Diplomatico del Ministero delgi Affari Esteri (ASDMAE), 63, b. 15
(1886-1894), f. 1, Questioni relative all’Amministrazione della giustizia in
Turchia (abolizione dei tribunal commerciali provinciali)). According to Hill,
the establishment of the tribunals was in 1847. Hill, supra note 24, at 299.
58. Renton, supra note 17, at 215.
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According to Esin Örücü, “sometimes ‘mixedness’ can be
the manifestation of a transition, sometimes it can be the final
outcome of the process. ‘Mixedness’ is usually a result of
historical accident and accidents can lead to unexpected outcomes
along unexpected paths.” 59 In the Ottoman case, this vocation to a
mixed solution seemed to be more the final outcome than the
transition moment of the process, especially if one considers the
compromise dimension of mixed tribunals’ establishment, and the
transitional value of the umpteenth occurrence of the disturbed
relations among European Powers and the Porte in the nineteenth
century. I allude to the Congress of Paris of 1856: at the end of the
Crimean War, in order to establish new conditions of peace in the
Balkan area, the homonymous Treaty admitted the Ottoman
Empire to participate in the advantages of European Public Law
(art. 7). 60 Even if functional to European aims, the situation
became embarrassing, as well as unusual and humiliating, for the
Porte. 61 Thanks to that stipulation, the logical preamble of the
unequal treaties and the theoretical framework to justify the
maintenance of capitulary privileges and consular jurisdictions
formally seemed to fail: it was inconceivable to preserve such a

59. Esin Örücü, What is a Mixed Legal System: Exclusion or Expansion?,
ELECTRONIC J. OF COMP. L. 12 (2008) available at http://www.ejcl.org (Last
visited December 11, 2011).
60. TRAITÉ DE PAIX SIGNÉ À PARIS LE 30 MARS 1856 ENTRE LA SARDAIGNE,
L’AUTRICHE, LA FRANCE, LE ROYAUME UNI DE LA GRANDE BRETAGNE ET
D’IRLANDE, LA PRUSSE, LA RUSSIE ET LA TURQUIE AVEC LES CONVENTIONS QUI
EN FONT PARTIE, LES PROTOCOLES DE LA CONFÉRENCE ET LA DÉCLARATION SUR
LES DROITS MARITIMES EN TEMPS DE GUERRE 10 (Imprimerie Royale, Turin
1856).
Art. 7. Sa Majesté le roi de Sardaigne, Sa Majesté l’Empereur
d’Autriche, Sa Majesté l’Empereur des Français, Sa Majesté la
Reine du Royaume-Uni de la Grande Bretagne et l’Irlande, Sa
Majesté le Roi de Prusse et Sa Majesté l’Empereur de toutes
les Russies déclarent la Sublime Porte admise à participer aux
avantages du droit public et du concert européens. Leurs
Majestés s’engagent, chacune de son côté, à respecter
l’indépendance et l’intégrité territoriale de l’Empire Ottoman,
garantissent, en commun, la stricte observation de cet
engagement, et considéreront, en conséquence, tout acte de
nature à y porter atteinte, comme une question d’intérêt
général.
Id.
61. Engelhardt, supra note 31, at 535.
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strong discriminating marker among proclaimed allies. 62 During
the Congress session of March 25, 1856, Alî Paşa, the
plenipotentiary of the sultan, expressly denounced this discrepancy
and asked for the abolition of capitulations and its corollaries
which stood, he said, in the way of the renewal of the Ottoman
state. For the first time, all the various forms of Western juridical
(and judicial) immunities started to appear as an unjust ostracism
by, and an unjust interference of, Western Powers. 63 The
negotiating parties showed their solidarity, but the question stayed
unanswered and they did not mention the subject in the Treaty. The
natural incoherence of the formally declared admission of the
Ottoman Empire to the International Society started revealing
itself. It was clear that article 7 could not work–as some scholar
noticed–as a turning point for international relations between
Europe and the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, if we consider
62. “Even though a significant portion of the Empire was based in Europe,
it cannot be said to have been of Europe.” Thomas Naff, The Ottoman Empire
and the European States System, in THE EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL
SOCIETY 143 (Hedley Bull & Adam Watson eds., Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1984).
63. According to this perspective, the Ottoman power itself, at the end of
the nineteenth century, started to promote the abolition of capitulations.
Engelhardt, supra note 31, at 75-76. In Paris Alî Paşa said:
Les privilèges acquis, par les capitulations, aux Européens,
nuisent à leur propre sécurité et au développement de leurs
transactions, en limitant l’intervention de l’administration
locale ; que la juridiction, dont les agents étrangers couvrent
leurs nationaux, constitue une multiplicité de gouvernements
dans le gouvernement et, par conséquent, un obstacle
infranchissable à toutes les améliorations.
France:
Reconnais que les capitulations répondent à une situation à
laquelle le traité de paix tendra nécessairement à mettre fin, et
que les privilèges, qu’elles stipulent pour les personnes,
circonscrivent l’autorité de la Porte dans des limites
regrettables ; qu’il y a lieu d’aviser à des tempéraments
propres à tout concilier ; mais qu’il n’est pas moins important
de les proportionner aux réformes que la Turquie introduit
dans son administration de manière à combiner les garanties
nécessaires aux étrangers avec celles qui naîtront des mesures
dont la Porte poursuis l’application.
That contest was not suitable to discuss and resolve the matter of capitulations.
The contribution at the congress was considered as a “voeu” to deliberate in
another place, very probable in Constantinople, about capitulations. In the
meantime, they remained in effect. Protocole n. XIV, Séance du 25 mars 1856,
in TRAITÉ DE PAIX SIGNÉ À PARIS LE 30 MARS 1856, at 102-104.
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literally the passage of the “admission” in the text of the Treaty,
the reference was only to an “admission to the advantages,” not
also to a mutual recognition and a concrete participation of the
Porte to the European System. 64
After Paris, the discussion on capitulations was postponed
until a future date, when a multilateral conference on
extraterritoriality would be held in Constantinople. The conference
never took place.
The indifference of the European Powers to capitulations
points to both their imperialistic aims, and their persistence in the
consideration of residing Western co-nationals and non-Muslim
protégés as a kind of fifth column within the Levant. All the forms
of European interference with the domestic policy of the sultan
appeared, instead, as a kind of “peaceful penetration” and
contradictions remained. 65 That admission of the Ottoman Empire
into European international society appeared to be necessary but
“premature,” because “it had not yet attained the standard of
‘civilization’ that would allow Europeans to accept Ottoman
jurisdiction over Western foreigners.” 66 For this reason
capitulations might remain. So, article 7 of the Treaty of Paris
could be read as a “precautionary rule” to an ambitious but young
international law. Therefore, the misunderstandings remained
strong due to the risk of interpretations that could read too much
into the text. An example in this sense was the declaration of
Keçecizade Mehmet Fuat Paşa (Grand Vizier and Minister of
Foreign Affairs during the Tanzîmât period) who, in 1858, noted:
La Porte élève la juste prétention de voir cesser de
fait un ostracisme qui a cessé de droit depuis le
congrès de Paris, et elle se croit pleinement
64. Cf. Augusti, The Ottoman Empire at the Congress of Paris, between
new Declensions and old Prejudices, in CROSSING LEGAL CULTURES 503-517
(Laura Beck Varela et al. eds., 3 Jahrbuch Junge Rechtsgeschichte, M.
Meidenbauer, München, 2009).
65. Renton, supra note 17, at 219. According to Samim Akgönül, “le
système des ‘protégés’ deviant sourtout au 19e siècle un moyen pour les
puissances occidentales d’avoir un œil sur la politique de la Sublime Porte.”
SAMIM AKGÖNÜL, MINORITÉS EN TURQUIE. TURCS EN MINORITÉ. REGARDS
CROISÉS SUR L’ALTÉRITÉ COLLECTIVE DANS LE CONTEXTE TURC 68 (Isis,
Istanbul, 2010).
66. KAYAOĞLU, supra note 54, at 111-112.
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autorisée à protester contre le maintien de privilèges
qui la privent des avantages essentiels du droit
public moderne auxquelles elle a été appelée à
participer en vertu du traité du 30 mars 1856. 67
Scholarly scrutiny was obviously needed. At that time, the
most important academic organ of international law was the
Institut de droit international. On September 10, 1887, during the
plenary session, the objective was communicated : the composition
of a new commission with the task of “Rechercher les réformes
désirables dans les institutions judiciaires actuellement en vigueur
dans le pays d’Orient.” 68 It took office in the Lausanne session of
1889. De Blumerincq, Carathéodory Efendi, Engelhardt, FéraudGiraud, Ferguson, De Labra, De Martens, Perels, Renault, RolinJaequemyns, Torres-Campos, Traver Twiss were the jurists
responsible to investigate about the matter. 69
As long as the jurists tried to organize international law in
this manner, capitulations, unequal treaties, consuls and mixed
courts were confirmed and appeared the irremissible instruments in
the hands of Europe to force the Ottoman Empire to its decline,
depriving from the inside the last shape of its sovereignty. This
happened in 1878, when all the exceptional system of immunities
by capitulations and unequal treaties was once and for all expressly
confirmed by another Treaty. 70 Minds would not change for
67. ANONYMOUS, LA TURQUIE DEVANT L’EUROPE 23 (E. Dentu, Paris,
1858).
68. Alphonse Rivier, Notice historique sur l’Institut de droit international,
sa fondation et sa première session, Gand 1873, Genève 1874, in INSTITUT DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL. ANNUAIRE (1877); Bureau de la Revue de Droit
International, Gand 1877 [repr. Schmidt Periodicals Gmbh, Bad Feilnbach
1994], at 11-16. About the Institute cf. Luigi Nuzzo, Disordine politico e ordine
giuridico. Iniziative e utopie nel diritto internazionale di fine Ottocento, in 2,
MATERIALI PER UNA STORIA DELLA CULTURA GIURIDICA, 319-338 (2011);
MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND
FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960 39-41 (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 2002); ANNUAIRE DE L’INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL,
NEUVIÈME ANNÉE 1887-1888 14 (1888).
69. ANNUAIRE DE L’INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, DIXIÈME ANNÉE
1888-1889 15 (1889).
70. Art. 8, Traité signé à Berlin, le 13 juillet 1878, entre la France,
l’Allemagne, l’Autriche-Hongrie, la Grande-Bretagne, l’Italie, la Russie et la
Turquie, in A. DE CLERCQ, XII RECUEIL DES TRAITÉS DE LA FRANCE 321 (A.
Durand & Pedone-Lauriel, Paris 1880). The article was proposed at the
preliminary session of June 24, 1878, by the Italian minister Luigi Corti, on
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seventy years. After the memorandum of September 9, 1914, by
which the Ottomans stressed to European Powers the
incompatibility of extraterritoriality with territorial jurisdiction and
national sovereignty (with a further enumeration of injustices and
humiliations suffered), and the rejection of Austria and Germany
of an Ottoman unilateral abolition of extraterritoriality, the Treaty
of general relations concluded at Lausanne (August 6, 1923)
designed to re-establish the consular and commercial relations of
the Contracting Parties, and to regulate the conditions of the
intercourse and residence of the nationals of each of them on the
territory of the other “in accordance with principles of international
law, and on the basis of reciprocity.” In conformity with the
avowed object of the Treaty, the Contracting Parties, in art. 2,
declared the capitulations concerning the régime of foreigners in
Turkey, together with the economic and financial system resulting
from the capitulations, “to be completely abrogated;” and in art. 30
they agreed that “from the coming into force of the new treaty the
treaties formerly concluded between [Contracting Parties] and the
Ottoman Empire shall absolutely and finally cease to be
effective.” 71 At Lausanne, as Kayaoğlu has underlined, “Turkish
dreams of putting Western citizens and commercial interest under
its jurisdiction materialized.” 72 In reality, this was only the start of
another phase of declensions and perturbations of the Ottoman
“hanging” sovereignty.

behalf of the French, Italian and Austro-Hungarian plenipotentiaries. The first
draft provided: “Les immunités et privilèges des sujets étrangers ainsi que la
juridiction et le droit de protection consulaires, tels qu’ils ont été établis par le
Capitulations et usages, resteront en pleine vigueur,” Protocole n. 5 (Séance du
24 juin 1878), in id. at 202. In the same session, Benjamin Disraeli, Lord of
Beaconsfield, the British Prime Minister, stressed how inappropriate it was to
spend that time in the capitulations’ discourse, still under review: “il ne faudra
pas les sauvegarder si elles sont inutiles; il y aurait lieu, sans doute, de leur
donner une force additionnelle dans le cas contraire; mais l’impression de S.
Exc. est qu’elles sont destinées a disparaître.” In reality, capitulations were
preserved, and not only as a reference in the treaty, but in the law-relations with
the countries of Christendom until 1923. Protocole n. 5 (Séance du 24 juin
1878), in id. at 214.
71. TURLINGTON, supra note 23, at 326.
72. KAYAOĞLU, supra note 54, at 134.
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In recent years, the strengthening in Turkish constitutional
culture of the rule of law and pluralism appeared as a further
breach of the Kemalist ideology of “sacralization” of the State.
Nevertheless, the principle of statehood, characterizing the
Republic of Turkey since its creation in 1923 and now affirmed in
art. 1 of the Constitution still influences Turkish institutions. With
regard to judicial system, while Euro-driven reforms and the
application of the conditionality principle led to its modernization,
the Constitution sketches an organization based on both
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institutional dependence and corporatism. These features are
reflected also in judicial education, notwithstanding the
establishment of a judicial academy in 2003 and the reform of
training catalogues.
Referring to legal and political science literature, as well as
to documents and reports of the Council of Europe and of the
European Union, this paper examines through the lens of training
policies the evolution of Turkish judicial culture in relation to
independence and pluralism, sketching a first hypothesis on the
effectiveness of judicial training reforms in the perspective of
European enlargement. Taking into account three typical elements
of any judicial training system—institutions, contents and
methods—it highlights the difficulties encountered in reforming
judicial training. In particular, it argues that the resistance to open
up the judicial elite to social pluralism in order to allow the
judiciary to act as an interface with civil society is due to the
peculiarities of the Turkish socio-political system (i.e. a nonhomogeneous society and the need of “lay” guardians of the
Republic). As a consequence, European influence is still limited to
the introduction of specific training catalogues, such as human
rights and EU law, but (still) do not really affect the institutional
framework, nor adapts judicial training contents and methods to
social and political pluralism.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper focuses on the changes in the Turkish judicial
training system in the context of the European convergence, which
has also involved other major legal reforms or projects such as the
harmonization packages adopted between 2002 and 2004 and the
Judicial Reform Strategy Action Plan launched by the Turkish
Government in 2009. The recent evolution of Turkish judicial
training is strictly related to the Europeanization of the national
legal system since the Helsinki European Council held in
December 1999, recognizing Turkey as an EU candidate country.
Thus, a joint programme between the Council of Europe and the
European Union on “Modernization of the Judiciary and Penal
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Reform” has been implemented from 2004 to 2007. 1 Among its
specific objectives, the programme included the “Training of
judicial staff strengthened according to European standards and
practices.” Furthermore, Turkish judges and prosecutors
participated in specific programmes aimed at providing training in
sensitive areas. In this paper, I investigate the relation between
changes in judicial training and the judicial culture, 2 arguing that
the Turkish-European convergence in the field of judicial training
is generating changes in specific areas of legal knowledge and
allowing a transnational diffusion of rules, but does not deeply
affect the judicial mentality nor involve the contaminations of
judicial cultures.
For this purpose, I will briefly outline some distinctive
features of the Turkish judiciary, and then analyze closer the
judicial training system. As a preliminary remark, it is necessary to
stress that I limit my discussion to the ordinary courts and judges,
without considering administrative courts, military courts and the
Constitutional Court. However, these different judicial branches
are partly interconnected and are characterized by a partially
common training.
II. DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THE TURKISH JUDICIARY
The Turkish constitutional system is founded on Kemalism,
as ideology marked by the unity of the State. As a consequence,
Turkish constitutionalism is rooted in the (partial) opposition
between government (hükümet) and State (devlet), that is between
institutions endowed with representative legitimization—Grand
National Assembly in primis—and State structures and elites—
1. ALFRED E. KELLERMANN ET AL., THE IMPACT OF EU ACCESSION ON THE
LEGAL ORDERS OF NEW EU MEMBER STATES AND (PRE-)CANDIDATE
COUNTRIES: HOPES AND FEARS 215 (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2006).
2. Judicial culture is intended here as legal and political culture of judges
and prosecutors. I refer to the definition given by Tamara Capeta of legal culture
as “the prevailing opinion in a society on the purpose of the law and the role of
different institutions within the legal order” in relation to judges and
prosecutors. Tamara Capeta, Courts and Legal Culture and EU Enlargement, 1
CROATIAN Y.B. OF EUR. L. AND POL’Y 10 (University of Zagreb, 2005). Political
culture is the general political principles to which judges refer as well as the
opinion on the relations between political institutions.
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among which the judicial body and mainly its hierarchy have a
relevant place—led by the military and playing the role of
“guardians” of the Republic. Three distinctive features of the
Turkish judiciary are strictly connected with the inclusion of the
judiciary among the State elites. The first is the centrality of the
judiciary within the legal and the constitutional system (i). The
second is its political insulation and corporatism (ii). The third,
which has a substantive character, pertains to the specific legal and
political cultures marking the judiciary (iii). On the basis of these
three features, the Turkish politico-legal system outlines a “strong”
and highly hierarchical judiciary, as a result of an historical
hybridism blending a traditionally relevant judicial role in the legal
and the constitutional system and a French-derived judicial
organization, characterized by hierarchy and corporatism. In this
framework, “statist” ideology is a crucial factor in shaping the
Turkish judiciary.
A. Centrality of the Judiciary
The importance of the Turkish judiciary, which is the result
of a gradual evolution and, in a measure, of a certain “casualness”
on which any legal system is often grounded, can be pointed out
from different perspectives. With regard to the legal tradition, the
Turkish legal system stems from Western continental legal systems
founded on the predominance of statutory law and codification,
since the adoption of the Swiss civil code and the Italian criminal
code, while in the administrative field the French influence has
prevailed; 3 in this context, the hierarchy of the sources of law lies
in the civil law tradition. However, the Turkish civil code includes
an “important revolutionary principle,” drawn from the Swiss civil
code, which expressly authorizes the judge to act as a law-maker
when any interpretative method is ineffective. 4 On this basis,
Turkish judges expressed a certain judicial activism, complying
with the model of the “interstitial legislator,” where judicial

3. TUGRUL ANSAY & DON WALLACE, INTRODUCTION TO TURKISH LAW 9
(5th ed., Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2005).
4. Id.
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activity does not differ qualitatively from that of the legislator. 5
Secondly, the Turkish legal system accepts exceptionally the
principle of stare decisis, binding lower courts as well as each
single division of the Supreme Court of Appeals, whereas the
decision is taken by the General Assembly of the Court. 6
From a constitutional point of view, the centrality of the
judiciary is rooted in the Constitution of 1961 and then renewed to
some extent by the Constitution of 1982. While the first establishes
the principle of the rule of law, formally considering the judiciary
as a guardian of the Republic, the second assigns the judiciary an
active role, aimed at regulating “the political arena and [at]
facilitat[ing] the transformation of the society through state
action.” 7 This particular position of the judiciary, which is typical
in authoritarian military regimes, 8 can be also explained through
the will of “political elites whose hegemonic interests are
threatened by popular politicians to delegate some of their power
to constitutionally empowered judicial institutions in order to
preserve their privileges.” 9 However, since 1982, this position is
closely linked with the will of the military elite to carry out a
programme of transformation of society, and the proper role of the
judiciary is “not to oppose the executive but to support it in the
performance of its constitutional duties.” 10

5. JOHN BELL, POLICY ARGUMENTS IN JUDICIAL DECISIONS 17 (Oxford
University Press, 1983). Meaningfully, the Constitution of 1961, which
introduces the incidental review, also allows the courts to directly interpret the
Constitution in the absence of a decision of the Constitutional court within three
months from its submission, CONSTITUTION OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC Art. 151.
The 1982 Constitution bans this practice, establishing that the lower courts have
to decide in conformity with the existing interpretation.
6. See supra text accompanying note 3.
7. Hootan Shambayati & Esen Kirdis, In Pursuit of “Contemporary
Civilization:” Judicial Empowerment in Turkey, 62 POL. RES. Q. 767 (2009). A
different spirit animates art. 8 of the Constitution of 1924: “The judicial power is
exercised in the name of the Assembly by independent tribunals constituted in
accordance with the law.” Edward M. Earle, The New Constitution of Turkey, 40
POL. SCI. Q. 73-100 (1925).
8. See RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN
REGIMES (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., Cambridge University Press,
2008).
9. G. M. Teczür, Judicial Activism in Perilous Times: The Turkish Case, 2
L. & SOC’Y REV. 245, 309 (2009).
10. Shambayati & Kirdiş, supra note 7, at 775.
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B. Political Insulation, Corporatism, Hierarchy
At this stage the issue of the specific legal and political
culture of Turkish judges arises. However, I want first to briefly
point out the second distinctive feature—or bulk of features—
consisting of the political insulation, corporatism and
“hierarchization” of the judiciary. Indeed, insulation and
corporatism are the core of the notion of the independence of
courts in Turkish constitutionalism.
Insulation is first of all declined in terms of neutralization
of the judicial function, which permeates several constitutional
provisions: as examples, I can recall the prohibition for judges and
prosecutors of becoming members of political parties (art. 68, fifth
paragraph); the conformity of the judicial activity to the
Constitution and the law (art. 138, first paragraph); the prohibition
of any direct or indirect influence on the exercise of the judicial
function (art. 138, second and third paragraphs); the possibility of
conducting all or part of the hearings in closed session “in cases
where absolutely required for reasons of public morality or public
security” (art. 141, first paragraph); and the election of the
members of the Supreme Court of Appeals by secret ballot (art.
154, second paragraph). 11 On the other hand, corporatism and
“hierarchization” shape the institutional organization and the status
of judges and prosecutors, which is built on the French-derived
bureaucratic organization. 12
The connection with the extrajudicial—political—sphere is
realized through the President of the Republic and the Ministry of
Justice, while the recently adopted constitutional reform of the
Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK), which
encountered the opposition of the higher judges, has broadened the
links with external institutions. Therefore, the former appoints the
11. Meaningfully, the Turkish legal system does not envisage the jury, as a
means to “introduce” society within the judicial system, and has excluded until
recent times the possibility for judges and prosecutors to create judicial
associations.
12. CARLO GUARNIERI & PATRIZIA PEDERZOLI., THE POWER OF JUDGES: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF COURTS AND DEMOCRACY (Cheryl A. Thomas ed.,
Oxford University Press, 2002). The Turkish judicial organization is based on
four different ranks, while the career processes are broadly determined by
magistrates’ superiors.
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Chief Public Prosecutor and the Deputy Chief Public Prosecutor
among the members of the Supreme Court of Appeals (art. 154,
first paragraph); 13 the Ministry of Justice, to which judges and
public prosecutors are attached “where their administrative
functions are concerned” (art. 140, sixth paragraph), authorizes
inquiries and investigations by judiciary inspectors or senior judges
or prosecutors (art. 144) and presides over the Supreme Council of
Judges and Prosecutors (art. 159, second paragraph). 14
C. Judicial Culture
The third feature is the legal and political cultures of
Turkish judges, bringing up three points. The first relates to the
guardianship role carried on by the judiciary as a part of a group of
elites 15 and to the above-mentioned importance of the judiciary
within the Constitution of 1961 and 1982. These characteristics are
linked to the safeguard (either active or passive) of the integrity of
the Kemalist Republic against any religious, ethnic or social
enemy. In this regard, it is common to speak in terms of “strategic
alliance between the judiciary and the military,” 16 while some
authors consider that “the case of Turkey offers a fascinating study
of a judiciary used in the service of the executive [military]
branch.” 17 The existence of a so-called Republican Alliance
including—besides the military and the judiciary—other sectors of
the society and the State such as the Universities and the
Republican People’s Party (CHP) is generally accepted, 18 even
though this picture is not completely sharp, as there have been
13. Before the above-mentioned reform, the President of the Republic also
appointed the five members of the HSYK, on the basis of lists established by the
Supreme Court of Appeals and the Council of State.
14. Other non-constitutional provisions give the Ministry of Justice an
important influence on the judiciary. As an example, a ministerial commission
controls the admission to the Justice Academy through an oral exam.
15. This principle “entails that a group of elites governs by reason of its
unique knowledge, wisdom, and virtue.” Teczür, supra note 9, at 307.
16. Id. at 309.
17. Lisa Hiblink & Patricia J. Woods, Comparative Sources of Judicial
Empowerment, 62 POL. RES. Q. 745, 748 (2009).
18. Ceren Belge, Friends of the Court: The Republican Alliance and
Selective Activism of the Constitutional Court of Turkey, 40 L. & SOC’Y REV.
653, 691 (2006).
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divergences to some extent between the military and the judiciary
during the 1960’s and 70’s. 19
The second point is the specific “statist” ideology of the
judiciary, as can be inferred both from the jurisprudence of the last
decade in some sensitive areas, such as freedom of expression and
freedom of association or in cases involving members of the
military, and from the surveys conducted on judicial culture. 20
Case law analysis and studies on judicial culture show that judicial
ideology is grounded on the defense of state interests (secularism,
integrity of the state, etc.), rather than on the inclusion of social
and political pluralism. Actually, a certain opening-up can be
found in courts’ decisions relating to human rights, showing a
fracture between sections of the lower judiciary and the high
judiciary. 21 In this regard, the Şemdinli case is exemplar. 22
Nevertheless, this opening-up does not change the general
tendencies, 23 and it has been further observed that “the nature of
19. Shambayati & Kirdis, supra note 7, at 773.
20. Daniella Kuzmanovic, Finally Insights into the Judicial Culture in
Turkey, available at http://cuminet.blogs.ku.dk (Last visited October 24, 2011)
(referring to two in-depth studies published in May 2009 by the Turkish
Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV)).
21. Tezcür holds that:
this [jurisprudence] is rather a collective expression of
professional commitments and ethics of the judges and
prosecutors. Since the 1980s, the state security forces executed
people under the pretext of war on terror and were acquitted in
the courts. This generated a trauma within the judiciary. Now
the judges are claiming, ‘Do not execute people on behalf of
the state and demand our complicity. This time, we will not
comply.’
Tezcür, supra note 9, at 328.
22. I refer to the bombing of a Kurdish bookshop in November 2005 by
noncommissioned officers of the army and an ex-PKK militant working for the
army, who were carrying out one of their ‘‘routine’’ counterinsurgency
operations. The accused were convicted by the Criminal Court of Van, but the
Supreme Court of Appeals revoked the verdict and transferred the case to a
military court. Id. at 318.
23. In 2005, the European Commission observed:
There are signs that the judiciary is increasingly integrating
the new provisions. Several court judgments have been issued
suggesting a positive development in areas such as freedom of
expression, freedom of religion, and the fight against torture
and ill-treatment and honour crimes. This trend also applies to
the decisions of the Council of State. On the other hand, courts
have issued judgments in the opposite direction in the area of
freedom of expression, including against journalists.
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the alliance between the TSK [Army] and the higher courts became
more pronounced after the Justice and Development Party . . .
came to power in 2002.” 24
Thirdly, consistently with the adherence of Turkish judge
to the model of the interstitial legislator, judicial discretion tends to
be very broad in order to implement the Kemalist principles,
thanks also to constitutional and legal provisions. 25 The broad
attitude of the Constitutional Court in defining, for example in
relation to the Kurdish issue, the boundaries between what is
cultural (i.e. nonpolitical) and what is political 26 can be extended to

European Comm’n, Turkey 2005 Progress Report 17, Sept. 11, 2005, available
at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/43956b6d4.html
(Last
visited
November 24, 2011). In an advisory report on the functioning of Turkish
judicial system, it has been noted that, “of course, it is one thing for judges and
public prosecutors to say that they apply the ECHR in their decisions and for
them to cite a selection of their judgments by way of example but that does not
necessarily reflect the general situation or mean that the predominant mentality
of the judiciary has changed.” European Comm’n, The Functioning of the
Judicial System in the Republic of Turkey: Report of an Advisory Visit 132, July
1119, 2004 (prepared by Paul Richmond & Kjell Björnberg); see also European
Comm’n, The Functioning of the Judicial System in the Republic of Turkey:
Report of an Advisory Visit, Sept. 29–Oct. 10, 2003 (prepared by Paul Richmond
& Kjell Björnberg).
24. Tezcür, supra note 9, at 309 (observing that changes in lower court’s
jurisprudence can be the result of the influence of a plurality of actors—
government, public opinion, and civil organizations—rather than of a more
supportive attitude towards human rights).
25. Even if the 2001 constitutional changes limited the grounds of
admissibility of the limitation of fundamental rights and freedoms, by
eliminating a series of general clauses included in article 13 (“public order,”
“general peace,” “public interest,” “public morality,” etc.), and introduced the
principle of proportionality, such clauses reappeared in other articles concerning
specific rights and freedoms (for example, art. 22 on freedom of
communication) and judges have the last word in evaluating proportionality.
26. Shambayati & Kirdiş, supra note 7, at 776. It is worth noting that even
judges and prosecutors who question the traditional pro-military predominance
use the same political arguments. Thus, in relation to the Şemdinli incident, the
prosecutor, indicting the trio who bombed the bookstore on charges of
disrupting the unity of the state and undermining the integrity of the country
(Article 302 of the Turkish Penal Code), made reference to political arguments,
such as the fact that “the employment of illegal means in the war on terror
undercut public confidence in the state and contributed to the goals of the PKK
by undermining state authority, creating disorder, and crystallizing divisive
ethnic identities,” or that, considering the conflict between elected politicians
and appointed bureaucrats, “the elements in the TSK pursued a deliberate
‘strategy of tension’ to preserve their prerogatives and block the reformist
agenda of the AKP government.” It has been observed that this public
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ordinary courts. In this regard, the example of article 301 of the
new Penal Code introduced in 2005 and successively modified in
2008 is meaningful. 27 Despite a considerable decrease in

prosecutor “had good connections with the government.” Tezcür, supra note 9,
at 320.
27. The modified text of the Penal Code reads:
1. A person who publicly denigrates Turkishness, the Republic
or the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, shall be sentenced
a penalty of imprisonment for a term of six months to three
years. 2. A person who publicly denigrates the Government of
the Republic of Turkey, the judicial bodies of the State, the
military or security organizations, shall be sentenced to a
penalty of imprisonment for a term of six months to two years.
3. Where denigrating of Turkishness is committed by a
Turkish citizen in another country, the penalty to be imposed
shall be increased by one third.4. Expressions of thought
intended to criticize shall not constitute a crime.” The last
paragraph is the most relevant innovation of the reform.
According to Algan, “this statement had also been drafted to
bring to law enforcement personnel’s attention that
‘denigration’ should be demarcated from free expression.”
Seen from this angle, it was an open warning directed to the
public attorneys and to the judges.
Bülent Algan, The Brand New Version of Article 301 of Turkish Penal Code and
the Future of Freedom of Expression Cases in Turkey, 9 GER. L. REV 2081,
2241 (2008). Further on, the word “asağılamak” (to denigrate) replaces other
terms meaning “to insult” (tahkir) and “to deride” (tezyif), used in the former
version of article 159. For some authors, the old terms are more precise.
The article has been modified again in 2008 in order to bring it in line with
European standards:
Denigrating the Turkish Nation, the State of the Turkish
Republic, the Institutions and Organs of the State 1. A person
who publicly denigrates Turkish Nation, the State of the
Republic of Turkey, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey,
the Government of the Republic of Turkey or the judicial
bodies of the State, shall be sentenced a penalty of
imprisonment for a term of six months and two years. 2. A
person who publicly denigrates the military or security
structures shall be punishable according to the first paragraph.
3. Expressions of thought intended to criticize shall not
constitute a crime. 4. The prosecution under this article shall
be subject to the approval of the Minister of Justice.
The introduction of the last paragraph is explained by the will to discourage any
arbitrary use of the article by prosecutors. Id. at 2238.
In the 2005 Regular Progress Report, the European Commission stated that:
the abovementioned Article 301 cases raise serious concerns
about the capacity of certain judges and prosecutors to make
decisions in accordance with Article 10 ECHR and the
relevant case law of the ECtHR. If the code continues to be
interpreted in a restrictive manner, then it may need to be
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indictments or convictions based on this article, 28 which has been
often used “as a political weapon of the judiciary against freedom
of expression” 29 thanks to the extremely general character of its
provisions, judges and prosecutors showed a certain degree of
resistance to normative changes through making reference to other
unchanged provisions; 30 in some cases they even continued to
behave as if the provisions were unchanged. Thus, in 2006 the
General Assemblies of the Civil and Criminal Divisions of the
Supreme Court of Appeals established highly restrictive
jurisprudence on article 301. 31 This decision highlighted the
autonomy of the judiciary with respect to the legislative branch.
In conclusion, despite the breaches in their jurisprudence,
courts—and the Supreme Court in primis—hold a strongly
conservative attitude in the most sensitive political cases, and
judges and prosecutors still have broad discretionary power to limit
fundamental rights and freedoms, while often using policy
arguments in their decisions. 32

amended in order to safeguard freedom of expression in
Turkey. In this context court proceedings based on Article 301
will be closely monitored.
Turkey 2005 Progress Report, supra note 23 at 26.
28. Id. at 17.
29. Algan supra note 27, at 2240, n.17.
30. It is the case of the provisions included in art. 169 of the Penal Code,
concerning the support to illegal armed organizations, or in art. 288 on the
prohibition of influencing a fair trial. European Comm’n, Turkey 2008 Progress
Report
16,
May
11,
2008,
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/keydocuments/reports_nov_2008/turkey_progress_report_en.pdf
(Last
visited
October 24, 2011); see also European Comm’n, 2002 Regular Report on
Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession 21, Sept. 10, 2002, available at
http://ekutup.dpt.gov.tr/ab/uyelik/progre02.pdf (Last visited December 13,
2011); 2003 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession 30,
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2003/rr_tk_final_e
n.pdf (Last visited December 13, 2011).
31. On the basis of Article 301 of the new Penal Code, the Court confirmed
a six-month suspended prison sentence for journalist Hrant Dink for insulting
“Turkishness” in a series of articles he wrote on Armenian identity, European
Comm’n, Turkey 2006 Progress Report 14, Aug. 11 2006, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/nov/tr_sec_1390_en.p
df (Last visited December 13, 2011).
32. As an example, in October 2005 the Council of State rendered a
decision sentencing a teacher wearing the headscarf on the way from home to
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III. JUDICIAL TRAINING
The conservative attitude of judges and prosecutors and the
peculiarity of their legal reasoning questions the characteristics of
judicial training, which plays an essential role in knowledge,
practices and behavior transmission and socialization. As the
judicial culture raises the issue of the proper implementation of the
recent Euro-driven reforms, the European Commission has
underlined the
[i]mportance [of] sustained efforts . . . with respect
to training judges [and] prosecutors,” as well as the
fact that judges and prosecutors “are reminded by
the responsible authorities about their duties and
obligations to respect the relevant provisions
stemming from International and European
conventions in the area of human rights and
fundamental freedoms, as required under Article 90
of the Turkish Constitution. 33
The Turkish judicial training system falls within the typical
continental model, hinging at the same time, at least since 1982, on

school, while the law prohibited wearing headscarf only in public places (in this
case, the school). Hootan Shambayati, Semi-Democratic/Authoritarian Regimes:
The Judicialization of Turkish (and Iranian) Politics, in RULE BY LAW: THE
POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 286, 297 (Tom Ginsburg &
Tamir Moustafa eds., Cambridge University Press, 2008).
33. Turkey 2005 Progress Report, supra note 23, at 17. In the European
Commission’s eyes, this should be even more necessary in consideration of the
corporatist character of some reform proposals raised by European Commission
experts. See European Comm’n, The Functioning of the Judicial System in the
Republic of Turkey: Report of an Advisory Visit (July 11-19, 2005) (prepared by
Paul Richmond & Kjell Björnberg). According to art. 90 of the Constitution, as
amended on May 22, 2004,
International agreements duly put into effect bear the force of
law. No appeal to the Constitutional Court shall be made with
regard to these agreements, on the grounds that they are
unconstitutional. In the case of a conflict between international
agreements in the area of fundamental rights and freedoms
duly put into effect and the domestic laws due to differences in
provisions on the same matter, the provisions of international
agreements shall prevail.
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY May 22, 2004, art. 90.
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the above-mentioned “civilizing mission” of the judiciary.
Therefore, the judicial training system resulted in a hybridism
between the French (bureaucratic) idea of the judge as a “law
technician” and the specifically Turkish tradition of the judge as
“ideology guardian.” This system, allowing internal hierarchical
and non-dialogical reproduction-transmission of knowledge and
connection with the executive, was consistent with the “top-down
attempt to enforce the ideas . . . and to inculcate the resulting
cultural values and norms, that the military regime believed should
direct state institutions as well as the individual lives of citizens.”34
At the same time, such a hierarchical training system was an
instrument to indirectly control the lower courts, because, as has
been observed, “while the military may have strong informal
influence over the high judiciary, the military’s ability to control
the behavior of the lower court judges cannot be assumed.” 35 It
seems that the even consistent changes in the Turkish judicial
training system have not radically modified this picture. This is
clear if we look at the different elements constituting the notion of
“judicial training system,” i.e. the structures making up the training
process (i) and the training contents and methods (ii).
A. Justice Academy
Before the creation in 1987 of a School for Candidate
Judges and Public Prosecutors under the control of the Minister of
Justice, the training process was essentially managed on the one
hand by the academic institutions,36 on the other by the judiciary
itself. In this framework, courts constituted the main agents of
34. “The goal was to create a Liberal Turkish state and society along a
French historical model of Liberalism.” Patricia J. Woods & Lisa Hilbink,
Comparative Sources of Judicial Empowerment: Ideas and Interests, 62 POL.
RES. Q. 745, 748 (2009).
35. Tezcür, supra note 9, at 311. It is worth noting that in France the
creation of a judicial school after the Second World War was supported by
lower judges and the Union fédérale de la magistrature (UFM), while the older
judges “optaient plutôt pour la simple reproduction sans école et, plus
globalement, les magistrats palcés en haut de la hiérarchie judiciaire, à la Cour
de cassation, en tenaient pour le statu quo.” JEAN-PIERRE ROYER, HISTOIRE DE
LA JUSTICE EN FRANCE, 876 (3d ed., Presses Universitaires de France, 2001).
36. These are under the supervision of the military through the Higher
Education Board (Yükseköğretim Kurulu, YÖK).
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socialization. The creation of the School during the liberal period
of Turgut Özal slightly weakened the internal influence, because
the training catalogues were under the control of the Education
Department of the Ministry of Justice and the School as a whole
was subordinated to the Ministry of Justice. 37 Nevertheless, judges
and prosecutors undertook two-thirds of the two-year period of
vocational training in general courts and in the Supreme Court of
Appeals (or the Council of State), which, therefore, still
determined the form of the training.
The creation of the Justice Academy in 2003—in view of
the gradual compliance of the Turkish legal system to the
European standards—did not bring about major substantial
changes, apart from opting for a multi-professional training
institution.38 On the one hand, dependence from the Ministry of
justice has been confirmed, notwithstanding the mixed
composition of the General Assembly of the Academy (which
somehow minimizes the presence of representatives of the
judiciary). 39 This entailed some criticism by the highest
37. The Functioning of the Judicial System in the Republic of Turkey:
Report of an Advisory Visit, supra note 33, at 44.
38. The Academy is also in charge of the training of administrative and
military judges, lawyers, notaries. Regarding judges and prosecutors, the initial
training path varies depending on the judicial career (ordinary, administrative,
military).
39. The President of the Justice Academy is appointed by the Ministry of
Justice from among three candidates proposed by the Board of Directors. The
Board of Directors consists of a President, the General Director for Personnel
from the Ministry of Justice and five members elected by the General Assembly.
The General Assembly is composed of 27 members, eleven of whom depend on
the executive power. Of the remainder, five are members of the judiciary, five
are academics from the universities, four are representatives of the Academy
staff and two represent the other legal professions. In addition, three members
appointed by the Ministry of Justice constitute the Board of Auditors. The
Presidency of the Centre for the Training of Candidate Judges and Public
Prosecutors, which is incorporated within the Academy once established, are
appointed by the Ministry of Justice on proposal of the President of the
Academy who, in turn, is appointed by the Ministry. See, The Functioning of the
Judicial System in the Republic of Turkey: Report of an Advisory Visit, supra
note 33, at 45. The Ministry of Justice also influences recruitment. Graduates
seeking entry to the judicial profession as either judges or prosecutors first take
a written examination administered by the School Selection and Placement
Centre, which administers all examinations for entry to higher education
institutes in Turkey. Candidates who pass the written examination are
interviewed by a panel composed of representatives of the Ministry of Justice,
and successful candidates are admitted to the Judicial Academy for two years of
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representatives of the judiciary against the law founding the
Academy, as well as by important members of the Union of
Turkish Bar Associations and of the Istanbul Bar Association. 40 On
the other hand, two-thirds of the training period continued to be
held within the courts, including the Supreme Court of Appeals. 41
Therefore, notwithstanding the existence of an institution
external to the judiciary, the current system reiterates forms of
internal hierarchical dependence and knowledge reproduction. On
the contrary, Turkey did not accept the suggestion of extending—
following the practice in the French training system—practical
experience to extrajudicial institutions, such as bar associations or
enterprises, as measures allowing the opening-up of the judiciary
towards the civil society. 42 In the same sense, the suggestion rising
from the Council of Europe to include representatives of other
legal professions and members of civil society in the teaching staff,
which is now composed mainly of academicians and members of
the higher courts, is not followed. 43 In conclusion, referring to the
Justice Academy as an autonomous institution—as the Turkish

training. The oral examination enables the Ministry of Justice to exercise
considerable influence over the recruitment of candidate judges and prosecutors.
Id. at 19.
40. Id. at 27.
41. The training period for future ordinary judges lasts two years and
includes two main phases. In the first, candidates follow a four-month
preparatory training programme within the Academy and an eight-month stage
within the so-called internship courts or prosecutor offices or ministerial
departments. The second phase is characterized by a specific training
(judge/prosecutor), also including a four-month training programme and an
eight-month stage within different courts (including the Supreme Court of
Appeals).
42. HAROLD ÉPINEUSE, ÉVALUATION DE LA FORMATION DES MAGISTRATS EN
FRANCE ET EN EUROPE. BILAN ET PERSPECTIVES 20 (Institut des hautes études
sur la justice., 2008).
43. CoE Lisbon Network, Questionnaire "A" on the structural and
functional features of training institutions of judges and prosecutors. Turkey,
available
at
www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/lisbonnetwork/questionnaires/Turkey-replyA.pdf (Last visited December 13, 2011). Furthermore, faced with the necessity
of integrating the judicial body in order to fulfill the many vacant posts, a law
allowing for practicing lawyers to become judges or prosecutors was rejected.
The many vacant posts have been filled every year through standard recruitment
procedures, The Functioning of the Judicial System in the Republic of Turkey:
Report of an Advisory Visit, supra note 33, at 58.
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Minister of Justice does 44—without taking into account the reality
of the different internal and external influences on the training
process could be misleading.
B. Training Contents and Methods
Concerning training contents and methods, three
preliminary observations have to be made pertaining to the general
situation of legal education in Turkey. The first is the lack of
satisfactory legal education within universities, which has been
highlighted by different reports as well as by judges themselves, 45
and the persistence of outdated teaching methods in initial training.
The second is that training contents and methods owe much to the
Roman law tradition, where the center of interest is not the student,
but the law, and legal education aims at presenting a coherent
system covered by general political principles which will enable
the judge to understand and apply the law. 46 This is common to
other systems, like the Italian system, where, starting with
university studies, teaching is essentially technical and theoretical
and law and politics are seen as two completely distinct areas. 47
The third is that education and training are ideologically-oriented.
Indeed, the military kept always in mind the importance of

44. See European Comm’n for the Efficiency of Justice, Scheme for
Evaluating Judicial Systems 2007 (March 9, 2008) (prepared by Mert Harun &
Turker Gökcen).
45. As the former President of the Supreme Court of Appeals stated,
one of the most important conditions of improving the quality
and reducing errors is to employ well-educated and competent
jurists who are able to make sound interpretations and correct
conclusions. Unfortunately, the ever-increasing Faculties of
Law, which are only so in name, are rapidly corrupting law
education. Unless radical measures are taken, this corruption
will increase. Professional ethics and the objectivity of judges
are only possible through quality education.
The Functioning of the Judicial System in the Republic of Turkey: Report of an
Advisory Visit, supra note 33, at 100. In 2006, there were thirty Law Faculties in
Turkey.
46. This applies also to the legal education in Law faculties. See Elliot E.
Cheatham, Legal Education in Turkey: Some Thoughts on Education for
Foreign Students, 2 J. LEGAL ED. 21, 23 (1949).
47. Shambayati, supra note 32, at 286.
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training 48 and, to mention some examples, it organized “special
briefings for judges and prosecutors in 1997 to ensure that they
shared the priorities of the TSK [the military] in its fight against
the ‘internal enemies’ (i.e. Islamic political actors),” 49 while law
school curricula included until recently a course on the history and
purposes of the revolutionary reforms in the fourth year. 50 Yet, one
could refer to the narrow notion of impartiality of judges that was
outlined on occasion of the opening ceremony of the Justice
Academy’s 2007-2008 academic year by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of Appeals, for whom judges must be partial to
protect and sustain the Republic. 51
Avoiding any review of the courses held at the Justice
Academy, I would like to point out one essential facet of the
current situation, questioning if recent reforms have brought (or
have the potential to bring) any change in Turkish judicial culture.
I think the response should be twofold. It is unquestionable that the
Ministry of Justice has suitably updated training catalogues in
more sensitive areas in accordance with the convergence with
European standards. The update concerned mainly EU law and
human rights through ECHR provisions and ECtHR case law,
consisting also in specific programmes aimed at training judges
and public prosecutors as trainers. The overall impact of these
48. As highlighted by the creation in 1982 of the Higher Education Board
and the statement that “it is natural that developments pertaining to the national
education system, which is of vital importance for Turkey, are followed by the
General Staff.” Id. at 289.
49. Tezcür, supra note 9, at 308. The briefing routine procedure involved
also other component parts of the state and social structures, HAMIT
BOZARSLAN, HISTOIRE DE LA TURQUIE CONTEMPORAINE 88 (La Découverte,
2006).
50. Cheatham, supra note 46, at 22.
51. Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals stated
The main component of judgeship is impartiality. However,
you will be partial in your decisions to protect and sustain the
Republic of Turkey. If we are here today, it is because of the
rights secured by our Republic. You should, and have to,
know that the Republic form of government is the most
appropriate regime suitable for human dignity and honor. You
will be partial to claiming ownership of a democratic and
secular system and the rule of law; you will be partial to
owning our crescent and star flag, and to raising the flag even
higher. You do not have the luxury of being impartial to these
issues.
Kemal Şahin, Impartiality of the Judiciary, 1 ANKARA B. REV. 16 (2008).
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measures was deemed largely satisfactory by several lawyers’
associations, and it is also indirectly confirmed by some analysis of
the courts’ jurisprudence. Certain attention was given to judicial
ethics in relation to corruption phenomena, and foreign languages,
although some concerns have been expressed on the quality and
the extension of the relative courses. 52 Specific ongoing training
courses focused on law reforms, falling within ordinary legal
adjournment. Moreover, several judges participated in exchange
programmes, allowing the potential opening of the judicial body.
In this regard, European convergence has then given noticeable
results.
Nevertheless, there is ground for more critical remarks in
relation to other disciplinary areas. The training catalogues for the
pre-service training are essentially oriented towards traditional law
subjects and technical issues, with scarce or no attention to social
sciences and comparative law as well as on subjects and learning
methods aimed at developing a critical attitude in the judge,
allowing the introjection of a culture of independence and
pluralism and the making of what has been called a “thinking
judge,” able to participate in European constitutional discourse. 53
In a word, no attention is given to what the European Judicial
Training Network calls “Society Issues,” a catalogue including
courses such as “The judge’s role and self-image today,” “The
judge as arbiter of value,” “On the independence of the judiciary—
A European comparison,” and so on. Therefore, a better balance
should be established between strictly technical issues and societal,
constitutional and comparative subjects—more in general, what is

52. The Functioning of the Judicial System in the Republic of Turkey:
Report of an Advisory Visit, supra note 23, at 96, 101.
53. Capeta, supra note 2, at 53, for which constitutional discourse “requires
not only mechanical application of the principles learned, but also a critical
assessment of them, either in relation to the internal legal order or as part of the
European legal order.” Within the pre-service curriculum for ordinary judges
there are six training catalogues. Two training catalogues concerns respectively
“Professional Culture” and “General Culture and Personal Development;” the
first one includes essentially technical subjects, while the second, which has a
residual character, includes essentially courses related to personal abilities rather
than general culture. A further catalogue focus on “Courses and Hobbies,”
which includes, among others, courses on “Applied Turkish music,” “Folkloric
dances,” “Traditional Turkish handicrafts” and “Foreign language.”
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indicated as “complex curricula.” 54 Further on, one could question
the inclusion in Turkish training catalogues of subjects concerning
Turkish national culture and the still scarce attention to foreign
languages and other cultures.
Lastly, training methods also reflect a traditional approach,
similar to legal university education, where teaching methods are
based on “lecturer centered system-conferencing courses” of a
theoretical character, consisting mainly in memorizing legal
principles and rules. 55 Thus, not much attention is yet paid to
suggestions coming from the European Commission on the need to
integrate lectures and seminars with “methods allowing broader
dissemination of the results of training.” 56 While this problem is
more serious concerning university legal education rather than
judicial vocational training, nonetheless it still exists.
In conclusion, we can look at the French judicial training
system, which is generally used as a reference model for candidate
countries, in particular in relation to training catalogues. The
French system responds to three main objectives: acquisition of
technical competence; understanding the social and economic
milieu in which judges operate; and developing critical reflection

54. “The types of judicial education programmes that fall under “complex
curricula” include those that suggest judges explore different dimensions to their
role or explore their attitudes, values and beliefs. Judges’ learning style
preferences generally mean these types of courses are more difficult to
implement. Most judges’ learning preferences are for concise, logical analysis,
abstract ideas, technical tasks and practical solutions. In contrast, complex
curricula programmes (such as those designed to explore diversity or the social
and cultural context to litigation) often do not fit these learning preferences,”
Daniela Piana, Cheryl Thomas, Harold Epineuse, Carlo Guarnieri, Judicial
Training & Education Assessment Tool. Meeting the Changing Training Needs
of Judges in Europe, JUDICIAL STUDIES ALLIANCE 14 (2007).
55. A. Başözen, New Method in Turkish Legal Education: Internship
During
the
Law
Faculty,
available
at
http://www.eakademi.org/incele.asp?konu=New%20Method%20in%20Turkish%20Legal%2
0Education:%20Internship%20During%20the%20Law%20Faculty&kimlik=127
1314793&url=makaleler/abasozen-3.htm (Last visited November 5, 2011).
56. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and
the Council on judicial training in the European Union, COM/2006/0356 final,
section 25, where it is added: “Moreover, the introduction of a multidisciplinary
element in compliance with national traditions should facilitate exchanges of
views and experience between, for example, judges, prosecutors, lawyers and
police officers.”
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on the judicial function. 57 As I have briefly pointed out, the
improvement of the Turkish judicial training system is essentially
oriented towards the first objective.
IV. CONCLUSION
As we have seen, changes in the Turkish judicial training
system do not achieve a shift from a traditionally bureaucratic
conception of judicial education to a pluralist one, where the “law
is defined not by the letter of the law, but by its meaning,” drawing
from interaction between multiple actors. 58 European influence is
limited to the introduction of training catalogues connected with
contingent needs, such as human rights and EU law, but (still) does
not affect the institutional framework, nor does it adapt judicial
training contents and methods to social and political pluralism. 59
This situation has tangible effects on judicial culture. The
above-mentioned analysis of courts’ jurisprudence and surveys of
judicial ideology seem to confirm a certain resistance in openingup the judicial elite to social pluralism in order to allow the
judiciary to act as an interface with civil society, due to the
peculiarities of the Turkish socio-political system. The result is a
57. Questionnaire ''B'' on the role of training institutions in recruitment and
initial training of judges and prosecutors. Council of Europe, Lisbon Network,
available
at
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/lisbonnetwork/
questionnaires/France-reply-B.pdf. (Last visited October 24, 2011).
58. Sinisa Rodin, Discourse and Authority in European and PostCommunist Legal Culture, 1 CROATIAN YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN L. AND POL’Y
3 (University of Zagreb, 2005).
59. An indirect confirmation comes from the observation that Turkey is not
an active player in international networks permitting broader socialization and
the opening-up of the judiciary. B. van Delden, Effectiveness of the Judicial
System. Report of a peer based assessment mission to Turkey, November 17-21,
2008 (European Commission, 2008). This seems to confirm what has been
observed by Daniela Piana in relation to Central and Eastern European recent
accession Countries, i.e. that the adoption of any judicial training reform is
highly dependent from the national actors which are involved. D. Piana,
Unpacking Policy Transfer, Discovering Actors: The French Model of Judicial
Education Between Enlargement and Judicial Cooperation in the EU, FRENCH
POL. 5, 33-65 (2007). In fact, judicial training reforms in Turkey were
essentially conducted by the Government through its Ministry of Justice and the
High Judiciary, with scarce participation of lower court judges and judicial
association, whose constitution has been authorized only in 2006.
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judge who is still separate from society. 60 The issue has been
recently raised by Osman Can, co-chairman of the “Judges and
Prosecutors Association for Democracy and Freedom.” According
to Can, the Turkish judiciary should have a mental transformation,
which passes also through an appropriate consideration of training
needs. Thus, he suggests that “members of the judiciary should
know about comparative political history and about nondemocratic movements and their implications for the world and
also for Turkey.” 61 The lack of a comprehensive training strategy
aimed at effectively shaping independent judges through the ability
to reason, taking into account normative and extra-normative
elements, is also reflected in the type of legal argumentation used,
characterized as authoritarian rather than authoritative legal
discourse: 62 thus, courts often refer to ECHR provisions or ECtHR
case law simply as a mere support of their decision rather than as a
reasoning instrument, excluding any constructive disagreement. In
this regard, it has been observed that “Turkish courts very often
pretend to consider the case law of the European Court of Human
Rights, but then conclude that national laws and their interpretation

60. Interesting evidence is given by a columnist of the English language
newspaper Today’s Zaman:
Even for practical family matters, they [the judges] treated the
people opposite them as just a part of problem. In the case in
which I was a witness, after answering the judge’s questions, I
tried to raise some points which had not occurred to him to ask
and which were very important to the subject; however, he
silenced me. In all three cases, instead of my own sentences,
the judges asked the record keepers to write whatever they
dictated on my behalf . . . I have heard several times that when
candidates are chosen to be future judges, they are told they
should keep their distance from ordinary people. They are
asked not go to places everybody goes—they should not carry
shopping bags, and they should not bargain when they buy
apples. Of course, not only are they learning some manners,
they are taught that they are the defenders of the republic,
especially secularism.
Ayse Karabat, A Face Like a Court(room) Wall, in TODAY’S ZAMAN, Feb. 21,
2010.
61. Karabat, Taboo-Breaking Jurist Osman Can: Judiciary Cannot be
Supra Political, in TODAY’S ZAMAN, Jan. 10, 2010.
62. M. Bobek, The Fortress of Judicial Independence and the Mental
Transitions of the Central European Judiciaries, 1 EUR. PUB. L. 109 (2008).
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of the present case is in full conformity with them.” 63 That means a
rhetorical use of ECHR provisions and ECtHR case law.
The Turkish-European convergence, which I have
considered through the lens of judicial training, is then generating
changes in specific areas of legal knowledge, not in judicial
mentality. This observation confirms what has been noted by some
authors in relation to the Centre and East European former
candidate and candidate Countries, concerning the ability of judges
not only to refer in their decision to European law, but also to fully
participate in the “constitutional discourse.” For these authors,
European convergence brings about the former, but not the latter.
As a consequence, major changes in legal education are needed
and, “provided this transformation does not remain merely formal,
but also brings changes in the curricula, syllabuses and methods of
legal education, future . . . judges will be prepared to participate in
European constitutional discourse.” 64 Regarding training
structures, the path that has been sketched through the creation of
the Justice Academy consists to a certain extent of the shift from
judicial influence to the ministerial influence. Rather, a settling of
the internal balance of the judicial training system involving a
breach of the vertical/hierarchical logic, that is typical of any
bureaucratic organization, would be more suitable. This new
milieu could profit from the greater reactivity to opening-up
towards civil society of the lower courts.

63. “In plain words, Turkish Courts should bring their understanding of
freedom of expression in line with that of the European Court of Human Rights.
Otherwise, no amendment of law will contribute to the protection of that
freedom. The solution to the problem mainly depends on a change in mentality,
not in the law.” B. Algan, supra note 27, at 2250.
64. Capeta, supra note 2, at 53. The task is not at all easy, by reason of the
high number of judges and prosecutors—more than 9000—for a country of
more than 75 million of inhabitants.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Claims for personal injuries are becoming very common,
especially in countries within the European Union. The amounts of
claims being made are exceptionally high. Having said this, in
∗ LL.B., LL.D., Malta.
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order to understand the basis of the Maltese Legal system, it is
imperative to go through the English case decisions to discover
patterns in the reasoning by which damages are awarded under the
English system of tort. The starting point will be in the 1960s,
when the English courts had a different approach to this issue. The
paper will then move on to discuss the innovations that were
subsequently introduced into the English system up to recent times,
the Maltese legal system of awarding damages and a comparative
study between the two legal systems. In order to do so, the author
intends to elucidate the different heads of damages for personal
injury, clarify the heads of damages under English law which
cover similar grounds or overlap with lucrum cessans, and will go
through each and one of them in order to come up with a
definition.
II. DIFFERENT HEADS OF DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY
A tortfeasor has the duty to compensate the victim for the
losses he has suffered. In tort law, the most important factor is
restitutio in integrum and thus the attempt to put the victim in the
same position as he was before the accident occurred. Of course
the restitutio in integrum as stated by Munkman 1 applies only in
cases where the original position can be restored. If such is not
possible, a fair compensation equivalent in money, is to be
awarded for the damage sustained. In fact Lord Morris in the case
Parry v. Cleaver stated that: “to compensate in money for pain and
for physical consequences is invariably difficult . . . no other
process can be devised than that of making a monetary
assessment.” 2
In Lim Poh Choo v. Camden and Islington Area Health
Authority, Lord Scarman said, “the principle of the law is that
compensation should as nearly as possible put the party who has
suffered in the same position as he would have been in if he had
not sustained the wrong.” 3
1. JOHN MUNKMAN, DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURIES AND DEATH 2
(Butterworths, London, 1989).
2. Parry v. Cleaver, 1 All E.R. 555 (1969), [1970] A.C. 1.
3. Lim Poh Choo v. Camden and Islington Area Health Authority, [1980]
A.C. 174 (1980).
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The key issue in tort has thus always been compensation
but in order to understand better such vital factor, it is necessary to
explain the different heads of damages that exist under the
Common Law system when dealing with personal injury.
In the case West v. Shephard, Lord Morris said, “in the
process of assessing damages judges endeavour to take into
account all the relevant changes in a claimant’s circumstances
which have been caused by the tortfeasor. These are often
conveniently described as ‘heads of damages.” 4
Reference to these heads of damages has been made over
the years by several judges. One is to note, however, that this
reference is different from saying that the heads of damages are to
be interpreted in a restrictive manner and as exhausting the field.
In fact, a case in point is Judge Cockburn, who in Phillips
v. London & South Western Railroad Co., 5 a case which dates back
to 1879, refers to some of these heads of damages. He mentions
“the bodily injury sustained,” “the pain undergone,” “the effect on
the health of the sufferer” and the “pecuniary loss sustained.”
Before delving further in the details of the heads of
damages, it is appropriate to define ‘damages.’ Lord Blackburn in
the Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co. 6 case of 1880 defines
damages as:
That sum of money which will put the party who
has been injured, or who has suffered, in the same
position as he would have been in if he had not
sustained the wrong for which he is now getting his
compensation or reparation.
So damages are primarily considered to be the means used to put
the plaintiff in the same position as if the tort has not been
committed. Therefore, the end goal of the court is to reinstate the
plaintiff to his previous position as much as possible. In order to do
this, the court has to consider the whole case and it is thus more
convenient for the judge to consider the whole case under separate
heads of damages.

4. H. West & Son Ltd. v. Shepard, 2 All E.R. 625 (1963), [1964] A.C. 326.
5. Phillips v. London & South Western Railroad Co., 5 Q.B.D. 78 (1880).
6. Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co., 5 App Case 25 (1880).
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The main ways of classifying damages in English Law are
in terms of whether they compensate for Pecuniary and NonPecuniary loss and also in terms of whether they constitute General
or Special damages. Thus the principal ways of categorizing
damages in English law are either in terms of the pecuniary nature
of the loss or the lack of such pecuniary nature or in terms of how
specific or general these damages are. It should be clear, however,
that these are mutually exclusive ways of classifying the same
spectrum of damages. Therefore, all damages can be classified as
either pecuniary or not and all damages can be classified according
to whether they are general or specific.
A. Pecuniary Damages
In Fair v. London and North Western Rly Co., 7 Judge
Cockburn had already referred to the distinction between pecuniary
and non-pecuniary loss. He stated that when taking into
consideration pecuniary loss, one is to take into account both the
incapacity to earn a future improved income and also the present
loss.
In the leading book The Quantum of Damages: Personal
Injury Claims, 8 pecuniary damages are described as being those
damages which are capable of being calculated in terms of money.
This category is then further divided in sub-categories listing the
various types of pecuniary damages. The first sub-category which
the author lists is expenses. So all the expenses incurred by the
victim such as medical expenses, cost of fares to and from hospital,
additional domestic help and the rest can all be reduced to cash and
are thus pecuniary damages.
Another sub-category is that of loss of earning or other
profits. This sub-category deals with all that loss of earning or
profit which the plaintiff, has lost due to the accident from the day
of the injury to the date of the trial.

7. Fair v. London and North Western Rly Co., [1869] 21 L.T. 326 (Lloyds
list law reports, 1963 Volume 1).
8. DAVID A. KEMP, MARGARET S. KEMP & RICHARD O. HARVEY., 1 THE
QUANTUM OF DAMAGES: PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS 8 (3d ed., Sweet and
Maxwell, London 1967).
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The sub-category of handicap in the labour market may
seem quite similar to the latter sub-category but in reality, when
scrutinized further, it is not. This deals with the disadvantage the
plaintiff will have when compared with his colleagues in the labour
market due to the injuries suffered. So, even if a person is still
capable of performing his normal duties as before, he could still be
disadvantaged if he is less capable of doing other kinds of jobs. As
Kemp and Kemp 9 say, if an employer needs one of the employees
to be redundant, naturally he will lay off the man least capable,
hence probably that person who has been incapacitated to a certain
extent. Such loss thus falls under pecuniary damages.
The fact of being disadvantaged in the labour market was
given more prominence as time went by, in the case Smith v.
Manchester 10 where the Court held that an additional award could
be made for the fact that the plaintiff was in risk that between the
date of the trial and the end of the working life he would have to
search for another job. This award is thus granted as a
compensation for the “weakening of the claimant competitive
position in the open labour market.”
These awards are known as Smith v. Manchester awards. In
order to be granted, the injuries suffered must be such that the
consequent disability will put the plaintiff at a disadvantage with
others when seeking alternative employment. Two very important
factors that must subsist in order to grant this award are: (a) there
must be a real or substantial risk that the claimant is in risk of
losing his current employment during his working life and (b) that
the claimant is at a disadvantage in obtaining alternative work as a
direct consequence of the injuries suffered.
In circumstances like these, even though the loss is a
pecuniary one, a mathematical calculation might not lead to justice
and thus the courts award an extra sum which is calculated upon
rough estimates in order to compensate for the future disadvantage
which will be suffered by the claimant. An important factor to keep
9. Id. at 8.
10. The claimant slipped and fractured an elbow. As a result, she had to
remain on light duties. She was found to be at a great risk of losing her
employment before retirement age. The trial judge awarded her £300 while on
appeal a sum of £1,000 was awarded. Smith v. Manchester, [1974] K.I.R. 1.
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in mind is that these awards may not be given if the plaintiff’s
condition has stabilised by the time of the trial. When assessing
such an award, the four factors which are taken into consideration
are the net annual income of the plaintiff, the length of the
remaining working life, the intensity of the risk of him being put
back on the labour market, and the effect of the disability on his
working capacity. Usually the courts do not award damages under
this heading which amount to more than five years loss of the
present net annual wage of the plaintiff.
Kemp and Kemp also include under pecuniary damages
those material losses which go beyond the loss of earnings. So if a
person loses his fringe benefits, he is entitled to be awarded as
damages the pecuniary equivalent of those material benefits which
were lost up to the date of the trial.
McGregor 11 defines pecuniary loss as being all financial
and material loss incurred by the plaintiff. He further clarifies these
financial losses by giving the examples of loss of business profits
or expenses of medical treatment. McGregor continues his
definition by saying that such loss “is capable of being
arithmetically calculated in money even though the calculation
must sometimes be a rough one where there are difficulties of
proof.”
Nick Parker writes that:
Pecuniary damages reimburse the expenses incurred
due to the accident. For example, the injury may
have resulted in the person missing work which in
turn will result in a loss of earnings or profits. The
injury may have also required the plaintiff to spend
money prior to trial for such things as parking and
mileage charges for going to see a doctor, or for
prescriptions and medical costs not covered by
health care. 12

11. HARVEY MCGREGOR, MCGREGOR ON DAMAGES 8 (Sweet and Maxwell,
London 1997).
12. Nick Parker, Damages in Personal Injury Cases, 2 A LEGAL DIGEST OF
CURRENT TRENDS IN PERSONAL INJURY LAW 1 (2002), available at
http://www.rmrf.com/files/resourcesmodule/@random4293f2f916ea0/11170530
62accid.pdf (Last visited November 26, 2011).
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The Law Commission’s Report on Personal Injury Litigation–
Assessment of Damages 13 specifically defines pecuniary damages
as, “loss in money or money’s worth, whether by parting with what
one has or by not getting what one might get, except that it
includes matters for which damages are available under section 4
or 5 of this act.” 14
Schedule 1, Part I and II, it lists all those losses which fall
under pecuniary loss. Part I deals with such loss before the
judgment.
1. Expenses incurred before judgment.
2. Loss of earning or profits suffered before
judgment.
3. Loss of income (other than earnings or profits)
suffered before judgment.
4. Matters for which damages are available under
section 4 of this act.

13. The Law Commission, Report on Personal Injury Litigation—
Assessment of Damages (Law comm. no. 56) (London 1973).
14. Article 4 (1) states:
In an action for damages for personal injuries damages may be
awarded in respect of a) any reasonable expenses gratuitously
incurred by any other person in rendering or causing to be
rendered to the injured person any necessary services, as if
those expenses had been recoverable by him from the injured
person; and b) the reasonable value of any necessary services
gratuitously rendered to the injured person by any other
person, as if their reasonable value had been so recoverable by
him.
Article 5(1) states:
In an action for damages for personal injuries damages may,
subject to subsection (2) below, be awarded in respect of the
reasonable value of any personal services which as a result of
the injuries the injured person has been or will or probably
will be unable to render to a dependant, being services which
the injured person used to render gratuitously to that
dependant before suffering the injuries and which but for the
injuries he would probably have continued to render
gratuitously to him.
5(2) Subsection (1) above applies only to personal services of a kind that can
ordinarily be obtained by paying a reasonable amount for them (for example
services of a kind that might be rendered by a housekeeper, nurse, secretary or
domestic servant whether full-time or part-time, or services involving the
provision of transport.) Id.
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5. The reasonable value of any services to which
section 5(1) applies, being services which would
probably have been rendered before judgment.
6. Pecuniary loss suffered before judgment, not
falling within another paragraph of this Part of this
Schedule.
Part II, then deals with future pecuniary loss.
7. Future expenses.
8. Future loss of earnings or profits.
9. Future loss of income (other than earnings or
profits).
10. The reasonable value of any services to which
section 5(1) of this Act applies being services which
would probably have been rendered after judgment.
11. Future pecuniary loss not falling within any
other paragraph of this Part of this Schedule.
Both Kemp and Kemp and the Law Commission define closely
what this head of damage means but delve also into all the possible
losses which fall under such head.
Having outlined the meaning of pecuniary damages, one
can now move on to the other head of damage known as nonpecuniary damages.
B. Non-Pecuniary Damages
Kemp and Kemp, define non-pecuniary loss as “those
losses which are impossible to assess by arithmetical calculation.”
Having said this, they then proceed to sub-categorize this head of
damage. 15 As a first sub-category, one finds pain, suffering, and
shock. The authors here explain that pain and suffering do not
necessarily have the same meaning, even though the phrase “pain
and suffering has almost become a term of art.” Since for example
as in the case Forrest v. Sharp 16 damages may be awarded simply
for the mental suffering of the victim and not for the pain. In the
mentioned case, the plaintiff went through mental suffering
15. KEMP ET AL., supra note 8, at 11-13.
16. Forrest v. Sharp, 107 S.J. 536 (1963).
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because he knew that his life expectancy has been significantly
reduced and that he must spend the remaining days in misery.
Shock is a separate factor which must, however, still be
taken into account when dealing with pain and suffering
Apart from pain and suffering, Kemp and Kemp deal also
with loss of amenities of life. They classify this as a sub-category
of non-pecuniary damages. For them this head includes,
“Everything which reduces the plaintiff’s enjoyment of life
considered apart from any material or pecuniary loss which may be
attendant upon the loss of amenity.” 17
In the case Manley v. Rugby Portland Cement Co. Ltd.,
Lord Justice Birkett defined loss of amenities in this way, “the man
made blind by the accident will no longer be able to see the
familiar things he has seen all his life; the man who has had both
legs removed and will never again go upon his walking
excursions—things of that kind—loss of amenities.” 18
So loss of amenities is anything which reduces the
enjoyment of one’s life. Lord Morris and Lord Tucker state that
damages under this category may not be reduced in cases where
the plaintiff loses consciousness and is thus unaware of the
pleasure lost.
As another sub-category of non-pecuniary damages, one
finds also loss of expectation of life which is quite close to the
category of loss of amenities. In cases of loss of expectation of life,
damages are awarded in respect of the happiness which the
plaintiff might have lost due to the fact that his life span has been
reduced as a consequence of the accident. In its decision, in the
case Benhan v. Gambling 19 the court held that damages awarded
under this category should be moderate. 20

17. KEMP ET AL., supra note 8, at 12.
18. Manley v. Rugby Portland Cement Co. Ltd., 1952 C.A. No. 286 (1952).
19. Benhan v. Gambling, [1941] A.C. 157.
20. An interesting point to make at this stage is that in 1971 Judge Crichton
halved the award of damages under the head of “expectation of life” on the
simple reason that the deceased was a habitual criminal and according to Judge
Crichton the “life of a criminal is an unhappy one.” This undoubtedly is far from
being fair. The fact that a person has had trouble with his criminal record does
not in any way means that he does not enjoy his life. Since life is what we make
it, everyone enjoys his life in a different and separate way.
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A minor sub-category is that of inconvenience and
discomfort. In such case, if the plaintiff suffers incidental
inconvenience or discomfort, both of which are non-pecuniary
damages, he must be compensated.
As a last sub-category Kemp and Kemp introduce
exemplary and aggravated damages. As admitted by them, the
distinction between the two is not very clear. Exemplary damages
are there to punish the defendant for outrageous or scandalous
conduct. Aggravated damages, on the other hand tend to
compensate the plaintiff for aggravated harm done to him, such as
injury to his feelings.
The Law Commission describes non-pecuniary damages in
quite a similar way as Kemp and Kemp. 21 The Report in Part III
states that:
Non-Pecuniary Loss means pain and suffering, loss
of amenities, and any other matters not falling
within Part I or Part II of this Schedule. Okrent and
Buckley define non-pecuniary damages as losses
(such as pain and humiliation) which have no
particular objective dollar amount that can be
placed on them. 22 Andoh and Marsh on the other
hand
describe
it
as
“pain
and
suffering (including mental distress), loss of
amenity and the injury itself.” 23
While all the definitions revolve around the concept of pain, once
again Kemp and Kemp manage to give an all rounded definition of
non-pecuniary damages by going into other aspects of damages
which do not strictly speaking, fall under the realm of pain but
which nonetheless are still to be considered as non-pecuniary
damages.

21. KEMP ET AL., supra note 8, at 11-13.
22. C.J. OKRENT & W.R. BUCKLEY, TORTS AND PERSONAL INJURY LAW 47
(3d ed., Delmar Learning, New York, 2003).
23. BENJAMIN ANDOH & STEPHEN MARSH, CIVIL REMEDIES 140
(Dartmouth, England 1997).
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C. General and Special Damages
Having dealt in quite some depth with the difference
between pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages, it is essential, at
this point to go into the disparities that lie between the other
principal ways of classifying damages, in terms of General or
Special Damages.
Law.com defines “general damages” as:
Monetary recovery (money won) in a lawsuit for
injuries suffered (such as pain, suffering, inability to
perform certain functions) or breach of contract for
which there is no exact dollar value which can be
calculated
(emphasis
added).
They
are
distinguished from special damages, which are for
specific costs, from punitive (exemplary) damages
for punishment, and to set an example when malice,
intent or gross negligence was a factor. 24
While on the other hand, “special damages” are defined as:
Damages claimed and/or awarded in a lawsuit
which were out-of-pocket costs directly as the result
of the breach of contract, negligence or other
wrongful act by the defendant. Special damages can
include medical bills, repairs and replacement of
property, loss of wages and other damages which
are not speculative or subjective. They are
distinguished from general damages, in which there
is no evidence of a specific dollar figure. 25
Atiyah identifies as the distinction between the two classes the fact
that some damages are precisely measurable and quantifiable
whilst others are not. He describes “special damages” as being
those damages which are confined to out of pocket expenses
incurred before the trial and to loss of earnings incurred before the
24. Law.com, General Damages,
http://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=809 (Last visited November 8,
2011).
25. Law.com, Special Damages,
http://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=1985 (Last visited November
8, 2011).
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trial. On the other hand “general damages” are “damages for loss
of earnings likely to be incurred in the future, plus damages for
pain and suffering, whether incurred before or after the trial,
together with damages for other immeasurable, such as loss of
amenities, “loss of expectation of life,” disabilities and
disfigurements.” 26
Lord Donaldson states that general damages are made up of
two elements: a subjective one being the pain and suffering and an
objective one being the loss of amenity. 27 He observes that this
head incorporates both physical and psychiatric injury in respect of
past, present and future loss.
Williams and Hepple say that special damage is that
damage which must be specifically claimed in the statement of
claim, while there is no need for one to make any specific
monetary claim as regards general damage. 28 They explain that:
Pain and suffering are not special damage because
their translation into money terms is arbitrary, but if
the plaintiff had his clothes ruined in the accident,
and incurred hospital expenses, and loss of wages,
the value of the clothes and other monetary loss up
to the date of the trial would be special damage
upon which he would have to put a figure. 29
In contrast a general damage is that damage which cannot be
accurately quantifiable in money terms. In such case no exact
figure needs to be claimed on the pleadings because the court
makes its assessment and awards the amount of damages which it
deems fit.
General damage, on the other hand, is damage not
accurately quantifiable in money terms for which damages can be
awarded even in the absence of any specific monetary claim in the
plaintiff’s statement of claim.

26. PATRICK S. ATIYAH, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 168 (3d
ed., Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1980).
27. In the foreword to the first edition of the Judicial Studies Board
Guidelines.
28. B.A. HEPPLE & G. WILLIAMS, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORT 6061(Butterworths, London, 1974).
29. Id.
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Osborne goes yet into a further difference between the two
heads. He describes general damages as “compensatory amounts
which have to be assessed by the court of trial.” In contrast,
“special damages are the specific amounts which represent
provable actual financial loss to the claimant.” 31 Like other
authors, he stresses that it is only actual loss incurred between the
accident and the trial that can be recovered as special damages.
Actual loss which occurs after the trial, even though the amounts
of expenses are precisely known, cannot be classified under the
head of special damages. He in fact describes in detail what
constitutes special damages in this way:
30

a) provable loss or earnings until trial;
b) damage to clothing, repairs to vehicles, hire of
alternative transport;
c) extra travel costs occasioned by the accident, e.g.,
by the claimant having frequently to visit hospitals
as an outpatient, or by relatives having to visit him
in hospital;
d) private medical or nursing treatment.
D. Distinguishing between the Two Classifications
As one can see, English law divides compensable loss
conveniently under heads of damages. The factor that determines
whether a loss should be listed under one head of damage and not
under another is essentially how general or special that loss is and
whether it is quantifiable in monetary terms. In order for a claim to
fall under the head of special damage, the loss claimed must have
taken place up to the time of the trial and it must be quantifiable in
monetary terms. So one can very well state that all special damages
are pecuniary damages since they can be fully compensated in
monetary terms.
The situation is somewhat more complex when dealing
with general damages, since not all the losses that fall within this
classification can be easily compensated in monetary terms. In fact
30. CRAIG OSBORNE, CIVIL LITIGATION 5 (Oxford University Press, Oxford,
2007).
31. Id.
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the only loss that can be quantified in monetary terms is loss of
future earnings; this in fact is classified also as a pecuniary loss.
The head of general damages includes also non-pecuniary losses
such as pain and suffering and loss of amenities which
undoubtedly can never be exactly quantifiable in monetary terms.
Thus even though one can state that all special damages are
pecuniary damages, to state that all pecuniary damages are special
damages would be incorrect, since there are certain pecuniary
damages which are classified as general damages. To understand
how each compensable loss is classified, one is to keep in mind
that the same compensable loss is classified twice, (1) under the
general or special head of damage and (2) under the pecuniary or
non-pecuniary loss. By way of an example, the weakening of a
plaintiff’s position in the labour market falls under the head of
general damages since it is a loss which will occur after the
judgment but it is also a pecuniary loss since it can be quantifiable
(even if not exactly through a mathematical calculation) in
monetary terms.
As Lord Donaldson said, “Paradoxical as it may seem one
of the commonest tasks of a judge sitting in a civil court is also one
of the most difficult. This is the assessment of general damages for
pain, suffering or loss of the amenities of life.” 32 Whilst no two
cases are ever precisely the same, justice requires that there be
consistency between awards.
It is therefore also interesting now to go through the
procedure as applied under the Maltese legal system when it comes
to compensating personal injuries and the way damages for lucrum
cessans are calculated.
Maltese law divides compensable damages under two
headings, mainly lucrum cessans and damnum emergens so when
awarding damages, the Maltese courts must clearly show which
damages are being awarded for lucrum cessans and which are for
damnum emergens.
Lucrum cessans is a civilian term derived from Roman law,
where it meant ‘loss of profit’ and corresponds to the Italian “lucro
32. JUSTICE BELL, GUIDELINES FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF GENERAL
DAMAGES IN PERSONAL INJURY (Oxford University Press, Oxford and New
York, 2002).
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cessante” which indicates an economic loss. Zimmermann refers to
the Principles of European Tort Law and describes lucrum cessans
as damage which: “includes future loss of income, and the
impairment of the victim’s earning capacity, even if such
impairment is not accompanied by any actual loss of income.” 33
In contrast damnum emergens is defined as direct
consequential loss due to the defendant’s action, and is therefore
described as an actual loss.
III. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
OF THE MALTESE CIVIL CODE PROVISIONS
Since 1868, laws have tried to cater to the problematic
issue of compensating tort damages. Section 751 of Ordinance VII
of 1868 originally dealt with damnum emergens, whilst Section
752 dealt with lucrum cessans and stated:
Il danno pero` che dev’essere risarcito da colui il
quale lo abbia dolosmente recato si estende, oltre le
perdite e le spese menzionate nell’articolo
precedente, al guadagno che il fatto impedisca al
danneggiato di fare in avvenire, avuto riguardo al
suo stato. La corte fissera per la perdita di tale
guadagno, secondo le circostanze una somma non
eccedente cento sterline. 34
The amounts of lucrum cessans damages which could be awarded
during this period were very limited and were based on the
intention of the wrong doer. It was only when damage (which
apparently could have been limited to economic loss) was caused
intentionally, that the judgment could compensate the victim also
for future loss of earnings. Moreover, the ceiling for compensation
for such damage was set at £100.
With time this law had to be amended in order to respond
to new exigencies. The adjustment took quite a long time, and it
was only in 1938 that the law was amended and Sections 751 and
752 were repealed. Through Ordinance No. III of 1938, which was
33. EUROPEAN TORT LAW (TORT AND INSURANCE LAW-YEARBOOK) 22
(Helmut Koziol & Barbara C. Steinger eds., 2003).
34. Ordinance VII of 1868 (Malta).
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promulgated and came into force on February 4, 1938, several
amendments were made. Not only were damnum emergens and
lucrum cessans grouped within the same article, but the £100 limit
on the compensable damages for all those cases which were caused
intentionally and which involved compensation of lucrum cessans
was removed. It is therefore worth noting that the amount of such
damages became unlimited. On the other hand, in cases where
culpa was involved and the damage was not caused maliciously,
the award could not be greater than £1,200. The code now linked
the compensation of lost earnings directly to whether a permanent
incapacity, whether total or partial, was caused.
Consequently, the law started providing compensation for
lost earnings both in cases of intentional and culpable infliction of
damage, whilst before it only catered to the former case.
The situation changed radically in 1962, when Ordinance
XXI finally removed the upper limit on compensation that had
been restricting the judges since 1868. This change was decisive in
that it gave judges a very wide discretion when awarding damages
for lucrum cessans. Although the law was still limited by the need
to show that loss was “arising from any permanent incapacity” all
the distinctions that the different laws had made between
negligence and wilfulness were at last completely removed and
judges were now free to decide on a particular amount
notwithstanding the state of mind of the defendant when the
accident was caused. It goes without saying, that this increase in
the discretion of the judges brought about a certain degree of
uncertainty and it was clear that there could be a significant
discrepancy between damages awarded for the same disability by
different judges as compensation in lucrum cessans.
Nothwitstanding the fact that the provisions of the Maltese
Civil Code are primarily inspired by continental law, Maltese law
quantifies lucrum cessans according to a formula which adopted
most of its key components from common law.
IV. LUCRUM CESSANS AND GENERAL DAMAGES
Lucrum cessans deals with the loss of earnings due to
permanent disability deriving from an accident. The English
category which is closest to lucrum cessans is general damages.
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The latter includes damages for loss of future earnings just like
lucrum cessans under the Maltese Law. However, this category is
much wider than lucrum cessans since it includes other headings
such as pain and suffering, loss of amenities and loss of
expectation of life amongst others. Unfortunately these are not
catered to under the lucrum cessans as applied by Maltese law.
An authoritative comparison between the heads of
compensable damages under English and Maltese law was made in
1967 by the House of Lords in Boys v. Chaplin.35 In this case, the
plaintiff was injured through the defendant’s negligence when his
car hit the motorcycle of the former. Both the plaintiff and the
defendant were British servicemen, stationed in Malta. According
to the House of Lords, the difference between Maltese and English
law was the fact that the Maltese system granted damages only in
cases of special damages and certain future financial loss. The
English system on the other hand, apart from special damages,
awarded also damages for pain, suffering, loss of amenities and
problematical future financial loss.
A. Calculating the Award: The Multiplier
It is now appropriate to move on to the way calculations are
made and how the final award is arrived at. The multiplier system
used by the Maltese courts is very similar but not identical to that
implemented by the English courts.
Firstly the weekly wage of the victim is calculated and
adjusted for inflation. This is then multiplied by fifty-two in order
to obtain the annual wage. Once the wage is calculated, the result
is multiplied once again, this time by the percentage of permanent
disability caused by the accident. Such disability is assessed by a
medical expert. In the leading judgment Butler v Heard, 36 it was
stated that the incapacity that must be taken into consideration is
that incapacity which would have an effect on the victim’s ability
35. Boys v. Chaplin, [1967] 3 W.L.R. 266, [1967] 2 All E.R. 665, (1967)
111 S.J. 297 (QBD), aff’d by Boys v. Chaplin, [1968] 2 Q.B. 1, [1968] 2 W.L.R.
328, [1968] 1 All E.R. 283, (1967) 111 S.J. 968; Times, December 7, 1967
(CA), aff’d by Boys v. Chaplin, [1971] A.C. 356; [1969] 3 W.L.R. 322; [1969] 2
All E.R. 1085; [1969] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 487; (1969) 113 S.J. 608 (HL).
36. Butler v. Heard, Court of Appeal (Civil), December 22, 1967.
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to make profit, and not just any incapacity. The Court quoted the
Italian Court of Cassation which explains this concept very clearly
by saying:
Si deve effettuare non gia` con criterio astratto su
un determinato adumo teorico offerto dalla perizia,
ma presumendo la misura dell’influenza dell’evento
sulla consistenza patrimoniale del danneggiateo, nel
senso che vi e` stato per tale fatto una diminuzione
del suo patrimonio. 37
In the way calculation is made under the Maltese system, one can
see the fusion between the calculation as applied by the Common
Law system and the element of riduzione della capacità lavorativa
as applied by continental law.
Once this calculation is completed, the result obtained is
multiplied by the number of years which the Court thinks the
victim would have continued to work had he not been injured. This
is known as the “multiplier.”
During the late 1960s, when the Maltese courts first made
reference to the way damages were calculated under the English
system, the Maltese system was very similar to the English one as
regards to the multiplier. In Butler vs Heard, 38 the multiplier was
calculated at fifteen and later on it rarely exceeded twenty years in
length, just like in the English system. However as years went by,
Maltese courts started moving away from the upper limit of twenty
years and stated that courts should not be bound by this limit
because the population’s life expectancy had changed since the
Butler case in 1967. Any ceilings created were purely subjective
and based on an opinion of a particular individual. Therefore, it
was decided that there should be no limit as regards to the
multiplier but that this should be applied in proportion to the case
in hand in order to make sure that justice is done. Notwithstanding
the fact that some judges were against this increase in the
multiplier, facts show that in quite a good number of cases, high
multipliers started to be adopted depending on the case in hand.

37. No reference as regards to the particular judgment is made in the case.
Id.
38. Id.
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B. The Rudiments of the Multiplier in Malta and in England
When it comes to calculating the multiplier, the Maltese
judge has a wide discretion and can apply different multipliers
depending on the circumstances of each case. There are no set of
guidelines which the courts are bound to follow and the multiplier
adopted is very subjective. The choice of the multiplier is at the
mercy of the judge. This means, that one can be faced with a
situation where different multipliers are adopted in two analogous
cases, for the simple reason that the case is decided by different
judges.
With the widespread use of the Ogden Tables 39 (actuarial
tables in England), the abovementioned discrepancies rarely occur.
Thanks to these tables, it is often possible to calculate the exact
multiplier which the court will apply in a particular case. Whilst in
Malta each judge can base the multiplier upon different elements,
in England the multiplier must be based on the age and the gender
of the plaintiff, whether the plaintiff was employed at the time of
the accident or otherwise, whether he or she suffered from any
disability, or their level of education.
If a judge in England chooses to adopt the Ogden Tables
system to calculate the multiplier, there will be limited room for
the courts’ interpretation, unlike with the system used in Malta.
Several factors are taken into consideration before arriving at a
multiplier. Through the use of this system, it is impossible to claim
that the multiplier applied was an arbitrary one. The same
unfortunately cannot be said in regards to the Maltese system since
there are fewer guiding principles to refer to.
C. Date of Trial versus Date of Accident
In the Maltese system, the multiplier is calculated from the
date of the infliction of damage, both in cases of personal injury
and in cases of death. By contrast, in the English system the
multiplier is calculated from the date of the judgment onwards in
39. Government’s Actuary Department, Compensation for Injury and Death
(Ogden
Tables),
available
at
http://www.gad.gov.uk/services/Other%20Services/Compensation_for_injury_a
nd_death.html (Last visited November 8, 2011).
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cases of personal injury, whilst in cases where unlawful death
ensues the multiplier is calculated as from the date of the infliction
of damage.
Having a multiplier which is calculated from the date of the
infliction of damage is of greater benefit to the victim since this
will mean that the multiplier is greater than it would have been had
it been calculated from the date of the judgment onwards. The only
problem with the Maltese system is that it creates possible
confusion between the damages awarded for damnum emergens
and those for lucrum cessans. If damages for future loss of
earnings are also given from the date of the infliction of damage,
one would be faced with double compensation. Thus during the
period between the infliction of damage and the judgment a person
is entitled to both lucrum cessans and damnum emergens. Under
the English system actual damages are awarded for the period
between the date when the damage is inflicted to the date of the
judgment, whilst in cases of personal injury compensation for
future loss is given from the date of the judgment. Such a system
eliminates the risk of double compensation.
D. Calculating Disability
When calculating disability, Maltese courts generally base
their judgment on the decisions of the experts. The medical expert
must first decide whether there is a disability and if so, what is the
percentage of disability in regard to the plaintiff’s working
capacity. In cases where a permanent disability is adjudged by
different experts with a different percentage of disability, the court
usually takes an average of these percentages. In cases where the
plaintiff suffers from different types of disabilities, the court
usually decides on each disability and adds up all the percentages
in order to arrive at a global percentage. The effect of such
disability should not be calculated according to the repercussions
the disability has on the functioning of the body in general but on
the repercussions it has on the working life of the plaintiff. In
Malta, various court judgments have concluded that loss of future
earnings covers compensation for a reduction in plaintiff’s ability
to work in general. This means that a disability is not only
calculated in cases where the disability will impede the plaintiff to
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continue in his job and earn a living but even if he keeps his job or
is promoted. Having said that, the courts, do insist on tailoring the
degree of incapacity to the particular occupation, social status, and
education of the victim.
Disability under the Ogden Tables is considered as a
contingency other than mortality. The tables take into
consideration the fact that the plaintiff is now disabled and the
award is calculated around this detail. For the Ogden Tables, there
is no need for a qualification of degree or type of disability.
Anything which is impeding the plaintiff from earning a future
income is calculated as a disability.
Unlike the Maltese system, the multiplier method in
England caters simply to loss of earnings and not for loss of ability
to work in the abstract. In England, in order for a person to be
awarded damages for disabilities which hinder the ability to work
in general, one must then refer to the Smith v. Manchester awards.
These awards are given in circumstances where a mathematical
calculation is not possible and where there is a weakening of the
claimant’s competitive position in the open labour market.
On a closer look, one can see that the same factors which
are taken into consideration when calculating the duration of the
multiplier in England are taken into consideration when calculating
the percentage of disability in Malta.
Another distinctive element under the Maltese system is the
fact that in Malta an unemployed person will still be able to get an
award under the multiplication system; this in England is not
possible since no loss of income is involved and therefore the
Ogden Tables cannot be applied. Such persons under the English
system will either get a Smith v. Manchester award or otherwise
will have to opt for an award for loss of amenities.
As one can see, the Maltese focus on establishing the
degree of disability has resulted in an all-encompassing technique
which aims to calculate by the same variable both future loss of
income for the specific plaintiff and his/her loss of capacity to
work in general.
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E. Lump Sum Payments and Alternative Methods
Awards for cases of lucrum cessans in tort take the form of
a lump sum payment both in the English system as well as in the
Maltese system. This brings along with it several problems, since
the judge must predict the future, and this can never be done
flawlessly. In England, the courts can give interim awards and also
provisional awards (which can then be varied subsequently), but in
Malta the award is rigorously given as a lump sum payment.
F. Lump Sum Deductions
Both the Maltese system and the English system apply a
deduction in order to cater to the fact that the victim or the heirs
are acquiring a large sum of money which can be invested. In
Malta this is known as Lump Sum deduction. However, in the
Common Law system, the deduction is taken into consideration
when calculating the multiplier. The courts assume that the lump
sum will be invested and yield an interest, so a rate of return is
taken into consideration in the Ogden Tables.
G. Compensation Proposals
Fresh government proposals to amend compensation law
were launched in June this year, aimed at establishing new
guidelines and increasing awards. The main amendments currently
discussed are the permanent disability capping, which will be
increased to €600,000, and the introduction of non-pecuniary
damages (damages for pain and suffering or moral damages) which
will, however, be capped at €250,000.
The proposal also establishes guidelines for compensation
awarded for specific disabilities, such as loss of limbs and organs,
with a long and very detailed schedule that caters to different types
of disabilities.
V. CONCLUSION
As one can see, despite the fact that the provisions of the
Maltese Civil Code in relation to responsibility are still
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predominantly influenced by continental law, the calculation of
damages is mostly influenced by common law. The mode of
calculating damages and the provisions of the Maltese Civil Code
will shift further towards the system employed by the Common
Law system if such legal amendments were to be approved in
Parliament. However, notwithstanding this, the strong fusion of
sources will always subsist in the Maltese legal system and it is
this which ultimately helps the Maltese system in maintaining its
individual and unique structure.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Neither the hybridity nor the diffusion of laws is new. 1
Within Europe, law predated the state and the creation of
genuinely national laws; a legal ‘system’ centered on the modern
nation-state, and the elimination of competing jurisdictions and
marginalization of non-legal norms was a very long historical
process. Especially before the nineteenth century, there were
multiple contemporaneous legal orders co-existing in the same
geographical space and at the same time. Modern national
traditions are unique hybrids rooted in diverse customary or folklaws, summary and discretionary jurisdictions, local and particular
iura propria, the Romano-canonical ‘learned laws’ or ius
commune, and other trans-territorial iura communia (including
feudal law and the lex mercatoria). Over time, these various bodies
of law were linked to public institutions and increasingly
meaningful and centralized powers of enforcement. They only
slowly came under the control of early modern states to form
modern legal traditions, contributing much to the substance and
subsequent success of common laws.
This legal hybridity was paralleled by additional normative
hybridity. Indeed, the boundaries between such official and
unofficial legalities were porous. The ‘law’ blurred seamlessly into
the less formally institutionalized, but meaningful, normative
pluralism from which more formal legal rules often emerged and
with which they would continue to compete. As Marc Galanter has
put it:
One of the striking features of the modern world has
been the emergence of those institutionalintellectual complexes that we identify as national
legal systems. Such a system consists of
1. See Seán Patrick Donlan, Remembering: Legal Hybridity and Legal
L.
REV.
1
(2011),
available
at
History,
2
COMP.
www.comparativelawreview.com/ojs/index.php/CoLR/article/view/13/17 (Last
visited November 9, 2011) and Histories of Hybridity: A Problem, a Primer, a
Plea, and a Plan (Of Sorts), in COMPARATIVE LAW AND HYBRID LEGAL
TRADITIONS (Eleanor Cashin-Ritaine, Seán Patrick Donlan & Martin Sychold
eds., 2010), full volume available at www.e-collection.isdc.ch/# (Last visited
November 9, 2011).
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institutions, connected to the state, guided by and
propounding a body of normative learning,
purporting to encompass and control all the other
institutions in the society and to subject them to a
regime of general rules. These complexes
consolidated and displaced the earlier diverse array
of normative orderings in society, reducing them to
a subordinate and interstitial status. 2
Similar patterns of hybridity occurred with the diffusion of
European law, often though colonialism, around the world. 3 Both
in the West and beyond, however, the displacement and reduction
of non-state norms has not made them unimportant.
The extraordinary legal and normative hybridity
(hereinafter ‘hybridity’) of the Mediterranean region was produced
in a complex history of conquest, colonization, and social and legal
diffusion across shifting and porous political boundaries. 4 Studies
of this hybridity and diffusion have been isolated, sporadic, and too
often framed within narrow jurisdictional and disciplinary
constraints. The objective of the Mediterranean Hybridity Project
is, through a collaborative international and interdisciplinary
network of experts, (i) to produce a published comparative or
cross-cultural collection on the subject and, if possible, (ii) to
generate additional projects related to our theme. Encompassing
both state laws and other social norms, the outcome will be more
accurate, useful, and accessible accounts of Mediterranean
legalities. Our project might produce an analytical model more
useful than existing taxonomies and methods for new research in
the region, in Europe, and around the world.
2. Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and
Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 19 (1981).
3. Indeed, ‘[s]cholars who study the one could learn from those who study
the other, and vice versa.’ Dirk Heirbaut, Europe and the People without Legal
History: On the Need for a General History of Non-European Law, 68 LEGAL
HIST. REV. 269, 277 (2008).
4. “If a system is attached to two families . . . the question is one of
genealogy, and thus of historical research first of all.” Maurice Tancelin, How
Can a Legal System be a Mixed System?, in FREDERICK PARKER WALTON, THE
SCOPE AND INTERPRETATION OF THE CIVIL CODE OF LOWER CANADA 3 (Wilson
& Lafleur, 1980) (1907).
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This brief paper outlines the initial general approach to the
project and related issues. It reflects its progress as of summer
2011. In the second section, the general outlines of the project will
be laid out based on a Roundtable held in Catania in late October
2010. The remaining sections will reflect my thinking on the
subject rather than that of the project Committee or participants.
The concepts of ‘hybridity’ and ‘diffusion,’ as used in my research,
will be discussed in more detail in the second section. The third
section will discuss legal hybridity, especially mixed systems; the
fourth section will briefly discuss normative hybridity and the
relationship between comparativists and social scientists. While
my interpretation of these topics was not imposed on those
participating in the project, it was influential. The paper is meant
both to suggest how the project is conceived and how it might
develop. It suggests a shared, basic vocabulary for the project and
notes some of the conceptual resources available in comparative
law and in the social sciences. Specific information on the
Mediterranean region is not discussed here.
II. THE MEDITERRANEAN HYBRIDITY PROJECT
The Mediterranean Hybridity Project was the result of
discussions between members of Juris Diversitas, an international
legal association dedicated to (i) the study of legal and normative
mixtures and movements and (ii) the encouragement of
interdisciplinary dialogue between jurists and others. 5 Begun in
2007, the group has so far held two symposia on the subject of
hybridity. The first was co-organized with the Swiss Institute of
Comparative Law in September 2009. A collection of articles
generated by that event was recently published as Comparative
Law and Hybrid Legal Traditions (2010). A second symposium
was held in June 2010 in Malta and focused on Mediterranean
5. See Juris Diversitas at www.jurisdiversitas.blogspot.com (Last visited
November 9, 2011). Our Executive Committee includes: Seán Patrick Donlan
(Limerick), Ignazio Castellucci (Trento and Macau), Lukas HeckerdornUrschler (Swiss Institute of Comparative Law), Salvatore Mancuso (Macau),
and Olivier Moréteau (Louisiana State). Our Advisory Board is composed of
Patrick Glenn, Marco Guadagni, Roderick Macdonald, Werner Menski, Esin
Örücü, Vernon Valentine Palmer, Rodolfo Sacco, Boaventura de Sousa Santos,
William Twining, and Jacques Vanderlinden.
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hybridity. It was co-organized with the Department of Civil Law
and the Mediterranean Institute of the University of Malta.
Professor Vernon Palmer, President of the World Society of Mixed
Jurisdiction Jurists and author of Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide:
The Third Legal Family, was kind enough to launch the
Mediterranean project there. 6 In addition, a project planning
roundtable was held in October 2010 at the Faculty of Political
Science at the University of Catania to finalize the questionnaire to
be used in our work and to begin the selection of jurisdictional
reporters. This will occur over the course of 2011. Another
colloquium will be held at Rabat, Morocco in June 2012. 7
The various legal orders, past and present, of the
Mediterranean include the Anglo-British, canonical, continental,
Islamic, Ottoman, Roman, socialist, and Talmudic traditions as
well as various customary and trans-territorial legal traditions. This
legal hybridity predates the establishment of modern nation-states.
It is complemented and further complicated by an equally diverse
and dynamic normative hybridity. 8 Neither has received sufficient
attention from jurists and social scientists. The project is rooted in
the desire across the region and within different disciplines to
improve our knowledge of the various legalities in the EuroMediterranean region. It encompasses both the state laws that are
the domain of lawyers and the wider normative orders typically
studied by social scientists. 9 In particular, it will both draw on and
go beyond earlier analysis of (i) ‘mixed legal systems,’ where
6. VERNON V. PALMER, MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE: THE THIRD
LEGAL FAMILY (2001). On the World Society of Mixed Jurisdiction Jurists, see
www.mixedjurisdiction.org (Last visited November 9, 2011). The papers of the
Maltese conference are published in this volume of the J. CIV. L. STUD.
7. Doing justice: official and unofficial ‘legalities’ in practice (Rabat,
Morocco; June 15-16, 2012).
8. For a different, more critical, understanding of ‘hybridity’ in the
Mediterranean, see Christian Bromberger, Towards an Anthropology of the
Mediterranean, 17 HIST.& ANTHROPOLOGY 91, especially 96-98 (2006).
9. In an even bolder program than ours, the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) proposes to codify both common principles
and non-state practices. See Salvatore Mancuso, Creating Mixed (?)
Jurisdictions: Some Methodological Reflections on Legal Integration in the
Southern African Development Community (SADC) Region, J. COMP. L.
(forthcoming 2012).
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diverse state laws emerge from different legal traditions, and (ii)
‘legal’ or ‘normative.’ The focus of the former scholarship is
typically limited to state law, especially mixtures of explicitly
Western legal traditions. Study of the latter is rooted in empirical
study, but is often focused on non-Western communities and rarely
extends across state boundaries. 10 As will be clear, these two
bodies of scholarship are importantly related. 11
A Managing Committee is responsible for the coordination,
steering, and oversight of the project. 12 An Advisory Board is
being created to assist the Committee. 13 The project’s main
objective is the relatively simple production of a comparative
collection on legal and normative hybridity in the region. 14 Our
project addresses the existing lacuna in research by developing a
collaborative inter- and multi-disciplinary network of experts on
10. But see LAURA NADER & HARRY TODD, THE DISPUTING PROCESS:
LAW IN TEN SOCIETIES (1976), the culmination of the fieldwork on the
“Berkeley Village Project.” It involved, among others, Lebanon, Sardinia, and
Turkey; see also PEREGRINE HORDEN & NICHOLAS PURCELL, Mists of Time:
Anthropology and Continuity, a bibliographical essay, in THE CORRUPTING SEA:
A STUDY OF MEDITERRANEAN HISTORY (2000).
11. On joining the study of legal and normative hybridity, as I define these
ideas, see Seán Patrick Donlan, ‘The Ubiquity of Hybridity: Norms and Laws,
Past and Present, and around the Globe,’ a paper delivered at the New Frontiers
of Comparative Law Conference (Macau, November 11, 2011). A follow-up
article will be published in 2012. For a similar argument, see Ido Shahar, State,
Society and the Relations between Them: Implications for the Study of Legal
Pluralism, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 417, 441 (2008). See also Mauro
Bussani, A Pluralist Approach to Mixed Jurisdictions, J. COMP. L. (forthcoming
2012).
12. In addition to me, the Committee includes Baudouin Dupret and
Olivier Moréteau. The Committee provides continuity within the project’s
flexible framework. Editorial and Advisory Boards may also be created to
provide advice and assistance to the Committee.
13. The Advisory Board includes Biagio Andò, Tom Bennett, Nathalie
Bernard-Maugiron, Sue Farran, David Nelken, Esin Örücü, Vernon Palmer, and
David Zammit.
14. Cf. John H. Merryman, Law and Development Memoirs II: SLADE, 48
AM. J. COMP. L. 713 (2000). The SLADE (Studies in Law and Development)
project resulted in LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MEDITERRANEAN EUROPE AND
LATIN AMERICA: A HANDBOOK OF LEGAL AND SOCIAL INDICATORS FOR
COMPARATIVE STUDY (John H. Merryman, David S. Clark, & Lawrence M.
Friedman eds., 1979). It included both Italy and Spain.
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the region—from law, anthropology, geography, history,
sociology, etc.—to foster dialogue on the subject. The project will
benefit from this jurisdictional and disciplinary diversity. Scholars
from throughout Europe, the Levant, North Africa, and beyond
will participate. Chief reporters will be selected for each of the
jurisdictions involved. It will be the responsibility of the chief
reporters, in collaboration with the Committee, to assemble a team
of additional reporters appropriate to complete the reports and to
ensure that deadlines are met. Essential to the project is the
creation of a questionnaire on which to structure our work. This
questionnaire will be produced by the Committee in discussion
with the participants. The combination of such reports and their
subsequent analysis is an established method of comparative law.
The International Academy of Comparative Law takes an
analogous approach in the thematic reports to its quadrennial
World Congress. In the 1990s, two projects managed in a similar
manner by the legal philosophers Neil MacCormick and Robert S.
Summers ended in the publication of important comparative
collections on statutory interpretation and precedent. 15 Our project
will take a broadly similar approach, but will marry this
comparative approach with other conceptual and empirical models
from the legal and social sciences.
In its origins, ‘hybrid’ had a very narrow meaning. The
Latin “hibrida was the offspring of a (female) domestic sow and a
(male) wild boar.” 16 In fact, a hybrid is often seen as a complex
individual entity, a singularity, from two parents. More recently,
however, it has become far broader in application. Indeed, the
15. INTERPRETING STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (Neil MacCormick
& Robert Summers eds., 1991) and INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY (Neil MacCormick & Robert Summers eds., 1997). For
summaries, see Robert S. Summers, The Comparative Statutory Interpretation
Project, 17 CORNELL L. FORUM 7 (1990) and The Comparative Precedent
Project, 1992-97, 24 CORNELL L. FORUM 17 (1997). These projects grew out of
earlier work comparing English and American law. PATRICK. S. ATIYAH &
ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY, AND LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS (1987). See also Robert S. Summers, Form and Substance in
Anglo-American Law, 14 CORNELL L. FORUM 2 (1987).
16. Brian Stross, The Hybrid Metaphor: From Biology to Culture, 112 J.
AM. FOLKLORE 254 (1999).
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word in its current usages is arguably, as the historian Peter Burke
has written, “a slippery, ambiguous term, at once literal and
metaphorical, descriptive and explanatory.” 17 ‘Hybridity’ has also
developed more nuanced meanings in, for example, Post-Colonial
Studies, serving both as a recognition of social complexity, “a way
out of binary thinking” about cultures (and individuals). 18 This
understanding of hybridity is not entirely unrelated to our Project.
Indeed, even the legal historian George Dargo, who wrote the
classic work on the founding of Louisiana’s mixed system, has
recently noted that, in Louisiana, “[h]ybridity produced a rich
interaction—call it conflict, contestation, or negotiation—from
within the mix of languages, cultures and legal traditions that the
Americans found in their first true colony.” 19 Hybridity’ is thus
meant to suggest, more explicitly than discussions of legal
‘mixes’—which typically focus on the various positive laws of the
state—a more dynamic complexity of both laws and other norms.
More diffuse normative influences and practical considerations,
both internal and external are also relevant, not least geo-political,
economic, and social relationships of power.
The phrase ‘legal hybridity’ is only rarely employed in
either legal or social science. Where it is used, it is broadly
synonymous with ‘legal pluralism.’ 20 Iza Hussin has used it to
17. PETER BURKE, CULTURAL HYBRIDITY 54 (2009).
18. ANJALI PRABHU, HYBRIDITY: LIMITS, TRANSFORMATIONS, PROSPECTS
1 (2007). Indeed, it also arguably “allow[s for] the inscription of the agency of
the subaltern, and even permit[s] a restructuring and destabilizing of power.” Id.
Note that the focus of Prabhu’s book is on the small islands of Mauritius and La
Réunion, the former of which is a mixed legal system. See also HOMI BHABHA,
THE LOCATION OF CULTURE (1994) and Alpana Roy, Postcolonial Theory and
Law: A Critical Introduction, 29 ADEL. L. REV. 317 (2008).
19. George Dargo, The Digest of 1808: Historical Perspectives, 24 TUL.
EUR. & CIV. L. F. 1, 30 (2009). See id., 29-30 (citing BHABHA, supra note, 2).
This is indeed far more nuanced than what he earlier called the “clash of
traditions” in nineteenth-century Louisiana. See GEORGE DARGO, JEFFERSON’S
LOUISIANA: POLITICS AND THE CLASH OF LEGAL TRADITIONS (1975, revised
2010).
20. Cf. Justin Holbrook’s use of ‘legal hybridity’ for what I call ‘normative
hybridity.’ Legal Hybridity in the Philippines: Lessons in Legal Pluralism from
Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, 18 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 3 n. 8
(2010). See also Clever Mapaure, Legal Hybridity: A Comparative Analysis of
the Role of Custom and Intricacies of Legal Pluralism in Relation to Customary
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capture not only plural laws and norms, but power relationships as
well. 21 For the purposes of the project, however, ‘legal hybridity’
refers to state laws and legal principles (hereinafter ‘laws’), those
traditions generally, conventionally recognized as legal by modern
lawyers. 22 This is the focus of most mixed jurists, though it may
extend still further to, among others, the ‘law in action,’ ‘legal
formants,’ or ‘legal polycentricity.’ 23 ‘Normative hybridity’ is, for
us, a far wider concept, largely synonymous with ‘normative
pluralism’ and including both laws and wider patterns of normative
ordering and non-state norms (hereinafter ‘norms’). Defined in this
way, law and norms are not opposites but points on a continuum.
As Baudouin Dupret writes,
[i]n our attempt to analyze the phenomenon of
norms we should move resolutely away from legal
categories and towards social categories, and . . . we
should do this both at a conceptual level and at a
methodological level. This is a shift from the law to
the norm, with all that such a move implies in terms
of assimilation with social constraints . . . Law must
be stripped of its conceptual status and returned to
the fold of general normativity, so that there is no
longer any ex post facto distinction between it and
other types of norms such as moral injunctions,

Marriages in Britain and African Jurisdictions, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1515630 (Last visited November 9, 2011).
21. Iza Hussin, The Pursuit of the Perak Regalia: Islam, Law, and the
Politics of Authority in the Colonial State, 32 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 759 (2007).
See also Mancuso, supra note 8.
22. See e.g. Biagio Andò, Seán Patrick Donlan & David Zammit, “A
Happy Union?” Malta’s Legal Hybridity, 27 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L. F.
(forthcoming 2012).
23. Donlan, supra note 11. See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in
Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910); Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic
Approach to Comparative Law, (1991) 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 and 343; HANNE
PETERSEN & HENRIK ZAHLE, LEGAL POLYCENTRICITY: CONSEQUENCES OF
PLURALISM IN LAW (1995); and ARI HIROVONEN, POLYCENTRICITY: THE
MULTIPLE SCENES OF LAW (1998).
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political rules, traditions, habits, etiquette and even
table manners. 24
This normative hybridity is not, or not necessarily, prescriptive, but
descriptive of a social fact with which scholars must contend.
Indeed, “as a purely descriptive matter, hybridity cannot be wished
away.” 25
Herbert Hart, the foremost legal positivist of the twentieth
century, began The Concept of Law (1961) with the remark that
‘‘[f]ew questions concerning human society have been asked with
such persistence and answered by serious thinkers in so many
diverse, strange, and even paradoxical ways as to the question,
What is law?” 26 This fact, and related definitional complexities,
have important consequences for our project. We must both
recognize the complexity of defining ‘law’ while, at the same time,
provide flexibility and reasonable coherence to our work. The
distinction between law and norms employed here is largely meant
to reflect juristic practice and modern, common understandings of
the terms in the West. This is not meant to suggest deep
ontological divisions between laws and other norms. 27 It is
24. Baudouin Dupret, Legal Pluralism, Normative Plurality, and the Arab
World, in LEGAL PLURALISM IN THE ARAB WORLD 31 (Baudouin Dupret,
Maurits Berger, & Laila al-Zwaini eds., 1999); See also Baudouin Dupret, Legal
Pluralism, Plurality of Laws, and Legal Practices: Theories, Critiques, and
Praxiological Re-Specification, 1 EUROPEAN J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2007) and What
is Islamic Law? A Praxiological Answer and an Egyptian Case Study, 24
THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 79 (2007).
25. Paul S. Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155,
1179 (2007). For a “social fact conception of legal pluralism,” see William
Twining, Normative and Legal Pluralism: A Global Perspective, 20 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 473, 488-489 (2010).
26. HERBERT L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1997). Twining
has proposed a “flexible working conception of law” in which “[f]rom a global
perspective it is illuminating to conceive of law as a species of institutionalized
social practice that is oriented to ordering relations between subjects at one or
more levels of relations and of ordering.” WILLIAM TWINING, GENERAL
JURISPRUDENCE: UNDERSTANDING LAW FROM A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 116-117
(2009).
27. Twining refers to the difficulty in distinguishing legal and non-legal
phenomenon as the problem of “the definitional stop.” See Twining, supra note
25, at 497. There exists a long-established and widespread conventional usage of
'law' (or, at least, 'lex') that defines the 'legal' on the basis of some minimal
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intended instead to prevent the project from becoming mired in
complex theoretical debates in its early stages. 28 State laws are
distinct, at least in practice, from other norms. Western legal
institutions, in particular, are highly formalized or institutionalized
in contrast to alternative forms of normative ordering. This view is,
however, open to challenge over the course of the project. Even
within modern Anglo-American analytical jurisprudence or legal
philosophy, there has been a move away from a narrow focus on
state law. For example, the late Neil MacCormick wrote that
“[i]nstitutional normative orders are characterized by the presence
of explicitly issued norms and decisions in authentic (that, in some
way official or authorized) texts, such that understanding and
interpreting such texts becomes an implicit part of maintaining the
order.” 29 More important was the argument that “[l]aw is
institutional normative order, and state law is simply one form of
law.” 30 As noted, our focus will extend to normative orders while
avoiding, for now, any decision on whether such orders are indeed
“law, properly so-called.” 31
Our decision to avoid using ‘legal pluralism’ is, in part, the
result of the very different ways in which that phrase may be

institutional structure and accepted authority. Critically, however, the
development of this convention preceded the development of the mature state
and a later conventional correspondence of law and the state. Cf. Jean-Louis
Halpérin, The Concept of Law: A Western Transplant, 10 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES IN L. 333, 353 (2009). 'Ius' had, of course, a less precise meaning of
right or rightness.
28. With sufficient support, a future meeting of participants will be
organized that would allow for such theoretical considerations to be revisited.
29. Neil MacCormick, Institutions and Laws Again, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1429,
1431 (1999). See also Mariano Croce, Is there a Place for Legal Theory Today?
The Distinctiveness of Law in the Age of Pluralism, in LAW’S ENVIRONMENT:
CRITICAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (Ubaldus de Vries & Lyana Francot eds., 2011).
30. Neil MacCormick, Institutional Normative Order: A Conception of
Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1051, 1067 (1997). See also NEIL MACCORMICK,
INSTITUTIONS OF LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL THEORY (2009); and William
Twining, Institutions of Law From a Global Perspective: Standpoint, Pluralism
and Non-State Law, in LAW AS INSTITUTIONAL NORMATIVE ORDER
(Maksymilian Del Mar & Zenon Bankowski eds., 2009).
31. See generally JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVIDENCE OF JURISPRUDENCE
DETERMINED (1832), Lecture Five.
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employed. Both comparative lawyers and legal historians
frequently use ‘legal pluralism’ as a synonym for what is called
‘legal hybridity’ here. 32 Social scientists have, however, usually
used the same term in their more extensive discussions of the
concept of normative hybridity. 33 This social science use of ‘legal’
to include both state laws and non-state norms has admittedly
made scholars sensitive to similarities between them. It has also
often confused jurists, arguably dissuading many from engagement
with social scientists. 34 This is not always true. A small number of
jurists have similarly noted that “the existence and content of
explicit laws depend on a network of tacit understandings and
unwritten conventions, rooted in the soil of social interaction.”35
These are also called law: ‘everyday law,’ ‘implicit law,’ ‘informal
law,’ and ‘unofficial law.’ 36 But, as the anthropologist Sally Engle
Merry puts it, “calling all forms of ordering that are not state law
by the name law confounds the analysis.” 37 Where project
32. In social science debates, this has often been called ‘state’ or ‘weak’
legal pluralism. Legal historians have to deal with an additional complication.
The ‘State’ has not always existed and use of ‘state’ terminology can, depending
on the historian’s focus, be deeply anachronistic.
33. This is also referred to as ‘deep’ or ‘strong’ legal pluralism. See
Gordon R. Woodman, Ideological Combat and Social Observation: Recent
Debate about Legal Pluralism, 42 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 21 (1998).
34. Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Who’s Afraid of Legal Pluralism?, 47 J.
LEGAL PLURALISM 37, 40 (2002).
35. Gerald J. Postema, Implicit law, in REDISCOVERING FULLER: ESSAYS
ON IMPLICIT LAW AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 255 (Willem J. Witteveen &
Wibren van der Burg eds., 1999). Postema was writing about Lon Fuller.
Fuller’s thoughts on “implicit law” were discussed in LON FULLER, THE
ANATOMY OF THE LAW (1968).
36. Roderick Macdonald uses each of these. See RODERICK MACDONALD,
LESSONS OF EVERYDAY LAW/LE DROIT DU QUOTIDIEN (2002). See Edward J.
Eberle’s use of “internal law” in, Comparative law, 13 ANN. SURV. INT’L &
COMP. L. 93, 97-99 (2007). Other writers have even suggested that legal study,
including comparative analysis, should focus on “the mundane and the very
small within its gaze. There is often enough kinship between normative orders at
various level of social life to make them comparable.” Daniel Jutras, The Legal
Dimensions of Everyday Life, 16 CAN. J.L. & SOC’Y 45, 64 (2001). See also W.
MICHAEL REISMAN, LAW IN BRIEF ENCOUNTERS (1999).
37. Sally E. Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 869, 878 (1988);
see also Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Folly of the ‘Social Scientific’ Concept of
Legal Pluralism, 20 J.L. & SOC’Y 192 (1993). His response has been to suggest
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participants want to emphasize the real continuum between laws
and other norms, it was suggested they might, with other writers,
refer to both as ‘legalities.’ As Christopher Tomlins has recently
defined them, “legalities are not produced in formal legal settings
alone. They are social products, generated in the course of virtually
any repetitive practice of wide acceptance within a specific locale,
call the result rule, custom, tradition, folkway or pastime, popular
belief or protest.” 38 This is admittedly something of a fudge. But
‘legalities’ underlines the similarities between laws and other
norms without ignoring the genuine differences already noted. 39 It
might also be useful, for the purposes of the project, to make finer
distinctions between different types of norms. 40 In addition, as
both comparatists and legal philosophers have noted, there is far
more to the interpretation of the law of the state than a
straightforward reading of its texts; context is critical. 41
Discussions at the Catania Roundtable largely focused on
the questionnaire to be used in the project. For practical purposes,

that “[l]egal norms are whatever people in the social group conventionally
recognize as legal norms through their social practices.” Brian Z. Tamanaha, A
Non-Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism, 27 J.L. & SOC’Y 296, 316 (2000);
see also The Internal/External Distinction and the Notion of a Practice in Legal
Theory and Sociolegal Studies, 30 L. & SOC’Y REV. 163 (1996).
38. Christopher L. Tomlins, The Many Legalities of Colonialization: A
Manifesto of Destiny for Early American Legal History, in THE MANY
LEGALITIES OF EARLY AMERICA 2-3 (Christopher L. Tomlins & Bruce H. Mann
eds., 2001); see also THE LAW AND OTHER LEGALITIES OF IRELAND, 1689-1850
(Michael Brown & Seán Patrick Donlan eds., 2010).
39. Cf. PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF
LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998), especially chapters two and three.
40. Tamanaha has, for example, recently listed “forms of normative
ordering commonly discussed in studies of legal pluralism.” Brian Z. Tamanaha,
Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global, 30 SYDNEY
L. REV. 375, 397 (2008). These included both “official or positive legal
systems” as well as “customary,” “religious/cultural,” “economic/capitalist,”
“functional,” and “community/cultural” normative systems. See generally id. at
397-400.
41. See, e.g., Sacco, supra note 23. See also P.G. Monateri & Rodolfo
Sacco, Legal Formants, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS
AND THE LAW (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
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it was agreed that the questionnaire should be completed in 2011. 42
It should be designed in a simple manner, complete with a basic
lexicon of terms as used in project correspondence. The reports
will focus on the contemporary situation in the jurisdictions
covered. 43 It is important, however, that sufficient attention be
given to the historical development of the laws and norms
discussed. Like much of the project, the appropriate amount of text
dedicated to history can be determined together by the Committee
and the Chief Reporters. More critically, the category of normative
hybridity is potentially very wide, extending to ordinary etiquette
and table manners. To narrow our focus, it was agreed that nonstate norms should be limited to either “non-state justice systems”
or to norms or normative orders that significantly influence legal or
normative practices. 44 There is no simple metric for the application
of this standard. The Committee will be responsible for
determining whether reporters have established that norms have
met this requirement. Insofar as is possible, both ‘internal’
perceptions of the actors engaged in the legalities involved and
‘external’ perceptions from actors beyond those legalities should
be considered. The emergence of new legal or normative creations
should also be considered.
Several approaches to the structure of the questionnaire
were considered. It was agreed that the final version should lay out
general headings that must be followed by reporters. These
headings apply to both laws and norms (as defined here). Beneath
the headings, however, will be more specific, optional questions
that might be relevant. These questions might not apply to all
jurisdictions and might not apply to both legal and normative

42. As a working rule, the reports should not exceed 25,000 words.
43. Cf. the “country surveys” in the YEARBOOK OF ISLAMIC AND MIDDLE
EASTERN LAW.
44. MIRANDA FORSYTH, A BIRD THAT FLIES WITH TWO WINGS: KASTOM
AND STATE JUSTICE SYSTEMS IN VANUATU 29 (2009). In discussing “normative
orderings existing outside the state,” she includes “customary law, non-state
justice systems, non-state legal fields, dispute-resolution systems, rule systems,
folk law, informal justice, collective justice, popular justice and vigilantism.” Id.
at 81. See also her discussion in chapter seven (‘A typology of relationships
between state and non-state justice systems’).
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hybridity. The basic, preliminary draft questionnaire includes the
following headings and questions:
1. Historical background: what are the origins of
the major legal and normative traditions,
especially through “diffusion?” How does this
relate to the creation of the jurisdiction
spatially?
2. Sources and institutions: what forms of state
laws or non-state norms are applicable and in
what institutions?
3. Bodies of law and norms: what bodies of state
law or non-state norms—substantive and
procedural—are utilized?
4. Actors: what actors are involved in state law
and non-state norms?
5. Methods:
what
methods—“customary,”
“doctrinal,” “legislative,” and “adjudicative” (or
analogous forms)—are used in state law and
non-state norms?
6. Efficacy: how certain is the enforcement of
state law and non-state norms? What role does
the “rule of (state) law” play in the jurisdiction?
How litigious are people in the various fora
available to them?
7. Regionalism and globalization: what is the
impact of regionalism and globalization—
including cultural, economic, and legal—on
laws and other norms? This includes, of course,
the role of human rights.
8. Identity: what is the relevance of state law and
non-state norms to individual and community
identities? Language, ethnicity, religion, and
culture might all be considered.
As noted, this is a first draft. The final questionnaire will be
completed in 2011. The approach is intended to provide a general,
uniform structure with a menu of questions that will be answered,
as appropriate, by the reporters. Throughout the project, the
Committee will adjust the program and the questionnaire as
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necessary. Participant feedback, project meetings, and the review
of draft reports in advance of publication will almost certainly
suggest changes. A bibliography will also be created for each
report. And, insofar as is possible, the reports should combine
existing empirical research with theoretical insight. 45
An important aspect of the project is the creation of legal
and normative hybrids as the product of the ‘diffusion’ of law and
norms. The mixtures and movements of both are two sides of the
same coin. 46 This is true both of time and space with the result that
“comparative law merges the approach of the legal historian with
that of the legal geographer.” 47 Here comparative lawyers have
generated an impressive, if bewildering, scholarship on the
movements of law and legal thinking. Alan Watson’s ‘transplant’
thesis is especially influential. 48 He has suggested that the
transplantation of legal ideas and institutions is extremely
common. While the difference between a ‘transplant’ and a
‘reception’ is probably best seen as one of degree, the latter is
generally used for more wide-scale borrowing, especially the
historical incorporation of the Romano-canonical ius commune by

45. Given the current size of the project, it is not expected that new studies
can be undertaken. It is hoped, however, that the project might encourage such
research, especially where gaps exist.
46. Cf. Esin Örücü, Mixed and Mixing Systems: A Conceptual Search, in
STUDIES IN LEGAL SYSTEMS: MIXED AND MIXING (Esin Örücü, Elspeth Attwooll
& Sean Coyle eds., 1996).
47. SCHLESINGER’S COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES - TEXTS - MATERIALS 178
(7th ed. Ugo A. Mattei, Teemu Ruskola & Antonio Gidi eds., 2009). The editors
define ‘diffusion’ as “the spreading of legal ideas, concepts and rules across
jurisdictions.” Id.
48. See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO
COMPARATIVE LAW, (2d ed. 1993); see also ALAN WATSON, LEGAL
TRANSPLANTS AND EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, IUS COMMUNE LECTURES ON
EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 1 (2000). For additional discussions, see Jonathan M.
Miller, A Typology of Legal Transplants: Using Sociology, Legal History and
Argentine Examples to Explain the Transplant Process, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 839
(2003) and Margit Cohn, Legal Transplant Chronicles: The Evolution of
Unreasonableness and Proportionality Review of the Administration in the
United Kingdom, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 583 (2010).
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the German states. 49 It can also be used in other contexts, including
the reception of Anglo-American law across the globe. These
concepts are so important to modern comparative analysis that
Michele Graziadei has even suggested that comparative law can be
characterized as the “study of legal transplants and receptions.” 50
In fact, considerable ink has been spent on the metaphors of legal
movement. In contrast to Watson’s organic ‘transplants,’ Nelken
has suggested the more neutral ‘transfers.’ 51 Others speak of
‘contaminations,’ 52 ‘irritants,’ 53 or the ‘migration of law.’54
William Twining’s choice of ‘diffusion’ is preferred here for (i)
reasons of simplicity and (ii) in parallel to discussions of similar
processes within the social sciences. 55 In addition, Twining’s use
of the concept is particularly sophisticated, untangling the deep

49. Alan Watson, Aspects of Reception of Law, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 345
(1996); see also Albert Kocourek, Factors in the Reception of Law, 10 TUL. L.
REV. 209 (1936).
50. Michele Graziadei, Comparative Law as the Study of Transplants and
Receptions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Mathias
Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2008). Indeed, “[u]nified visions of
legal cultures and legal orders should thus be replaced by a more analytic,
dynamic, and realistic picture of the local law, which also comprises that law’s
interaction with other legal orders.” Id. at 471-472.
51. “The terms we use will make a difference.” David Nelken, Legal
Transplants and Beyond: Of Disciplines and Metaphors, in COMPARATIVE LAW
IN THE 21ST CENTURY 31 (Andrew Harding & Esin Örücü eds., 2000).
52. P.G. Monateri, The Weak Law: Contaminations and Legal Cultures, in
ITALIAN NATIONAL REPORTS TO THE XVTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF
COMPARATIVE LAW, BRISTOL 1998 (1998). See Olivier Moréteau, An
Introduction to Contamination, 3 J. CIV. L. STUD. 9 (2010); see also Olivier
Moréteau, Mare Nostrum as the Cauldron of Western Legal Traditions: Stirring
the Broth, Making Sense of Legal Gumbo whilst Understanding Contamination,
in this same volume of the J. CIV. L. STUD.
53. Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How
Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11 (1998).
54. Örücü has also spoken of “law as transposition,” the “tree model,” and
the “wave theory,” the last two borrowed from linguistics. See Esin Örücü, A
Theoretical Framework for Transfrontier Mobility of Law, in TRANSFRONTIER
MOBILITY OF LAW (Robert Jagtenberg, Esin Örücü, & Annie J. De Roo eds.,
1995) and Esin Örücü, Law as Transposition, 51 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 205
(2002).
55. The term was also used a century ago in Robert W. Lee, The Civil Law
and the Common Law: A World Survey, 14 MICH. L. REV. 89, 90 (1915).
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complexity of the process of diffusion. 56 These are important
considerations in our work. Normative diffusion is, of course, still
more complex. 57
At the time of the Roundtable, potential reporters were
available for Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy,
Libya, Malta, Morocco, Slovenia, Spain, Tunisia, and Turkey. 58 It
was agreed that reporters for additional jurisdictions would also be
sought, especially for those jurisdictions falling outside of Western
Europe. 59 Particularly important was the inclusion of additional
social scientists and, given the levels of relevant research and
scholarship produced in French, that that language should be
included as a working language of the project. The importance of
funding and institutional support was also noted. Subject to
securing such support, the project will progress through meetings,
colloquia, and conferences. These gatherings will foster research
and dialogue and prepare participants for production of the
jurisdictional reports. At all events, the Committee will work to
ensure dissemination of the information generated by participants,
including, most importantly, publication of the final reports. The
process towards publication will include pre-circulation of draft
reports by participants before discussion in a colloquium.
56. See William Twining, Diffusion of Law: A Global Perspective, 49 J.
LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 34-35 (2004); see also William Twining, Diffusion and
Globalization Discourse, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 507, 512 (2006). Note that
Twining’s use of the term effectively envelopes the study of both (i) hybridity
and (ii) legal culture. See William Twining, Globalisation and Comparative
Law, in COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK (Esin Örücü & David Nelken eds.,
2007); see also William Twining, Social Science and Diffusion of Law, 32 J.L.
& SOC’Y 203 (2005).
57. See e.g. the discussion of “ethnoscapes, technoscapes, finanscapes,
mediascapes, and ideoscapes” in Arjun Appadurai, Disjuncture and Distance in
the Global Cultural Economy, in MODERNITY AT LARGE: CULTURAL
DIMENSIONS OF GLOBALIZATION (1996).
58. Additional reporters are now available.
59. E.g. Albania, Croatia, Lebanon, Montenegro, the Palestinian
Authority, Syria, and additional microstates (Andorra, Gibraltar, Monaco, San
Marino, Vatican City, etc). Additional countries not currently touching the
Mediterranean Sea may also be included—e.g. Jordan and Portugal—depending
on their historical and contemporary connection to the region. Rather than
creating simplistic rules to determine difficult cases, the Committee will decide
on the inclusion of additional countries on a case-by-case basis.
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Participants will then be expected to edit their reports on the basis
of those discussions. As the reports are completed, the project
leaders will prepare a draft general overview to be discussed with
participants. The leaders will complete an introduction and
conclusion for the published collection. Finally, an international
conference will be organized to publicize the project, the network,
the resulting reports, and the database.
Participants also agreed to try to meet at various other
related conferences and events (e.g. the World Society of Mixed
Jurisdiction Jurists’ Third ‘International Congress’ held in
Jerusalem, Israel in June 2011). The extended process of preparing
reports will better enable participants to transcend jurisdictional
and disciplinary boundaries. In addition to the published collection,
we will work to disseminate, as widely as possible, the information
gathered and generated. This will be accomplished in numerous
ways, i.e. through
•
•
•

various public events made possible by the
project;
teaching, blogging, and presentations by
participants;
additional research projects and publications—
both academic and mainstream—generated.

In addition, a website hosting an online database of laws and
norms in the region may be created and updated over the course of
the project. This will provide for the collection of existing primary
and secondary materials, links to information currently dispersed,
and an extensive bibliography. Access to both existing official
legislation and jurisprudence and more complex redactions of
unofficial norms could be included. Each of these will assist
knowledge transfer to jurists and scholars, to practitioners and
policy-makers, and to civil society organizations and the wider
community.
By combining the study of laws and norms and the methods
of the legal and social sciences, the project will produce numerous
conceptual and practical benefits. It will create more accurate,
useful, and accessible accounts of Mediterranean hybridity. It
might spur development of a new framework for scholarly
collaboration. Indeed, it may produce an analytical model more
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useful than existing taxonomies and methods for new research in
the region, in Europe, and around the world. Most importantly, the
project will permit a more empirically-grounded approach to issues
of law and policy. The collective activities of the network and the
research it generates may make important contributions to current
Euro-Mediterranean debates on, for example, commerce, the
environment, and human rights, and security. Another benefit will
be to facilitate discussion of future alignments between
Mediterranean and wider European cultures and their laws, i.e. the
Union for the Mediterranean. Given continuing debates in research
on the Mediterranean, it is important to note that the region will
serve as a geographical and jurisdictional focus for our study. We
do not seek evidence of a reified and perennial Mediterranean
experience. As Peregrine Horden expressed in a different context,
‘[w]e put “the Mediterranean” within our frame rather than assume
it as the frame itself.’ 60 Instead, the region is a laboratory. 61
III. LEGAL HYBRIDITY
The recognition of historical and comparative hybridity,
both legal and normative, allows us to better contextualize modern
traditions identified as ‘mixed legal systems.’ 62 These are
designated as such largely through the failure of comparatists to
assign them elsewhere. 63 The crude classifications of much past
and present comparative study—positivist, centralist, monist—
have often resulted in pushing these jurisdictions “into a marginal

60. Peregrine Horden, Mediterranean Excuses: Historical Writing on the
Mediterranean Since Braudel, 16 HIST. & ANTHROPOLOGY 25, 26 (2005). On
these contemporary debates, see HORDEN & PURCELL, supra note 10.
61. See Dionigi Albera, The Mediterranean as an Anthropological
Laboratory, 16 ANALES DE LA FUNDACIÓN JOAQUÍN COSTA 215 (1999).
62. Michele Graziadei, Legal Transplants and the Frontiers of Legal
Knowledge, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 723, 727 (2009). Cf. the use of
‘hybrid’ in Dorcas White, Some Problems of a Hybrid Legal System: A Case
Study of St Lucia, 30 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 862 (1981) and ‘hybridity’ in Dargo,
supra note 19.
63. Jacques du Plessis, Comparative Law and the Study of Mixed Legal
Systems, in REIMANN & ZIMMERMANN, supra note 50, at 478.
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and uncertain position.” 64 That peripheral status has begun to
change. In the last decade, scholars have increasingly focused on
mixed systems, or at least the European hybrids among them. The
jurisdictions are, or so it has been argued, models for a more mixed
century to come. 65 More specifically, it has been argued that mixed
systems suggest what a future European common law, a novum ius
commune Europaneum, might look like. 66 The implications of
scholarship on mixed jurisdictions is, however, still more
significant. Indeed, as Palmer argues,
[r]ecognizing that hybridity is a universal fact will
no doubt require us to revise some of the received
attitudes and prejudices about mixed systems . . .
[M]ixed systems have been too much at the center
of legal evolution to be regarded as something
unusual or strange. They cannot be both paradigms
and pariahs at the same time. A useful classification
scheme ought to begin with their centrality as a
point of departure. 67
Mixity is thus not the exception, but “the rule.” 68 Mixed traditions
are simply the most explicit and obvious legal hybrids. 69 But

64. See Luigi Moccia, Historical Overview on the Origins and Attitudes of
Comparative Law, in THE COMMON LAW OF EUROPE AND THE FUTURE OF
LEGAL EDUCATION 619 (Bruno De Witte & Caroline Forde eds., 1992). See also
Ake Malmström, The System of Legal Systems: Notes on a Problem of
Classification in Comparative Law, 13 SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES IN LAW 129,
148 (1969).
65. See Nora V. Demleitner, Combating Legal Ethnocentrism:
Comparative Law Sets Boundaries, 31 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 737, 748-749 (1999).
66. See JAN SMITS, THE MAKING OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: TOWARDS A
IUS COMMUNE EUROPAEUM AS A MIXED LEGAL SYSTEM (2002); see also Jan
Smits, Introduction: Mixed Legal Systems and European Private Law, in THE
CONTRIBUTION OF MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS TO EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW (Jan
Smits ed., 2001); see also Hein Kötz, The Value of Mixed Legal Systems, 78
TUL. L. REV. 435 (2003).
67. See Vernon Palmer, Mixed Legal Systems . . . and the Myth of Pure
Laws, 67 LA. L. REV. 1205, 1211 (2007).
68. Du Plessis, in REIMANN & ZIMMERMANN, supra note 63, at 481.
69. ‘Mixed jurists,’ those working within or on mixed systems, may be, as
a result, especially sensitive to the hybridity of all traditions. See Esin Örücü, A
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difficulties remain in determining “how mixed a mixed system
must be.” 70 Inevitably, classification of a tradition as mixed—or
indeed ‘pure’—is subjective. It is also fundamentally historical.
The transition from considerable legal hybridity to greater legal
unity, largely occurring in the nineteenth century, also effectively
created the modern distinction between ‘pure’ and ‘mixed’ legal
traditions. 71 There remains, however, a meaningful division
between the identification of past and present hybrids. Four
decades ago, Joseph McKnight distinguished “between what may
be termed mixed and that which has already been blended to an
extent that origins of rules are lost in ordinary legal practice. The
distinction is therefore at once a practical and a psychological
one. . . .” 72 While the dividing line between these might be better
seen as a fuzzy border between implicit and explicit mixes, it is
nevertheless a significant distinction.
Discussion of mixed systems can be confusing. The topic is
complex and the vocabulary of ‘mixity’ is “basically an accident of
history.” 73 The classification of jurisdictions, explicitly mixed or

General View of “Legal Families” and of “Mixing Systems”, in ÖRÜCÜ &
NELKEN, supra note 56, at 169-187.
70. Ignazio Castellucci, How Mixed Must a Mixed System be?, 12 ELEC. J.
COMP. L. (May 2008), available at http://www.ejcl.org/121/art121-4.pdf (Last
visited November 9, 2011). See also Örücü, supra note 46.
71. This is the “hidden temporal dimension” in the categorization of mixed
traditions. Patrick Glenn, Quebec: Mixité and Monism, in ÖRÜCÜ ET AL., supra
note 46, at 1.
72. Joseph McKnight, Some Historical Observations on Mixed Systems of
Law, 22 JURID. REV. 177, 186 (1977).
73. Vernon Palmer, Mixed Jurisdictions, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 467 (Jan Smits ed., 2006) (referring to mixed jurisdictions).
In two articles, Palmer has traced the genealogy of this terminology. See Vernon
Palmer, Two Rival Theories of Mixed Legal Systems, in MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS
AT NEW FRONTIERS (Esin Örücü ed., 2010). See also Vernon Palmer, Quebec and
Her Sisters in the Third Legal Family, 54 MCGILL L. J. 321 (2009). Note that
the former is also available in (2008) 3 J. COMP. L. 7 and (2008) 12 ELEC. J.
COMP. L., available at http://www.ejcl.org/121/abs121-16.html (Last visited
November 9, 2011). See also Kenneth G.C. Reid, The Idea of Mixed Legal
Systems, 78 TUL. L. REV. 7 (2003).
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otherwise, remains subjective. 74 In current research, ‘mixed legal
systems’ is generally used for those jurisdictions that contain
significant and explicitly segregated elements of different pannational legal traditions. 75 It remains a residual, catch-all category
for those that cannot be assigned elsewhere and can cover any mix,
whether Western or non-Western. ‘Mixed jurisdictions’ may
sometimes be used in this general manner or for any mixture of
Anglo-American and continental laws. 76 It is most often, however,
applied to a narrower subset of Western mixes that dominate
scholarship. 77 Here, ‘mixed jurisdictions’ refers to situations in
which (i) continental laws are “overlaid” or “suffused” with
Anglo-American laws later in time 78 or (ii) continental private law
is joined to Anglo-American public and criminal law. For

74. PALMER (2001), supra note 6, at 17 and Palmer (2006), supra note 73,
at 468.
75. For example, a list prepared and posted online by the University of
Ottawa, uses ‘mixed legal systems’ to cover various collections of ‘civil law,’
‘common law,’ ‘customary law,’ ‘Muslim law,’ and ‘Jewish law.’ Mixed Legal
Systems, University of Ottawa, http://www.juriglobe.ca/eng/sys-juri/classpoli/sys-mixtes.php (Last visited November 9, 2011). See generally,
Classification of Legal Systems and Corresponding Political Entities, University
of Ottawa, http://www.juriglobe.ca/eng/sys-juri/index-syst.php (Last visited
November 9, 2011).
76. See T.B. Smith, Mixed Jurisdictions, in 6 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW (F.H. Lawson ed., 1974), 2-230; T.B.
Smith, The Preservation of the Civilian Tradition in “Mixed Jurisdictions,” in
CIVIL LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD 5 (Athanassios N. Yiannopoulos ed., 1965);
Robin Evans-Jones, Receptions of Law, Mixed Legal Systems and the Myth of
the Genius of Scots Private Law, 114 L. Q. REV. 228 (1998). By this latter
definition, however, seemingly pure Anglo-American jurisdictions might be
classified as mixed given their past borrowing from pan-European legal
traditions. See Seán Patrick Donlan, All this Together Make Up Our Common
Law: Legal Hybridity in England and Ireland, 1704-1804, in ÖRÜCÜ (2010),
supra note 73.
77. “Facetiously, one might therefore define a mixed jurisdiction as a place
where debate over the subject takes place.” William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions:
Common Law v. Civil Law (Codified and Uncodified), 60 LA. L. REV. 677, 680
n.3 (2000).
78. See Smith (1965), supra note 76, at 5; Walton, supra note 4, at 1. In
Israel, Anglo-American law was overlaid with continental law rather than the
other way around. See Stephen Goldstein, Israel, in PALMER (2001), supra note
6, at 448-468.
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historical reasons, the first has usually resulted in the second. The
so-called ‘classical mixed jurisdictions’ are roughly the same,
referring to specific jurisdictions—Louisiana, Puerto Rico,
Quebec, Scotland, and South Africa—on which a scholarly critical
mass has long existed. This terminological plasticity arguably
impedes
more
accurate
classification
and
effective
79
communication. For example, in an important essay on “The idea
of mixed legal systems,” the Channel Islands, Cyprus, and Malta
are each described as ‘mixed jurisdictions.’ 80 In fact, each is quite
distinct, both from one another and the ‘classical mixed
jurisdictions.’ 81 Non-Western mixed systems—Cameroon,
Indonesia, the United Arab Emirates, etc—are still more diverse.
A decade ago, Vernon Palmer added another term with the
publication of Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide: The Third Legal
Family (2001). A native Louisianan, he emphasized the degree to
which the systems discussed in his work shared “profound
generalizable resemblances.” 82 The work included reports on
Israel, Louisiana, Quebec, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Scotland,

79. See Donlan (2010), supra note 1.
80. Reid, supra note 73, at 7 n.1 (2003). See also George L. Gretton &
Kenneth G.C. Reid, The Civil Law Tradition: Some Thoughts from North of the
Tweed, 11 JERSEY & GUERNSEY L. REV. (2007), available at
www.jerseylaw.je/Publications/jerseylawreview/Oct07/JLR0710_Gretton.aspx
(Last visited November 9, 2011).
81. The legal tradition of the Channel Islands combines Norman
‘Germanic’ folklaw with the pan-European ius commune. This is, in fact, true
for all of Western Europe. But its legal ideas and institutions also reflect both
significant English influence and post-Code civil borrowings. In contrast to the
classical mixed jurisdictions, Maltese criminal law combines both AngloAmerican and continental law at both the substantive and procedural levels. Its
civil procedures also reflect the investigative traditions of the continent. Cyprus,
for example, mixes Anglo-American private law with continental public and
criminal law. Symeon C. Symeonides, The Mixed Legal System of the Republic
of Cyprus, 78 TUL. L. REV. 441 (2003).
82. PALMER (2001), supra note 6, at 4. See also Seán Patrick Donlan, A
Thing Without Cohesion of Parts: The Professional and Pedagogical
Contribution of Mixed Jurisdictions, 38 IRISH JURIST 383 (2003) (reviewing
VERNON VALENTINE PALMER, MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE: THE THIRD
LEGAL FAMILY (2001) and JAN SMITS, THE CONTRIBUTION OF MIXED LEGAL
SYSTEMS TO EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW (2002)).
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and South Africa. 83 Palmer suggests that the jurisdictions can be
treated collectively as a distinctive ‘third legal family’ between the
well-known Anglo-American and continental legal ‘families.’ 84 In
addition to combining continental private law with AngloAmerican public and criminal law, he notes that in each of these
jurisdictions Anglo-American law penetrates, to varying degrees,
both (i) judicial institutions and procedures and (ii) substantive
(private and commercial) law. 85 The former is significant; the latter
varies in a reasonably common “pattern of penetration and
resistance.” 86 Precedent in these jurisdictions falls somewhere
between the parent traditions, “rais[ing] a defining issue in the
quest for the ‘soul’ of the system.” 87 While Palmer, like other
mixed jurists, uses different terms at different times to label these
different jurisdictions, he sees the classical mixed jurisdictions and
the third legal family as synonymous. 88 His classification can
sometimes, however, marginalize elements, especially nonWestern laws and customs, unique to a tradition that might
otherwise exclude it from ‘third family’ gatherings: e.g., the
customary laws of South Africa, the Islamic law of the Philippines,
and the religious laws of Israel. 89
83. A footnote notes that “other of this type” include Botswana, Lesotho,
Mauritius, Saint Lucia, the Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe.
PALMER (2001), supra note 6, at 4.
84. See PALMER (2001), supra note 6, at 7-10 and Palmer (2006), supra
note 73, at 467-468.
85. Indeed, his inclusion of public law was an important shift from the
traditional narrow focus of comparative law on private law. PALMER (2001),
supra note 6, at 6 n.8.
86. PALMER (2001), supra note 6, at 57. While property law is largely
unaffected, Anglo-American influence on obligations, especially tort, is more
significant. Succession law is somewhat resistant, though pressure for freedom
of testation has altered the laws of some jurisdictions. For practical reasons,
Anglo-American commercial laws were also adopted with little resistance. Id.,
53-59, 66-76 and Palmer (2006), supra note 73, at 471-472, 474. See Palmer’s
detailed synopsis in Palmer (2009), supra note 73, at 343-344.
87. PALMER (2001), supra note 6, at 45. See id., 44-46. See also Palmer
(2006), supra note 73, at 471.
88. It might be better to see the latter as a subset of the former with
specific traits.
89. But note “The Stellenbosch Papers” generated in a colloquium on
“Mixed Jurisdictions as Models? Perspectives from Southern Africa and
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But Palmer is central to the study of mixed systems. This
is, in part, due to his role as the driving force in the establishment
of the World Society of Mixed Jurisdiction Jurists in 2002. But
great strength of his work has been to promote communication
among, and considerable scholarship on, mixed traditions. And
Palmer’s Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide is an especially important
resource for the Mediterranean Project. The work is, as a result of
his method, both far more general and richer in detail than that of
other mixed jurists. His approach was broadly familiar to
comparatists. He collected jurisdictional reports based on a
questionnaire he produced. The study was collaborative, involving
specialists in the respective jurisdictions supplemented by his own
cross-cultural comparison. 90 Palmer’s report categories included:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

the founding of the system
the magistrates and the courts
judicial methodology
statutory interpretation
mercantile law
procedure and evidence
the judicial reception of common law
the emergence of new legal creations
purists, pollutionists, and pragmatists
the linguistic factor 91

Using these categories, he was able to go into considerably more
detail than earlier discussions of mixed system. It is an obvious
model for our work. And even within the intentionally juridical
limits of his questionnaire, his analysis revealed the importance not
only of history, but of culture, to the development and unique
character of the mixed traditions studied. 92

Beyond”, collected in 25 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 1-209 (2010) and introduced by
Palmer.
90. PALMER (2001), supra note 6, at 15-16.
91. The expanded questionnaire is included as ‘Appendix A’ in PALMER
(2001), supra note 6, at 471-478. A report bibliography was also included.
92. This is especially true with respect to differences in the source and
living languages of the law in the jurisdictions. PALMER (2001), supra note 6, at
41-44 and Palmer (2006), supra note 73, at 470. See also Roger K. Ward, The
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Equally important to the scholarship on mixed systems and
our project is the work of Esin Örücü. 93 Her writings, perhaps
especially her “Mixed and Mixing Systems: A Conceptual
Search,” may be the most sophisticated general analyses of legal
hybridity. 94 A native of Turkey, she has consistently argued for an
‘expansion’ of research beyond the classical mixed jurisdictions to
more exotic hybrids. 95 She has been especially critical of the
traditional legal families of comparative law. 96 Instead, Örücü has
proposed a “family trees” model that “regards all legal systems as
mixed and overlapping, overtly or covertly, and groups them
according to the proportionate mixture of the ingredients.” 97 She
has also employed an especially colorful vocabulary and useful
models. She has used, for example, culinary terms to describe the
ways in which laws might mix:

French Language in Louisiana Law and Legal Education: A Requiem, 57 LA. L.
REV. 1283 (1997). On culture, see Daniel Visser, Cultural Forces in the Making
of Mixed Legal Systems, 78 TUL. L. REV. 41 (2003) and Nir Kedar, Law, Culture
and Civil Codification in a Mixed Legal System, 22 CAN. J.L. & SOC’Y 177
(2007).
93. Her scholarship on Turkey is especially important to our work. See
especially Esin Örücü, Turkey: Change under Pressure, in ÖRÜCÜ ET AL., supra
note 46 at 89; see also Esin Örücü, Turkey’s Synthetic Legal System and Her
Indigenous Socio-Culture(s) in a “Covert” Mix, in ÖRÜCÜ (2010), supra note
73, at 150.
94. Örücü, supra note 46, at 335. The title—Mixed and Mixing Systems—
underscores the dynamic, on-going nature of hybridity.
95. Esin Örücü, What is a Mixed Legal System: Exclusion or Expansion?,
in ÖRÜCÜ (2010), supra note 73. Earlier versions of this article can be found in
3 J. COMP. L. (2008) and in 12:1 ELEC. J. COMP. L. (2008) available at
www.ejcl.org/121/abs121-15.html (Last visited November 9, 2011).
96. Örücü, supra note 69 at 177. See also Sue Farran, Scots Law: A System
in Search of a Family, 61 N. IRELAND LEGAL Q. 311 (2010). On the rise of
modern comparative taxonomy, see Mariana Pargendler, The Rise and Decline
of Legal Families, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. (2012).
97. See Esin Örücü, Family Trees for Legal Systems: Towards a
Contemporary Approach, in EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 363, 375 (Mark van Hoecke ed., 2004); see also H. Patrick
Glenn, Comparative Legal Families and Comparative Legal Traditions, in
REIMANN & ZIMMERMANN, supra note 50, at 425.
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At times, elements from socio-culturally similar and
legal-culturally different legal systems come
together forming ‘mixed jurisdictions’ of the
already mentioned “simple” kind, [i.e.] ‘mixing
bowls,’ the ingredients being still in the process of
blending but in need of further processing if a
“puree” is to be produced . . . Next come the
“complex” mixed systems, where the elements
are both socio-culturally and legal-culturally
different . . . [i.e., t]he “Italian salad bowl,” where,
although the salad dressing covers the salad, it is
easy to detect the individual ingredients clearly
through the sides of the glass bowl . . . Then, there
is . . . the “English salad plate,” the ingredients
sitting separately, far apart on a flat plate with a
blob of mayonnaise to the side into which the
different ingredients can be dipped before
consumption. 98
Indeed, Örücü has repeatedly argued that “[i]nstances of mixing
are complicated. They may be overt or covert, structured or
unstructured, complex or simple, blended or unblended.” 99 In her
most recent edited collection, Mixed Legal Systems at New
Frontiers, she has written that “it is invaluable to consider legal
systems, designated as legal pluralisms, in order to appreciate the
relationship between official state law and religious and customary
laws, not only as anthropologists but as comparative lawyers.”100
While this might seem to suggest a focus limited to legal hybridity
or state legal pluralism, she has also argued that “comparative law
studies should extend to norms of non-state law, folk law and
customary law, remembering that the law is global, national and
local.” 101 Combining these ideas of expanding research on legal
98. See Örücü, supra note 69, at 180; see also Orücü, supra note 54, at 1012.
99. Örücü, supra note 95, at 67. As noted, Örücü has also written about the
diffusion of law.
100. See Esin Örücü, General Introduction, in ÖRÜCÜ (2010), supra note
73, at 7; see also Örücü, supra note 46, at 342, 350-351.
101. See Esin Örücü, Developing Comparative Law, in ÖRÜCÜ & NELKEN,
supra note 56, at 60-61. “In the context of ‘legal pluralism,’ law goes far beyond
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hybrids with extending comparative study into other norms is a
challenging, but promising, approach for future study. It is at the
center of our project.
Even limiting ourselves to legal rather than normative
hybridity, there remain still deeper complexities. First, all legal
traditions are hybrids. There are also, however, a number of other
approaches to law that underline the complexity of the most
ordinary law and legal systems. One commonly-acknowledged
type of complexity can be discovered in the distance between
formal law and its actual application. Roscoe Pound famously
formulated this as the gap between the ‘law in books’ and the ‘law
in action.’ 102 If this is now a standard bromide in legal scholarship,
Rodolfo Sacco’s theory of ‘legal formants’ arguably goes still
further, underscoring the considerable diversity in the
interpretation of state laws, a diversity that was frequently rooted
in practical, professional differences among those interpreting the
law. 103 Similarly, the study of ‘legal polycentricity’ stresses legal
diversity within or internal to state law, especially with regard to
sources. 104 Other varieties of post-modern and critical thinking
provide many of the same conclusions. In each of these instances,
the insistence on context significantly problematizes neat divisions
between legal families, portrayed as closed and discrete ‘systems.’
IV. NORMATIVE HYBRIDITY
Örücü’s interest in non-state law reflects a wider “ethos of
pluralism” in legal and social science scholarship. 105 This ethos
reflects the increasingly explicit complexity of contemporary law
and legal systems at the global, national, and sub-national levels.
Both within states and without, it is difficult to ignore the

the so-called ‘official law, and extends to multi-layers o systems. Thus, today,
‘law’ spans the range of positive law and then moves to non-state law, rules,
custom and tradition.” Id., at 60. See also Twining, supra note 56, at 69-89.
102. Pound, supra note 23.
103. Sacco, supra note 23.
104. PETERSEN & ZAHLE, supra note 23 and HIROVONEN, supra note 23.
105. Margaret Davies, The Ethos of Pluralism, 27 SYDNEY L. REV. 87, 112
(2005).
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proliferation of laws and the recognition of norms over the course
of the last half-century. Social scientists, in particular
anthropologists and sociologists, have long noted the frequently
fuzzy divisions between state and non-state legalities. 106 The
coexistence of both is, John Griffiths argued, “the omnipresent,
normal situation in human society.” 107 Social scientists and their
allies in the legal academy have provided very sophisticated
analyses, often rooted in empirical study, of these relationships. In
a classic of the genre, Sally Faulk Moore has described these plural
“legal” orders as “semi-autonomous social field[s]” that have
“rule-making capacities, and the means to induce or coerce
compliance; but [are] simultaneously set in a larger social matrix
which can, and does, affect and invade it.” 108 A few comparatists
have also embraced (what I’ve called) hybridity, most notably
Patrick Glenn and Werner Menski. 109 Complementing in many
respects the former’s analysis, Menski, a comparatist and social
geographer, has “place[d] legal pluralism . . . confidently into the
mainstream study of comparative law” and “emphasize[d] the need
for strengthening socio-legal approaches.” 110
In fact, the growth of scholarship on hybridity has brought
an ever-expanding catalogue of ‘pluralist’ approaches. The first
wave of social science research, the so-called ‘classical legal

106. Masaji Chiba, Other Phases of Legal Pluralism in the Contemporary
JURIS
228
(1998),
available
at
World,
11
RATIO
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9337.00088/pdf (Last visited
November 9, 2011).
107. John Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism, in 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM
39 (1986). Note his shift to the language of ‘normative pluralism’ in The Idea of
Sociology of Law and its Relation to Law and Society, in 8 LAW AND
SOCIOLOGY: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 49, 63-64 (Michael Freeman ed., 2005).
108. Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous
Social Field as an Appropriate Field of Study, 7 L. & SOC’Y REV. 719, 720
(1973).
109. See also MATTEI ET AL., supra note 47 and Graziadei, supra note 50.
110. WERNER MENSKI, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT: THE
LEGAL SYSTEMS OF AFRICA AND ASIA 16 (2d ed. 2006). “Within a global
framework for the comparative study of law and legal systems, it is evident that
a narrow approach to law as state law leads neither to appropriate understanding
of non-European societies and cultures nor to satisfactory analysis of the
phenomenon of law even in its European manifestations.” Id. at 185-186.
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pluralism,’ focused on non-Western, post-colonial communities.111
It often served as a critique of Western colonialism and hegemony.
An important distinction is also made between (i) ‘weak’ or ‘state
legal pluralism’ in which plural legal orders are effectively part of
the wider state systems and (ii) ‘strong’ or ‘deep legal pluralism’
in which the focus includes both state laws and significant nonstate norms. 112 Understandably, lawyers, including comparatists,
are often more interested in the former than the latter. 113 More
recently, research in so-called ‘new legal pluralism’ has included
case studies of hybridity within the West, suggesting the
continuing importance of non-state norms here. 114 These works
have suggested, that “[i]n most contexts, law is not central to the
maintenance of social order.” 115 And, if the “specifics are not yet
clear,” one element of a third pluralist paradigm—after ‘classical’
and ‘new’ legal pluralism—is “global legal pluralism.” 116 This
encompasses international law, human rights, and, more
problematically, involves the assertion of an increasingly important
111. There were exceptions. In addition to Ehrlich’s work, some early
classics of “legal pluralism” were not limited to colonial societies. See e.g.
GEORGES GURVITCH, SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (1947) and LEOPOLD POSPISIL,
ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW: A COMPARATIVE THEORY (1971).
112. See e.g. Gordon Woodman, The Idea of Legal Pluralism, in DUPRET,
supra note 24, at 5.
113. In the former, non-state normative orders exist with the approval of,
or at the sufferance of, the state; the latter refers to non-state normative orders
that exist despite the state. The lawyer’s distinction might be that between intra
or praeter legem on the one hand and contra legem on the other. “‘[W]eak’
pluralism is no more than a plural arrangement in a diversified legal system
whose basic ideology remains centralist.” Menski, supra note 110, at 116.
114. Merry, supra note 37, at 872 et seq. (This has sometimes been linked
to research on ‘social norms’ linked both to political science and to the “law and
economics” movement.); see also William K. Jones, A Theory of Social Norms,
1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 545 (1994) and ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS
(2000).
115. ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS
SETTLE DISPUTES 280 (1991).
116. See Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV.
1155 (2007); Ralf Michaels, Global Legal Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC.
SCI. 243 (2009). See also Gunther Teubner, Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism
in the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE (Gunther Teubner ed.,
1996); Gunther Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism,
13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1443 (1991-1992).
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commercial ‘law’ or lex mercatoria created by non-state actors.
These are often linked to debates on the character of globalization.
Perhaps more useful to our project is ‘critical legal pluralism.’
Here, rather than “reify[ing] ‘norm-generating communities’ as
surrogates for the State,” the focus is on the role of individuals in
“generating normativity.” 117 Rather than being the product of
formal legislation or even informal custom, individuals are
themselves the site of law or norm creation in a complex and fluid
normative web. 118 In a similar manner, the ‘post-modern legal
pluralism’ of Boaventura de Sousa Santos details a “conception of
different legal spaces superimposed, interpenetrated and mixed in
our minds, as much as in our actions.” 119 He insists that the
modern situation is one of the thick “interlegality” of both laws
and norms. 120
In addition to the numerous internal debates on legal
pluralism in the social sciences, broadening the mission of
comparative law to include the study of both legal and normative
hybridity has also encountered opposition. Among mixed jurists,
Palmer has expressed concerns about the dangers of expanding the
concept of ‘mixity’ to include the complexities of legal
pluralism. 121 While he has recognized the virtues of a functionalist
or “factual approach” to the study of legal and non-state norms,
Palmer has significant anxieties about the implications of the study

117. Martha-Marie Kleinhans & Roderick Macdonald, What is a Critical
Legal Pluralism? 12 CAN. J.L. SOC’Y 25, 35, 38 (1997). See also Jacques
Vanderlinden, Return to Legal Pluralism: Twenty Years Later, J. LEGAL
PLURALISM 149, 151-152 (1989).
118. Cf. Robert Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11
(1983) (arguing “that the creation of legal meaning—‘jurisgenesis’—takes place
always through an essentially cultural medium”).
119. Boaventura De Sousa Santos, Law: A Map of Misreading. Toward a
Postmodern Conception of Law, 14 J.L. & SOC’Y 279, 297-298 (1987): see also
BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARDS A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE:
LAW, GLOBALIZATION, AND EMANCIPATION (2nd ed. 2002); Franz von BendaBeckmann & Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, The Dynamics of Change and
Continuity in Plural Legal Orders, 53-54 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 10 (2006).
120. De Sousa Santos (1987), supra note 119, at 298.
121. Note Palmer’s critical comment on the “eclectic list of systems”—
including Australia, Algeria, and the European Union—discussed in Palmer
(2009), supra note 73, at 333 n.43.
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of hybridity on comparative law, especially in the classification of
legal traditions. In discussing mixed systems, he has expressed
concern about the loss of precision in expanding mixed scholarship
to more complex varieties of legal hybridity or state legal
pluralism:
To legal anthropologists and legal pluralists, the
principal criterion of a mixed system is simply the
presence or interaction of two or more kinds of laws
or legal traditions with the same social field. The
mixed nature of a legal order can be discovered and
confirmed in an objective manner by research and
observation. Any interaction between laws of a
different type or source—indigenous with received,
religious with customary, Western with nonWestern—is sufficient to constitute a mixed legal
system . . . 122
Palmer acknowledges the importance of expanding our
understanding of how hybrid traditions are generated, but remains
cautious:
Attempting to reclassify and reorder the mixed legal
systems of the world in accordance with the
information supplied by historical pluralism, ethnic
pluralism, and transnational legal pluralism is the
next daunting task of comparative law. If it can be
accomplished, it would revolutionize the legal
universe in a way comparable to the Copernican

122. Palmer (2009), supra note 73, at 333. “Pluralism,” he writes, “has yet
to present a taxonomy that differentiates and arranges the hybrids into useful
groupings.” Id. at 335. Kenny Anthony has also noted that “in a mixed system,
unlike a plural system, there is just one set of rules for every situation:” The
Identification and Classification of Mixed Systems of Law, in COMMONWEALTH
CARIBBEAN LEGAL STUDIES: A VOLUME OF ESSAYS TO COMMEMORATE THE
21ST ANNIVERSARY OF THE FACULTY OF LAW OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST
INDIES 194 (Gilbert Kodilinye & P.K. Menon eds. 1992); The Viability of the
Civilist Tradition in St Lucia: A Tentative Appraisal, in ESSAYS ON THE CIVIL
CODES OF QUÉBEC AND ST. LUCIA (Raymond Landry & Ernest Caparros eds.
1985).
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revolution on the old Ptolemaic system of
astronomy.
He adds, however, that:
We are far from that at the present time. So far
pluralism is an insight suggesting that the playing
cards need to be reshuffled; it has yet to be shown
how the cards can be re-dealt in a rational and
coherent way. 123
Palmer is right, of course, to note these very real difficulties. 124 It
is, after all, his focus on selected mixtures that has proven most
constructive in the study of mixed systems.
But legal pluralists and their allies are not attempting to
create new classifications, but to provide instead a conceptual
lexicon and analytical models that allow for the unique
characteristics of legal-normative orders (or the intersection of
such orders). 125 And Palmer’s ‘pluralist challenge’ may be met by
the methodological pluralism he has suggested in other writings.
He has written “that there is not, and indeed cannot be, a single
exclusive method that comparative law research should follow.”126
Comparative law must, in fact, “be accessible and its methods must
be flexible.” 127 For example, one response to this pluralist
challenge is to look to alternative approaches to taxonomy. Both (i)
123. Palmer (2010), supra note 73, at 48. “But I predict that if this task is
one day accomplished, it will be done by a mixed jurisdiction jurist, for he or
she knows best that there is a need, and knows best the means to achieve the
goal.” Id. Cf. Örücü, supra note 100, at 7 (including Örücü’s desire for a
“workable grid”).
124. Jane Matthews Glenn has expressed a similar concern that including
“[m]ixity between formal and informal law” in discussions of mixed
jurisdictions “runs the risk of extending the notion beyond recognition.” Jane
Matthews Glenn, Mixed Jurisdictions in the Commonwealth Caribbean: Mixing,
Unmixing, Remixing, in ÖRÜCÜ, supra note 45, at 76, 76. The article is also
available in (2008) 3 J. COMP. L. 53 and (2008) 12 ELEC. J. COMP. L., available
at http://www.ejcl.org/121/abs121-10.html (Last visited November 9, 2011).
125. It is also “first and foremost a scheme of comprehension, and not a
moral or political theory.” Croce, supra note 29, at 38.
126. Vernon Palmer, From Lerotholi to Lando: Some Examples of
Comparative Law Methodology, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 261, 290 (2005).
127. Id.
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Ugo Mattei and (ii) Marc van Hoecke and Marc Warrington have
recently suggested new models of comparative classification and
corresponding paths to research. 128 The legal philosopher Kaarlo
Tuori has suggested classifying law according to its “surface
level,” “legal culture,” or “deep structure.” 129 Interestingly, Tuori
borrows from, among others, Ferdinand Braudel. Reflecting the
varying rates of historical change detailed in Braudel’s magisterial
work, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean world in the age
of Philip II (originally published in French in 1949), Tuori
suggests that:
Even within the law, approached in its symbolic
normative aspect, we can distinguish between levels
obeying different historical times. At the surface
level, change is an everyday phenomenon, at the
level of the legal culture the pace of change slows
down, and the most inert level in its variation is the
deep structure, which represents the long durée of
the law. 130
Each of these approaches reflects a move away from the narrow
observation of black-letter law. Other comparatists have begun to
combine these different methods in novel and productive ways. 131
128. See Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in
the World’s Legal Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 5 (1997); Mark van Hoecke &
Mark Warrington, Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine:
Towards a New Model for Comparative Law, 47 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 495
(1998). See also James A. Whitman, Consumerism versus Producerism: A Study
in Comparative Law, 117 YALE L. J. 340 (2007).
129. Kaarlo Tuori, Towards a Multi-layered View of Modern Law, in
JUSTICE, MORALITY AND SOCIETY: A TRIBUTE TO ALEKSANDER PECZENIK ON
THE OCCASION OF THIS 60TH BIRTHDAY 433 (Aulis Aarnio, Robert Alexy &
Gunnar Begholz eds., 1997); see also the discussion in chapter 6 of KAARLO
TUORI, CRITICAL LEGAL POSITIVISM (2002).
130. Id. at 150. See also Kjell Å. Modéer, Mixed Legal Systems and
Coloniality: Parts of the Construct of a Global Legal Culture, in ASIA AND
EUROPE IN GLOBALISATION: CONTINENTS, REGIONS AND NATIONS 14 (Göran
Therborn & Habibul Haque Khondker eds. 2006).
131. Lukas Heckendorn-Urscheler, Multidimensional Hybridity: Nepali
Law from a Comparative Perspective, in CASHIN-RITAINE ET AL., supra note 1,
at 55 (combining the traditional ‘legal families’ approach, Glenn’s ‘legal
traditions,’ and Mattei’s ‘three patterns of law’).
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Alternatively, of course, we might resist the taxonomic urge in
favor of generating additional research. Aware that the two cannot
be easily separated, we might instead “research first, categorize
later.” 132
Our project takes up this task of researching both legal and
normative hybridity, i.e. both ‘state’ and ‘deep’ legal pluralism.
We will do so by combining the concentrated research,
comparative method, and specific results of Palmer with the vivid,
creative conceptual vocabulary of Örücü and the rich resources of
the social sciences. Admittedly, a shift to studying both ‘official’
and ‘unofficial’ legalities significantly complicates the work of
comparative law, drawing jurists into debates they typically avoid
and for which they are arguably ill-prepared. Jurists and social
scientists not only define ‘law’ differently, but also often adopt
very difference methods in their research. In a recent discussion of
law and anthropology, for example, Thomas Bennett usefully
outlined “[i]n very general terms, the preferences of each
discipline . . .”
Perspective
Subject matter of
research
Method
Ultimate concern

COMPARATIVE LAW

LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY

◦Macro
◦Lawyer’s
◦Formal laws
◦Rules and concepts
◦Theoretical and
dogmatic
◦System

◦Micro
◦The subject’s
◦All normative orders
◦Social contexts
◦Participant observation
◦Social result

133

There are obviously more complex approaches between these two
ideal types. They remain, however, meaningful disciplinary
distinctions related to the respective goals of legal and social
132. Ignazio Castellucci, in CASHIN-RITAINE ET AL., supra note 1, at 75. In
conversation, Castellucci has also noted that “only two things in life are certain:
death and taxonomy.” We are, it is true, classifying animals. See also Giovanni
Marini, Foreword: Legal Traditions–A Critical Appraisal, 2 COMP. L. REV. 1
(2011),
available
at
www.comparativelawreview.com/ojs/index.php/CoLR/article/view/15/19 (Last
visited November 9, 2011).
133. T.W. Bennett, Legal Anthropology and Comparative Law: A
Disciplinary Compromise, 21 STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 1, 16-19 (2010).

2011]

MEDITERRANEAN HYBRIDITY PROJECT

391

science research and pedagogy. The prescriptive purposes of state
laws, either for social ordering or legal practice, are quite different
from the comparative luxury of the descriptive research of social
scientists. Tamanaha has created a similar table comparing “legal
versus social scientific perspectives:”
Concept of law

FIRST CATEGORY–
LIVED NORMS

SECOND CATEGORY–
ENFORCED NORMS

Phase

◦Patterned or regular
conduct

◦Social reaction to
disruption of regular
conduct

‘Legal’ Mechanism

◦Complex of social
obligations

◦Institutionally imposed
sanction

Sociological Studies

◦Internal control—
conformity

◦External control—
response to deviance

Sociological
Mechanism

◦Socialization

◦Coercive application of
power

Effective Moment

◦Proactive (shaping
conduct)

◦Reactive (following
disruptive conduct) 134

These disciplinary differences reflect not only distinctive training
and research, but mirror the distinction between legal and
normative hybridity, between “(state-)enforced” and “lived”
norms. Combining the study of both will require a rarely exhibited
interdisciplinary spirit. 135 It will demand considerable
collaboration and dialogue as well as translation between legal and
social science vocabularies. 136 We are optimistic about both the
practicalities and the possibilities of our project. As Örücü has
written, “[i]f comparatists and regionalists work more closely in
the future, the outcome will prove to be extremely beneficial to
both and to legal scholarship.” 137
134. Brian Z. Tamanaha, An Analytical Map of Social Scientific
Approaches to the Concept of Law, 15 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 501, 523 (1995).
135. William Twining, Law and Anthropology: A Case Study in InterDisciplinary Collaboration, 7 L. & SOC’Y REV. 561 (1973).
136. See also David Nelken, Can Law Learn From Social Science?, 35
ISR. L. REV. 205 (2001).
137. Esin Örücü, The Boundaries of Unity: Mixed Systems in Action, J.
COMP. L. 1, 6 (2008).
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While there are real obstacles to such research, several
writers have recommended that the study of pluralism or hybridity
might be the ideal subject on which jurists and social scientists can
collaborate. Annelise Riles has suggested, for example, a “new
rapprochement” was occurring between comparatists and sociolegal jurists, not least because of legal pluralism. 138 Roger
Cotterrell has similarly written that “comparative law and legal
sociology are interdependent and . . . their central, most general
and most ambitious scientific projects—to understand law in its
development and its variety as an aspect of social life—are
identical.” 139 His suggestion that “a genuinely pluralist approach”
to law involves shifting the research focus away from the state to
communities might also be of particular use to our work. 140 With
others, Cotterrell has specifically noted that scholarship on
comparative law and legal culture is also promising. 141 Indeed, it
points away from positivist understandings of law and “towards a
legal pluralist understanding of the scope of law that is close to that
of many legal sociologists and legal anthropologists.” 142 Indeed, as
Nelken notes:
138. Annelise Riles, Comparative Law and Socio-Legal Studies, in
REIMANN & ZIMMERMANN, supra note 50, at 777. See id., at 805-806. See
Bennett, supra note 133, at 25.
139. ROGER COTTERRELL, LAW, CULTURE AND SOCIETY: LEGAL IDEAS IN
THE MIRROR OF SOCIAL THEORY 129 (2006); see Roger Cotterrell, Comparatists
and Sociology, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND
TRANSITIONS 135 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., 2003); see also
Nelken, supra note 51, at 22. For an earlier attempt, see JEROME HALL,
COMPARATIVE LAW AND SOCIAL THEORY (1963) and Jerome Hall, Comparative
Law and Jurisprudence, 16 BUFF. L. REV. 61 (1966).
140. Roger Cotterrell, Transnational Communities and the Concept of
Law, 21 RATIO JURIS 1, 10 (2008). See particularly the types of legal pluralism
(monistic, agnostic, statist, and genuinely pluralist) discussed in id., at 8–10. See
also Roger Cotterrell, A Legal Concept of Community, 12 CAN. J.L. & SOC’Y 75;
see also ROGER COTTERRELL, LAW’S COMMUNITY: LEGAL THEORY IN
SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (1995).
141. See COTTERRELL, supra note 138, at 81-82 and Roger Cotterrell, The
Concept of Legal Culture, in COMPARING LEGAL CULTURES 13 (David Nelken
ed., 1997).
142. Roger Cotterrell, Comparative Law and Legal Culture, in REIMANN
& ZIMMERMANN, supra note 50, at 729; see also RENDEZVOUS OF EUROPEAN
LEGAL CULTURES (Jørn Øyrehagen Sunde & Knut Einar Skodvin eds., 2010).
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In employing the idea of legal culture in
comparative exercises geared to exploring the
similarities and differences amongst legal practices
and legal worlds the aim is to go beyond the tired
categories so often relied on in comparative law
such as ‘families of law’ and incorporate that
attention to the ‘law in action’ and ‘living law’
which is usually missing from comparative lawyers’
classifications and descriptions. 143
Our project may appropriately be seen as a comparative study of
both the ‘law in action’ and the ‘living law’ (as Ehrlich called it) in
the Mediterranean. 144 This cultural approach to comparative law is
promising. It may even be essential to any genuine understanding
of normative ordering, whether of the state or society, in
context. 145
Acknowledging the ubiquity of hybridity has important
consequences for both comparative law and for legal theory. 146 It
undermines the dissection of plural and dynamic traditions into
discrete, closed legal families or systems. It challenges legal

143. David Nelken, Using the Concept of Legal Culture, AUSTRALIAN J.
LEGAL PHIL. 1 (2004). Note section II, “Legal Delay in Italy: A Case Study.” Id.
at 11-26. See David Nelken, Defining and Using the Concept of Legal Culture,
in ÖRÜCÜ & NELKEN, supra note 56.
144. In discussing Ehrlich, Nelken writes that “it may be helpful to
distinguish developments in the study of law beyond the law (law other than that
contained in statutes and judgments), law without the state (especially the
coexistence of plural legal regimes), and order without the law (the implicit
norms that make order possible).” David Nelkin, Eugen Ehrlich, Living Law,
and Plural Legalities, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 443, 466 (2008). See
David Nelken, Law in Action or Living Law?: Back to the Beginning in
Sociology of Law, 4 LEGAL STUD. 157, 169 et seq. (1984). See also Mathias
Hertogh, A “European” Conception of a Legal Consciousness: Rediscovering
Eugen Ehrlich, 31 J.L. & SOC’Y 457 (2004).
145. In part, this is the recognition that law is “constituted by culture, and
culture (in no small way) by law.” LAWRENCE ROSEN, LAW AS CULTURE xii
(2006).
146. Juris Diversitas, with the Swiss Institute of Comparative Law, held a
conference (21-22 October 2011) on the theme of “The Concept of ’Law‘ in
Context: Comparative Law, Legal Philosophy, & the Social Sciences.” A
collection of essays from that conference will be published in 2012.
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nationalism, positivism, centralism, and monism. 147 Indeed, much
of the scholarship of legal pluralism was rooted in a critique of
state- and state law-centered analytical models. 148 This parallels
legal theory, informed by legal history, which suggests that much
of the legal and moral thought of the pre-modern era adopted, by
necessity, a more complex view of human ordering. 149 Similarly,
contemporary legal philosophers like Twining and Tamanaha—
each with their own personal experiences with hybridity and links
to the social sciences—have recently recognized the value, or
necessity, of incorporating multiple sources of legal and normative
authority into their analysis. 150 Twining, for example, has stressed
the importance of moving beyond Euro-centric and state-centered
legal theory in an age of globalization. In demanding a less
parochial ‘general jurisprudence,’ he noted that:
A reasonably inclusive cosmopolitan discipline of
law needs to encompass all levels of relations and
of ordering, relations between these levels, and all
important forms of law including supra-state (e.g.
international, regional) and non-state law (e.g.
religious, transnational law, chthonic law, i.e.
tradition/custom) and various forms of ‘soft law’ 151

147. Roderick Macdonald and David Sandomiershi extend this critique to
“prescriptivism,” which is “the belief that law is a social fact existing outside
and apart from those whose conduct it claims to regulate.” Roderick Macdonald
& David Sandomiershi, Against Nomopolies, 57 N. IRELAND LEGAL Q. 610, 615
(2006).
148. Griffiths, supra note 107, at 39.
149. As Geoffrey Samuel notes, with admittedly different ends, “[t]he task
of historical jurisprudence is not, then, to provide the basis for a philosophy of
law. It is to provide insights into law as an object of knowledge.” Geoffrey
Samuel, Science, Law and History: Historical Jurisprudence and Modern Legal
Theory, 41 N. IRELAND LEGAL Q. 1, 3 (1990). See also Harold J. Berman, The
Historical Foundations of Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 13 (2005) and Geoffrey
MacCormack, Historical Jurisprudence, 5 LEGAL STUD. 256 (1985).
150. Twining was born, raised, and taught for some time in Africa;
Tamanaha is a native of Hawaii and practiced law there and in Micronesia.
151. Twining, supra note 56, at 71. This acknowledgement “that
normative and legal orders can co-exist in the same time-space context,” he
notes, “greatly complicates the tasks of comparative law.” Id.
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Although there are important differences between their approaches,
Tamanaha has made similar arguments. 152 For both, state law is
but one manifestation of normative ordering and the study of legal
theory is closely linked to comparative law and socio-legal studies.
And Twining and Tamanaha are not alone. 153 Such theoretical
insights will inform our project. But it is hoped that the data
generated by the project as well as the project’s conclusions may
also contribute to a more grounded philosophy of law and
normative ordering.
V. CONCLUSION
In concluding, it is important to note that the legal
traditions and normative orders that are the focus of the
Mediterranean Hybridity Project are, by their nature, fluid and
slippery, constantly in flux. Even their component parts are
hybrids. As the anthropologist Brian Stross wrote in discussing
‘hybrid’ as a metaphor:
There are after all no ‘pure’ individuals, no ‘pure’
cultures, no ‘pure’ genres. All things are of
necessity ‘hybrid.’ Of course we can construct them
to be relatively ‘pure,’ and in fact we do so, which
is precise how we manage to get (new) hybrids
from purebreds that are (former) hybrids. 154
This article has briefly sketched an outline of our attempt to
capture the legal and normative complexity of the Mediterranean
region. It may be too much, of course, to ask that scholars as
individuals grasp both the theoretical writings and detailed case
studies of both jurists and social scientists. But a collaborative,
interdisciplinary project might successfully combine both theory
152. BRIAN TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND
SOCIETY (2001). On Tamanaha, see William Twining, A Post-Westphalian
Conception of Law, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 199 (2003).
153. See, e.g., EMMANUEL MELISSARIS, UBIQUITOUS LAW: LEGAL THEORY
AND THE SPACE FOR LEGAL PLURALISM (2009) and DETLEF VON DANIELS, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW FROM A TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (2010). See also
MENSKI, supra note 110, at chapter three.
154. Stross, supra note 16, at 266-267.
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and practice to produce new information and novel insights on
both hybridity and diffusion. In attempting this, our project will
combine three elements. First, the comparative method,
concentrated research, and specific results of Professor Palmer on
the classical mixed jurisdictions and the ‘third legal family.’
Second, the expansive vision and vivid conceptual vocabulary of
Professor Örücü in her research on comparative law and mixed
legal systems. Third, we will add the rich resources of the social
sciences, especially the extensive scholarship on legal or normative
pluralism. Recent political reforms and continuing social crises
across the region suggest how timely and useful the Mediterranean
Hybridity Project might be.
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ABSTRACT
The ideas of centralized political power and monarchy that
emerged from the Mediterranean world are among the most
important philosophical bases for the concept of sovereignty. My
thesis is that the normative idea of an absolute, independent, and
exclusive center of power originates in a complex case of
philosophical hybridity. It is the outcome of the alternation
between the conception of the Sovereign as representing the
supreme power (the indirect theory) and the conception of the
Sovereign as directly containing that power (the direct theory). The
former conception is usually associated with the history of Western
∗ Assistant Professor of Philosophy of Law, Faculty of Law, University of
Catania, Italy.
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political culture and the passage from Greek to Roman ideas of
public authority. The latter conception is typically associated with
the understanding of supreme political power found in Eastern
culture, as exemplified in Persian kingship and the Byzantine
theocracy.
My intention is to show how the modern concept of
sovereignty has emerged from a mixture of these two conceptions.
In fact, the early philosophical structure of sovereignty in both its
monarchical and its democratic versions can be summed up in the
notion of secularized transcendence. The sovereign benefits
simultaneously from both the conceptual model of subjectivity (the
indirect theory) as a mask that represents a center of attribution (le
Roi est mort, vive le Roi), and the conceptual model of a material
supreme subject (the direct theory) who embodies the primacy of
an authority that is beyond actual social relationships (l’État c’est
moi).
I. INTRODUCTION
My thesis is that the normative idea of sovereignty, that is,
of an absolute, independent, and exclusive center of power, is a
complex instance of philosophical and cultural hybridity. It
constitutes a specific kind of mixture whose nature seems obvious
in the complex transition from pre-modernity to modernity but that
is clearly freighted with the multiple nature of the millennia-long
historical experience of Mediterranean life.
This thesis does not challenge the widespread conception of
sovereignty as a typical legal-political category of modernity. That
conception is not at issue in my analysis. In fact, it is precisely
from the perspective of a philosophical discontinuity in the concept
of sovereignty that it becomes possible to grasp the unique mixture
of ancient and modern features to be found in new ways of
theorizing supreme legal and political power. In tracing this
conceptual history, we need to adopt a specific approach that seeks
to identify the area of convergence where past concepts are
subsumed into and transformed by modern concepts. This
approach entails taking account of both the rupturing impact on
culture and society of new principles and the presence of traces of
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past attitudes in the formation of new styles of life and thought. 1
Thus I am not questioning the need to interpret and understand the
concept of sovereignty in a holistic way, that is, by taking into
consideration the network of social, historical, political, and
cultural features that frame modernity.
At first glance, the conception of sovereignty in the
Mediterranean region seems to consist of a temporal-spatial mosaic
of interdependent elements that compose a single conceptual
structure: that of a transcendent, absolute power intended to further
human well-being. The modern European attitude towards
centralized power would appear to derive from this structure, even
when we take account of the indisputable differences between
Eastern and Western conceptions of power. The point is that the
cultural mobility that has always been a feature of the
Mediterranean region allowed for numerous intersections and
cases of intermingling between Eastern and Western cultures in a
way that was decisive for the development of the concept of
sovereignty.
II. BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
From a historical perspective, an illuminating picture of
this process of hybridization, specifically relevant to the
development of the concept of sovereignty, is provided by the
relationship between the theocratic autocracies established in the
Egyptian and Persian empires and the structure adopted by the
Roman Empire in the fourth century. 2 As Mommsen observed,
Roman imperial power was based at this time on the model of the
Eastern Hellenistic monarchies. By means of this new model,
1. See REINHART KOSELLECK, VERGANGENE ZUKUNFT:
GESCHICHTLICHER ZEITEN (Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 1979).

ZUR SEMANTIK

2. Groundbreaking work on this process of hybridization, including the
presentation of precise data, can be found in Pier Giuseppe Monateri, Black
Gaius: A Quest for the Multicultural Origins of the “Western Legal Tradition”,
51.3 HASTINGS L.J. 479 (2000). See also Dionysios Zakythinos, Processus de
Féodalisation, 2 L'HELLÉNISME CONTEMPORAIN 499 (1948); D. ZAKYTHINOS,
BYZANCE: ETAT-SOCIÉTÉ-ECONOMIE (Variorum, London, 1973); SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL THOUGHT IN BYZANTIUM FROM JUSTINIAN I TO THE LAST
PALAEOLOGUS: PASSAGES FROM BYZANTINE WRITERS AND DOCUMENTS (Ernest
Barker ed., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1957).
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imperial dignity had been sacralized. The emperor was no longer
primus inter pares but rather a distant and holy person. He was
viewed as a divinity that was to be honored; and then, following
Constantine’s reform, as a person representing the divinity. 3
These Hellenistic political models that so strongly
influenced the Eastern Roman Empire and thus the complex
process of formation of the Byzantine Empire had of course in turn
been based on Alexander the Great’s celebrated conquest of the
Persian and Egyptian empires and thus they incorporated a mixture
of Greek, Egyptian, and Persian political and cultural
characteristics. In Alexander’s project and in his political praxis,
the intention was evident of combining Greek political models
with elements of a pronounced Eastern character. Alexander was
attracted in particular by the sacralized conception of the topmost
political figures in Eastern culture.
From this Mediterranean dynamic of the interaction
between legal and political power, the conception of the governor
as Deus et Dominus and the establishment of a vast bureaucratic
apparatus emerged as salient in the most significant political
entities of the region. As well, the cult of the emperor was
established, along with the organization of a system of officialdom
closely linked to the source of power. Finally, this conception of
the sovereign appears to have been systematically transmitted
through the Byzantine interpretation of imperial divinity and was
maintained (of course in Christian terms) even following the
Christianization of the Empire.
Thus in this conception, the emperor, by virtue of his
dignity, is understood to stand above all other people as the
imitation of God. He is God’s shadow on Earth. He is invested
with a majesty of divine origin. He is not just a representative of
the supreme power, but an intermediate figure between God and
humans who participates in the nature of the holy. He is the God of
the World. Indeed, the emperor’s holiness and Christ’s divinity are
strongly connected. Numerous imperial rites and ceremonies of
Byzantine society evince the practice of a sort of
3. See 1-2 FRANTISEK DVORNIK, EARLY CHRISTIAN AND BYZANTINE
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: ORIGINS AND BACKGROUND (Dumbarton Oaks,
Washington, 1966).
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“Christomimesis.” Thus the common unifying feature of the most
significant (in terms of extension in time and relevance to
modernity) Mediterranean political experience, an experience that
did not come to a formal end until 1453, was that of a relationship
between politics and transcendence: a legitimizing relationship
ensured by the role of a holy emperor conceived of as a figure with
direct contact with the transcendent. 4
This feature is closely linked to a belief shared by the
Byzantines with other peoples of the Mediterranean region, namely
that their community in some manner constituted a divine
manifestation, a theophany. 5 In a framework of this kind, a highly
important notion is that of the center; that is, the idea of the
supreme city as the center of the world where the point of contact
with the transcendent is located.
III. THE HOLINESS OF THE POLITICAL
We are dealing, then, with the question of the relationship
between politics, law, and the dimension of the holy. Within this
framework, the concept of the “holy” is equivalent to the meaning
of a productive social ritual that is never totally subjective, since its
orientation depends on its relationship with the transcendent. In
this sense, the dimension of the holy is the sphere in which
mechanisms of collective and symbolic identification unfold. It is a
foundational dimension for the “political,” since we find in it
original and unchanging dynamics of inclusion/exclusion. We are
dealing with a kind of process of political consecration that is in a
sense very close to Émile Durkheim’s notion of the “holy.” For
Durkheim, the holy stands for a collective representation that
makes it possible to order, and thus constitute, reality. This
representation is a sociocultural datum that allows individuals to
transcend themselves by virtue of their identification with the
group. Thus the symbolic separation of the “holy” from the
4. For an insightful overview of the relationship between holiness and
political power in Christian Europe, see ADVENIAT REGNUM: LA REGALITÀ
SACRA DELL'EUROPA CRISTIANA (Franco Cardini & Maria Saltarelli eds., Name,
Genova, 2000).
5. See HÉLÉNE AHRWEILER, L'IDÉOLOGIE POLITIQUE DE L'EMPIRE
BYZANTIN (PUF, Paris, 1975).
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“profane,” deriving from humankind’s original socio-religious
attitude, is the original operation of social classification. 6
And indeed, symbolic function is integral to sacrificial
experience, both in original true sacrifices and in subsequent
developments in which a purely linguistic ceremony prevails over
the physical aspects of the ritual. What is at issue here is the
symbolization of the community’s political and social origins
through its link with the principle of the transcendent. But this
reality is the product of a cultural process of social institution that,
by consecrating a “place,” sanctions a difference between the real
and the unreal, the human and the non-human. Pierre Bourdieu’s
analysis of the meaning of consecrating rituals as legitimizing
rituals of a social reality is precisely relevant here. According to
Bourdieu, in rituals of consecration we are dealing with institutive
rituals of sociality, that is, with rituals that lead to the recognition
as legitimate and natural of a difference that is in fact arbitrary.
From this perspective, the sacralization of a space and of a leader
within this space is an institutive ritual of sociality because it
simultaneously establishes and consecrates a difference.
Thus the institution of society is an operation of attribution
of properties to places, persons, actions, behaviors, and objects in a
way that makes it possible to perceive these properties as
something natural. What is communicated and represented, and
therefore perceived, as the manifestation of the holy (theophany) is
precisely a political and legal order interpreted as the product of a
consecrating separation: “To institute, in this case, is to consecrate,
that is, to sanction and sanctify a particular state of things, an
established order, in exactly the same way that a constitution does
in the legal and political sense of the term.” 7

6. See ÉMILE DURKHEIM, LES FORMES ÉLÉMENTAIRES DE LA VIE
(PUF, Paris, 1968) (1912).
7. PIERRE BOURDIEU, LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLIC POWER 119 (John
Thompson ed., G. Raymond & M. Adamson trans., Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, 1993). The original version is in PIERRE BOURDIEU, LANGAGE ET
POUVOIR SYMBOLIQUE 177 (Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 2001) (1993) (“Instituer, en
ce cas, c’est consacrer, c’est-à-dire sanctionner et sanctifier un état de choses, un
ordre établi, comme fait, précisément, une constitution au sens juridico-politique
du terme.”).
RELIGIEUSE
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IV. THE MODERN CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY
What is really surprising, given the flux of change one
finds in the history of ideas and cultures, is the reappearance at the
end of the sixteenth century of extremely centralized organizations
of political power, in contrast to the chaotic plurality of legal and
political centers of power typical of the Middle Ages. This
reappearance is especially surprising in its implicit assumption and
positioning of a “holy” subject that transcends social reality for the
purpose of governing it. In conceptual terms, this subject stands for
the core of a single, central political and legal power. Thus from
this perspective, the idea of an absolute, exclusive, and
independent power, embodied in the institutional figure of the
sovereign as the core of the modern state, shows the implicit
persistence of a structural conception of supreme power. It is a
conception in which, as we will see, the relationship between
politics and the transcendent continues to figure; but this
relationship has changed in significant ways and now emerges as a
bare conceptual model fully contextualized within the complex
turn of the modern.
It is widely recognized that the crisis of the medieval order
is visible in the process of the formation of modern states.
According to historiography convention, the Peace of Westphalia
of 1648 is emblematic of this epochal political and legal
transformation. 8 What is crucially relevant to the thesis of the
present article is the celebrated reaffirmation in the texts of the
Peace of Westphalia of the principle of cuius regio, eius et religio,
which had been established in 1555 in the Peace of Augsburg. This
principle enshrines the link between an individual’s authority over
a region (including over a kingdom) and that individual’s religious
faith: the latter automatically becomes the state religion. Thus we
have here the establishment of a link between territory and the
cultural identity of a people that is forming itself as a nation under
the exclusive and independent direction of a unique authority.
8. The literature on the Peace of Westphalia is of course vast. For a
systematic but also unconventional conceptual approach, see PEACE TREATIES
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY: FROM THE LATE MIDDLE
AGES TO WORLD WAR ONE (Randall Lesaffer ed., Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 2004).
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Within this set of interconnections that link territorial, political,
and cultural-religious elements, we grasp the existence of the
nucleus of sovereignty as the expression of the modern conception
of political authority.
The feudal lord becomes sovereign in the territory that
belongs to him. Within this framework, he accedes to the status of
the one who has no superior. Thus the sovereign exercises his
power superiorem non recognoscens. His authority is exclusive,
since there is no possibility for the exercise of a legitimate power
that, within a specific territory, is not subject to the sovereign’s
will. But further, his authority is also independent of that of other
sovereigns who symmetrically exercise their own power over
specific populations and territories.
It can thus be affirmed that post-Westphalia European
society was composed of a plurality of territorially based political
systems. Each of these systems had a supreme and independent
governing authority. The medieval political-theological universitas
now acquired the nature of an international societas of sovereign
states. Sovereign power emerged from the intersections and
complex links among political and normative centers that had been
typical of the Middle Ages. Thus the sovereign state, at any rate in
ideal terms, neutralized the medieval system of dispersed powers
and established a centralizing authority. The population governed
by the sovereign had the duty to obey the laws he enacted; and the
possibility of external interference by presumptively superior
authorities, like the pope and the emperor, were in principle
eliminated: rex est imperator in regno suo.
An important example of the modern theory of sovereignty
that nevertheless reveals significant traces of its medieval origins is
Jean Bodin’s Les six livres de la République (1576). 9 Bodin
advances an original notion of absolute power (ab-solutus, that is,
without constraints). On one hand, absoluteness is to be confined

9. For overviews of Bodin’s thought, see ROGER CHAUVIRÉ, JEAN BODIN
AUTEUR DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE (Champion, Paris, 1914); SIMONE GOYARD-FABRE,
J. BODIN ET LE DROIT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE (PUF, Paris, 1986); Julian H.
FRANKLIN, J. BODIN AND THE RISE OF ABSOLUTIST THEORY (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1973); DIEGO QUAGLIONI, I LIMITI DELLA
SOVRANITÀ: IL PENSIERO DI J. BODIN NELLA CULTURA POLITICA E GIURIDICA
DELL'ETÀ MODERNA (Cedam, Padova, 1992).
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to the exercise of political-legal power in the sense of the
sovereign’s positive statutes. This means the absoluteness does not
equate to power without limits, for the sovereign must respect
God’s laws. On the other hand, Bodin’s intention is not to set
factual limits on sovereign political power. Rather he wishes to
preserve the normative value of the idea of “nature” as a horizon
within which the rationality of sovereign power is to be confined.
The measure of nature provides the foundation for the rationality
of political power and thus the rationality of absoluteness as its
inescapable prerogative. The conceptual supremacy of the
sovereign is rationally justified by the absolute transcendence of
the “natural” order. Interpreting Bodin’s thought, we might say
that, in the modern “natural” world of equal individual subjects, a
purely sovereign power finds its foundations in the rational idea of
an absolute (and so “unequal”) center of power that, by virtue of its
“inequality,” can serve as a legitimate authority over its subjects:
“Similarly sovereign power given to a prince charged with
conditions is neither properly sovereign, nor absolute, unless the
conditions of appointment are only such as are inherent in the laws
of God and of nature.” 10
Thus it is understandable that Bodin should arrive at this
famous definition of sovereignty: “Sovereignty is that absolute and
perpetual power vested in a commonwealth.” 11 Under this
conception, absoluteness coincides with the uniqueness of the
political-legal source represented by the sovereign. Its perpetual
nature is evident in the new prerogative assigned to sovereign
power in modernity, namely exclusive competence to enact laws.
Bodin situates the specific function of a sovereign subject in the
concrete establishment of a normative order. The sovereign is
10. JEAN BODIN, SIX BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH (J. M. Tooley
trans.,
Basil
Blackwell
1955)
(1576),
available
at
http://www.constitution.org/bodin/bodin.txt (Last visited October 24, 2011).
The original version is in J. BODIN, LES SIX LIVRES DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE 89
(Reproduction of the Paris Edition by Jacques du Puys, BNF, Gallica, 15811583) (1576) (“Aussi la souveraineté donnée à un Prince sous charges &
conditions, n’est pas proprement souveraineté, ny puissance absolue: si ce n’est
que les conditions apposées en la création du Prince, soyent de la loy de Dieu ou
de nature.”).
11. Id. The original version is in J. BODIN, LES SIX LIVRES DE LA
RÉPUBLIQUE 85 (1576) (“La souveraineté est la puissance absolue et perpétuelle
d’une République.”).
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justified and legitimized before his modern subjects by virtue of
his ability to deal rationally with the need for coexistence and
within the framework provided by God’s laws.
Another (perhaps more radical) instance of the
development of the modern concept of sovereignty that–
notwithstanding its disruptive assumptions and outcomes–features
traces of a shared heritage with the Mediterranean tradition of
absolute power is found in the theory Thomas Hobbes set out in
Leviathan in 1651. 12
According to Hobbes, the natural condition of equality
between people is an essential condition of subjectivity. The
anthropology of conflict advanced by Hobbes derives from this
radically modern starting point:
Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of
the body, and mind; as that though there be found
one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or
of quicker mind than another; yet when all is
reckoned together, the difference between man, and
man, is not so considerable, as that one man can
thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to which
another may not pretend, as well as he. 13
Hobbes’ anthropology, relying for its starting point on the
metaphorical-transcendent notion of the state of nature, may be
represented (if perhaps somewhat simplistically) in the form of this
strict logical sequence: equality of individuals => equality of hope
=> possibility of convergent desires for the same goods => mutual
diffidence => war of all against all as outcome of a strategy of
anticipation => consequent generalized condition of brutishness
and isolation.
According to Hobbes, anthropologically, the neutralization
of this endemic conflict in a pre-legal and pre-institutional context
can be guaranteed simply by an internal solution within the
12. From among the many works that deserve mention, I recommend for
general accounts of Hobbes’ life and ideas, RICHARD TUCK, HOBBES (Oxford
University Press, Oxford-New York, 1989); and NORBERTO BOBBIO, THOMAS
HOBBES (Einaudi , Torino, 2004) (1989).
13. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, OR THE MATTER, FORME AND POWER
OF A COMMON-WEALTH ECCLESIASTICALL AND CIVIL 82 (J.C.A Gaskin ed.,
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) (1651).
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dynamics of the conflict. The conflict itself will select a subject
that has attained, even if only temporarily, to a power that
overcomes all other subjective powers and is thus feared by
everyone. But in order to exploit this precarious situation to obtain
peace before the decline that is inescapable for any temporary
superior power, a stabilizing step is necessary. This stabilization
may be guaranteed by the institutionalization of this
anthropologically based hierarchy. In particular, a stable context is
achievable by means of legal tools (covenants) likely to make
permanent the excess of power of a given subject who, being
feared by all, will be capable of ensuring the peace. Thus the
pactum unionis is also a pactum subjectionis to a subject who is
invested with the power of all the individuals and who thus
becomes the most powerful among them. This makes possible the
transition from the precarious state of nature to a stable and
permanent civil society.
This transition performs its function simply through the
dynamic of representation in which is crystallized the idea of a
sovereign subject who transcends the multitude of people
represented and who is conceived of as an external center of unity
and as himself the condition for unity:
A multitude of men, are made one person, when
they are by one man, or one person, represented; so
that it be done with the consent of every one of that
multitude in particular. For it is the unity of the
representer, not the unity of the represented, that
maketh the person one. And it is the representer that
beareth the person, and but one person: and unity,
cannot otherwise be understood in multitude.14
Thus from a logical-temporal perspective, the covenants are not
divisible, since the members of the multitude are associated with
each other by virtue of the fact that they are subject to the same
institutional person who performs a representative function.
Representation, as legal form, frames the nuclear structure of the
Hobbesian state and the Hobbesian concept of sovereignty. 15 The
14. Id. at 109.
15. The literature on the concept of representation in Hobbesian thought is
vast. To mention just a few insightful interpretations: YVES-CHARLES ZARKA,
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sovereign power, whose institutional end is individuals’ safety, is
legally justified by means of a reciprocal authorization exchanged
by subjects uti singuli:
I authorize and give up my right of governing
myself, to this man, or to this assembly of men, on
this condition, that thou give up thy right to him,
and authorize all his actions in like manner. This
done, the multitude so united in one person, is
called COMMONWEALTH, in Latin CIVITAS. 16
Thus the sovereign stands in an external position with respect to
the covenant. He is a third party who benefits from individuals’
authorizations. The subjects are the authors of the sovereign’s
action. The sovereign is the actor who acts in the name of the
multitude of people. The sovereign’s absoluteness is the outcome
of the totalizing authorization derived from the subjects’ will. The
sole effective limit on the sovereign is imposed by the purpose of
his having been constituted, that is, by the guarantee of a peaceful
social order. But at the end of the day, the effective ability of the
sovereign to maintain the peace is not a limitation on the exercise
of legal-political power. It is precisely the cause of the sovereign’s
existence, and when he can no longer guarantee the peace he
concretely loses the quality of sovereign. This means that
conceptually the Hobbesian sovereign is substantially absolute. He
is really a third party superiorem non recognoscens. He materially
transcends the multitude, since he stands outside the social
contract; and he symbolically transcends the multitude as well,

HOBBES ET LA PENSÉE POLITIQUE MODERNE (PUF, Paris, 1995); Y. C. ZARKA,
LA DÉCISION MÉTAPHYSIQUE DE HOBBES. CONDITIONS DE LA POLITIQUE (Vrin,
Paris, 1999); RAYMOND POLIN, POLITIQUE ET PHILOSOPHIE CHEZ HOBBES (Vrin,
Paris, 1977); DAVID P. GAUTHIER, THE LOGIC OF LEVIATHAN (Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1969); CARL SCHMITT, DER LEVIATHAN IN DER STAATSLEHRE DES
THOMAAS HOBBES. SINN UND FEHLSCHLAG EINES POLITISCHEN SYMBOL
(Hohenheim verlag, Köln-Lövenich, 1982) (1938); LUCIEN JAUME, HOBBES ET
L’ETAT REPRÉSENTATIF MODERNE (PUF, Paris, 1986); FRANCESCO VIOLA
BEHEMOTH O LEVIATHAN? DIRITTO E OBBLIGO NEL PENSIERO DI HOBBES,
(Giuffrè, Milano, 1979); GIUSEPPE SORGI, QUALE HOBBES? DALLA PAURA ALLA
RAPPRESENTANZA (Franco Angeli, Milano, 1989); ADALGISO AMENDOLA, IL
SOVRANO E LA MASCHERA. SAGGIO SUL CONCETTO DI PERSONA IN THOMAS
HOBBES (Esi, Napoli, 1998).
16. HOBBES, supra note 13, at 114.
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since he embodies its unity: he is “above” the plurality of the
singularities that compose the multitude.
Thus the modern form of political representation as
conceived by Hobbes serves as the condition for thinking about the
unity of a collective body. It does not consist in the representation
of different organizations, social bodies, or parties; it is, rather, the
embodiment of the idea of a people and of its unity made possible
solely by virtue of representation by one person. This unity
acquires its form, its visibility, because of the representative action
of the sovereign. Modern political representation, so conceived,
has a productive and formative nature: it makes visible and present
something that is invisible and absent (a people and its unity)
through the presence of a public (representative) entity. As Carl
Schmitt has said, the dialectical nature of the concept of
representation resides in the fact that the invisible being is
presupposed to be absent and yet at the same time made present. 17
The invisible entity of reference, which seems so crucial to
understanding the epochal political-legal meaning of the concept of
sovereignty in modernity, indicates in a specific way the idea of
openness to transcendence that we earlier described as the main
Mediterranean legacy in our model of a supreme and absolute
power. Thus what emerges from the modern concept of
sovereignty, as well as from the significant role of the notion of
representation within it, is a specific function filled by conceptual
transcendence in order to constitute the political and legal order.
The unity in the multitude that constitutes the crucial political
question of modernity requires a transcendent movement from
empirical reality. This movement is conceptually unresolved, since
the ideal nature of the unity of a people is inescapable and is
always ideal (absent) even when it is made present by virtue of the
political representation of the sovereign.
17. See CARL SCHMITT, VERFASSUNGSLEHRE (Duncker & Humblot,
Berlin, 1928). Discussing the conceptual structure of political-legal
representation see also HASSO HOFMANN, REPRÄSENTATION. STUDIEN ZUR
WORT- UND BEGRIFFSGESCHICHTE VON DER ANTIKE BIS INS 19. JAHRHUNDERT
(Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1998); GIUSEPPE DUSO, LA RAPPRESENTANZA: UN
PROBLEMA DI FILOSOFIA POLITICA (Giuffrè, Milano, 1998); GIOVANNI MAGRÌ,
DAL VOLTO ALLA MASCHERA. LA REPRÄSENTATION NEL DIALOGO TRA GUARDINI
E SCHMITT (Scriptaweb, Napoli, 2010); G. MAGRÌ, LA LEGGE DELLA FORMA. LA
SCIENZA DEL DIRITTO DI CARL SCHMITT (Scriptaweb, Napoli, 2010).
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V. SECULARIZED TRANSCENDENCE
Given the conceptual outcome arrived at in the last
paragraph, we should now specify and clarify the Mediterranean
legacy in the concept of sovereignty with a reading of the
relationship between legal-political power and conceptual
transcendence. As Bertrand de Jouvenel has written, there is
nothing less natural than that concentration of authority that makes
authority distant and invisible. 18 A certain aptitude for the mystical
that has historically been weak in the West is needed to grasp the
relevance of this concentration; or failing that, the clear presence
of a dash of belief in the holy. Indeed, the mix of Eastern traditions
of the sacred core of political power with the proto-secularized
understanding of authority typical of Greek and Roman culture
may be seen as one of the cultural conditions for possibility for the
vast process of political unification effected by the establishment
of the state in modernity.
From this perspective, early modern literary descriptions of
political power are significant. The political and existential
representation of the sovereign found in Rosencrantz’s speech in
Act III, Scene iii, of Shakespeare’s Hamlet seems to indicate a
proto-modern centrality of the sovereign, of his soul in relation to
the world around him. Like “a massy wheel / Fix’d on the summit
of the highest mount / To whose huge spokes ten thousand lesser
things / Are mortis’d and adjoin’d,” he is at the center of
everything and has innumerable people attached to him, their
destinies attached to his destiny. 19 The fall of the sovereign is the
fall of a world. This use of the form of the wheel and of the idea of
the center as represented in the sovereign’s soul points to the
unifying capacity of sovereignty when viewed, in modernity, as the
locus of political unity.
The persistence of the symbolism of the center of the
world, then, is highly relevant to an understanding of the modern
face of the sociopolitical, within which the concept of sovereignty
is framed. But how are we to understand the meaning of this
18. BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL, DE LA SOUVERAINETÉ (Genin, Paris, 1955).
19. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK, act III, sc.
III, (1600-1602).

2011]

MEDITERRANEAN LEGACY

411

persistence? How are we to understand this symbolism, given the
cultural horizons of an age that has emerged out of a gradual
process of secularization? Perhaps we need to recall the cultural
and philosophical core meaning of the concept of sovereignty as it
appeared in the era of the Peace of Westphalia and in the theories
of Bodin and, above all, Hobbes.
The point is to grasp that, from a conceptual perspective,
the logic that governs processes of political sacralization expresses
the institution of a difference, of a distinguishing feature. On one
hand, the process of legitimizing political authority in modernity is
founded on the gradual establishment of a self-sufficient
humanism; 20 on the other hand, it emphasizes the need to institute
a new order: an artificial order built by human beings as a creation
ex nihilo. But as we have seen, the institution of an order is the
institution of a difference in relation to the previous chaotic and
profane space. The logic of modern sovereignty, then, is the logic
of an instituted difference. The sovereign state establishes borders,
that is, signs of difference from other profane states. The state is
established through the consecration of a territory, its inhabitants,
and their form of life.
But this institution is guaranteed, within the conceptual
structure of sovereignty, by openness to a secularized
transcendence: that is, the transcendence of a sovereign subject
who has been instituted as different among equals, as a supreme
being in comparison with inferior others, but above all as the locus
of the authority that transcends all concrete social relationships.
This is an authority that relies on the conceptual model of
subjectivity as the mask to which is attributed the unity of the
institution as the reflex of the ideal unity of the multitude; and this
applies to both the monarch’s mask and the people’s mask. Thus
the secularized transcendence of sovereignty issues from the longterm impersonality of the center of legal and political attribution in
which it is embodied.
The plenitudo potestatis, as potestas directa, is the
technical outcome of this conceptual transcendence. More
precisely, it is the form that the sovereign, as representative of
20. For a description of this concept, see CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR
AGE (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2007).
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unity, must acquire in order to make visible the empirically absent
unity in the multitude. The peculiar potestas of the sovereign,
being the acting representation of a subject who is one because he
transcends all parties, all singularities, guarantees the transition
from the fragmented multitude of the state of nature to the personmultitude that is a people. Thus symbolically the sovereign must
represent himself as an entity that tries to make immanent, by
virtue of the absoluteness of his power and his decisions, what is in
fact designed to remain transcendent: the pure ideal source of
unity. The continuous attempt to render this ideal earthly is the
regulatory principle of secularized transcendence as embodied in
the modern concept of sovereignty. The process of secularization
consists, then, of just this attempt, never totally successful, to bring
unity to the world. 21 But the attempt is conceptually destined to
partly fail because that unity in se stands outside the world; it
consists precisely of the perspective of the ideal standing above the
material many.
This dynamic helps account for the clear and deep traces of
the pre-modern evident in the visible royal acts engaged in by
several modern monarchies. At least until the French Revolution,
the king could rely on the argument of the divine nature of his
person, for example by pointing to his anointment at Reims; and
this attitude was illustrated by his self-attribution of special powers
(the Sun King proclaiming his own high and dazzling light). When
Louis XIV said l’État c’est moi, he was expressing as well his
awareness of being a material supreme subject who embodied the
primacy of an authority beyond actual social relationships.
Consistently with one strand of the Mediterranean legacy, and thus
with the Eastern culture of political power, he affirmed a
conception of the sovereign as directly containing the transcendent
supremacy of an absolute center of power (direct representation).
Sovereignty is embodied in the monarch’s body. We see here the
attempt to delineate a subject that directly represents transcendence
through the attempt to materialize ideal unity. This is not a third
transcendent king evoked by the sovereign, but rather a presumed
direct earthly-making of the unity in the king’s body.
21. See GIUSEPPE DUSO, LA LOGICA DEL POTERE.
COME FILOSOFIA POLITICA (Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1999).
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At the same time, however, sovereign power represents
itself as articulating, under various configurations, the medieval
theory of the king’s two bodies. 22 The monarch’s physical body,
which, like every body, is destined to suffer disease and decay, is
associated with, and not distinguished from, the institutional and
impersonal political body of a king who, as a power, as the center
of the world, is immortal. The traditional formula adopted
following the accession of a new sovereign, le Roi est mort, vive le
Roi, is something like the emblem of the coexisting conception of
secularized transcendence that seems to be largely associated, at
least until the advent of the Byzantine Empire, with the Greek and
Roman tradition of the impersonal nature of the supreme power. 23
As Ernst Jünger has written, 24 this formula implies a third extratemporal king, and both the dead king and the living one are
images of that king. They are like bodies that wear the mask of this
third totally transcendent king who is the supreme center of
attribution of legal, political, and social life within the state. Thus
we have here, coexisting with the previous theory, a conception of
the sovereign as strictly representing the supreme power and
therefore as representing the original and transcendent source of
absolute power (indirect representation). Indeed, the king’s
physical death makes clear the impossibility of an immanent unity.
The true sovereign is the third, extra-temporal, king and thus the
indirect theory expresses the awareness of the irreducible distance
between the physical unity of a person and the unity in a multitude.
The latter is just an idea, but an idea with tremendous
concreteness. This coexisting conception reminds us that the
attempt to give unity earthly form is destined to fail; but this
reference to unity as a third transcendent idea is understandable
precisely because of the experience of many failures as part of the
pretence of making unity earthly.

22. The best known overview of this theory is provided by ERNST H.
KANTOROWICZ, THE KING'S TWO BODIES: A STUDY IN MEDIEVAL POLITICAL
THEOLOGY (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1957).
23. For a groundbreaking interpretation of the formula “Le roi est mort,
vive le roi” see RALPH E. GIESEY, LE ROI NE MEURT JAMAIS: LES OBSÈQUES
ROYALES DANS LA FRANCE DE LA RENAISSANCE (Flammarion, Paris, 1987).
24. See Ernst Jünger, Der gordische Knoten, in 7 SÄMTLICHE WERKE
(Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart, 1980) (1953).
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The center of attribution that I have now referred to several
times would appear to be, then, the conceptual condition for
thinking about the social bond and unity-in-difference in a
secularized context. As has been implied, the structure here
described has remained substantially unchanged even within the
conceptual model of popular sovereignty that begins with
Rousseau’s theory of democracy, and even taking into account
Rousseau’s notorious aversion to representative democracy. The
twofold conception of secularized transcendence in modern
sovereignty as simultaneously representing directly and
representing indirectly supreme and absolute power is manifestly a
Mediterranean legacy and the expression of a dialectic that enables
the state to perform its regulatory function. This dialectic has,
indeed, a normative nature, since it is what to a certain extent has
allowed, until the present-day crisis of sovereignty, for the
guarantee of a movement towards the impersonality and stability
of the institution as a condition for the regulation of contingent
aspects of social life.
In fact, especially in the initial stages of the trajectory of
change traced by the concept of sovereignty, the reference to the
transcendent as embodied in the figure of the sovereign ensured
that the project of a secularized unification received driving and
legitimizing force. The unity of the supreme center implied the
uniqueness of the source of law, with law viewed as the expression
of the sovereign’s will, thereby guaranteeing the legitimization of
positive law without structural reference to classical or explicitly
theological forms of justification. Subsequently, the gradual
unfolding of the process of secularization allowed for the
emergence of an idea of transcendent sovereignty standing high
above all other things: no longer embodied in the figure of the
sovereign, but rather mainly represented in his person. In this way,
the process of secularization gave rise to an idea more familiar to
us, that of sovereignty as a supreme and depersonalized institution.
What is really at issue in the Mediterranean legacy present in the
concept of sovereignty, in the twofold form of conceptual
transcendence that I have tried to describe, is the establishment of a
dimension of institutional sovereignty, that is, the establishment of
the impersonal legal-political condition for the unification of a
secularized but not desacralized society.
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On this reading, the present crisis of socio-legal unification
found at the level of both states and supranational entities is also a
kind of crisis of the very idea of conceptual transcendence that has
been associated with the concept of sovereignty. In his celebrated
introduction to Leviathan, Hobbes conceives of sovereignty as the
artificial soul of the State, thereby implying it constitutes the
immaterial core of supreme power. He seems also to have had
clearly in mind the Mediterranean legacy that has been discussed
in this paper, in particular as embodied in the Byzantine idea of the
emperor as imitation of God. In Chapter XVII of Leviathan,
Hobbes writes, after describing the social covenant: “This is the
generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speak more
reverently) of that Mortal God, to which we owe under the
Immortal God, our peace and defence.” 25 Thus, the Hobbesian
covenant is also an act of faith. It expresses the rational process
that leads subjects to have faith in their sovereign as the one able to
protect them but also as the one who embodies, in his decisions
and his representative actions, the unity of the state, the unity of
the many.
VI. CONCLUSION
Could there be something in the structure of secularized
transcendence that we have no choice but to come to terms with if
our aim is the socio-political unification of individuals in a context
of pluralism and great diversity? Is the radical horizontality of
institutional relationships found in the various contemporary
models of governance really suited to the establishment of a social
bond?
On this score, it is worth remembering Immanuel Kant’s
observations on the nature of the social contract. According to
Kant, the indisputable practical reality of the social contract, as an
idea of reason and as a keystone by which to measure the
legitimacy of every public law, consists in the obligation on the

25. HOBBES, supra note 13, at 114; see ALOYSIUS P. MARTINICH, THE TWO
GODS OF LEVIATHAN (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992) (For an
interesting interpretation, within Hobbesian studies, of the relationship between
politics and transcendence).
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legislator to enact laws in such a way that they could have been
produced by the united will of a people. 26
But the united will of a people is not an empirical fact
discernible through opinion polls, referenda, or elections. It is,
rather, a rational ideal that can be concretely grasped in the form of
the duty of civil union, the duty of life together regulated by law.
The instantiation par excellence of the public good is the civil
constitution of a social union that guarantees everyone freedom by
means of laws. Thus the truly general interest of a polity is an a
priori that precedes any recognition of consent. It is the idea that
allows us to stay together, guaranteeing that nothing has been
decided for a people if that same people could never have
rationally reached the very same decision on its own.
The general interest cannot, then, be the product of the
aggregation of particular interests. The generality of the interest
must be established and understood on a different level, one that
transcends the logic of balance, of compromises, of negotiations.
Indeed, without the assumption of a general interest so conceived,
potential negotiations consistent with the democratic rule of law
are not conceptually possible. Thus the general interest is the
supreme investment in the salus publica; it is the investment in a
regulated civil life that derives from a foundational and
constitutional covenant. It coincides with the “prospect” of a
(never totally) secularized transcendence embodied in the modern
sovereignty of the people.
Modern democracy, in the form of power of the people and
government by the people symbolically conceived, finds a
condition for its possibility in the conceivability of the general
interest, because a people as a synthetic unity finds conceptual
consistency precisely in the representative form of the general
interest. From this perspective, a people should be conceived of as
the rational outcome of a way of thinking of political unity that
presupposes a multitude of subjects. This way of thinking unity
seeks unceasingly to bring to reality, to make immanent, the unity
and the existence of a people. We need only consider all the
26. See Immanuel Kant, Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie
richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis, XXII BERLINER MONATSSCHRIFT,
201 (Sept. 1793).
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attempts to render the direct will of the people empirically visible
through referenda and deliberation and the fact that these attempts
never seem to pin down unity in a material way and make it
possible to perceive a people as one sole thing.
At the end of the day, what I hope can be grasped from the
path pursued in this text is the pregnant historical-conceptual
nature of the notion of sovereignty. Assuredly it is a modern
concept, but within its structure of meaning a specific theoretical
tradition about supreme political power has been absorbed and has
evolved in line with modern conditions. The Mediterranean legacy
bequeathed to the concept of sovereignty through the mutually
enriching interactions between the Greek, Egyptian, and Persian
cultures of power, and manifested in the mixture that constituted
the principle of the topmost political subject in the Byzantine
Empire, has clearly been incorporated into the founding ideas of
political representation. In this model, representation always comes
from the top, from the openness to transcendence that sacralizes
the polity that constitutes representation. Modern political
representation similarly comes from the top, from the ideal
dimension of unity that cannot be discerned in the empirical
multitude.
The major modern difference resides in certain
foundational assumptions about the representation of unity. In
modernity, the rational foundation emerges from the bottom, from
the convergent wills of rational agents, naturally equal, free,
autonomous, and independent. But at the same time, since the sum
of particular wills is different from the will of a people, and since
the will of a unitarian people is the sole requirement for the
modern legitimization of power, openness to a “conceptual top,”
where the idea of unity is visible, becomes inescapable even for
modernity. This bottom/top dialectic seems thus to capture the
movement of the concept of sovereignty in modernity; but I would
argue that this movement appears to have been triggered by the
long and venerable tradition of political power in Mediterranean
culture.
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I. INTRODUCTION
One may ask to which extent is codification compatible
with the existence of a plurality of laws and the validity of
different legal traditions within a jurisdiction. Perhaps at the first
glance the title of this article may look provocative. That is not my
intention though. I just want to make clear three points. First,
Spanish legal history shows the existence of different legal
traditions which are, in turn, composed of a plurality of laws.
Second, I will show the compatibility of this variety of laws and
legal traditions with the codification movement or, in other words,
how Spain uncovers the myth whereby codification necessarily
implies legal unification. And third, I will conclude with some
considerations regarding the presence of the past in the current,
Spanish private law system. In doing so, I will divide the paper
into three parts. First, I will briefly explain both the plurality of
* University of Valencia, Spain.
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laws and legal traditions in Spain; second, I will turn to what, in
my view, should be considered regarding the compatibility
between the existence of different legal traditions and the
codification movement; and third, I will conclude with some
reflections on the presence of the past concerning the current
validity of different legal traditions in Spain.
II. A BRIEF HISTORIOGRAPHICAL OVERVIEW:
SPANISH LEGAL TRADITION? SPANISH LEGAL TRADITIONS
Spanish history has witnessed a long legal development
which goes from the period of its legal Romanization until today. 1
Interestingly enough, it has been said—although not always
recognized by non-Spanish scholars 2—that Spanish legal history is
one of the most instructive, oldest and richest legal tradition which
has ever existed, a statement which could have been hardly written
by a Spanish scholar. Instructive, because “Few countries have
experienced so many vicissitudes as Spain; and few, if any, present
more varied and more instructive lessons in social sciences . . .
(than) the ancient history of Spain.” 3 Considering at least that
1. An interesting question to pose is at what time Spanish legal history
really begins. There are different views among legal historiography. Some state
that it begins with the Roman conquest (218 B.C), others with the Visigothic
period (476 or 568 AD), and others with the Constitution of Cádiz (1812). They
give all different arguments to defend their own views. I think it is better to start
from the beginning, that is, before the Romanization of the Iberian Peninsula,
since it will enable us to cover the history of Roman law in Spain which
constituted an important characteristic not only of Spanish legal tradition but
also of civil law countries.
2. In my opinion, this is due to the fact that few non-Spanish legal
historians can read Spanish, and that Spanish legal historians have made little
effort to publish in other languages different from those used in Spain.
Nevertheless, this is another matter that does not concern the topic of this paper.
3. Schmidt stated in the nineteenth century that:
Few countries have experienced so many vicissitudes as
Spain; and few, if any, present more varied and more
instructive lessons in social sciences . . . the ancient history of
Spain [referring to the period of Iberians, Celts and
Phoenicians], though obscure and by time and disfigured by
fables, affords sufficient information to enable us to ascertain
that it was at a very early period a rich and flourishing
kingdom.
GUSTAVUS SCHMIDT, THE CIVIL LAW OF SPAIN AND MEXICO 9 (New
Orleans, 1851).
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Spanish legal history should cover all laws made and applied
throughout history in the territories that have formed part of Spain,
it is clear that Spanish legal history is quite long and rich. As
Putnam says, “it possesses one of the oldest developed systems of
law—a composite of Roman, Germanic and Arabic elements, with
a strong infusion of canon law.” 4 Kleffens stated that “there is no
doubt that the history of Spanish law in the Middle Ages is
exceptionally rich.” 5
There is no doubt, as Kleffens recognized, of the richness
of “Spanish law in the Middle Ages,” which comes not just from
the fact of the presence of a plurality of laws, but of different legal
systems or traditions. In fact, a clear feature of the Spanish
historiography has largely been the study of legal sources and
institutions of the different Spanish (or Hispanic) legal entities
(Castile, Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia, Majorca, Navarre, etc.). A
brief look at the considerable number of Spanish legal history
4. Putnam also says that:
. . . Spain offers a fruitful field for study. It possesses one
of the oldest developed systems of law–a composite of
Roman, Germanic and Arabic elements, with a strong infusion
of canon law; it is growing in industrial and commercial
importance; it is participating actively in the legislative
movement for social and economic reform; and—of particular
interest to us—is the mother of the legal system of a large part
of the world in which we have vital interests.
and later on, the same author states that:
the history of Spanish law assumes far more than a local
importance. In the early Spanish codes and compilations may
be traced some of the most lasting institutions of Roman law,
and they were the medium through which Spain carried her
law into the new world.
HERBERT PUTNAM, preface to THOMAS W. PALMER, JR.: GUIDE TO THE
LAW AND LEGAL LITERATURE OF SPAIN 4, 26 (Washington, Gov’t Printing
Office, 1915).
5. Kleffens says that:
there is no doubt that the history of Spanish law in the
middle Ages is exceptionally rich; it’s study cannot but
broaden the law-student’s understanding, and open his eyes to
his merits and demerits of a great many solutions for a great
many problems which, through the ages, are basically and
generally the same everywhere . . . Surely, a legal system of
such unique magnitude would seem to deserve more attention
than it has hitherto received beyond the frontiers of Spain.
E.N. VAN KLEFFENS, HISPANIC LAW UNTIL THE END OF THE MIDDLE AGES
27-28 (Edinburgh, 1968). See also J. O’CALLAGHAN, HIST. OF MEDIEVAL SPAIN
(Cornell, Univ. Press, 1975).
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handbooks would be enough to realize the importance and
autonomy of the different kingdoms in creating and developing
their legal traditions, 6 although none of them dared to state
explicitly this important point in the very title of the handbook. 7
The plurality of laws—or legal pluralism 8—in Spanish
legal history does not just refer to the duality between ius
commune and ius proprium (or iura propria). 9 In Spain, for
example, the variety of legal sources of the different kingdoms
was, like in other European territories, considerable. A legal
historian dealing with the Spanish case, then, has to make the
necessary effort to capture a clear picture of the different Spanish
6. See e.g. SANTOS M. CORONAS GONZÁLEZ, MANUEL DE HISTORIA DEL
DERECHO ESPAÑOL (Valencia, 1999); JOSÉ ANTONIO ESCUDERO LOPÉZ, CURSO
DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO: FUENTES E INSTITUCIONES POLÍTICOADMINISTRATIVAS (Madrid, 2003); R. FERNÁNDEZ ESPINAR, MANUAL DE
HISTORIA DEL DERECHO ESPAÑOL (Madrid, 1989); JOSEP Mª FONT I RIUS,
APUNTES DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO ESPAÑOL TOMADOS DE LAS
EXPLICACIONES ORDINARIAS DE LA CÁTEDRA: PARTE GENERAL: LA EVOLUCIÓN
GENERAL DEL DERECHO ESPAÑOL: LECCIONES 1-37 DEL PROGRAMA DE CLASES
(Barcelona, Univ., D.L., 1974); ENRIQUE GACTO FERNÁNDEZ ET AL, DERECHO
HISTÓRICO DE LOS PUEBLOS DE ESPAÑA (Madrid, 1992); ALFONSO GARCIA
GALLO, MANUAL DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO (Madrid, 1992); RAFAEL GIBERT,
HISTORIA GENERAL DEL DERECHO ESPAÑOL (Madrid, 1975); AQUILINO IGLESIA
FERREIROS, LA CREACIÓN DEL DERECHO: UNA HISTORIA DE LA FORMACIÓN DE
UN DERECHO ESTATAL ESPAÑOL (2 vols., Barcelona, 1992); JESÚS LALINDE,
INICIACIÓN A LA HISTORIA DEL DERECHO ESPAÑOL (Madrid, 1989); HISTORIA
DEL DRET ESPANYOL (Tomàs Montagut Estragués coord., edicions de la
Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, Barcelona, 1998); MARIANO PESET ET AL,
HISTORIA DEL DERECHO (Valencia, 1989); ROGELIO PÉREZ-BUSTAMANTE,
HISTORIA DEL DERECHO ESPAÑOL. LAS FUENTES DEL DERECHO (Madrid,
Dykinson, 1994); JOSÉ MANUEL PÉREZ PRENDES, CURSO DE HISTORIA DEL
DERECHO ESPAÑOL (Madrid, 1990); GALO SÁNCHEZ, CURSO DE HISTORIA DEL
DERECHO ESPAÑOL: INTRODUCCIÓN Y FUENTES (Valladolid, 1980); FRANCISCO
TOMÁS Y VALIENTE, MANUAL DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO ESPAÑOL (Madrid,
1992).
7. An exception can be found in ANICETO MASFERRER, SPANISH LEGAL
TRADITIONS: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL HISTORY OUTLINE (Madrid, Dykinson,
2009).
8. On the distinction between the expressions “plurality of laws” and
“legal pluralism,” see Séan Donlan, All this together make up our Common
Law: legal hybridity in England and Ireland, 1704-1804, in MIXED LEGAL
SYSTEMS AT NEW FRONTIERS (Esin Örücü ed., London, Wildy, Simmonds &
Hill Publishing, 2010), and bibliographical references concerning this matter
contained in Donlan’s article.
9. As said, the ius commune, or common law, co-existed with the
particular law of every European kingdom or jurisdiction, called ius proprium.
As a result, from the Late Middle Ages to the Modern Ages, there was a duality
between the ius commune and ius proprium.
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legal traditions. In doing so, the legal systems of Castile, Catalonia,
Aragon, Valencia, Majorca, Navarre and Basque territories
(Guipúzcoa, Alava and Vizcaya) need to be analyzed from
different aspects, revolving all of them around the plurality of legal
sources. A possible scheme of its structure may be as follows: 10
a) brief presentation of the main legal sources
(local, territorial and general—or common to the
whole kingdom—from the Modern Age, the general
legal sources enacted to be in force within the
territory of the whole monarchy should also be
mentioned);
b) the role of the ius commune in the different
Spanish legal traditions;
c) the Cortes and the King as lawmakers;
d) the enforcement of the law in a juridical system
of divergent legal sources: the hierarchy of legal
sources; and
e) the role of the judicial precedent and legal
doctrine in developing law and legal science.
Furthermore, the historical approach of Spanish Law shows,
leaving aside political and ideological tendencies, the existence of
diverse cultures—Christian, Muslim, and Jewish, and different
ethnic groups that populated the Iberian Peninsula. 11 Spain was—
and is still—“an aggregation of different regions, diverse
populations and languages, with historical struggles to maintain a
centralized national ‘Spanish’ State in the face of cultural
pluralism.” 12
10. MASFERRER, supra note 7, at 161-219.
11. O. R. CONSTABLE, MEDIEVAL IBERIA: READINGS FROM CHRISTIAN,
MUSLIM AND JEWISH SOURCES (U. Pa. Press, 1997).
12. JOHN A. CROW, SPAIN: THE ROOT AND THE FLOWER (1985); see also
WOODROW BORAH, JUSTICE BY INSURANCE: THE GEN. INDIAN COURT OF
COLONIAL MEXICO AND THE LEGAL AIDES OF THE HALF-REAL 6 (1983) (in this
sense, it has been said that following the complete Reconquest of Spain by
Christians in 1492, the national legal system that emerged was based on beliefs
“that there was a natural law binding on all people and peoples whoever they
might be,” and there was “a variety of human observance, all of it permissible so
long as it did not conflict with natural law and ius gentium,” “a common body of
law and custom that might be found in the practices of all peoples.”); but see
PATRICIA SEED, CEREMONIES OF POSSESSION IN EUROPE’S CONQUEST OF THE
NEW WORLD 1492-1640 69, 99 (1995) (It has also recognized that, when
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As said, legal historiography has made clear this important
aspect of Spanish legal history, dealing with the legal traditions of
different kingdoms from the Middle Ages up until Late Modern
Age. Literature on this matter written—and published—in English
or/and by non-Spanish scholars have also emphasized this point,
distinguishing the different kingdoms and their diverse legal
sources and institutions. 13 In doing so, Castile 14 and Aragon 15 have
been much more explored than Catalonia, 16 Valencia, 17 and the

Christians retook control of Spain, “Moslems were allowed to live under their
own law and custom and to resort to their own courts for matters concerning
themselves”); see also Donald Juneau, The Light of Dead Stars, 1 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 11, 13 (1991) (when the Spanish occupied the New World, for example,
they also recognized Indian laws and courts. On August 6, 1555, Emperor Don
Carlos (Charles V) and Queen Doña Juana issued a decree that “ordered and
commanded” that “the laws and good customs” of Indians, along with their
“usages and customs,” must “be kept and enforced.” This principle, firmly
accepted in Spanish Indian Law, was lost when new states emerged in Latin
America following the period of revolutions.).
13. J. HILLGARTH, THE SPANISH KINGDOMS, 1250-1517, (2 vols., Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1976-1978); A. MCKAY, SPAIN IN THE MIDDLE AGES: FROM
FRONTIER TO EMPIRE, 1000-1500 (London, Macmillan, 1977); DAVID
ABULAFIA, THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN KINGDOMS 1200-1500 (Longman,
1997).
14. Charles Sumner Lobingier, Las Partidas and its Predecessors, 1
CALIF. L. REV. 487-498 (1912-1913); Charles Sumner Lobingier, Las Siete
Partidas in Full English Dress, 15 AM. B. ASS’N J. 356-371 (1929); Madaline
W. Nichols, Las Siete Partidas, 20 CALIF. L. REV. 260-285 (1931-1932); E.S
PROCTER, ALFONSO X OF CASTILE (Oxford, Clarendon, 1951); J.
O’CALLAGHAN, THE LEARNED KING: THE REIGN OF ALFONSO X OF CASTILE
(Philadelphia, 1993); J. O’CALLAGHAN, THE CORTES OF CASTILE- LEÓN 11881350 (U. of Pa. Press, 1989) and E.S. PROCTER, CURIA AND CORTES IN LEÓN
AND CASTILE 1072-1295 both available at THE LIBRARY OF IBERIAN RESOURCES
ONLINE http://libro.uca.edu/title.htm (Last visited November 7, 2011); T.F.
Ruíz, Unsacred Monarchy: The Kings of Castile in the Late Middle Ages in T.F.
RUIZ, THE CITY AND THE REALM. BURGOS AND CASTILE 1080-1492 (1992).
On Castile and Aragon, see THE WORLDS OF ALFONSO THE LEARNED AND
JAMES THE CONQUEROR (R. I. Burns ed., Princeton U. Press, 1985) available at
THE LIBRARY OF IBERIAN RESOURCES ONLINE http://libro.uca.edu/title.htm (Last
visited November 7, 2011).
15. RALPH E. GIESEY, IF NOT, NOT: THE OATH OF THE ARAGONESE AND
THE LEGENDARY LAWS OF SOBRARBE (Princeton U. Press, 1968); T. BISSON,
THE MEDIEVAL CROWN OF ARAGON: A SHORT HISTORY (Oxford, 1986).
16. T.N. BISSON, THE PROBLEM OF FEUDAL MONARCHY: ARAGÓN,
CATALONIA AND FRANCE 460-478 (Speculum, 1978); JOSEP M. MAS I SOLENCH,
THE CIVIL LAW OF THE CATALANS ( Generalitat de Catalunya, Barcelona, 1990);
P. FREEMAN, THE ORIGINS OF PEASANT SERVITUDE IN MEDIEVAL CATALONIA
(Cambridge Univ. Press, 1991); THE CUSTOMS OF CATALONIA BETWEEN LORDS
AND VASSALS BY THE BARCELONA CANON, PERE ALBERT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE
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other Spanish kingdoms. 18 The Spanish historiography also shows
the autonomy enjoyed by kingdoms in creating and developing
their own legal traditions, 19 synthesizing the peculiarities of

CASTLE FEUDALISM IN MEDIEVAL SPAIN (Donald J. Kagay trans., Arizona
Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, Tempe, 2002); Ferràn Badosa
Coll, “…Quae ad ius Cathalanicum pertinent:” The Civ. L. of Catalonia, Ius
Commune and the Legal Tradition, in REGIONAL PRIVATE LAWS AND
CODIFICATION IN EUROPE 136-163 (H.L. MacQueen, A. Vaquer and S. Espiau
Espiau eds., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003).
17. REMEDIOS FERRERO MICÓ, THE LIMITS TO ROYAL POWER:
“CONTRAFUEROS” OR ACTIONS AGAINST VIOLATIONS OF PRIVILEGES IN THE
VALENCIAN PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLIES UNTIL 1604 145-158 (Parliaments,
Estates & Representation 27, 2007); REMEDIOS FERRERO MICÓ, THE FINANCIAL
AUTONOMY OF THE MUNICIPALITIES AND THE VALENCIAN PARLIAMENT
(Parliaments, Estates & Representation 29, 2009).
18. In the Spanish historiography, see C. Petit, De Iustitia et Iure
Retentionis Regni Navarrae, in CENTRALISMO Y AUTONOMISMO EN LOS SIGLOS
XVI-XVII: HOMENAJE AL PROFESOR JESÚS LAINDE ABADÍA 319-337
(Barcelona, Univ. de Barcelona, 1990); J.L. DE ORELLA UNZÚE, LAS
INSTITUCIONES DEL REINO DE NAVARRA EN LA EDAD ANTIGUA Y MEDIA. LAS
INSTITUCIONES DE LA BAJA NAVARRA (1530-1620) (San Sebastián, 1991); V.
VÁZQUEZ DE PRADA, LAS CORTES DE NAVARRA DESDE SU INCORPORACIÓN A
LA CORONA DE CASTILLA: TRES SIGLOS DE ACTIVIDAD LEGISLATIVA (15131829) (Pamplona, 1993); M. Galán Lorda, Los manuscritos del Fuero General
de Navarra Existentes en Pamplona, in 57 ANUARIO DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO
ESPAÑOL 579-607 (1987); Mercedes Galán Lorda, Los Amejoramientos al Fuero
General de Navarra en los Manuscritos de Pamplona 7 REVISTA JURÍDICA DE
NAVARRA 97-132 (Pamplona, 1989); M. Galán Lorda, Las fuentes del Fuero
Reducido de Navarra, 1 EL FUERO REDUCIDO DE NAVARRA 93-773 (Pamplona,
1989); J. García-Granero Fernández, Fuero viejo' y 'Fuero nuevo' de Navarra, in
ANUARIO DE DERECHO FORAL 131-216 (1975); Estudio sobre el capítulo 3, 20, 6
in Fuero General de Navarra: Un Texto Recibido del Derecho Romano, in 46
ANUARIO DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO ESPAÑOL 225-345 (1976); J.M. Lacarra,
En torno a la Formación del Fuero General de Navarra 50 ANUARIO DE
HISTORIA DEL DERECHO ESPAÑOL 93-110 (1980) ; A. MARICHALAR & C.
MANRIQUE, HISTORIA DE LOS FUEROS DE NAVARRA, VIZCAYA, GUIPUZCOA Y
ALAVA (San Sebastián, 1980); A.J. Martín Duque, El Fuero General de
Navarra. Una Redacción Arcaica 56 ANUARIO DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO
ESPAÑOL 781-861 (1986); see also GREGORIO MONREAL ZIA, THE OLD LAW OF
BIZCAIA (1452): INTRODUCTORY STUDY AND CRITICAL EDITION 21-160
(William A. Douglass & Linda White eds., Center for Basque Studies, Univ. of
Nevada, 2005).
19. It would be too long to exhaustively cite the Spanish legal
historiography dealing with the different Spanish legal traditions; for a quite
exhaustive list of articles and books published between 1973 and 1998 dealing
with it, see José Mª Puyol Montero, Un Balance de 25 Años de Historiografía
Histórico-Jurídica en España (1973-1998), 5 CUADERNOS DE HISTORIA DEL
DERECHO 283-409 (1998).
TO
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Castile, 20 Aragon, 21 Catalonia, 22 Valencia, 23 Majorca, 24 Navarre25
and the Basque Provinces. 26 In the Spanish historiography there

20. Aquilino Iglesia Ferreirós, La obra legislativa de Alfonso X El Sabio,
in ESPAÑA Y EUROPA. UN PASADO JURÍDICO COMÚN 275-599 (Murcia, 1986);
Antonio Pérez Martín, La Obra Legislativa Alfonsina y Puesto que en ella
Ocupan Las Siete Partidas, 3 GLOSSAE: REVISTA DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO
EUROPEO 9-63 (1992).
21. J. LALINDE ABADÍA, LOS FUEROS DE ARAGÓN (Zaragoza, 1976); G.
Martínez Díez, En Torno a los Fueros de Aragón de las Cortes de 1247, 50
ANUARIO DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO ESPAÑOL 68-92 (1980); A. PÉREZ
MARTÍN, LAS GLOSAS DE PÉREZ DE PATOS A LOS FUEROS DE ARAGÓN (Zaragoza,
1993); see also Gobierno de Aragón, Biblioteca Virtual de Derecho Aragonés,
available at http://www.bivida.es (Last visited December 16, 2011).
22. J.M. Gay i Escoda: Eficàcia de les Normes a la Tradició Jurídica
Catalana des de la Baixa Edat Mitjana Fins al Decret de Nova Planta, 78
REVISTA JURÍDICA DE CATALUNYA 249-94, 505-586 (1979); T. de Montagut
Estragués: Pactisme o Absolutisme a Catalunya: Les Grans Institucions de
Govern (siglos XV–XVI), 19 ANUARIO DE ESTUDIOS MEDIEVALES, 669-679
(1989); S. SOBREQUÉS VIDAL, HISTORIA GENERAL DEL DERECHO CATALÁN
HASTA EL SIGLO XVIII (Nuria Mir trans., Barcelona, 1989); VICTOR FERRO, EL
DRET PUBLIC CATALÀ. LES INSTITUCIONS A CATALUNYA FINS AL DECRET DE
NOVA PLANTA (3rd ed. Eumo Vic ed., 1999); JOSEP Mª MAS I SOLENCH, EL
DRET CIVIL DELS CATALANS (3rd ed., Barcelona, Generalitat de Catalunya,
1990).
23. VICENTE GRAULLERA SANZ, HISTORIA DEL DERECHO FORAL
VALENCIANO (Valencia, 1994); M. PESET, ET. AL., DERECHO FORAL
VALENCIANO (Valencia, 1995); VICENTE L. SIMÓ SANTOJA, DERECHO
HISTÓRICO VALENCIANO: PASADO, PRESENTE Y FUTURO (Valencia, Universidad
Cardenal Herrera-CEU, 2002); J.A. OBARRIO MORENO, DE IUSTITIA ET IURE
REGNI VALENTIAE: LA TRADICIÓN DE LAS FUENTES JURÍDICAS ROMANAS EN LA
DOCTRINA VALENCIANA (Edisofer ed., Madrid, 2005); ANICETO MASFERRER &
OBARRIO MORENO, J.A: LA FORMACIÓN DEL DERECHO FORAL VALENCIANO
(Madrid, Dykinson, forthcoming).
24. ROMÁN PIÑA HOMS EL DERECHO HISTÓRICO DEL REINO DE
MALLORCA (Ediciones Cort, Palma de Mallorca, 1993); Antonio Planas
Rosselló, La sucesión intestada de los impúberes y la supuesta aplicación de las
Constituticiones de Cataluña en Mallorca. Reflexiones en torno a un pleito,
1365–1378, 8-9 IUS FUGIT 95-126 (1999-2000).
25. J. Angulo y de la Hornaza, La abolición de los fueros e instituciones
vascongadas. En torno a un centenario, 1876-1976, 2 SAN SEBASTIÁN (1976);
R. GÓMEZ RIVERO, EL PASE FORAL EN GUIPÚZCOA EN EL SIGLO XVIII (Sevilla,
1982); R. Gómez Rivero, Análisis comparado del pase foral en el País Vasco a
partir del siglo XVIII, 39 BOLETÍN DE LA REAL SOCIEDAD VASCONGADA DE
AMIGOS DEL PAÍS 3-4 (1983); J.M. del Portillo Valdés, El “provincialismo
exacerbado.” La consolidación del régimen foral vasco 1845-1850, 56
ANUARIO DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO ESPAÑOL 167-218 (1986); see also
RAFAEL D. GARCÍA PÉREZ ANTES LEYES QUE REYES: CULTURA JURÍDICA Y
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA EN LA EDAD MODERNA, NAVARRA, 1512-1808
(Milano, Giuffrè Editore, 2008).
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are also works containing the making and development of both
legal sources 27 and institutions governing several kingdoms, either
belonging to the same crown, 28 or from different crowns. 29

26. See e.g. Rivero, supra note 25, at 3-4; for a panoramic overview of the
legal traditions of the different kingdoms, see ANICETO MASFERRER, SPANISH
LEGAL TRADITIONS, supra note 7, at 161-219.
27. See e.g. Ana Mª Barrero García, El Derecho local, el territorial, el
general y el común de Castilla, Aragón y Navarra, in DIRITTO COMUNE E
DIRITTO LOCALI NELLA STORIA DELL'EUROPA 263 (1980); ENRIQUE ÁLVAREZ
CORA, LA PRODUCCIÓN NORMATIVA MEDIEVAL SEGÚN LAS COMPILACIONES DE
SICILIA, ARAGÓN Y CASTILLA (1998).
28. Concerning the crown of Aragón, see Lalinde Abadía, “Las
instituciones de la Corona de Aragón en la crisis del siglo XIV”, in La mutación
de la segunda mitad del siglo XIV en España, 8 CUADERNOS DE HISTORIA.
ANEXOS DE LA REVISTA 155-170 (1977); El Derecho y las instituciones políticoadministrativas del Reino de Aragón hasta el siglo XVIII (Situación actual de
los estudios), in 2 I JORNADAS SOBRE EL ESTADO ACTUAL DE LOS ESTUDIOS
SOBRE ARAGÓN, TERUEL, DEC. 18-20, 1978 599-624 (Zaragoza, 1979); El
pactismo en los reinos de Aragón y de Valencia, in EL PACTISMO EN LA
HISTORIA DE ESPAÑA (Madrid, 1980); El Derecho común en los territorios
ibéricos de la Corona de Aragón, in ESPAÑA Y EUROPA: UN PASADO JURÍDICO
COMÚN 145-178 (Murcia, 1986); T. de Montagut Estragués, El renacimiento del
poder legislativo y la Corona de Aragón (siglos XIII–XIV), in ANDRÈ GOURON
& ALBERT RIGAUDIÈRE, RENAISSANCE DU POUVOIR LEGISLATIF ET GENÈSE DE
L’ETAT 165-177 (Montpellier, 1988).
29. P. DOMÍNGUEZ LOZANO, LAS CIRCUNSTANCIAS PERSONALES
DETERMINANTES DE LA VINCULACIÓN CON EL DERECHO LOCAL: ESTUDIO SOBRE
EL DERECHO LOCAL ALTOMEDIEVAL Y EL DERECHO LOCAL ARAGÓN, NAVARRA Y
CATALUÑA (Madrid, 1988); concerning the custom as a legal source, see F.L.
Pacheco, Ley, costumbre y uso en la experiencia jurídica peninsular
bajomedieval y moderna, in EL DRET COMÚ I CATALUNYA. ACTES DEL IV
SIMPOSI INTERNACIONAL. HOMENATGE AL PROFESOR JOSEP M. GAY ESCODA 75146 (Barcelona, Fundació Noguera, 1995).
Concerning the history of criminal law, see MANUEL TORRES AGUILAR, EL
PARRICIDIO: DEL PASADO AL PRESENTE DE UN DELITO (1991); MIGUEL ÁNGEL
MORALES PAYÁN, LA CONFIGURACIÓN LEGISLATIVA DEL DELITO DE LESIONES EN
EL DERECHO HISTÓRICO ESPAÑOL (Madrid, 1997); MIGUEL PINO ABAD, LA PENA
DE CONFISCACIÓN DE BIENES EN EL DERECHO HISTÓRICO ESPAÑOL (1999); F.J.
BURILLO ALBACETE, EL NACIMIENTO DE LA PENA PRIVATIVA DE LIBERTAD
(1999); ANICETO MASFERRER, LA PENA DE INFAMIA EN EL DERECHO HISTÓRICO
ESPAÑOL: CONTRIBUCIÓN AL ESTUDIO DE LA TRADICIÓN PENAL EUROPEA EN EL
MARCO DEL IUS COMMUNE (2001); JUAN SAINZ GUERRA, LA EVOLUCIÓN DEL
DERECHO PENAL EN ESPAÑA (2004); ISABEL RAMOS VÁZQUEZ, ARRESTOS,
CÁRCELES Y PRISIONES EN LOS DERECHOS HISTÓRICOS ESPAÑOLES (Dirección
General de Instituciones Penitenciarias, 2008).
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III. SPANISH LEGAL TRADITIONS, LEGAL UNIFICATION AND
CODIFICATION
The current Spanish legal system constitutes perhaps the
clearest European model of codification without aiming at a
complete unification of the law. Despite the French influence, 30 it
could be said that the Spanish codification of private law was
original and attached to its own legal tradition. An important
aspect of that legal tradition consisted precisely in the co-existence
of different legal traditions, enjoying all of the legislative powers
in developing their own legal institutions. Is that compatible with
the codification scheme? How did Spanish legal traditions manage
to survive when going through a codification movement seems to
aim—theoretically—at legal unification?
Spanish legal traditions show that it is not accurate to
maintain that codification is a legal source or tool whose main
purpose consists in complete unification of law. Whoever may
think this way should make up his mind after considering the
Spanish case.
It is true that in the nineteenth-century European
codification movement, which took place in the context of two
legal theories, namely, the iusrationalism (or natural law theory)
and the historicism, theoretically aimed at the unification of law,
no matter its main source, was supposed to be found either in
nature and reason, or in culture, history, and tradition.
I do not deny that in Spain the codification process did
somehow lead to unify the law since, in fact, Spanish codification
30.

Merino-Blanco states that:
Prussia, Austria and France were the first European countries
to have codes. However, it was the French Code Civil of 1804
which was the greatest of them all because of its technical
perfection and the fact that it was elaborated in a country
which already had a bourgeois revolution. The influence of the
French Civil Code has been enormous. It was implemented
and copied in several countries and inspired the codification of
Civil law in many others, among them, Spain.
ELENA MERINO-BLANCO, THE SPANISH LEGAL SYSTEM 20-21 (Sweet and
Maxwell, 1996). But see, Charles Sumner Lobingier, A Spanish Object-Lesson
in Code-Making, 16 YALE L.J.411 (1906–1907) (defending a different thesis:
“Doubtless the Spanish codifiers profited much from the Code Napoleon, but we
have it on the authority of the eminent French jurist Levé, that the Spanish Code
is the superior.”).
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constituted an important step towards unification. It could be said,
then, that Spanish codification tended to unify private law, but not
in a complete way. More specifically, if it is true that the
codification of criminal law, 31 commercial law, 32 criminal
procedure, and civil procedure 33 sought such an utter unification of
law, the codification of private law never pursued to entirely unify
the law. 34
It is very well-known that technical and political obstacles
were to be overcome to codify the law. In private law, political and
technical problems arose in such a way that the whole nineteenth
31. On the codification of Spanish criminal law, see Aniceto Masferrer,
Liberal State and Criminal Law Reform in Spain, The Rule of Law in
Comparative Perspective, 3 IUS GENTIUM: COMP. PERSP. ON L. AND JUST. 19-40
(2010); Aniceto Masferrer, Codification of Spanish Criminal Law in the
Nineteenth Century. A Comparative Legal History Approach, 4 J. OF COMP. L.
96-139 (2009); ANICETO MASFERRER, TRADICIÓN Y REFORMISMO EN LA
CODIFICACIÓN PENAL ESPAÑOLA: HACIA EL OCASO DE UN MITO: MATERIALES,
APUNTES Y REFLEXIONES PARA UN NUEVO ENFOQUE METODOLÓGICO E
HISTORIOGRÁFICO DEL MOVIMIENTO CODIFICADOR PENAL EUROPEO (2003); Mª
D. M. SÁNCHEZ GONZÁLEZ, LA CODIFICACIÓN PENAL EN ESPAÑA: LOS CÓDIGOS
DE 1848 Y 1850 (2004).
32. J. RUBIO, SAINZ DE ANDINO Y LA CODIFICACIÓN MERCANTIL (1950);
see also J.M. EIZAGUIRRE, EL DERECHO MERCANTIL EN LA CODIFICACIÓN DEL
SIGLO XIX (1987); E. GACTO, El Código de comercio de 1885, in LA ESPAÑA DE
LA RESTAURACIÓN. POLÍTICA, ECONOMÍA, LEGISLACIÓN Y CULTURA 401-412

(1985); M. Peset Reig, Arreglo de consulados' y Revolución burguesa: en los
orígenes del moderno Derecho mercantil español, 11 HISTORIA, INSTITUCIONES,
DOCUMENTOS 255 (1984); Carlos Petit Calvo, Oposición foral al Código de
Comercio (1829), 59 ANUARIO DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO ESPAÑOL 699-736
(1989); CARLOS PETIT CALVO, DERECHO PRIVADO Y REVOLUCIÓN BURGUESA: II
SEMINARIO DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO PRIVADO, GERONA, 25-27 DE MAYO
1988 (Marcial Pons ed., 1990); CARLOS PETIT, DERECHO MERCANTIL: ENTRE
CORPORACIONES Y CÓDIGOS, HISPANIA: ENTRE DERECHOS PROPIOS Y DERECHOS
NACIONALES 315-500 (1990).
33. A. Fiestas Loza, Codificación procesal y estado de la Administración
de Justicia, 1875–1915, in LA ESPAÑA DE LA RESTAURACIÓN. POLÍTICA,
LEGISLACIÓN, ECONOMÍA Y CULTURA (Madrid, 1985); E. ÁLVAREZ CORA, LA
ARQUITECTURA DE LA JUSTICIA BURGUESA: UNA INTRODUCCIÓN AL
ENJUICIAMIENTO CIVIL EN EL SIGLO XIX (2002).
34. On the codification of Spanish civil law, see J.BARÓ PAZOS, LA
CODIFICACIÓN DEL DERECHO CIVIL EN ESPAÑA (1808–1889) (1993);
MASFERRER, supra note 7, at 354-370; Judit Valls Salada, The Codification of
Civil Law in Spain, in TURNING POINTS AND BREAKLINES (S. Hornyák, B.
Juhász, K. Korsósné, and Z. Peres eds., 2009); see also Aniceto Masferrer,
Relations Between Neighbours in Spanish Law (1850-2000), in THE
DEVELOPMENT OF LIABILITY BETWEEN NEIGHBOURS: COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN
THE DEVELOPMENT ON THE LAW OF TORTS IN EUROPE 173-204 (James Gordley,
ed., 2010).
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century was needed to enact the current Spanish Civil Code. While
the first code was passed in 1822 (Criminal Code), the Civil Code
was enacted in 1889, with private law being the last legal branch to
be codified.
That was because the promulgation of the Civil Code was
not wished by everybody. The conservative elite did not want it for
different reasons, being afraid of entering into the school of liberal
thought, and preferring the Roman, Canonical and Spanish law that
they had been acquainted. Besides, the nineteenth century was
politically complex: the War of Independence, the Carlist Wars,
the military uprisings, changes of governments, the First Republic
and the restoration of the monarchy.
Nonetheless, such delay was not much due to a lack of
interest or political will to codify the private law, but because of
the difficulty to assert the best way of codifying this legal branch
without sweeping away some regional laws (Derechos forales),
whose validity came from the Middle Ages and whose regions
(particularly, some territories of the Crown of Aragon) did not
accept the abolition of their own legal tradition.
The political will of codifying private law was clear from
the beginning of the codification movement. Moreover, all Spanish
constitutions contained expressed provisions dealing with the
matter. Moreover, article 169 of the Statute of Bayonne,
promulgated by the French during their occupation of Spain on
July 6, 1808, stated, “[t]he Spaniards and the Indies shall be
governed by a single Code of Civil and Criminal Laws.”
This provision of the Statute of Bayonne influenced the
article 258 of the 1812 Spanish Constitution, which prescribed:
The Civil and Criminal Codes, as well as the
Commercial one, shall be the same throughout the
Monarchy, without prejudice to the variations
which the Cortes may enact for particular
circumstances. 35

35. Diverse provisions on this matter can be found in other Spanish
Constitutions (1937 SC, art. 4 (1937); 1845 SC, art. 4 (1845); 1869 SC, art. 91
(1869); art. 75 1876 SC adopted art. 91 of 1869 SC; 1931 SC, art. 8 (1931); see
M.C. Mirow, Codification and the Constitution of Cádiz, in ESTUDIOS JURIDICOS
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The current 1978 SC eventually makes clear that the legislative
competence in civil law matters does not exclusively belong to the
Spanish government and parliament, since the Autonomous
Communities also enjoy legislative powers. 36 Article 149.1.8 of
the Spanish Constitution tried to settle a very complicated problem
whose origin and development belong to Spanish legal history.
It is very well-known that the legal diversity in the Iberian
Peninsula started in the Early Middle Ages, particularly in the
context of the Christian Reconquest (Reconquista) over the
Muslim dominance. 37 In the long process of such Reconquest,
which lasted almost eight centuries (from 722 to 1492), five
Hispanic Kingdoms emerged. In the thirteenth century, the
Peninsula had already been transformed into the territory of Leon,

EN HOMENAJE AL PROFESOR ALEJANDRO GUZMAN BRITO (Patricio-Ignacio
Carvajal and Massimo Miglietta eds., Edizioni dell’Orso, forthcoming).
36. 1978 SC, art. 149.1 (1978) reads:
The State has exclusive authority over the following matters:
8. Civil legislation without prejudice to the preservation,
amendment, and development by the Autonomous
Communities of civil, local, and special laws wherever in
existence. In any event, the rules of application and
enforcement of legal norms, civil law with respect to the form
of marriage, regulation of public registers and instruments,
foundations of contractual obligations, norms for the
determination of conflict of laws, and the determination of
sources of law concerning norms of local and special law.
37. The Islamic conquest of the Christian Visigothic kingdom in the eighth
century (begun 710-712) extended over almost the entire peninsula (except
major parts of Galicia, the Asturias, Cantabria and the Basque Country). Given
the failure of the Muslims to occupy the entire Iberian Peninsula, several
independent kingdoms and counties emerged in the foothills of the Cantabrian
and Pyrenees mountains (Asturias, León, Castile, Navarre, Aragón, and
Catalonia). The idea of Reconquest originated in Asturias, where King Pelayo
(718–737), the leader of a hardy band of mountaineers, proclaimed his intention
to achieve the salus Spanie—the “salvation of Spain”—and the restoration of
the Gothic people. His victory over the Muslims at Covadonga in 722 is
traditionally regarded as the beginning of the Reconquest. The Reconquest
constituted a period of 800 years in the Middle Ages during which several
Christian kingdoms of the Iberian Peninsula succeeded in retaking Hispania
from the Muslims. By the thirteenth century all that remained was the Kingdom
of Granada, to be conquered in 1492, bringing the entire peninsula under
Christian leadership. On this matter, see, for example, JOSEPH F. O’CALLAGHAN,
RECONQUEST AND CRUSADE IN MEDIEVAL SPAIN (2003); Lucas VillegasAristizábal, Norman and Anglo-Norman Participation in the Iberian Reconquista
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Nottingham University, 2007).
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Castile, Aragon-Catalonia, Navarre and Portugal, kingdoms which
from the beginning enjoyed political and juridical autonomy. Spain
then went through a further metamorphosis in the last stage of the
Reconquest when the marriage of the Catholic monarchs united the
kingdoms of Castile and Aragon. The kingdom of Navarre was
then incorporated into this unified political entity (1512) and the
period of the Reconquest ended with the surrender of the last
Muslim territory, Granada (1492).
The political unity achieved by the Catholic monarchs did
not bring with it legal unification. In fact, one of the main—if not
the main one—features of the Spanish monarchy from the marriage
of Fernando and Isabel (October 19, 1469) was precisely the
compatibility of political unity with legal diversity or plurality of
laws. Every kingdom had not only its own laws but also its own
legal institutions to make the law and develop it throughout time.
The unification of Castile and Aragon did not then imply the
unification of the law, although the law itself, due to several causes
(mainly, because of the Royal legislation and the ever-increasing,
wide-pervading influence of the ius commune over the different
Spanish legal traditions), would experience a clear, progressive
tendency towards unification.
The uneasy balance between political unity and legal
diversity changed drastically when the last king of the house of
Austria (Carlos II) was succeeded by Felipe V, a king from another
Royal dynasty, called bourbon, after the Spanish War of
Succession whose origin, causes and development cannot be here
dealt with. 38 What is really worth noting is how it was precisely
the legal consequences of the Spanish Succession War that
constituted an important shift on the development of Spanish
private law tradition. The main legal consequence was the
abolition of the

38. On this matter, see GÉNESIS TERRITORIAL DE ESPAÑA (José A Escudero
ed., 2007); as known, the circumstances which led to the War of Spanish
Succession went beyond to the Spanish interest, affecting many other European
countries. In fact, the final outcome of the war was the result of diplomatic
negotiations seeking a peaceful solution to the Spanish royal succession.
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legislative power enjoyed by all the Crown of Aragon kingdoms
(Aragon and Valencia, 39 Catalonia, 40 Majorca and Ibiza, 41 and
39. The first Decree of Nueva Planta was promulgated by Felipe V on
June 29 (NR, 3, 2, 3; NoR 3, 3, 1), 1707, by which the legal systems of the
kingdoms of Valencia and Aragon were abolished. Later on, subsequent Decrees
of Nueva Planta were enacted by Felipe V, affecting both kingdoms, namely,
Valencia and Aragon. The main difference between the final outcome of the
Decrees imposed to Valencia and Aragon was remarkable, namely, while Felipe
V returned to Aragon its fueros concerning private and criminal law matters, the
Furs of Valencia were never returned in these general terms. In this regard, on
April 3, 1711 (NoR 5, 7, 2), Felipe V promulgated a Decree for Aragon, by
which, among other things, a General Commanding Officer was established as
the supreme authority (concerning military, political, economic, and
governmental matters). Furthermore, a tribunal (Audiencia) with two chambers
was created to settle judicial disputes in private and procedural law matters,
being the former ones resolved according to the fueros of Aragon.
Consequently, the civil law chamber could resolve the lawsuits related to the
laws of the kingdom of Aragon, although they turned to the Council of Castile in
the second instance of the appellation procedure. In other words, Felipe V
eventually allowed Aragon to maintain its proper private law but abolished all
public law by imposing the Castilian law; on Valencia, see A. MASFERRER, LA
PERVIVENCIA DEL DERECHO FORAL VALENCIANO TRAS LOS DECRETOS DE NUEVA
PLANTA (Madrid, 2008); see also Mariano Peset Reig, Notas sobre la abolición
de los Fueros de los Fueros de Valencia, 42 ANUARIO DE HISTORIA DEL
DERECHO ESPAÑOL 657-716 (1972); Apuntes sobre la abolición de los Fueros y
la Nueva Planta valenciana, in 3 PRIMER CONGRESO DE HISTORIA DEL PAÍS
VALENCIANO 525-536 (1976); Mariano Peset, La creación de la Chancillería de
Valencia y su reducción a Audiencia en los años de la nueva Planta, in
ESTUDIOS DE HISTORIA DE VALENCIA 309-334 (1978); GÉNESIS TERRITORIAL DE
ESPAÑA 41-201, 333-460 (Josè Antonio Escudero Lopez ed., 2007); on Aragon,
see JESÚS MORALES ARRIZABALAGA, LA DEROGACIÓN DE LOS FUEROS DE
ARAGÓN (1707-1711) (Huesca, 1986).
40. Catalonia was the next territory affected by the Decrees of Nueva
Planta. More specifically, the new legal regime of Catalonia was established by
the Decree of January 16, 1716 (NoR 5, 9, 1), by which a new legaladministrative system was imposed, abolishing and re-establishing in the same
Decree the civil law, commercial law, criminal law and procedural law. Felipe V
also wanted to make clear that the political constitution of Catalonia which had
not been explicitly abolished was equally replaced by the new law, that is, the
Castilian one. In doing so, chapter 42 of the Decree provided: “Regarding that
which is not foreseen in the preceding chapters of this Decree, I command that
the former Constitutions of Catalonia be observed; by which it is to be
understood that they are established anew by this Decree.” It is true that the
civil, commercial, criminal and procedural law were all maintained, but they
were not affirmed through a pact, but rather by the absolute power of the king,
being legitimated retroactively: “. . . by which it is to be understood that they are
established anew by this Decree.” This was a concept of absolute power which,
while referring to the past, projected itself much more into the future, definitely
abolishing the political notion of pactism; see J.Mª Gay I Escoda, La gènesi del
Decret de nova planta de Catalunya. Edició de la consulta original del ‘Consejo
de Castilla’ de 13 de juny de 1715, 81 REVISTA JURÍDICA DE CATALUNYA 7-41,
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Sardinia 42), although they all—apart from Valencia—were allowed
to apply their own private legal institutions, not by virtue of their
own political and juridical autonomy, but because of an express
Royal concession. In other words, since then, in the whole of the
Spanish monarchy’s territory there was only one source of political
and juridical power, namely, the monarchy and its own
administrative machinery.
In this regard, the Decrees of Nueva Planta promulgated by
Felipe V (1707-1717) brought with it the definitive abolition of the
political and juridical autonomy that the current Spanish
Constitution established again. Setting aside the 1931 Constitution
which, although it was never in force, was of great value in terms
of influencing the making of the 1978 Constitution,43 the

263-348 (1982); Notas sobre el Derecho supletorio en Cataluña desde el
Decreto de Nueva Planta (1715) hasta la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Supremo
(1845), 34/35HISPANIA. ENTRE DERECHOS PROPIOS Y DERECHOS NACIONALES.
REVISTA PER LA STORIA DEL PENSIERO GIURIDICO MODERNO 805-865 (1990);
GÉNESIS TERRITORIAL DE ESPAÑA, supra note 39, 205-330.
41. The Nueva Planta for Majorca and Ibiza was laid down through the
Decree of November 28, 1715 (NoR 5, 10, 1), by which the main public
institution, the Jurats and the Gran i General Consell, were abolished, while the
Consolat de Mar and the Sindicat de fora were maintained. The Decree created
the Audiencia of Majorca. Since then the Castilian law had to be applied
concerning public law matters, while the Majorcan law sources (including the
ius commune as subsidiary law) could be applied concerning private (including
civil and commercial), criminal and procedural law matters; see GÉNESIS
TERRITORIAL DE ESPAÑA, supra note 39, at 463-545. On Menorca, see PIÑA
HOMS, ROMÁN: LA REINCORPORACIÓN DE MENORCA A LA CORONA ESPAÑOLA
1781-1798: MEDIDAS DE GOBIERNO Y ADMINISTRACIÓN (Palma de Mallorca ,
1983); Las fuentes del Derecho en la Menorca británica, in ESTUDIOS EN
HOMENAJE A MIGUEL COLL CARRERAS 523-540 (Palma de Mallorca, 2006).
42. Sardinia (Cerdeña), incorporated to the Spanish monarchy for a short
period of time (1717-1720), was also affected by two Decrees of Nueva Planta
of similar content of those which were granted to Catalonia and Majorca: Decree
of November 24, 1717, and Real Cédula of February 16, 1719; see Regina Mª
Perez Marcos, Cerdeña en el marco de la Guerra de Sucesión: Administración y
gobierno, 13/14 IUS FUGIT 479 (2004-2006); GÉNESIS TERRITORIAL DE ESPAÑA,
supra note 39, at 549-578.
43. Between the Decrees of Nueva Planta and the current Constitution,
only the 1931 Constitution laid down a provision granting political and juridical
autonomy to regional territories. In this sense, article 8 of 1931 C.E. envisioned
autonomy for those regions meeting the requirements specified therein, which
included the approval of a Statute of Autonomy. Power to legislate on matters
such as forms of marriage and contractual obligations were exclusively reserved
to the central government, although the autonomous regions could promulgate
laws to regulate their execution C.E. of 1931, article 15 (1931)). For the matters
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development of the legal diversity in the current territory of Spain
has three marked, different periods:
•

•

•

From the Reconquest (722-1492) to the Decrees of
Felipe V (1707-1717), in which the kingdoms
enjoyed legal diversity and legislative powers to
develop their legal institutions;
From the Decrees of Felipe V (1707-1717) to the
current Constitution (1978), in which, leaving aside
the short Spanish II Republic, old regional
kingdoms (apart from Valencia) were allowed to
use and apply their own private legal institutions
without any possibility of developing them by
means of legislative bodies, since they had been
abolished; and
From the creation of the 1978 Spanish Constitution
to nowadays, in which only some Autonomous
Communities (the name currently used for the
different regional territories), have been granted
political and legislative autonomy in civil matters
which enables them to preserve, amend, and
develop “wherever in existence” (article 149.1.8 of
1978 SC).

It could be said, then, that plurality of laws and legal diversity
enjoyed by the old Spanish regions experienced two different
contexts depending on whether the kingdoms had legislative (or
institutional) autonomy or not. The legal diversity with legislative
powers enjoyed by the kingdoms before the Decrees of Felipe V
experienced a decisive shift after the Spanish Succession War
whose legal consequences belong not just to the past, but also to
the present.

over which Madrid did not enjoy exclusive competence, however, article 16 of
the 1931 Constitution granted the autonomous regions “exclusive legislative
powers and direct powers of execution pursuant to the provisions of their
respective Statutes of Autonomy as approved by the Cortes.” The Catalan
Government, for example, took advantage of this legal context to push the
enactment of a Statute in which article 11 granted the Catalan Government
(Generalitat) “exclusive legislative powers in civil law matters save those
provided in the Civil Code.”
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In effect, to a large extent the changing fortunes of the
current Spanish regional legislative system mirrors the history of
modern Spain. Granted by monarchs who amassed victories during
the Reconquest but then proved unable to establish strong central
governing institutions, the regional laws (fueros) were not
eradicated by the unification of Aragon and Castile or the
subsequent expulsion of Islam from the Iberian Peninsula. As noted,
in 1707 Felipe V abolished the fueros and the legislative bodies of
both the Crown of Aragon (including Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia
and the Balearic Islands) in retaliation for their opposition to his
claims during the War of the Spanish Succession. Although
regional laws were soon returned to all but the Valencians, the
defeated regions never regained their legislative powers.
In consequence, the Spanish history shows how fueros had
to overcome two difficult periods, without which they would be
unable to survive the strong tendency towards legal unification,
first with Felipe V, and later with the codification movement. 44
Concerning the codification period, the first thing that
should be kept in mind is that, leaving aside the 1931 and the
current Spanish Constitution, the other SCs did not provide the
possibility of granting legislative powers to the territories that had
regional laws. On the contrary, if some regional laws were allowed
to be in force, they should be passed by the Spanish parliament
(Cortes). 45 In fact, the exercise of legislative powers was
44. Moreover, the distinction between the new “common law” (that is, the
Castilian law) and the regional laws (the laws of Catalonia, Aragon, Valencia,
etc.), had succeeded and the regional laws were considered as local (or
municipal) and exceptional. In this regard, regional laws were considered to be
an exception to the Spanish “common law” (Derecho común). In fact, the
distinction between the “common law” (Derecho común) and regional law
(Derecho foral) appeared after the Decrees of Felipe V and was invented by
Gregorio Mayans y Siscar, an outstanding Valencian lawyer and scholar, and
brought with it an important controversy concerning the adjudication law
process, particularly in Catalonia; See Gay I. Escoda, supra note 40. Despite of
all, the old regional laws managed to survive after the Decrees of Felipe V
without any possibility of updating the law to the new political, social and
economic context of the societies of Catalonia, Aragon and Majorca. Valencia,
since Felipe V never returned its legal institutions, theoretically–not in practice–
had no need of survival.
45. See, Javier Moreno-Luzón, Nationalist Conflict in Spanish Parliament
(1898-1919), in SEPARATION OF POWERS AND PARLIAMENTARISM, THE PAST
AND THE PRESENT: LAW DOCTRINE, PRACTICE 584 (Waclaw Uruszczak,
Kazimierz Baran, & Anna Karabowic eds., 2007).
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something which surpassed the codification scheme, being a
constitutional issue which went beyond codifiers’ powers.
The codification movement began in Spain at the beginning
of the nineteenth century, one century after the Decrees of Felipe V
were passed. During the whole eighteenth century some old
regional territories had to make great efforts to find effective ways
to develop their own legal institutions without legislative
institutions. Catalonia is in this regard the paramount example.
Some of the Spanish Constitutions made explicit reference
to the regional laws in civil matters when providing the
convenience of enacting codes for the whole Monarchy.
Everybody agreed with the goodness of codes, even the members
of the Cortes representing old regional territories. They never
envisioned the civil code as a legal tool not compatible with the
respect of the regional laws which constitute and important part of
their legal identity.
If that is the case, one could ask why the enactment of the
Civil Code experienced such a delay. Such delay was due not to
the lack of acceptance of the Code itself as a convenient legal tool
to modernize the law, but rather to the difficulty to reach an
agreement about the role of the regional laws within the new code
system, as well as the specific way or method to include them in
the codification sketch (or outline). In fact, the regional aspirations
did not hinder the codification of private law up to the Civil Code
Project of 1851. Regional lawyers, who up until then had
supported the codification enterprise, changed—some of them,
radically—their attitude once the 1851 Project came out.
The main evil of the 1851 Civil Code Project could be
found in its article 1992 which stated as follows:
All fueros, laws, uses and customs existing prior to
the promulgation of this Code, in all matters that are
the object of the same, shall not have the force of
the law even when not contrary to the present Code.
The provision disregarded regional laws, since they were
abrogated no matter whether they were not against the Project or
compatible with it. In addition to it, the Project contained many
institutions from Castilian Law, ignoring the other regional legal
traditions, option which did not please Spanish jurists from some
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Spanish territories like Catalonia, Aragon, and the Basque
Provinces, among others.
This provision and the immediate reaction against it
generated among the regional lawyers, particularly the Catalans, 46
marked the beginning of a fierce and difficult controversy, similar
somehow to that which originated in Germany (between Savigny
and Thibaut) or in New York (between David Dudley Field and
James Coolidge Carter) about the advantages and disadvantages of
codes, although in Spain, like in Germany, the discussion did not
revolve around the convenience to codify the law or not, rather
around the sort of codification that was most suitable. 47

46. See Pablo Salvador Coderch, El Proyecto de Código Civil de 1851 y el
Derecho Civil Catalán, in LA COMPILACIÓN Y SU HISTORIA 10 (1986). The
attitude of resistance against this project can be also understood considering that
in the second half of the 19th century emerged a renewed flourishing of
regionalism in different Spanish regions. From a politico-legal point of view,
these movements drew notably from Savigny’s ideas concerning the Volksgeist
(“spirit of the people”), based on the Historical School of Law and,
consequently, against a iusrationalist codification. Regionalist movement strove
to preserve the regional differences and to maintain those established differences
both in the same language and form of law. It is noteworthy that the ideas of
Savigny came to Spain through the works of Duran y Bas, an outstanding
Catalan lawyer who, after spending time in Germany, introduced Savigny’s
legal theory in Spain. Logically, the Historical School was not much of a
supporter of codification projects based on rational law rather than on the legal
culture and tradition of the different territories where the people live and
interact. As Badosa states:
Nineteenth-century opposition to the codification process had
its roots in the ideology of the historical school of law and its
rejection of codification. This influence is clear in the setting
up in Barcelona of a 'Spanish Committee' linked to the
Savigny Foundation of Berlin, under the honorary presidency
of Pere Nolasc Vives i Cebrià, although Duran y Bas was
effectively its leader. It was this Committee that requested a
change in the statutes of the Foundation (12 September 1871)
so that studies written in Spanish might be accepted.
Badosa Coll, supra note 16, at 159. On the existence of “ein Spanisches
Savigny-Comite,” founded at the College of Lawyers of Barcelona on July 11,
1869, see Karl Georg Bruns, Die Savigny Stiftung, I ZSS (1880) 6 (I) (cited in
Badosa’s article).
47. On Field’s attempts to pass a civil code in New York, see Aniceto
Masferrer, The Passionate Discussion among Common Lawyers about
postbellum American Codification: An approach to its Leal Argumentation, 40
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 173 (2008); Aniceto Masferrer, Defense of the Common Law
against Postbellum American Codification: Reasonable and Fallacious
Argumentation, 50 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355 (2009).
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It is true that the Spanish Constitutions of 1837 and 1845
provided that the entire kingdom would be governed by identical
Codes. In this regard, article 4 of the Constitution of June 18, 1837
provided, “identical Codes shall rule throughout the Monarchy,
and they shall not provide more than one fuero for all Spaniards in
all common, civil and criminal trials.” The same principle
contained the article 4 of the Constitution of 1845, “identical
Codes shall rule throughout the Monarchy.”
However, the dispute over foral laws arose intensely in
1851, because such constitutional articles did not necessarily imply
to ignore the different regional legal traditions. It did not imply it
theoretically, but the 1851 Civil Code Project was clear enough in
this regard, generating a reaction led by the champions of
regionalism who succeeded in defeating the aforementioned Civil
Code Project that intended to abolish all regional civil legislation.
The Government, taking for granted that this Project had been
killed before being born, did not go further with its approval,
although it ordered its publication to bring it to general use and
obtain opinions from the members of the law schools, the Judiciary
and other institutions. After such a failure, the practicability of the
codification in civil law was always questioned in connection with
the problem of respecting or removing the regional (or foral) civil
laws.
Not surprisingly, the 1869 Constitution once again
recognized regional rights. In this sense, article 91 of the 1869
Constitution provided, “identical Codes shall rule throughout the
Monarchy, without prejudice to the variations determined by law
for particular circumstances.”
The First Spanish Republic lasted only long enough to draft
a constitutional project. 48 Following the downfall of the First

48. This effort departed sharply from previous endeavors because it
acknowledged, as we said, the existence and validity of regional laws and sought
to incorporate them into a Constitution. Legislative powers were reserved
exclusively to the Cortes, and the Federal Government was instructed to draft
comprehensive codes. The federal entities comprising the Republic were not
prohibited from legislating, and they were assured by article 92 full economic
and administrative autonomy and as much political autonomy as compatible
with the existence of the Nation.
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Republic, the draftsmen of the 1876 Constitution formulated article
75 on the basis of article 91 of its 1869 counterpart. 49
By a Royal Decree on February 2, 1880, Minister Álvarez
Bugallal expressed the agreement to respect regional private law
traditions in the future Civil Code, although not in their entirety,
preserving only those legal institutions which deserved to be kept
in force in their own territory. Moreover, he wanted regional
territories to put them in a written form. 50
At that time it was already clear that codification could not
succeed unless room was made for regional laws. This explains
why Manuel Alonso Martinez’s Ley de Bases of 1881, a project
containing fundamental legal provisions to be developed in the
future Civil Code, contained some regional civil institutions called
to have validity for all Spanish citizens in the future Civil Code.
Regional territories could conserve their own institutions, but the
Civil Code would be a stopgap for all regional legislation, bringing
to an end the validity of Roman law. 51 Nevertheless, the Cortes did
not accept this Ley de Bases.
After a private law conference, held in 1886, in which the
majority of participants agreed with the idea of drafting a Civil
Code respecting regional laws, Francisco Silvela, the Minister of
Justice, presented another Ley de Bases, establishing that regional
territories could conserve their legal institutions. In addition, the
future Civil Code would be a stopgap only if Roman or Canon law
could not be applied. Once the code would be completed, the
government would proceed to draft appendices, containing the
regional institutions. Silvela’s Ley de Bases was approved on May
49. 1876 SC, article 75 (adopting article 91 of 1869 SC); and later it
would be incorporated in article 8 of 1931 SC.
50. Article 4 of the Royal Decree of February 2, 1880; to that undertaking
several lawyers were appointed as members of the Codification Committee
(Comisión de Codificación) (which had been re-established five years before by
the Minister Cárdenas, by Decree of May 10, 1875): Manuel Duran i Bas for
Catalonia, Luis Franco López for Aragon, Antonio Morales Gómez for Navarra,
Rafael López de Lago for Galicia, Manuel Lecanda Mendieta for the Basque
Provinces, and Pedro Ripoll Palou for the Balearic Islands. Everyone presented
his report containing the private law institutions which needed to be kept of his
own region. The most important reports were written by the Catalan Duran i
Bas, and the Aragonese Franco López.
51. The Cortes should not have to discuss every article, but just the main
principles and fundamental bases of the civil legislation. Afterwards, the
Codification Committee could draft the entire Code.
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11, 1888. 52 According to it, provinces and regional territories had
to conserve all their legal institutions, the code being a stopgap just
in these territories; later on, every regional territory would write
appendices containing the legal institutions they considered to be
conserved.
Taking into account the Ley de Bases of 1888, the current
Civil Code was elaborated and published on October 6, 1888,
coming into force on May 1, 1889. 53 The Civil Code of 1889
granted regional civil laws temporary validity, a status they
maintained until the amendment of the Code in 1974. The 1889
version of article 13 of the Code read as follows:
First. The provisions of this Title [Preliminary
Section] shall be mandatory in all the provinces of
the reign to the extent that they determine the effect
of the laws, statutes and general rules for its
application. The provisions of title IV, book I of the
Code shall also be mandatory.
Second. As for the rest, the provinces and territories in
which foral law endures shall conserve them for the
moment in their integrity; and their actual legal
regime, whether written or customary, shall not be
altered by the publication of this Code, which shall be
applied only as supplementary law, in the absence of
what is set forth in the special laws of the foral
regions. [Emphasis added]
The Civil Code did allow then the existence of territorial laws,
considered as a supplementary legal source. The Civil Code also
provided matters for the compilation of foral laws and their
incorporation into the Code as appendices. The Government
appointed commissions to prepare the appendices. They devised a
six month plan at the end of which they were to present their
conclusions to the Government. It is important to note that the
system was not comprehensive but restrictive, requiring a partial
52. The Codification Committee had to draft the Civil Code following that
Ley de Bases, being published by the Government and then revised by the
Cortes; the Code should mainly follow the 1851 Project.
53. However, on July 24, 1889, a new version of it was published,
containing some necessary amendments and additions proposed by the Cortes.
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sacrifice of the foral regions, since they knew that they could only
preserve certain elements. This explains why provinces and
regional territories were not willing to write their appendices,
preferring to extend indefinitely a situation in which their
traditional law would continue to be in force in all their territories.
It may be that this issue led to the ultimate breakdown of the
system, where neither conclusions nor appendix were finally
reached or approved, except that of Aragon. 54
In the context of the Spanish II Republic, the Statutes of
Autonomy for Catalonia and the Basque Provinces were approved
on September 15, 1932 and on October 6, 1936, respectively,
Catalonia and the Basque Provinces thus regained the legislative
powers they had relinquished during the reign of Felipe V in
Catalonia, and after the Third Carlist War in the Basque provinces
(1876). 55
In 1946 the status of Spanish foral laws changed even more
when a Civil law conference, held in Saragossa, recommended that
“Compilations” (instead of “Appendices”) be drafted for each foral
region. The compilation system allowed codifying all foral laws
without any restriction, so regional territories were not required to
select some legal institutions refusing others. As from the decree
on May 23, 1947 compilation committees were designated to draft
54. The Government approved the appendix of Aragon’s foral law by a
Royal Decree of December 7, 1925. This appendix found a way to smooth over
the differences between the Civil Code. It did this not so much by suppressing
institutions that were of doubtful validity, but more by replacing those that were
well-established, though they diverged from the “common law.” This appendix
was arranged casuistically, with little order and with limited legal reasoning to
its 78 articles and a single transitory provision. It was very unfavorably received.
Other Regional territories that made some projects which never received
approval were Galicia (published in 1915), Balearic Islands (finished in 1903),
Navarre (1900), and Catalonia (published in 1896).
55. The Basque Parliament never enacted civil legislation. The application
of the Statute of Autonomy in Catalonia, however, provoked tension between
the Madrid government and local legislators when the latter, purporting to
execute the Republican mandate, promulgated two decrees in 1936 which added
new causes of divorce to the 1932 Divorce Law (Decree of September 18, 1936;
Decree of December 23, 1936; among the new causes allowed following the
Nationalist uprising of July 18, 1936 was “culpable” absence from the marital
home without minimum requirement as to the time spent away). The 1936
Catalonian decrees called for their preferential application over the Divorce Law
of the Republic. The Madrid norm would be resorted only when the Catalan
laws proved inapposite. After the Civil War, the Nationalist forces repealed both
the 1931 Constitution and the Statutes of Autonomy enacted under its aegis.
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foral compilations of all foral territories. After the passage of such
a decree on May 23, 1947, the following compilations were
promulgated:
• Compilation of Vizcaya and Alava civil law:
Law of July 30, 1959.
• Compilation of Catalonia civil law: Law of
July 21, 1960.
• Compilation of Balearic Islands civil law:
Law of April 19, 1961.
• Compilation of Galicia civil law: Law of
December 2, 1963.
• Compilation of Aragon civil law: Law of
April 8, 1967.
• Compilation of Navarre civil law: Law of
March 1, 1973.
In all these territories the Compilation had to be applied before the
Spanish Civil code, which was considered a supplementary legal
source. Moreover, all foral laws not contained in the special
compilations were abolished at the moment of the Compilations
approval.
Consequently, the Decree of May 31, 1974 changed the
temporary status of regional laws by revising the Preliminary Title
of the Civil Code. As amended, paragraph 2 of article 13
emphasized the “full respect” owed to foral laws and eliminated
the term “for the moment” that had appeared in the article prior to
amendment:
. . . [F]ully respecting the special and local or foral
laws of the provinces or territories in which these
are in force, the Civil code shall be in force as
general principle applying in default of specific
regulation, when the foral law does not exist, in
accordance with its special rules. 56

56. Accordingly, article 1 of Compilation of Special Civil law of
Catalonia, for example, stated: “In accordance to what is established in the
Constitution and the Statute of Autonomy, the provisions of the Civil law of
Catalonia shall prevail over the Civil Code and other provisions of an equal
general application.”
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Furthermore, the Statement of Legislative Intent (Exposición de
Motivos) of the Decree made clear that “the historical and political
integration of Spain, instead of suffering there from, is completely
realized by the acknowledgement of foral rights.” Suppressed by
early nineteenth century liberal movements and briefly restored
during the Second Republic, regional legislation was finally
recognized as an integral part of the Spanish legal system by the
1974 amendment of the Civil Code. The creation of foral
legislative bodies, however, would have to wait for the promulgation of the Spanish Constitution of 1978, whereby foral (and
non-foral) regions would regain the legislative powers they had
relinquished in the eighteenth century with the reign of Felipe V
(kingdoms from the crown of Aragon), and in the nineteenth
century (the Basque provinces as a consequence of the Third
Carlist War, 1876; and Navarre through the Ley Paccionada,
August 16, 1841).
IV. LEGAL DIVERSITY AND SPANISH LEGAL TRADITIONS TODAY:
THE PRESENCE OF THE PAST
As said, the current 1978 SC eventually tries to make clear
that the legislative competence in civil law matters does not
exclusively belong to the Spanish government and parliament,
since the Autonomous Communities also enjoy legislative
powers. 57 While some authors regard this system as similar to that
of a Federal system, 58 others seem to be less optimistic, pointing
out its weaknesses and dangers. 59 It is true that article 149.1.8 SC
tried to settle a very complicated problem whose origin and
development belong to Spanish legal history. It may seem unlikely,
but that provision did not settle the problem, and in recent years
the controversy about this matter has increased considerably. In
fact, there has been constant, real friction between the Central
Government and the Autonomous Communities. Furthermore, in
57. See article 149.1.8. SC, at supra note 36.
58. See Encarna Roca I. Trias, Spanish System of Federalism and Self
Government: Regional Law in Catalonia, 10 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.J. 39
(1986).
59. Juan Cadarso Paulau & Jose W. Fernandez, The Spanish Constitution
of 1978 Legislative Competence of the Autonomous Communities in Civl Law
Matters,15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 47 (1982).
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the last few years, controversies have arisen because of
discriminatory treatment of different Autonomous Communities,
with political reasons rather than strictly historical or juridical.
As said, the legal diversity with legislative powers enjoyed
by the kingdoms before the Decrees of Felipe V experienced a
decisive shift after the Spanish Succession War whose legal
consequences drastically affected both the history of the Spanish
legal system, and also the present.
Historically, up to Felipe V Hispanic or Spanish kingdoms
enjoyed not only legal but also institutional (or legislative)
autonomy, since they were provided by legislative bodies to
develop their own laws and institutions. From then up to the 1978
Spanish Constitution (leaving aside the 1931 Constitution which
never received legal enactment), the majority of regional identities
were granted their fueros without legislative autonomy, so they had
to find out different ways to develop their institutions without
resorting to legislative outcomes.
However, Felipe V’s measures affected also the current
Spanish legal system. Let me explain this very briefly. When
article 149.1.8 SC provided that only Autonomous Communities
which had some regional laws at the time when the Constitution
was approved (1978) would enjoy legislative powers “to preserve,
amend, and develop” their own private institutions, it was clear
that only those old regions which managed to keep their laws in
force were called to enjoy legislative competence in civil law
matters. Interestingly though, there was an old regional territory,
Valencia, with a considerable body of old laws which, according to
a strict interpretation of the Spanish Constitution, had a very
limited scope of legislative competences in civil law (because
Felipe V never gave back in general terms their civil laws), while
others (like Galicia), not being an old region at all and, hence,
lacking old laws, enjoyed a great deal of legislative competence
because in the twentieth century this territory took good advantage
of the position of some Galician politicians who achieved the
making of a private law compilation (1963) without old regional
written legislation; so the Galician drafters adopted regional
custom as their principal source.
Furthermore, while in some old regions, in drafting their
compilations, drafters merely collected existing foral norms (it is
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the case of Catalonia, Balearic Islands, and the provinces of
Vizcaya), others either expanded their foral laws into areas not
previously governed by regional legislation (Aragon, 1967), or
pursued to limit the Madrid government’s power to modify or
revise regional legislation, introducing entirely new sources of law
which relegated the status of the more liberal Civil Code in
Navarre to that of supplemental law (see Law of March 1, 1973,
Leyes 5 and 6 Compilación del Derecho Foral de Navarra).
Moreover, since 2004 that problem became worse:
Autonomous Communities, old and not that old regions, attempted
to make good use of some advantageous, political context to
promulgate new regional laws or even new Statutes of Autonomy,
modifying the scope of the legislative competence in civil law
matters, causing discriminatory outcomes whose justification could
not be found in historical or legal reasons but only in political
ones. 60
60. The cases of Galicia, Catalonia and Valencia constituted a paradigm in
this regard. Galicia, lacking written legal tradition, currently enjoys legislative
competence thanks to political reasons, just because some influent politicians
held positions which enabled them to ensure and expand Galician private legal
tradition.
Catalonia, since it had a written Compilation of Catalan private law at the
time of the promulgation of the Spanish Constitution, from 1978 onwards was
allowed to legislate in civil law matters inasmuch as they had been contained in
the aforementioned Compilation. However, since 2004, the political context has
favoured the expansion of its legislative competence to other private institutions
which had never been regulated by this regional identity. Such expansion even
acquired a legislative nature when in 2005 a new Statute of Autonomy was
passed thanks to the support (that is, the votes) of the Socialist Party and the
different parties governing Catalonia.
Valencia, trying to follow in the Catalonia’s footsteps, prepared a new
Statute of Autonomy attempting to expand the scope of the legislative
competence of the Valencian region in civil matters. Such law was, in fact,
enacted with the support the Socialist party. According to such legal reform,
Valencian Parliament was allowed to “conserve, amend and develop” the
customary institutions not abolished by Felipe V and which were in force at the
time of the approval of the Spanish Constitution, as well as all the private
institutions which had been abolished, and not returned, by Felipe V. The new
Statute was very celebrated in Valencia. Nonetheless, a year later, when the
Valencian Parliament, passed the first law on a private institution whose validity
had been interrupted because of the Felipe V’s decrees, the state government
presented an appeal to the Spanish Constitutional Court against that law arguing
that its content violated the state jurisdiction concerning the legislative
competence in civil law matters. Later on, because of new political
circumstances which surpass our interest now, the stated government rectified
and renounced to keep the appeal forward.
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Nevertheless, it could be said that the current Spanish legal
system shows that the coexistence of autonomous regions with
their own legal traditions within a centralized State is possible.
That all the Autonomous Communities currently enjoy legal and
institutional autonomy is undeniable. The question at stake is the
scope of legislative competence they have to “conserve, amend and
develop” (article 149.1.8 SC) their civil law. 61
Theoretically, one may think that the scope of legislative
competence on civil law matters should depend on historical
reasons. In practice, the historical basis has been and is being
biased out of political motives which sometimes constitute the
driving argument and basis in determining the scope of legislative
competence of Autonomous Communities in civil law issues.
V. CONCLUSION
Considering the evolution of the Spanish private law
tradition, and particularly the impact of the codification movement,
the following conclusions could be drawn. Codification does not
mean complete legal unification; as said at the beginning of this
paper, the Spanish case shows that it is not accurate to maintain
that codification is a legal source or tool whose main purpose
consists in complete unification of law. In fact, the compatibility of
codification with the different legal traditions delayed the
enactment of the Spanish Civil Code (1889).
Legal diversity entails necessarily the possibility of
developing legal institutions, through either legislative bodies or
doctrine (ius commune), as it happened in Spain in some territories
from the eighteenth century onwards.
The balance between state and regional, legislative
competence in civil law matters has become a source of constant
controversy, and its development is nowadays uncertain. While
some regional identities are allowed to expand the scope of their
legislative competence in civil law matters, others are forbidden,
creating sometimes a discriminating and unequal treatment out of
61. See, María Pilar Ferrer Vanrell, State Powers Regarding Civil Law
Versus Balearic Parliament Powers–The Section 30.27 of the Charter of
Autonomy of the Balearic Islands, 3 INDRET (2008).
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political motives, disregarding strictly juridical or historical
reasons.
The variety of legal sources of the different Hispanic
kingdoms was, like in other European territories, considerable. In
exploring and describing such complexity, a comparative approach
is highly recommended. Otherwise, it would be difficult to capture
a clear picture of the different Spanish legal traditions. Applying
the comparative approach to the Spanish mixed, complex legal
system constitutes a necessary requirement to appreciate a plurality
of laws and legal traditions in force as of today. Although these
legal traditions underwent a significant process of legal unification,
it is important to keep in mind that in Spain legal unification never
was entirely achieved, and different Spanish legal traditions are
(and will be) in force. 62

62. See Aniceto Masferrer, Spanish Legal History: A Need for its
Comparative Approach, in HOW TO TEACH EUROPEAN COMPARATIVE LEGAL
HISTORY: WORKSHOP, FACULTY OF LAW, LUND UNIVERSITY, 19-20 AUGUST
2009 107-142 (Kjell Å. Modéer and Per Nilsén eds., Lund University, 2011).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Today, Malta has one judicial system which is administered
from one central building in Valletta. At the same time, the place
where justice is administered is known in Maltese as Qrati talĠustizzja or Courts of Justice. However, the fact that all these
courts are situated under one roof causes the people to associate it
* Director, Mediterranean Institute; Lecturer in Historical Demography,
University of Malta, Malta. His work has a special emphasis on behavioural
history, population growth, and development amongst people living in coastal
areas.
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as one institution. I think that this popular perception is more than
correct and despite of the use of the word “courts,” all these
different seats of power fall under the responsibility of one person–
the Chief Justice. This sort of anomaly made me look into the
semantic reason for the use of the plural qrati rather than the
singular qorti even though people refer to this building by the latter
nomenclature. In my opinion, the use of the plural conveys an
older idea when Malta had a multi-court system.
In this paper, I shall be looking at the Court of the
Inquisition in Malta and how it administered justice during the
early modern period. I want to state from the onset that I am not a
juristic scholar by profession. My training is that of a historian.
Therefore, in this paper, I shall be analyzing the development of
this tribunal between 1530 and 1798, that is, during the period
when the Island was ruled by the Order of Saint John. Most of the
observations that I shall be making on this tribunal are based on
pragmatic observations that I have made on analyzing the different
trials or processi of criminal justice judged by the Inquisition. I
want to state very clearly that the reason for my analysis of these
processi is to gather information to build the social framework of
Maltese society during early modern times. However, studying
these trials and other court records belonging to other
Ecclesiastical Courts in Malta, I noted the different courts that
existed on the Island and the different functions that these courts
had in Malta.
II. TRIBUNALS
Already during medieval times, Malta had more than one
judicial tribunal functioning on the Island. There was the Tribunal
of the Church as well as the Tribunal of the State. Both had civil
and criminal roles. Furthermore, the secular arm had more than one
tribunal. There was a court in Malta and another in Gozo; both
administering civil and criminal justice independently. The
Maltese tribunal had its seat at Mdina whilst that of Gozo was
situated at the Castello. From 1184, with the setting up of the
Inquisition Tribunal in Sicily, Malta would begin to experience a
new judicial system.
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The Inquisition in Sicily was administered directly by the
Dominican Order. It was the duty of the Sicilian General Inquisitor
to appoint pro-Inquisitors to travel to those areas where the need
was felt, or a request was made, for their presence. Thus, this
Medieval Inquisition lacked a formal seat but relied on the figure
of a peripatetic judge who began investigating cases according to
the exigencies of the moment. Therefore, the figure of this
Inquisitor was more of a prosecuting magistrate rather than a judge
who had the faculty to investigate and pass sentences.
Local records never speak about the presence of an
Inquisitor in Malta throughout the medieval period. Whenever the
need for an Inquisitor was felt, a pro-Inquisitor was sent over to
Malta. During this period, it is very difficult to differentiate
between those cases that fell directly under the Inquisition and
those related to the Ecclesiastical Tribunal led by the Bishop. The
reason for this mix-up is related to the nature of the Medieval
Inquisition itself. The local Bishop, more often than not, assumed a
dual role. He could act as Bishop or as Inquisitor depending on the
nature of the case. Bishops were given a power of attorney by the
General Inquisitor in Sicily to investigate cases related to the Faith.
To complicate matters further, more often than not, the Bishop was
absent from Malta.
The surviving documents of court cases before the
Ecclesiastical Tribunal show that this court mainly dealt with
various cases of a domestic nature, such as requests from married
couples to be granted divorce, nuns asking for dispensations to
leave the convent, other cases related to the administration of
church property, and issues related to aspects of authority between
the Governing body in Malta and the Church. 1 These matters fell
under the sole prerogative of the Ecclesiastical Court. Then, there
were the cases of ecclesiastics who committed serious crimes and
even though their crime was not of a religious or criminal nature,
they were still dealt with by the Bishop. Lay people had their own
tribunals. They were prosecuted by the tribunals of the Università,
which in medieval times was the governing body in Malta.
However, the Ecclesiastical Court had the prerogative over cases
1. ALEXANDER BONNICI, 1 STORJA TA’ L-INKIŻIZZJONI TA’ MALTA 33
(Rabat, Malta, 1990-1994).
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of marriage, such as separation, annulment of betrothals and
permission to foreigners to marry after undergoing through what
was known as the Status Liberi proceeding. Such prerogative
remained in the hands of the Bishop even after there was a
separation of roles and an Inquisitor began to be appointed for
Malta.
With the arrival of the Order of Saint John in 1530, Malta
would experience changes. At first, the legal changes were few
except that the Knights now became practically responsible for the
local lay courts. The magistrates and judges had to pledge their
loyalty to these new rulers and immediately, the judges
experienced a sense of limitation in their power. While, in
medieval times, their power did not cover ecclesiastics, now such a
limitation was extended to the members of the Order of Saint John;
they too began to enjoy total immunity from the local courts.
Instead, the Grand Master set up his own courts where Knights and
other members of the Order could submit their complaints, whether
civil or ecclesiastical.
While Malta was undergoing these changes, new
developments were taking place in the field of the judiciary on the
international scene which would have a direct influence on Malta.
As part of the process of Catholic reform taking place in the
sixteenth century, the Papacy decided to overhaul the structure of
the Church’s Medieval Inquisition. Today, the word Inquisition
carries a very negative semantic meaning. It stands for torture,
corruption and utter disregard for human rights. However, these
bad attributes are in part the result of a negative literature that has
been produced about the subject; the result of a political stratagem
aimed at putting the Catholic Church in a bad light. While the
responsibilities of this Tribunal are not doubted, it is also an
undeniable fact that this system was supported and used by the
secular State and that the methods of investigation adopted by this
Tribunal were no different to those of other judicial instruments
that were being applied in the rest of Europe. Perhaps, in
comparison with those of the secular powers, the system of
procedure of the Roman Inquisition was fairer and more humane.
A semantic analysis of the word inquisition shows that it
derives from the Latin work “inquisere” which had a very simple
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judicial meaning to investigate. 2 However, as early as the year 884,
this Latin word acquires the meaning of persecution. Ironically
enough, the stimulus for this legal imposition did not come from
the Church or the Papacy, but from what may today be termed the
Secular State. It was Emperor Charles II who admonished his
Bishops to be vigilant over their subjects and obey his orders.
Then, in 1184, Pope Lucius III set up the Tribunal of the
Inquisition through the famous (or now infamous) decree Ad
Abolendam. It was intended as a temporary deed, but in judicial
systems, temporary measurements have the habit of becoming
permanent structures. As already explained, this medieval
Inquisition functioned more as an ad hoc tribunal, with a
peripatetic judge who moved from one diocese to the next
according to the exigencies of the day.
The next important development was the creation of the so
called Spanish Inquisition. Due to the practices adopted, including
the indiscriminate use of torture, it has become the subject of a
number of studies. Torture was not only applied to extract
confessions but once a death sentence was passed, extreme torture
was used to increase the suffering of the condemned. In 1932,
Carlo Havas contributed an important study on the cruel
investigative methods applied by the Spanish Inquisition.3
However, closer to our times, the political role of the Tribunal is
being revised and re-evaluated through the works of Henry
Kamen. 4
In 1542, Paul III began a long process of reform of the
whole system through the bull licet ab initio. The Roman Catholic
Inquisition was established. In principle, it followed the medieval
model with the difference that it had to have a permanent seat
whilst the Inquisitor was always accountable to his superiors in
Rome. At first, Diocesan Bishops began to be entrusted with the
dual role, that of a Bishop and of an Inquisitor. However, this new
system also envisaged the appointment of the specific figure of the
Inquisitor who could be totally independent of the Diocesan
Bishop.
2. Id. at 17.
3. CARLO HAVAS, STORIA DELL’INQUISITIONE (Odoya, 2010) (1932).
4. See HENRY KAMEN, THE SPANISH INQUISITION: A HISTORICAL REVISION
(1997).
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In this reform, the inquisitorial judges were specifically
instructed to show moderation and to treat all strata of society
equally. 5 The condemned was given the right of appeal to Rome
from a sentence handed down.
Soon Malta would feel the effect of this reform. In 1558,
Paul IV sent an Apostolic Commissioner, Fra Angelo from
Cremona, to help the resident Bishop investigate and fight heresy.
Thus, the role of the Inquisitor was envisaged as a sort of
investigating magistrate rather than a neutral judge who hears and
collects evidence. Once Fra Angelo returned to Rome, he made a
report wherein he recommended the need of the presence of a
resident inquisitor in Malta.
At first, it was decided that Malta‘s Bishop would be given
the added responsibility of Inquisitor besides his other duties. In
other words, Rome was confirming the medieval vestiges that the
local Bishop might still have had while rekindling any defunct
judicial power. Thus, in 1561, Rome decided to set up a permanent
Tribunal of the Inquisition in Malta. 6 The resident Bishop
Domenico Cubelles (1540-1566) was appointed Inquisitor.
For less clear reasons, the Bishop took over a year to act on
the Papal Ordinance. Perhaps, such a delay demonstrates the
resistance put up by the Knights towards instituting this Tribunal.
In fact, the Tribunal of the Inquisition would become a cause of
contention. Between June 16-19, 1562, the Bishop assembled
Grand Master Jean Parisot de La Valette (1557-1568), the Council
of the Order, the Conventual Chaplains, priests and friars and
officially proclaimed the setting up of the Tribunal of the
Inquisition in Malta. 7 On their part, the Grand Master and the
Council discussed the setting up of this new Tribunal at their
Council meeting on July 25, 1562. The seventeenth-century
Inquisition expert Sebastianus Salelles wrote about this dispute that
this was the first and last time that a Grand Master of the Order
would attend a sitting or a ceremony presided by the Inquisitor.
Future Grand Masters expected the Inquisitor to call on them as
Head of the Islands without expecting them to reciprocate.
5. Id. at 41.
6. Id. at 38.
7. Id. at 46.
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There is no doubt that Bishop Cubelles had no clear
guidance as to how to operate. Rules of procedure had not yet been
established. He literally administered this Tribunal by trial and
error. On one hand, he relied on instructions and outside help and
on the other hand, he realized that this Tribunal had to be governed
on the principle of case-law. Case-law becomes an important
aspect of this Tribunal, and once praxis was established it would
become difficult, if not impossible, to change. For this reason, the
Bishop was given an assistant. The first one was Dominican
Theologian, Tommaso de Vio but this was not enough and soon a
pool of officials began to be recruited to support the trial system of
the Inquisition. There should be no doubt that Bishop Cubelles
wanted to create a Tribunal for the Inquisition independent from
the ecclesiastical one even though he presided over both. Probably,
the same court room was used, but both courts had a separate
administration.
The Tribunal of the Inquisition was suspended during the
period of the Ottoman Siege of Malta of 1565. The theologian de
Vio left the Island, most probably out of fear, after the news
announcing an impending siege of Malta was received. The
suspension of office was so quick that there was not even time to
pay the officials of the Tribunal.
With the death of Bishop Domenico Cubelles, in 1566, the
occasion arose for serious efforts to be made by the Order of Saint
John to curtail the authority of the Court of the Inquisition on the
Island. For a long period the Island remained without a Bishop. It
was only in 1572, that the Grand Prior of the Knights, Martin
Rojas de Portalrubio was appointed Bishop. The Grand Master and
the Knights’ Council did their utmost to remove the prerogative of
Inquisitor from the Bishop’s portfolio. 8 His inquisitorial power
was considered a threat to their authority. Their efforts were not in
vain. Starting in 1575, Rome separated the role of Bishop from that
of Inquisitor. Two different courts were set up administered by two
different persons. The Holy See began to send to Malta a resident
Inquisitor. Besides being an Inquisitor, the appointee was given the
added administrative duty of Apostolic Delegate, which was a
lower rank than a Nuncio.
8. Id. at 54.
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The Knights immediately responded and showed their
appreciation by offering the Inquisition a palace in Birgu which
until then had been used as the seat of the civil and criminal court,
which, in the meantime, was moved to the new capital city of
Valletta. The Roman Catholic Inquisition unconditionally accepted
this offer.
Therefore, Malta ended up with three judicial authorities,
all having their own independent courts of justice. In terms of
hierarchy, the Court of the Inquisitor ranked third; second was the
Bishop, whilst the Grand Master was the Supreme Primate. In
practice, the situation would soon appear to be very different for
the Court of the Inquisition, through its direct link with Rome,
began to have the upper hand and be shown the highest respect
from the Maltese people.
In reality, the Inquisition ended up with two seats in Malta.
The first was in Birgu and generally dealt with cases involving
Maltese residents. Due to geographical reasons, the Inquisition felt
the need to have a separate court in Gozo. Thus, an assistant was
appointed for Gozo. Normally, the person chosen was a resident
from Gozo who only dealt with those cases that fell under the
jurisdiction of the Inquisition, concerning residents from this
island.
The Lay Court had three seats for the administration of
criminal justice. There was the court, known as Castellania, which
was situated in Valletta. It judged religious crimes committed by
residents from Valletta, as well as its suburb Floriana together with
the three cities, Senglea, Bormla and Birgu and the surrounding
environs. Mdina and Rabat and the neighbouring villages were
looked after by another court, locally known as that of Captain of
the Rod. The judge was always Maltese. Gozo had its distinct
court. It was presided by the Governor of the Island, and was
assisted by an assessor.
Malta’s thriving maritime trade required the setting up of a
special court that dealt with cases of corsairing and other maritime
disputes. For this reason, the Order set up the Tribunale degli
Armamenti first in 1605 and the Consolato del Mare later in 1697;
they were completely an independent courts. Commercial cases
were decided through another court structure. There was the
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Camera di Commercio, composed of an assessor and merchants to
deal with cases of a business and commercial nature.
Lay civil justice was administered through three private
auditors appointed by the Grand Master. They judged civil cases at
the first instance. Appeal was possible and this was done in front
of the Auditor of the Grand Master. Finally, there was a sort of a
family judge to preside over cases of a household nature, such as
cases concerning rent. For this reason, the judge was known as a
Home Judge. 9
The Inquisition expresses a high esteem regarding the
Maltese Civil Courts in particular how they operated in the second
half of the eighteenth century. On July 21, 1777, Inquisitor
Antonio Felice Zondadari (1777-1785) wrote that the sentences
handed down by the Maltese Civil Court are essentially just.
However, he had reservations about the training of the local
advocates. The advocates and the officials of the Civil Courts were
all Maltese, some of whom had studied abroad. However, for
Zondardari, some of the advocates were not sufficiently prepared,
with the result that one had to be extremely vigilant to ensure that
the correct court procedure was being employed. In case someone
felt aggrevied by a sentence or a decision of the Civil Court, as a
remedy, he could petition the Grand Master for redress. Grand
Master Emmanuel De Rohan Polduc (1775-1796), for example,
used to give particular attention to these petitions and used to
appoint commissioners to investigate the cases.
III. THE DUTIES OF THE INQUISITION
The first obligation of the Inquisition was to safeguard the
purity of the Catholic Faith and maintain obedience to the Holy
See. 10 This was done by being vigilant against heresy, polygamy,
solicitation during confession, apostasy and superstition or better
still magic. Swearing was judged by this Office as another form of
heresy, while defamation was considered the same as swearing and
was therefore judged by this Office. 11 The non-observance of
9. 3 BONNICI, supra note 1, at 439.
10. ELINA GUGLIUZZO, IN VESTE DEVOTA, LE CONFRATERNITE DI MALTA IN
ETÀ MODERNA 85 (Rubbettino ed. 2009).
11. Id. at 84.
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abstaining from eating meat on Wednesdays and Fridays as well as
throughout Lent was considered a crime that undermined the purity
of the Faith. 12 Whilst circumcision was the hallmark that singled
out a person as a Jew or Muslim during this period, abstinence
distinguished a Catholic from other faiths.
Whatever a person’s position in society was, by
contravening one of the briefs that fell under the jurisdiction of the
Inquisition, he or she became liable to prosecution. Not even the
Knights or the Bishop were immune from the Inquisition’s
jurisdiction. This was considered by the Knights extremely
dangerous. Besides, there was the privilege of immunity granted to
the members of the Inquisitor’s retinue. They too enjoyed the
privilege or immunity of not being prosecuted by any other court
in Malta, even those who were not directly related to religion and
therefore in normal circumstances did not fall under the
competence of the Inquisition. In case of civil or other criminal
infractions they would still be judged by the Inquisition.
The Inquisitors observed two particular characteristics in
Malta. The first one was the risk of apostasy. This was a cause of
grave concern due to the presence of Jews and Muslims and the
contact that the Maltese had with North Africa and the Orient. The
second one was a tendency, among the Maltese, to tell fat lies.
They had no scruples about spreading false information to taint the
names of honest people. 13 While these were the cause of moral
concern, what created the biggest political concern was the issue of
heresy as it became the bone of contention between the Inquisition
and the Knights.
This was one of the few responsibilities which directly
affected them and made them liable to prosecution. In fact, the
Inquisitor could judge the Knights on two counts. In cases where
they committed acts against the Faith and when they attacked any
of their dependents. 14 Both were highly contentious. With regard
to the first, it was an open secret that a number of Knights were
attracted to the teachings of Luther and other protestant reformers.
Some even began to give protection to foreign individuals who
12. 1 BONNICI, supra note 1, at 214.
13. GUGLIUZZO, supra note 10, at 93.
14. 1 BONNICI, supra note 1, at 156.
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happened to be in Malta and expressed diverse religious feelings
which went against the official teachings of the Church. For
example, some French Huguenots in Malta found asylum and
support from French Knights. 15 Thus, they were liable to be
prosecuted by the Inquisition. The second point was even more
disturbing since it undermined the aristocratic Knights’ authority.
Most, if not all the men in the Inquisitor’s entourage, were
Maltese and the Knights in Malta were losing their political edge
to the Inquisition which was being run by the locals. While the
local courts did not have any political will power to proceed
against a Knight, in cases of a criminal act against a local who
happened to belong to the entourage of the Inquisition, the entire
judicial system was being turned upside down. Moreover, the
Inquisitor began to surround himself with a number of consultants,
most of whom happened to be locals.
This situation began to cause tension. The Order had the
tendency to back the immunity of its members and at times would
even use force against the Inquisitor’s agents who attempted to
arrest Knights who were accused of heresy and were being
summoned to appear before the Inquisition. This remained a bone
of contention throughout their stay in Malta. Under such
circumstances, one understands why the Knights did all in their
power not to fall under the Inquisition and when this became
unavoidable, they claimed that they ought to be treated differently
to the rest of the population. 16
Each time they felt there was undue interference from the
Inquisitor on matters which they considered an internal affair, the
Knights lodged a protest against the Inquisition to the Pope’s
Secretary of State through their ambassador in Rome. 17 However,
the Papacy, as expected, tended to support the Inquisitor. 18
However, the Inquisitor’s hands were tied. He could not
enter into open conflict with the Grand Master. More often than
not, he needed the latter’s help to execute particular sentences
where force was required to execute an order, including those that

15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 151.
1 BONNICI, supra note 1, at 120.
GUGLIUZZO, supra note 10, at 91.
Id. at 92.
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did not involve members of the Order. 19 The Grand Master had to
be kept informed about the outcome of cases where the punishment
entailed the assistance of the Secular State such as executing
capital punishment. The Inquisitor was bound to personally call on
the Grand Master and present him the relevant information about
the case. Confidentiality was necessary in these cases since the
Inquisitor was bound and had to restrain from making references or
revealing the names of the witnesses. 20
It was within such a climate that a series of written and
unwritten rules began to take hold and regulate the behaviour of
the Inquisition and the procedure to be adopted in such cases. First
of all, the Grand Master obtained the right to be informed
beforehand whenever one of his members was going to be judged
by the Inquisition. The Grand Master judged each and every case
according to its own merits and when it was found that the
indicated facts did not fall within the jurisdiction of the Inquisition,
the latter’s role became that of a mediator. On the other hand if it
was ascertained that the accusations were the competence of the
Inquisition, then the Grand Master was to be kept informed of the
outcome. 21 To further strengthen the role of the Grand Master, the
Order even acquired the right to be represented on the Tribunal by
the Grand Master together with the Grand Prior and the ViceChancellor. 22 Yet, these measures created more problems than they
solved.
Elina Gugliuzzo in her book In Veste Devota, 23 observes
this situation. She rightly states that the fact that the Knights could
not participate in the court proceedings as extremely humiliating to
the extent that the Order began to appeal to the Pope, the Emperor
of Germany and the Kings of Spain and Sicily for help. But each
time, the Knights failed to receive a satisfactory answer or any
support. The Knights qualified the Inquisitor as “nearly a
monarch” due to the power vested on him by the Papacy. On their
part, the Inquisitors began to refuse to go to the Palace of the
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

3 BONNICI, supra 1, at 127.
Id. at 81.
Id.
Id. at 47.
GUGLIUZZO, supra note 10.
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Grand Master to hold audiences there. The Knights reacted by not
accepting to attend the court cases in Birgu. 24 A status quo was
reached. The Grand Master sought to bypass the issue of protocol,
by appointing a high ranking member of the Order, usually a
Grand Cross, to represent him on the Tribunal. 25 Yet, this did not
solve matters as even the Grand Crosses began to refuse to attend
in Birgu. The reaction of the local Inquisitors was very clear. They
began to hold their trials in Birgu without the presence of the
Knights. 26 This permitted the Inquisitor to continue hearing court
cases against the Knights to the extent that by the time of Inquisitor
Evangelista Carbonese (1608-1614), the right of the Knights’
dignitaries to sit on the Tribunal was considered obsolete.
One has to admit that it was not easy for the Inquisition to
proceed against members of the Order; it was always an uphill
struggle, primarily, because the Inquisition did not enjoy full legal
freedom to proceed against the Knights or their servants. 27 The
Grand Master’s presence meant that the Order had more than a
passive say on the proceedings, 28 whilst the Knights sitting on the
Tribunal tended to favour more the accused Knight rather than the
course of Inquisitorial justice. 29 The said issue of protocol
facilitated matters for the Inquisition to get rid of the incumbent
Knights.
From 1670 onwards, an agreement was reached that in
cases involving patentees of the Inquisition who were harassed or
had harassed members of the Order, the accused would be judged
by a combined court made up of the Inquisition and members from
the Order of Saint John.30
IV. THE AREAS OF COMPETENCE
The relationship of the Inquisition with the Bishop was also
another bone of contention. It was not a rare instance that a Bishop
felt that an Inquisitor was interfering in the diocese’s internal
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

GUGLIUZZO, supra note 10, at 91.
1 BONNICI, supra note 1, at 124.
GUGLIUZZO, supra note 10, at 91.
1 BONNICI, supra note 1, at 120.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 171.
Id. at 81.
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affairs. 31 Sometimes, the situation became even more complicated
for the Bishop’s court did not always see eye to eye with the Grand
Master. 32 The Knights were sometimes accused of being enemies
of the priests. 33 Like the Inquisitor, the Bishop had his own retinue
which, besides all the members of the clergy and even individuals
taking minor orders, included a number of patentees and lay
staff. 34 However, there was one cardinal difference. If any one of
the Bishop’s patentees or ecclesiastical members erred against a
principle of Faith or offended the Inquisition he became subject of
scrutiny by the Inquisition and not the Bishop. Unlike the Knights
of Saint John, the local Bishop was not given the right to judge
members of his retinue in partnership with the Inquisitor. 35
The right of ecclesiastical immunity became a contentious
issue between the local Curia, the Inquisition and the Grand
Master. Immunity was a hot issue but in this case, the Bishop had
the upper hand. Both the Grand Master and the Inquisition sought
to limit the Bishop’s rights in this respect. Grand Master Jean De
Lascaris Castellar (1636-1657) for example, put pressure on
Inquisitor Antonio Pignatelli (1646-1649) to reduce the number of
churches that enjoyed ecclesiastical immunity. The Grand Master
wanted to reserve this privilege only for parish churches. The
strong objection came from the Congregation of Immunity in
Rome. Even the Inquisition could not infringe so easily upon such
an ecclesiastical immunity. In fact, victims of the Inquisition could
seek the protection of this immunity for any crimes they may have
committed against the Holy Office and the Inquisition had no right
to arrest them unless the guilt was related to heresy. Even escaped
convicts of the Inquisition, who sought refuge in churches, could
not be arrested by the soldiers of the Holy Office, unless the guilt
was not related to heresy. 36
The judicial structure of the ecclesiastical world in Malta
became even more complicated with the presence of Religious
Orders. They enjoyed a certain amount of immunity and
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 206.
GUGLIAZZO, supra note 10, at 92.
Id. (citing 1 BONNICI, supra note 1).
1 BONNICI, supra note 1, at 124.
Id. at 120.
Id. at 296.
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irregularities within the community could only be judged by their
Superior General. 37 However, sometimes, the line of separation
was not always clear and there were cases which led to
contestation between the Religious Orders and the Inquisition over
which of the two had the right to judge an erring brother. 38
The cause of contention, with the Knights first and with the
Bishop and Religious Orders afterwards, derived from the fact that
the Inquisition was given the upper hand by Rome in any issue that
regarded matters of Faith. This explains why a number of Maltese,
including ecclesiastics began to seek the political coverage of this
office by becoming associated with the Inquisition. They began to
recognize in this institution a powerful body that could offer them
protection.
Gugliazzo rightly observes that a number of ecclesiastics,
priests and friars, did their utmost to obtain positions with the
Tribunal of the Inquisition, in particular as consultants to the
Inquisitor. Collaboration with the Inquisition gave them the right to
be exempted from both the jurisdiction of the Grand Master as well
as the Bishop’s. Even lay people sought to get such an exemption
by becoming “patentati” of the Inquisitor. One way of becoming a
“patentato” was by donating a piece of land to the Inquisition, but
this donation was subject to two conditions: that from that donation
they got an annual income and that they were appointed or
included amongst the protégés of the Inquisition. 39
The Order of Saint John also had a section to which
members from Maltese society were admitted. Adult male
members were allowed to become priests within the ranks of
Conventual Chaplains. Consequently, they enjoyed the right of
exemption from being judged by other bodies such as the
Inquisition and the Bishop and could only be prosecuted by the
internal tribunal of the Order, represented by the Hospitaller’s
Grand Council. The Inquisitor had difficulty prosecuting them, as
they came under a special criminal code which made it problematic
for the Inquisition to charge them since they enjoyed the same
legal immunity as the Knights.
37. GUGLIAZZO, supra 10, at 83.
38. 1 BONNICI, supra note 1, at 165.
39. GUGLIAZZO, supra note 10, at 76-77.
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Due to these complicated legal structures, it was often
thought that the Maltese suffered most as a result of a hostility that
was so profoundly rooted amidst these three Authorities. If the
Bishop or the Inquisitor decided to take a Maltese under his
protection making him one of his patentees they risked persecution
from the Civil Authorities. The Grand Master greatly resented
seeing most of the able-bodied Maltese escape his jurisdiction to
pass over to the other authorities on the Island. 40
Yet, in reading the historical documentation and
Inquisitorial proceedings, a different situation emerges. Such a
fragmental judicial system turned out to be beneficial for the
Maltese since it gave them the chance to seek protection in case
they wanted to oppose one of these institutions. The office of the
Inquisitor was the strongest. That of the Bishop was politically
slightly weaker, even if in theory, the Bishop was the second most
important person in Malta after the Grand Master. The Grand
Master came third. First of all, no lay member was admitted within
the ranks of the Order even if the Order sought to retaliate by
creating a new noble class on the Island which owes the origins of
its titles to the Knights.
Thus, it was through the office of the Inquisitor that the
Maltese began to voice the first signs of protest, expressing
disagreement in writing against the Order’s rule. 41 It should be
noted that at this period, such literature was punishable by death.
Yet there were good reasons for protest. The behaviour of the
Knights towards the Maltese was not at all exemplary. One
particular traveller wrote: “These people are extremely devout. If
only we could say the same things about the Knights.” 42
Once, two Knights assaulted a Maltese who formed part of
the Inquisitor’s staff and died as a result of the attack. One may
rest assured that had this assault been carried out in a different
context, the Maltese victim would not have found any form of
solidarity or justice but, being under the umbrella of the

40. Id. at 83.
41. Godfrey Wettinger, Early Maltese Popular Attitudes to the Government
of the Order of St. John, 6 MELITA HISTORICA 255-278 (1974).
42. GUGLIAZZO, supra note 10, at 89.
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Inquisition, the murder could not pass unnoticed. The two Knights
were arrested, prosecuted and both were condemned to death. 43
However, the Inquisition’s power to use the death penalty
was already being curtailed in the seventeenth century. Many
decades before, such a position was proposed by the Neapolitan
jurist Pietro Giannone. By 1670, the power of the Inquisitor in
criminal cases, in particular his power to condemn people to death,
was diminished by Pope Clement X. 44
Therefore, the affirmation that the Inquisition in Malta had
instilled an atmosphere of fear, or to be exact, created a climate
that Bartolomé Bennassar called the pédagogie de la peur should
be considered as historically unproven. The local population
supported the system and a proof of this is that a negative
collective memory towards this Tribunal does not exist in Malta.
The conclusion made that there was in Malta such “pedagogy of
fear” came as a result of the number of accusations and autoaccusations made to this Tribunal. 45
However, the institution that truly carried a grudge and was
afraid of the Inquisition was the Order of Saint John. Its members
were those who really hated it as it was the only power in Malta
that could exercise pressure and in some way restrain it. It was for
this reason, according to Inquisitor Ludovico Gaultierio Gualtieri
(1739-1743), that the Knights of Saint John always sought to
demean the tribunal of the Inquisition. 46 Gaultieri was not the sole
Inquisitor to express such views. Manciforte had a similar opinion.
“This is only tribunal of the Inquisition that . . . helps the poor
Maltese, subject greatly suppressed by the Order.” 47 On their part,
it was not rare that the Roman Inquisition in Malta performed acts
of charity. In 1684, it distributed money to the poor of the Island. 48
Acquaviva asked his superiors to allow him to use money of the
Tribunal to help poor and persons in need. 49

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

1 BONNICI, supra note 1, at 187-188.
Id. at 188.
GUGLIAZZO, supra note 10, at 86.
3 BONNICI, supra note 1, at 146.
Id. at 360.
2 BONNICI, supra note 1, at 228.
Id. at 258.
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V. THE PROCEDURE
The method of procedure at the Inquisitors’ court was
different from the rest of the courts present in Malta at the time.
Foremost, the Inquisitor had the right to renounce to hear or
preside over a sitting because he did not approve of, or had
reservations about, the case. This was mostly relevant in relation to
civil cases. In these cases, he was obliged first to consult his
superiors. 50 Then, any pending cases, both civil and criminal, were
continued by succeeding appointees. 51
Definitely, the presence of this Tribunal introduced a new
method as to how criminal justice was to be administered.
Prosecution only began after presentation of a denunciation or
report. In other words, somebody needed to make a report before
inquisitorial procedures could begin. In this area, the system was
not much different from the procedures used in the Lay Courts. In
these courts too, proceedings began only if someone had lodged a
report against someone else for some type of criminal offence or
other. However, here lay the first major difference. In the Lay
Courts, any person lodging a report first needed to have proof in
hand as to the accusations he or she was making. The Inquisition’s
system was different. Anyone could report somebody even on
mere supposition or suspicion. It was then the duty of the
Inquisitor to establish whether the report was true or not. The
individual making the accusation was protected by anonymity.
Therefore, the accused would never get to know who betrayed him.
Even the witnesses were kept secret. The accused would not know
who the witnesses testifying against him were. Then, there was a
second aspect. The accused had the right to take the witness stand.
The fact that the accused could take the witness stand brought
about changes in the question of anonymity of the accusers. The
Inquisitor could reveal the persons testifying against an accused
should the need arise and confront the accused with those
testifying against him. This had its positive and negative aspects as
in the Secular Criminal Courts; the accused had no right to give

50. 3 BONNICI, supra note 1, at 124.
51. 2 BONNICI, supra note 1, at 202.
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testimony until 1909. 52 The Inquisition avoided direct
confrontation. Only in rare instances did such confrontation take
place, 53 and only if, in giving evidence, the discrepancy was so
great as to be unable to establish who was saying the truth.
The reason for discouraging such a procedure was very
simple. It was aimed at helping and encouraging people, even from
the lower classes of society, to come forward and denounce their
superiors. There was the real risk that a person, socially inferior,
would feel threatened and extremely uncomfortable if he was to be
asked to testify against his superiors or confront someone who was
his peer. 54 The system worked. Instances exist where slaves
reported their masters to the Inquisition such as when Turkish
slaves did so because they were denied the prescribed liberty they
were entitled to. 55
Yet, this system too had its risks. For this reason, even in
this area, protective measures began to be taken to avoid the
beginning of proceedings against somebody on the simple pretext
of suspicion, in particular in the area of solicitation during
Confession. This turned out to be one of the most contentious
issues of the Inquisition. Typically, accusations were launched by
women who felt that they had been sexually harassed by priests
during Confession. Touching the shoulder or hand of a woman at
this period was tantamount to harassment. Thus, to avoid cases
where accusations were lodged more out of revenge than for any
other motive, proceedings only began if the Inquisition received
more than one report against the priest. 56 The second innovative
aspect of this Court was the praxis to accept and encourage autodenunciations. Such a concept was also present in the Secular
Courts. The Inquisition expected that if a person made a mistake,
that same person would appear voluntarily before it to autoconfess. 57

52. Albert Ganado, Book Printed in Malta on the Sicilian Revolution of
1848, in MALTA AND MAZZINI, PROCEEDINGS OF HISTORY WEEK 2005 192
(Simon Mercieca ed., 2007).
53. 1 BONNICI, supra note 1, at 68.
54. Id. at 75.
55. Id. at 212.
56. Id. at 236.
57. Id. at 68.
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Thirdly, there was the possibility of appealing a sentence to
an external authority based in Rome. At the same time, the Roman
Church Authorities sought to check and counter-check the work of
the Inquisitor. For this reason, Rome requested the local Inquisitor
to gather as much information as possible. In case of missing
information, Rome reserved the right to ask for such information
before proceeding to pronounce itself on the case. Fourthly, the
Inquisitor was also given the right to consult with Rome during the
compilation of evidence to seek advice about procedure and
practice.
Denunciation followed an established protocol. It was made
in front of the Inquisitor, his assistant or assessor. The person who
made the denunciation had to take an oath that he or she was
denouncing somebody not out of hatred but as a result of religious
duty. He or she also had to give the exact circumstances of the
case, the place where the crime had occurred, its context and time.
If these were not clear, questions were put by the Inquisition to
establish these facts. The Inquisition had to ask whether there were
others who knew about the fact. The accuser had to be asked
whether he had any reason to hate the person that he was
accusing. 58
A. Secrecy
The person who made the denunciation was then bound by
an oath of secrecy. The principle of secrecy was paramount. No
one could speak out, not even the Inquisitor. Even the files were
secret and were kept in a special place under lock and key.
Once a report was received, irrespective of whether it was
an auto-denunciation or not, the procedure was the same. In cases
where there was no suspicion of guilt, the case would stop there.
No one would get to know. The outcome was different when the
accusation held water. The accused would be informed and asked
to appear in front of the Inquisition. The first question the accused
would be asked was to list the persons whom he or she thought
hated him. It was after having done so that he or she was informed

58. Id. at 214.
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about the substance of the accusation. Then, the Inquisition had the
right to start questioning.
Afterwards, it would be the witnesses’ turn to appear before
the Inquisition. They were not called by the accused but were only
asked to appear at the behest of the Inquisitor. Even the Inquisitor
could not name witnesses arbitrarily. The Inquisitor could only ask
those individuals whose names were listed by the accuser or were
mentioned by the accused when listing down his enemies or during
investigation. In turn, if the witnesses mentioned other names that
were related to the investigation, these too could be asked to
appear in front of the Inquisition. Therefore the gathering of
witnesses took time and was not conditioned by the collation of
evidence by the prosecution or the response of the defense
advocate. There was no such division. The Tribunal and all the
convoked witnesses were expected to remain silent and maintain
secrecy on any denunciation made.
In cases of auto-denunciation, the procedure was shortened.
Witnesses were not called and the case was normally closed with
the usual admonition and penitence. If the person making the autodenunciation mentioned third parties, then the case protracted as
the Inquisitor would begin investigating. When auto-denunciation
was pronounced by a Knight, proceedings were even quicker as the
Inquisitor had no need to call other members of the Order or the
Grand Crosses to attend the hearing. 59
Secrecy protected the accused and, if innocent, he or she
was being spared adverse exposure. Today, we are witnessing in
our system public prosecution judgment by the media. Then, there
was the constant fear of mistakes, but this was in part
counterbalanced by giving the accused the faculty to initiate
proceedings against the members of the Tribunal in case of wrong
doing. 60
For this reason, through its history, the Inquisition resisted
all efforts from ruling Grand Masters to reveal the names of the
witnesses. In 1677, such type of pressure was extremely strong but

59. Id. at 214.
60. Id. at 128.
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Inquisitor Visconti objected and considered such a request and
procedure as a means to diminish freedom in court proceedings. 61
B. Torture
While the role and importance of the Tribunal was
underestimated due to the use of torture to obtain confessions, this
was a minor feature in the whole procedure. First of all, it should
be remembered that torture was not an exclusivity of the
Inquisition. It was used by the inquiring judges, including by the
Secular Courts. Perhaps, as Henry Kamen noted, 62 the use of
torture by the Inquisition was more a cause of controversy after
this office was abolished than when it was in operation.
First of all, as thoroughly bad and inhuman as it was,
torture was regulated and could not be arbitrarily applied by the
Inquisitor. It was only his absolute right, or that of the Assessor to
use torture in cases when there was strong suspicion that the
accused was lying to the court. Moreover, it was meant to be used
only in those proceedings arising from reports. Torture was not
supposed to be applied to those who appeared of their own free
will to make an auto-denunciation. 63
An Inquisitor could apply torture against anybody who was
being accused in front of him, irrespective of his rank or social
status. Ecclesiastics, for example, were tortured. 64 What he had to
ensure was that, when torture was applied, no extreme cruelty was
used. It was not considered a sign of good behavior by the Holy
Office in Rome. 65 In fact, the use of torture began to come under
the scrutiny of Rome.
Once the hearing of evidence ended, the Inquisition went
on to pass sentence. The accused had to listen to the sentence on
his knees with a lighted candle in his hand. However, only in cases
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

2 BONNICI, supra note 1, at 181.
KAMEN, supra note 4.188-192.
Id. at 159.
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Id. at 288.
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of being condemned was a sentence pronounced. Witnesses could
also be present for sentencing. 66 Otherwise the accused was set
free without any need of issuing a sentence. In case of guilt, there
was always a sentence of a spiritual nature which normally
included the obligation to go to Confession and receive Holy
Communion on at least the four principal feasts of the Church:
Christmas, Easter, Ascension of Christ and the Assumption of the
Virgin. There could also be corporal punishments, which could
include public flogging, sentencing to the galleys and, in extreme
cases, the death penalty. Corporal punishment was normally
executed by the Civil Justice. 67 In theory, the Holy Office in Rome
was against pecuniary punishment. Pecuniary punishments were
considered by Rome dangerous as they could give a bad name to
the Inquisition. Any pecuniary punishment needed first the
approval of Rome. 68
By the eighteenth century, public punishments fell out of
use and the execution of corporal punishment was done in private,
in the Inquisitorial prison and without disclosing it to the public. 69
C. Appeal
The Inquisition’s judgment was not final. Once a sentence
was pronounced the Inquisitor did not have the power to change it.
However, mechanisms of appeal where created which first of all
permitted the Inquisitor himself to change a sentence given by one
of his predecessors’ or even by himself, by first seeking consent
from his superiors in Rome. 70 More importantly, the accused
enjoyed the same right of appeal which he could file in two ways.
First, anyone who was condemned by the Inquisition in
Malta had the right to appeal to Rome to ask for a revision of the
sentence or request clemency. 71 This was an expensive procedure,
which only the rich could afford. This explains why this sort of
appeal was rare.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
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Id. at 225.
Id. at 196.
2 BONNICI, supra note 1, at 380.
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The second procedure was simpler and within the reach of
everybody. The condemned had only to wait for the appointment
of a new Inquisitor. There were a number of possibilities. The new
Inquisitor would be asked to re-open the case or make a plea for a
revision of the sentence to Rome or ask for clemency. 72 When one
considers that the length of service of an Inquisitor in Malta was
short–on average, he stayed on the Island for two and half years–an
appeal was extremely feasible. In all cases, the Inquisitor would
write to Rome. Rome’s reply was always the same irrespective of
whether the plea came directly from the accused or the Inquisitor.
The Holy Office in Rome considered the case on its own merits
and if there was a reason for a change in the sentence, the
Inquisitor would be informed accordingly and he would be given
the possibility to change the sentence. However, the final decision
was normally left to the Inquisitor’s discretion. 73 There were cases
when it was decided to absolve the accused or else the sentence
was commuted to a lighter one. 74 For example, the parish priest of
the village of Chircop was sent to prison in 1659 by the
Inquisition. He appealed to Rome, and Rome took his side and
wrote to the Inquisitor in Malta, Gerolomo Casanate (1658-1663),
giving him the faculty to commute the sentence. 75
The intervention of Rome was not just sought for the
revision of a sentence but also to supervise that the sentence was
being correctly executed. For example, sometimes prisoners
sentenced to the galleys continued to be kept at the oars despite the
fact that their term had expired. Thus, the prisoners used to appeal
to Rome to be liberated. For this reason, the local Inquisition
received warnings from Rome to monitor that the sentences
handed down by the Inquisition were properly executed by the
State within the terms of the sentence. 76
The procedure could take two different forms. The abuser
could be denounced directly to Rome or else, whenever the
presumed offended party did not possess such power, he had to

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
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wait for a new Inquisitor to be appointed before making a report. 77
Once, a jailer denounced an Inquisitor taking the opportunity of
doing so when there was a change in office and when the new
Inquisitor, Giovanni Ludovico Dell’Armi (1592-1595), arrived.
The Supreme Sacred Congregation of the Roman and
Universal Inquisition looked positively at the possibility of appeal
as it argued that appeal increased rather than decreased the good
name of the Inquisition. 78
D. Internal Mechanisms
The Inquisition’s system had a number of internal
mechanisms to auto-regulate itself to ensure that all was working
well. The idea that people in authority were immune by the mere
virtue of their position ceased to hold ground in the late sixteenth
century. The Inquisitor himself could be liable to investigation
following accusations made by his subalterns.
An Inquisitor could also risk censorship from Rome in
particular if he carried out an illegal arrest on an individual who
did not fall under his jurisdiction or the crime committed was not
within the competence of the Inquisition. Therefore, the Inquisitor
was also liable to be accused of abuse of power. 79
However, at the same time, in theory, he had power to
investigate both the Grand Master, who was the ultimate ruler of
Malta, and the Bishop. Such power was exercised in the sixteenth
century but would become ineffective in the following centuries.
During the time of Inquisitor Federico Cefalloto (1580-1583), both
the Grand Master and the Bishop were suspended from office.
The Grand Master was censored by his own Council but the
Bishop, Tommaso Gargallo (1578-1614) was first censored by
Inquisitor Cefallato after he refused to pay tithes to the Inquisitor.
Cefallato’s successor, Inquisitor Pier Francesco Costa (1583-1585)
would again suspend Gargallo after the latter performed acts of
barbarity in executing a warrant of arrest which led to the demise
of two Monsignors of the Cathedral and protected persons who
77. Id. at 137.
78. 2 BONNICI, supra note 1, at 193.
79. 1 BONNICI, supra note 1, at 194.
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assaulted the Assessor of the Inquisition. This was not the last time
that the Inquisition ended up investigating the actions of the local
Bishop. In the seventeenth century, Inquisitor Giulio Degli Oddi
(1655-1658) received instructions to be vigilant on Bishop Miguel
Jean Balaguer Camarasa (1635-1663) and on the local clergy. 80
Inquisitors were warned to scrupulously observe the rules of the
Inquisition unless they did not wish to be removed from office 81
and they had to defend all the Tribunal’s privileges. 82 They were
also warned by Rome not to gather information about cases which
did not fall under their jurisdiction. 83 The Inquisitors were asked to
follow the same praxis as their predecessors. Rome strongly
advised the Inquisition not to go back on decisions and decrees
issued in the past. 84
Each time an Inquisitor was appointed, a period of grace
was announced. The period could vary from 12 up to even 30
days 85 wherein the faithful were asked to denounce their
wrongdoings and having done so would be exempted from any
punishment from the Inquisition. 86 All the decrees of the
Inquisition, including the ones issued to announce the appointment
of a new Inquisitor, were to be read out in all the churches. 87
Finally, he enjoyed the faculty to issue a general pardon. 88
VI. THE STRUCTURE OF THE OFFICE OF THE INQUISITION
The office of the Church’s Inquisitor was a pyramidal
structure. The Inquisitor was always answerable to his superiors.
Up to 1575, the post of Inquisitor was filled by the local Bishop,
thus the Church continued to follow the medieval structure, but
after this date, this post was always occupied by a foreigner, often
of noble birth, who was appointed by Rome. The choice of a noble
person came naturally for Malta when one considers that Malta
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
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was run by an aristocratic Order. Besides, being an Inquisitor, the
person in this position was also appointed Apostolic Delegate. This
last appointment was only given to Inquisitors from 1575 onwards.
When this post was also linked to that of Bishop, he did not have
such a role. It became a normal praxis for Rome to give three
briefs to the person nominated Inquisitor in Malta, and before he
received them from the Secretary of State, he could not leave for
Malta. The first brief was that of Inquisitor, the second of
Apostolic Delegate and the third the right to judge criminal cases.
Once in Malta, he had to present these briefs to his staff as well as
to the Grand Master and the Bishop.
The history of the Malta’s Inquisition shows that the
persons appointed by Rome as Inquisitors always held a University
degree in Civil and Ecclesiastical law. Finally, all Inquisitors were
ecclesiastics but not necessarily priests. Some were simple clerics,
others were just priests and in one particular case, the Inquisitor
was consecrated Bishop in Malta. Eventually, this Inquisitor, by
the name of Fabio Chigi (1634-1639), became Pope Alexander
VII. When the office was held by a Bishop, the Bishop remained
an Inquisitor for life. When his appointment began to be made
directly by Rome, the term of office was definite. Young
ecclesiastics, sometimes in their early thirties, began to be
appointed Inquisitors and were normally kept in office for a few
years - on average two years - after which they would ask for a
transfer and obtained a promotion within the church hierarchy.
The second important person at the office of the Inquisition
was the Assessor. He acted as Vice-Inquisitor and could take over
the administration of the office in lieu of the Inquisitor, especially
during the transition period between the departure of one Inquisitor
and the appointment of the next. 89
In the early days of the Inquisition, the post of the Assessor
was not considered of great importance within the Tribunal. He
had the passive role of serving as a substitute to the Inquisitor
whenever the latter was unavailable. However, from 1610, the
Assessor began to have a more active role. He began to sit next to

89. Id. at 131.

476

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 4

the Inquisitor and share with him the responsibility of the
Tribunal. 90
The Assessor was practically always a Maltese. He could
be either an ecclesiastic or a lay person. The major academic
qualification for this post was a degree in jurisprudence. For this
reason, the choice originally fell on a lay advocate but later, for
practical purposes, an ecclesiastic began to be preferred for the
simple reason that when the Inquisitor left, he could run the office.
According to Canon Law, an Assessor could only run the Tribunal
office if he was an ecclesiastic. The person held this office
practically for life. 91
The Tribunal included the figure of the Promotore Fiscale.
He was the public prosecutor 92 and this post was always occupied
by a Maltese. 93 He gathered the denunciations and presented them
to the Inquisition. He led the prosecution and asked for the
condemnation of the accused according to the laws of the Church.
His assistant was known as sotto-Fiscale. This office was further
complemented with the post of the “istruttore.” He was responsible
to search for any missing evidence in the investigation of the case.
To a certain extent, he did the work that is nowadays carried out by
the police. These posts too were occupied by Maltese.
The Prosecutor’s office was counter-balanced by the post
of the Defense Advocate. He was known as the Advocate of the
Poor, as his services were used only by those who could not afford
a defense lawyer. Yet, unlike today, the presence of the Defense
Advocate was only required in those cases where a trial would be
held and could lead to the accused being condemned. In case of an
auto-denunciation, his presence was not requested. In these cases,
the sentence inflicted was always one of a spiritual nature and for
this reason his presence was not felt necessary. 94
Then, there were the Consultants. They were appointed to
give advice to the Inquisitor. 95 These were either local
ecclesiastics, that is, priests, friars or lay advocates. Even members
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
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of the Order, including Knights or Conventual Chaplains could be
enrolled in this post.96 There number was never less than four and
never more than eight. They were appointed for life and removed
only in case of incompetence in performing their duties, though
they could be asked to resign due to health reasons. The role of the
Consultant was a passive one as his main function in the Tribunal
was to give authoritative advice. As their counsel carried heavy
weight, in extreme situations, their role could switch to an active
one. The Inquisitorial procedures allowed them to participate
whenever the Inquisitor asked them to cast their vote in cases
where agreement about a case was not reached. Yet, their role
remained that of enlightened jurors. 97
The last authority of the Tribunal was the Chancellor. His
post was similar to that of the Registrar of the Court. This post was
occupied by a person who was authorized to work as a public
notary in Malta. He was responsible for safe-guarding the court
records, including each and every court case. 98 He was assisted by
clerks who sat in the court taking down the minutes and recording
the testimony given in court. The clerks could act as or be flanked
by interpreters.
The above constituted the core staff of the Inquisition. For
this reason, they had to take the oath of loyalty each time a new
Inquisitor was appointed. For this ceremony, the Vicar-General
was also invited to attend and he, too, took the oath of allegiance. 99
The Tribunal had the support of a full administrative staff. At the
head was the Depositario whose position was equivalent to the
present day Director of the Courts. He was the Accountant of the
Tribunal. He took care of all the payments, including the
Inquisitor’s salary. 100 There was also the spenditore. He was
always Maltese 101 and his role was that of a servant at the service
of the Inquisition acting as a sort of a court messenger with the

96. Id. at 205.
97. Id. at 181.
98. Id. at 180.
99. Id. at 310. The other members of the tribunal who took this oath, were
the chancellor, the assessor, the advocate of the poor, and the consultants of the
Inquisition.
100. Id. at 180.
101. 2 BONNICI, supra note 1, at 73.
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added responsibility to take care of the Inquisitor’s personal
affairs.
The Tribunal availed itself of the services of a medical
doctor, a jailor and a Captain to oversee the small force at the
service of the Holy Office. The doctor was needed first of all to
oversee the administration of torture to obtain a confession.
Secondly, the prison was within the same Tribunal and office of
the Inquisition. The Inquisitor lived in the same palace together
with his prisoners. Thus, a doctor could be needed for medical tests
and assistance to both the Inquisitor and his prisoners. The
presence of a prison within the palace walls brought the obvious
need for a jailor. The Inquisition had its own police or soldiers.
They fell under the command of the Captain of the Holy Office.
Unlike the Commissioner of Police in today’s society, he could
only act under the strict instructions of the Inquisitor. He could not
make arrests on mere suspicion. He had to have clear orders from
the Inquisitor. In other words, he could not act arbitrarily. Vestiges
of this system have remained in our present system, as in particular
instances, police inspectors have to request the permission of the
courts to make an arrest. Therefore, the authority of the Captain of
the Inquisition was only to execute a sentence. 102 On his part, as
was the custom at the time, he wore a chain of office or carried a
rod as a sign of authority. 103 The Inquisition’s officials were
limited to 15104 and had its own messengers. 105 The last position in
the palace of the Inquisition was that of the butler. Each and every
Inquisitor had a butler who took care of all the work related to the
administration of his palace and the household chores. 106
Other services engaged by the Tribunal of the Inquisition
were those of professional translators. Malta was extremely
cosmopolitan at the time, and people of different nationalities
appeared in front of the Inquisition. The official language of the
Inquisition was Latin and Italian but the accused could speak in his
own language, in which case there were interpreters who translated
everything into Italian. Even evidence given by the Maltese were
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
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translated into Italian. 107 In most cases, the post of interpreter was
occupied by friars. 108
At the turn of the seventeenth century a new figure was
introduced in the Tribunal. This was that of the Catechist whose
purpose was to guide sinners back onto the right Christian track. In
other words, they were appointed to teach Christian Doctrine to
those who were considered to have fallen into heresy. 109 These
Catechists were friars, and in most cases, they were either foreign
or locals trained in foreign languages so that they could be in a
position to teach foreigners who also had lapsed and needed to be
brought back into the Catholic fold. 110 Perhaps their position
would be equivalent today to that of a social worker, aimed at
helping social diverters to turn away from their devious social
habits.
The choice of staff was not to be conditioned by any sort of
recommendation. The Inquisitors were specifically instructed not
to accept recommendations or references from anybody. 111 Thus,
any letters of recommendation for any of the above posts was not
even considered. 112 For the same reason the Inquisitor was to
refuse any offer of gifts. More important, he had to lead an
exemplary life and be a guiding force to all his staff. 113
The Inquisitor had the right to create his own entourage
known as familiari of patentees of the Inquisition, and all were lay
people. 114 The number of familiari was fixed at 20. 115 Though
there were always attempts by the Inquisition to increase this
number, these requests were always turned down by Rome. 116 A
person who was a patentee of the Inquisition was literally in
possession of a document in which it was attested that only the
Inquisitor had judicial rights over him. 117 He had the right to show
it to any Authority on the Island in case of need, which practically
107.
108.
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meant when confronted with an arrest warrant. Married patentees
tried to extend this jurisdiction to the rest of the members of their
immediate family, that is, wife and unmarried children.
Finally, the Inquisition in Malta owned arable land which
was tilled by a number of peasants. The peasants working in the
Inquisitor’s fields began to be considered as part of the familiari of
the Inquisition 118 and ended up being given similar rights as the
patentati, 119 that is, they were excluded from prosecution by the
other judicial authorities present in Malta. The applicants for these
posts came from the best Maltese families. 120 At the same time, to
safeguard the integrity of this Tribunal, the respective officials
employed with the Inquisition had to be independent and not be
involved with any other Tribunal in Malta.
VII. CONCLUSION
Inquisitors were continuously reminded by Rome to carry
out their duties with a sense of charity and friendship and should
not feel that they were judges even if this was being asked of
them. 121 For this reason, Rome insisted repeatedly that the plaintiff
brought in before the Court had to be treated with charity and
justice. 122 At the same time, if somebody was condemned by the
Inquisition, such a sentence did not signify automatic social
exclusion and definitely it did not hinder social advancement or
promotion. 123 For these reasons, one can rightly conclude that the
Maltese, in general, were convinced that this Tribunal offered them
a sense of fair justice and it was, by far, more serious than the other
Tribunals operated by the State at that time. 124

118. Id. at 172.
119. Id. at 229.
120. Id. at 181.
121. Id. at 299.
122. Id. at 237.
123. Id. at 186. For example, Baldassare Cagliaris was condemned by the
Inquisition for showing lack of respect to the Inquistor’s familiari when he was
still Conventual Chaplain. This conviction did not stop him from making it to
the highest post in Malta, that of Archbishop of the Diocese.
124. Id. at 84.
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regulating liquidation of compensation (damages) under Maltese tort law
and examines whether or not compensation for moral damage is
compatible therewith. French law and Austrian law (being the main
sources of Article 1045) are analysed and contrasted with the
peculiarities of Maltese tort law whilst the motivations of the original
* This paper is based on the author’s LL.D. thesis entitled The Rationale
for Excluding Moral Damages from the Maltese Civil Code: A Historical and
Legal Investigation, University of Malta, 2008 (hereafter Excluding Moral
Damages). Reproduction of extracts from this paper is permitted provided that
clear acknowledgment is made of the author as the source. This paper elaborates
on the key points tackled in the presentation delivered by the author during the
Juris Diversitas Symposium on “Mediterranean Legal Hybridity” held at the
Old University in Valletta, Malta, June 12, 2010.
†
Associate, Mamo TCV Advocates, Malta.
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legislator (Sir Adriano Dingli) are also critically discussed. The paper
subsequently examines the dichotomy between responsibility in tort and
damages under Maltese tort law and concludes by analysing some
selected case law.

I. INTRODUCTION
Les larmes ne se monnaient pas goes one of the sayings for
rejecting what is known in civil law countries as dommage moral and in
common law countries as a “non-pecuniary loss” or a “non-economic
loss.” 1 If the loss is one which can be easily measurable in monetary
terms, almost all legal systems throughout the world agree that
compensation is due. Having said that, acceptance of “dommage moral”2
or “non-pecuniary loss” 3 is not universal. “Moral damage” is generally
understood to encompass the pain suffered by the victim or the victim’s
family for crimes or torts against the life, health, honesty, integrity or
emotional well-being of the victim and is generally difficult to calculate
in monetary terms. 4 Munkman refers to moral damage as including “pain
and suffering, both physical and mental; loss of the pleasures of life;
actual shortening of life; and at least in some cases, mere discomfort and
inconvenience . . . ” 5
In Malta, barring recent legislative proposals which might
introduce limited forms of compensation for moral damage in the
Maltese Civil Code in certain specific instances,6 and the presence of
such compensation scattered in specific branches of law,7 the core
provisions of Maltese tort law have never really developed beyond
certain basic principles introduced in the Nineteenth Century8 and to

1.
2.
3.
4.

“Tears do not permit calculation in money.”
As opposed to “dommage matériel.”
As opposed to “pecuniary losses.”
ROSA MARIA ABDELNOUR GRANADOS, LA RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL
DERIVADA DEL HECHO PUNIBLE 330-358 (Editorial Juricentro, 1984).
5. JOHN MUNKMAN, DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURIES AND DEATH 62
(1938).
6. Including in particular, Article 1046 of the Maltese Civil Code (which
is not discussed in this paper).
7. Namely: Human Rights cases, the Consumer Affairs Act (Chapter 378
of the Laws of Malta), the Press Act (Chapter 248 of the Laws of Malta), the
Promises of Marriage Law (Chapter 5 of the Laws of Malta), and the
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (Regulation) Act (Chapter 488 of
the Laws of Malta).
8. Which were in turn heavily reliant upon Roman law principles.
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date, claiming compensation for moral damage explicitly is seemingly
generally precluded. However, the question is whether or not there is
more to this issue than at first meets the eye.
The origins of Article 1045 9 of the Maltese Civil Code can be
traced back to Ordinance No. VII of 1868 10 which regulated delicts and
quasi-delicts. This was the work of Sir Adriano Dingli who was
appointed crown advocate general on December 27, 1853 and who was
tasked with the drafting of several Ordinances which would eventually
constitute the Maltese Civil Code. It is apparent that in drafting the
provisions regulating delicts and quasi-delicts (or torts and quasi-torts),
Dingli was greatly influenced by the Code Napoléon, but as shall be seen
below, this was not the only source used. 11
The Napoleonic Code or Code Napoléon was established under
Napoléon I. 12 It was drafted by a commission of four eminent jurists and
entered into force on March 21, 1804. The Code, with its stress on
clearly written and accessible law, was a major step in establishing the
rule of law and historians have called it “one of the few documents
which have influenced the whole world.” 13

9. At the time of writing, Article 1045 states as follows:
(1) The damage which is to be made good by the person
responsible in accordance with the foregoing provisions shall
consist in the actual loss which the act shall have directly
caused to the injured party, in the expenses which the latter
may have been compelled to incur in consequence of the
damage, in the loss of actual wages or other earnings, and in
the loss of future earnings arising from any permanent
incapacity, total or partial, which the act may have caused.
(2) The sum to be awarded in respect of such incapacity
shall be assessed by the Court, having regard to the
circumstances of the case, and, particularly, to the nature and
degree of incapacity caused, and to the condition of the injured
party.
10. “[E]nacted to amend and consolidate the laws concerning the rights
relative to property, and the different modes of acquiring and transmitting it.”
GEORGE ALFRED PAGE, A GUIDE TO THE LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF MALTA.
57 (1868).
11. Arturo Mercieca, Sir Adriano Dingli [Part II] sommo statista,
legislatore, magistrato. (Continuazione), 1:4 MELITA HISTORICA: J. OF THE
MALTA HIST. SOC. 221-260 (1955).
12. Originally called Code civil des Français.
13. ROBERT B. HOLTMAN, THE NAPOLEONIC REVOLUTION (Louisiana
State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1981).
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“Delicts” and “quasi-delicts” are dealt with in Book III, Title IV,
Chapter II of the Code Napoléon and are regulated by merely five
articles. 14 The provision that basically governs the entire law of tort in
France today is contained in Article 1382 of the Code civil which has
remained identical to the words found in the Code Napoléon. This article
states, “Any act committed by a person which causes damage to another
obliges that person by whose fault it occurred to make reparation.” 15 It is
clear that in terms of delictual responsibility, this provision is very
similar to the Maltese equivalent, In fact, Article 1031 of the Maltese
Civil Code, provides that “Every person . . . shall be liable for the
damage which occurs through his fault.” This general fault-based
liability is defined in Article 1032 of the Maltese Civil Code which
states:
(1) A person shall be deemed to be in fault if, in his own
acts, he does not use the prudence, diligence, and
attention of a bonus paterfamilias.
Under both legal systems, the elements of damage, fault and the causal
link between them are necessary preconditions for any successful action
in tort. It is important to note that moral damage is completely absent
from the French text, despite its being so similar to the Maltese
equivalent. Having said that, although the French text remained to a large
extent unchanged in the Code civil, the interpretation given to the law
clearly came to include what is now known as dommage moral or
similarly, préjudice moral.
There is no doubt that when Sir Adriano Dingli was drafting the
Maltese provisions in question, such interpretations had already surfaced.
As early as 1833, the French Cour de Cassation established that the
words of Article 1382 16 were sufficiently general to allow compensation
to be awarded for dommage moral. 17 It is said by some that the case,
which dealt with the grief of a family upon the death of one of the family
members, might not have been directly supported in the travaux
préparatoires which might mean that the authors thereof only had

14. CODE NAPOLÉON art. 1382-1386 (Paris, 1807).
15. Translated from: “Tout fait quelconque de l'homme, qui cause à autrui
un dommage, oblige celui par la faute duquel il est arrivé, à le réparer.”
16. Imposing a liability to make reparation upon anyone causing another a
“dommage” in general.
17. Cour de Cassation [Cass.] June 15, 1833, Bull. Civ. (Fr.), S.1833.
I.458.
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material damage in mind. 18 However, Mazeaud and Tunc,write that since
there was an absence in the French provisions of an express exclusion of
dommage moral, then its acceptance by the old pre-code law could be
relied on. 19 Even Pothier himself–the père du Code civil–who is said to
have cut-off from Justinian doctrine, defined “délit 20 in a wide enough
manner to include moral damage within it.21 There is ample evidence that
the dommage mentioned by Pothier was wide enough to include even
dommage moral. The Maltese courts themselves, as early as 1909, were
quoting Laurent and other influential commentators who were of this
opinion and were taking it as a fact that moral damage was included in
Article 1382 of the French Civil Code. 22
Today, there is no doubt that French law accepts compensation
for moral damage. The réparation du dommage moral is a concept that
has been commented upon by numerous authors. 23 Some of these define
the so-called “préjudice moral” (as opposed to a préjudice matériel) as
being “celui qui atteint le monde immatériel, incorporel, des pensées et
des sentiments.” 24
These authors however, admit that the notion of “moral damage”
needs further explanation and some say that a préjudice moral refers to

18. See MAZEAUD & TUNC, 1 TRAITÉ THÉORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE LA
RESPONSIBILITÉ CIVILE DÉLICTUELLE ET CONTRACTUELLE 301 (5th ed., 19571960).
19. See MAZEAUD & TUNC, supra note 18, at 299, 302.
20. “On appelle délit le fait par lequel une personne, par dol ou malignité,
cause du dommage ou quelque tort à une autre. Le quasi-délit est le fait par
lequel une personne, sans malignité, mais par une imprudence qui n’est pas
excusable, cause quelque tort à un autre.”
21. ROBERT JOSEPH POTHIER, 1:1 TRAITÉ DES OBLIGATIONS §2, 158
(1761).
22. See Cini v. Townsley, discussed in Part II, infra.
23. See e.g., ARMAND DORVILLE, DE L’INTÉRÊT MORAL DANS LES
OBLIGATIONS (1901); ANDRÉ MANTELET, RÉPARATION DU PRÉJUDICE MORAL
(1907). See also, MARCEL PLANIOL & GEORGES RIPERT, 6:1 TRAITÉ PRATIQUE
DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS: OBLIGATIONS 753 (2d ed., 1952) (where Planiol and
Ripert confirm that as long as the damage is personal, direct and certain, the
following can be stated: “Toute espèce de préjudice lésant un intérêt protégé par
le droit justifie une action en justice, qu’il touche la personne ou le biens, qu’il
soit matériel ou moral, susceptible ou non d’une évaluation exacte en argent.”).
24. HENRI MAZEAUD, JEAN MAZEAUD, LÉON MAZEAUD & FRANÇOIS
CHABAS, 2:1 LEÇONS DE DROIT CIVIL: OBLIGATIONS, THÉORIE GÉNÉRALE 422
(9th ed., Montchrestien, 1998).
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“celui qui ne se traduit point par une perte en argent, parce qu’il porte
atteinte à un droit extrapatrimonial.” 25
It is important to note that moral damage is not all treated in the
same manner in France. Since the concept has been refined over the
years, we find various categories of moral damage in France including
pretium doloris (or “psychological suffering”), préjudice esthétique (or
“disfigurement”) and préjudice d’agrément more generally (meaning
“deprivation of the pleasures of life”). 26 In Malta, for reasons explained
below, it seems that no such developments can take place unless the law
is amended.
The words in respect of “tortuous responsibility” and “fault”
more specifically, are very similar to the Maltese equivalent, and it is a
fact that Maltese law contains no express exclusion of moral damage, 27
so the question is why damages cannot be awarded explicitly under the
Maltese Civil Code to compensate moral harm The answer, it seems, lies
in the fact that Maltese law contains additional provisions inserted by Sir
Adriano Dingli which are not found in French law. These “additional
provisions” deal with damages, and in this author’s opinion, actually
dilute the civil law nature of the provisions on responsibility in tort. 28
Unlike the provisions on delictual responsibility, the provisions on
damages in Maltese law, (including Article 1046 which is not discussed
in this paper) seem to function very much on a common law basis in the
sense that the Maltese courts do not usually grant any compensation
unless a particular type of damage falls within the classes of
compensable damage contemplated therein. 29
English law is very different to the general fault-based system
found in Maltese law dealing with delictual responsibility. English law
recognises a large number of specially designated torts such as trespass,
negligence, nuisance and defamation. In this respect, it is the Maltese
provisions on “damages” which seem to function on a similar basis. The
Maltese courts’ own reference to British case law may of course, be the
reason why the provisions function this way, but it may be argued that
Adriano Dingli himself may have been more influenced by the British

25. Id. Emphasis added.
26. See GENEVIÈVE VINEY & PATRICE JOURDAIN, TRAITÉ DE DROIT CIVIL,
LES CONDITIONS DE LA RESPONSABILITÉ 39-66 (3RD ED., 2006).
27. Just like French law.
28. MALTA CIV. CODE art. 1045, 1046 (2011), available at
http://www.justiceservices.gov.mt/DownloadDocument.aspx?app=lom&itemid
=8580&l=1 (Last visited December 9, 2011).
29. Which are clearly rooted in the civil law tradition.
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rule in Malta than one might realise.30 Moreover, the idea of regulating
specific categories of moral injuries such as in case of a breach of the
Promises of Marriage Law 31 or else of Press Law 32 is clearly a common
law practice and the Ordinances that grant compensation for moral
damage in these specific instances must also be studied on the basis of
this premise. 33
As was mentioned above, the notion of damage was not
regulated specifically in the Code Napoléon (and still is not today), so
Adriano Dingli must have drawn inspiration elsewhere in this regard.
Dingli’s own appunti state that this “influence” was not derived from
French law or even English law but Austrian law. 34 It is therefore time to
examine the domestic text dealing with damages, in light of the Austrian
provisions cited by Dingli himself.

II. THE ORIGINAL DOMESTIC TEXT AND AUSTRIAN LAW
In Adriano Dingli’s appunti, one finds an index of the provisions
he introduced. Adjacent to these provisions, one finds a short description
of the sources used (as well as some general remarks). The daunting
question here is why Dingli felt the need to exclude reference to moral
damage from Maltese tort law, when it appears that the Austrian
provisions he was using as a reference, permitted the awarding of
damages for “suffering”—at least in certain limited instances. This is
what shall be examined in this section.
The modern Article 1045 of the Maltese Civil Code was
originally split into two articles: Article 751 and Article 752 of
Ordinance No. VII of 1868 (also referred to as the “Ordinance”
hereinafter). 35 The former dealt with damnum emergens whilst the latter
with lucrum cessans.

30. As evidenced in the cases cited infra.
OF
MALTA
ch.
5
(1834),
available
at
31. LAWS
(Last
http://www.justiceservices.gov.mt/lom.aspx?pageid=27&mode=chrono
visited November 9, 2011).
32. Which is today embodied in the Press Act of the Laws of Malta. Id. at
ch. 248.
33. This issue is explained in great detail by the author in the paper
entitled MORAL DAMAGES OUTSIDE THE AMBIT OF THE MALTESE
CIVIL CODE, ID-DRITT VOLUME XXI, 109-139, (GħSL–the University of
Malta’s Law Students’ Society, 2011).
34. ADRIANO DINGLI, APPUNTI DI SIR ADRIANO DINGLI 59.
35. See MALTA CIV. CODE, supra note 9 & 28, at art. 1045.
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A. Damnum Emergens
Article 751 of Ordinance No. VII of 1868 states as follows:
Il danno che dev’ essere risarcito da colui il quale lo
abbia recato senza dolo, consiste nella perdita reale che
il fatto abbia direttamente cagionato al danneggiato;
nelle spese che questo abbia in consequenza del danno
dovuto fare; e, se il danneggiato e` una persona che
lavora per salario o altro pagamento, nella perdita ancora
di tale guadagno. 36
Very basically, damnum emergens, as dealt with in this article, are those
actual losses incurred as a result of the injury sustained. It is a wellknown fact that Maltese courts have generally restricted damnum
emergens to pecuniary losses that can be easily quantified and have
almost never explicitly included moral damage under this heading. 37 The
words senza dolo (without malice) in the original text indicate that in
cases of culpable negligence, only damnum emergens could be claimed
whereas in those cases where the person who caused the damage did so
intentionally or maliciously, even lucrum cessans could be claimed. In
respect of the type of damages that could be claimed under damnum
emergens at the time back then, the situation is more or less similar to the
position today. Article 751 indicated that the damage shall consist:
1) “. . . nella perdita reale che il fatto abbia direttamente
cagionato al danneggiato.”
This translates almost identically into the wording of the modern Article
1045: “ . . . the actual loss which the act shall have directly caused to the
injured party . . .”
It can be argued that basing ourselves purely on the wording of
the law, it might be difficult to understand why a moral damage should
36. Translated into English as follows:
The damage that has to be made good for by whoever caused it
without malice consists in the actual loss which the act shall
have directly caused to the injured party, in the expenses that
that the latter may have been compelled to incur as a result of
the damage caused and if the injured party is a person who
works for a salary or other payment, in the loss of such
earnings.
37. The reader is advised to refer to the author’s thesis for more detail on
this issue. See Micallef-Grimaud, Excluding Moral Damages, supra starfootnote.
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be excluded from this “actual loss.” With respect to the concept of a
perdita reale the Maltese courts have always understood an “actual loss”
to be a material or economic loss and nothing more. 38 By way of
example, harm caused to movable or immovable property would usually
lead to depreciation in value of the said property, and such “actual loss,”
if directly caused by the act in question, can be compensated under this
heading. This contrasts sharply with the recent innovations that have
taken place outside the ambit of the Civil Code.39
Having said the above, in the recent judgment Linda Busuttil et
v. Dr. Josie Muscat et 40 the Court addressed this issue (among others)
and indicated that the term actual loss found in Article 1045 (as well as
the term any damage found in Article 1033 of the Civil Code) 41 can no
longer be interpreted as referring solely to patrimonial damage and must
therefore encompass damage of all kinds, 42 including non-patrimonial
damage. In this particular case dealing with a physical injury (a facial
scar on a female victim) 43 resulting from an unsuccessful medical
intervention, the plaintiff was awarded €5,000 in compensation for moral
damage, calculated on an arbitrio boni viri basis. This judgment has been

38. Id.
39. Especially in the realm of Intellectual Property Law where in one
particular legislative provision (Article 12 of Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights (Regulation) Act [Chapter 488 of the Laws of Malta]) “moral
prejudices” seem to be included under “actual prejudices.” Enforcement
of
Intellectual
Property
Rights Act , in LAWS OF MALTA
ch.
488
art.
12
(2006),
available
at
http://www.justiceservices.gov.mt/DownloadDocument.aspx?app=lom&itemid
=8954&l=1 (Last visited November 7, 2011). The author has his doubts on the
consciousness of such innovations and believes that this is more a case of strict
adherence to European Union directives and regulations rather than anything
else. The Directive in question is Directive 2004/48/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of April 29, 2004 on the enforcement of
intellectual property rights which is transposed almost word-for-word into
Chapter 488 of the Laws of Malta.
40. Linda Busuttil et v. Dr. Josie Muscat et, First Hall (Civil Court 2011).
41. Article 1033 states as follows: “Any person who, with or without
intent to injure, voluntarily or through negligence, imprudence, or want of
attention, is guilty of any act or omission constituting a breach of the duty
imposed by law, shall be liable for any damage resulting therefrom.”
42. “Ħsara” in Maltese.
43. A category of injuries which has generally been treated in a particular
manner by the Maltese courts as illustrated infra.
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appealed and it therefore remains to be seen whether or not the principles
enshrined therein will be confirmed or rejected by the Court of Appeal.44
2) “ . . . nelle spese che questo abbia in consequenza del
danno dovuto fare . . .”
As the reader will note, this is also almost identical to its modern-day
equivalent: “ . . . in the expenses which the latter may have been
compelled to incur in consequence of the damage . . . ”
This refers to expenses such as necessary repairs after one’s
property sustains damage. While the expenses of repairing the said
property fall under this sub-heading, the reduction in value of the same
(which in most cases can never return to its former state) is an actual loss
as seen above. The courts resort to many principles in compensating,
such as developing the rule that the victim should try to minimize
expenses, as far as possible, that the person who committed the tort will
have to pay.
Medical expenses for physical injuries are also recoverable under
this heading (excluding any claims for “pain and suffering” caused by
the injuries). Expenses for the treatment of psychological injuries (as
distinguished from compensation for the injury itself) would also
theoretically be recoverable under damnum emergens.
3) “ . . . e, se il danneggiato e` una persona che lavora
per salario o altro pagamento, nella perdita ancora di tale
guadagno.”
The third category of damages that could be claimed originally is also
similar to what may be claimed today under Article 1045: “ . . . in the
loss of actual wages or other earnings . . . ”
The well-known case Butler v. Heard,45 dealing with a street
collision between two vehicles, effectively laid down the basic formula
for calculating such damages (which goes beyond the scope of this
paper). It suffices to say that such formulae give rise to certain problems
under this heading just like they do under the lucrum cessans heading (as
discussed below).
The notion of “loss of wages” under damnum emergens can
merge with lucrum cessans (“loss of future profits”) unless some sort of
dividing line is drawn. In the case Shaw v. Aquilina 46 it was concluded
that the reference to a loss of “actual or other earnings” in Article 1045,
44. The appeal was registered on December 16, 2010.
45. Court of Appeal (Civil, Superior 1967).
46. Court of Appeal (Civil, Superior 1996) (per J. Said Pullicino, Carmel
A. Agius & J. D. Camilleri).
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can be deemed wide enough to include loss of actual profits until the
date of the judgment. Profits that could be lost in the future 47 are deemed
to fall under lucrum cessans (discussed infra). In Malta, damnum
emergens are usually easily proved and very often, compensation under
this heading is awarded without any contestation from any of the parties.
Alongside Article 751 dealing with damnum emergens, Dingli
wrote:
“Austr. 1293, 1323 a 1325 con modif.”
As confirmed by local case law, Article 751 was derived almost entirely
from Austrian law as amended by Adriano Dingli himself. 48 Private law
in Austria is divided into general private law–applicable to all persons–
and specialised forms of civil law–applicable only to certain categories,
such as commercial law for businessmen or employment law for
employers and employees. The major part of what is considered “general
private law” is regulated in a comprehensive private law code called the
Allgemeine Buergerliche Gesetzbuch (“ABGB”). It is interesting to note
that ever since Dingli referred to the laws contained in the ABGB, very
little has changed. In fact, the provisions he quoted have remained almost
identical. Let us look at the laws cited by Dingli.
Article 1293 (ABGB) is the first article to deal with “damage” 49
whilst Articles 1323 and 1324 (ABGB) deal with methods of
indemnification for damage. 50 Article 1325 (ABGB), which was also
cited explicitly by Dingli, is very important. This so called
Schmerzensgeld dealing with bodily harm, has definitely existed since
47. That is, after the judgment has been delivered.
48. See Giuseppe Fenech v. Vincenzo Pace, Court of Appeal (Civil 1937)
(per A. Mercieca, Rob. F. Ganado & E. Ganado).
49. And states as follows: “Damage is every detriment which has been
caused to any person in regard to his property, his rights or his person. The loss
of profits which a person expects according to the usual course of his affairs is
to be distinguished there from.”
50. Article 1323 (ABGB) states as follows: “In order to make amends for
damage caused, the damaged property must be returned to the former state
(status quo) or, if this is not possible, the estimated price thereof must be paid.
Compensation for only the actual damage suffered is called indemnity;
compensation which includes lost profit and the elimination of all effects of the
injury is called full satisfaction,” whilst Article 1324 (ABGB) states as follows:
“In case of damage caused by malice or by gross negligence, the person injured
is entitled to demand full satisfaction, and in other cases only indemnity. Where
the general expression ‘damages’ occurs in the law, it is to be interpreted
pursuant hereto.”ALLGEMEINES BÜRERLICHES GESETZBUCH (1811), available at
http://www.ibiblio.org/ais/abgb1.htm (Last visited November 9, 2011).
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the origins of the ABGB, so the following applies in Austrian law today
as it did at the time when Adriano Dingli was using it as a reference:
A person who harms another person bodily shall bear the
expenses of the cure of the person injured, compensate
him for lost profits, or where the injured person is made
incapable of earning a livelihood for the lost future
gains, and moreover pay him at his request a
compensation for his suffering, in accordance with the
particular circumstances of the case.
It is imperative to focus on the italicized words. It is clear from these
words that Austrian law has always allowed “some form” of damages for
suffering even though it must be said, it appears that “immaterial
damage” is not generally compensated under Austrian law. That being
said, certain damages for pain and suffering are actually allowed but only
if the person responsible acted with intent or gross negligence, and if the
law does not exclude compensation of non-economic damage. 51 The type
of “non-pecuniary damage” which is compensable is worth mentioning
here. Such damage includes the so-called affection interest, the
deprivation of the possibility to use a damaged or destroyed item of
property, the loss of comfort and recreation, and finally frustrated
expenditures. 52 The question thus is self-evident: Why did Adriano
Dingli seemingly and entirely exclude damages for pain and suffering?
Before answering this important question, we need to examine
what was included in domestic Article 752 dealing with lucrum cessans
(found in Article 1045 today), which must be read together with Article
751 and in respect of which Article 1325 of the ABGB gains even more
importance.
B. Lucrum Cessans
Very basically, lucrum cessans is referred to in the law as being
a loss of future earnings which must be a result of the permanent
incapacity that which the act shall have directly caused. The Maltese
courts have generally been more ‘liberal’ in respect of the lucrum
cessans heading and it is here that they have sometimes taken moral
damage into consideration–some in a more explicit manner than others as
shall be seen below. 53

51. As in Article 1330 of the ‘ABGB’ for example. Id. at art. 1330.
52. Inferred from the second half of Article 1331. Id. at art. 1331.
53. See supra Part II.A.

2011]

ARTICLE 1045 OF THE MALTESE CIVIL CODE

493

Article 752 of Ordinance No. VII of 1868 states as follows:
Il danno pero` che dev’essere risarcito, da colui il quale
lo abbia dolosamente recato, si estende, oltre le perdite e
le spese menzionate nell’articolo precedente, al
guadagno che il fatto impedisca al danneggiato di fare in
avvenire, avuto riguardo al suo stato. La corte fissera`
per la perdita di tale quadagno, secondo le circostanze,
una somma non eccendente cento lire sterline.54
It is apparent that for this type of damage to be recoverable, the person
liable for its causation must have acted intentionally. It should be noted
that the law was amended in 1938 55 changing this requirement and
grouping lucrum cessans and damnum emergens into the same article. 56
It should also be stressed that, at least theoretically, the loss of future
earnings can only be compensated if there is a permanent incapacity.
Temporary disabilities (however long they may last) are excluded here,
although from the Shaw v. Aquilina case discussed above, it can be
deduced that any effect the temporary disability may have on one’s
income until the date of the judgment should be recoverable under
damnum emergens.
Another thing that must be noted is the fact that generally, what
one is compensated for under lucrum cessans is the effect the disability
has on one’s ability to generate an income and not for any effect of the
disability on any other areas of one’s life (like harm to one’s feelings.) It
is important for the reader to note that there have been several exceptions
in this regard. 57
Under Article 752, the legislator included a ceiling fixed for
lucrum cessans and this was limited to £100. Thus, the approach of the

54. Basically translated as follows:
However, the damage which must be compensated from
whosoever caused it maliciously, extends in addition to the
losses and expenses mentioned in the last preceding article
(i.e., Article 751), to the future earnings which the fact
(causing damage) prevents the victim from receiving, taking
into account his state. The Court shall establish for the loss of
such future earning, depending on the circumstances, a sum
not exceeding one hundred sterling [£100].
55. By ‘Ordinance No. VII of 1868 Amendment Ordinance,’ 1938–
(Ordinance No. III of 1938).
56. The modern Article 1045. MALTA CIV. CODE, supra note 9 & 28, at
art. 1045.
57. See supra Part II.A.
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original legislator was to limit damages under lucrum cessans by linking
this to “loss of income” (as opposed to “loss of enjoyment of life”) and
also by limiting the amount that could be awarded in compensation. We
shall examine the rationale for this in some detail below. The legal
position was amended in 1938 due to an apparent change in mentality 58
and in 1962, the ceiling was removed completely59 so that the courts
were free to award large amounts in compensation for the effects of an
injury on one’s future earnings. The position today is that in all
probability, a new ceiling will be imposed in the very near future (which
seems to be around €600,000 according to current proposals).60 It
obviously remains to be seen in what manner this will be applied and
what effect it will have on claims for damages under Article 1045.
The main point here is that the lucrum cessans heading was
always problematic–and remains so nowadays, despite the fact that
certain cases attempted to create guidelines which might help the courts.
Above, reference was made to the Butler v. Heard case. 61 It is important
to note that the appeal stage of Butler v. Heard (discussed below)
effectively laid down a method of compensation which would be
followed (albeit tweaked) by most judgments to this very day. It should
also be noted that this method of compensation might be explicitly
mentioned in the amendments to Article 1045 and 1046 of the Maltese
Civil Code (henceforth referred to as the “Amendments”) which are
currently being proposed. 62 The basic workings of the “Butler v. Heard
formula” used to calculate the lucrum cessans due have been included in
rudimentary style as a footnote for the reader’s convenience.63
58. Reflected by the numerous cases that began exhibiting a change in
attitude as discussed in the author’s LL.D. thesis.
59. By the Civil Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 1962–(Ordinance No.
XXI of 1962).
60. See New Law to Remove Uncertainties on Compensation, TIMES OF
MALTA,
June
1,
2010,
available
at
http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20100601/local/new-law-toremove-uncertainties-on-compensation (Last visited November 9, 2011).
61. See supra note 45.
62. As mentioned supra, articles 1045 and 1046 are currently under review
and it is highly probable that they will be amended in the near future. An Act
amending the said articles had already been passed by the Maltese Parliament
(Act VI of 2004) but this never came into effect. Since these new amendments
might be contained in other legislative instruments, it would be more prudent to
await the termination of the consultation period currently underway before
commenting in any detail on the said amendments.
63. The average weekly wage of the complainant is taken and adjusted for
inflation. It is then multiplied by the number of weeks in a year and then
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The Amendments in question would, among other things,
introduce a set of “guidelines” which would help the courts adopt certain
methods of calculating damages, as well as include a detailed table
listing various percentages of disability depending on the type of injury
sustained. The scope of such Amendments seems to be of aiding pre-trial
assessments of particular disabilities and therefore facilitating out-ofcourt settlements.
Alongside Ordinance No. VII of 1868 art. 752, dealing with
lucrum cessans, Adriano Dingli wrote in his appunti: “Austr. L. c. con
modif.”
Presumably, no specific article is cited because in drafting his
own provisions on lucrum cessans, Dingli was looking at the Austrian
provisions as a whole as well as the specific articles mentioned above–
particularly Article 1325 (ABGB). The content of Dingli’s Article 752 in
fact, is taken from various Austrian provisions, some of which were not
separated from the content found in Article 751 of the Ordinance.
It was Dingli’s modifiche that separated the concepts of damnum
emergens and lucrum cessans into separate provisions and it was his idea
to give them separate requirements. One would generally have had to
verify whether the injury was caused intentionally or else through
culpable negligence 64 to see which provision applied. As noted above,
the Austrian provision on methods of indemnification defines both
damnum emergens and lucrum cessans in the same provision as being
“indemnity” and “full satisfaction” respectively. 65
It is clear that Adriano Dingli was very selective in transposing
provisions from the ABGB into Maltese law. The only rationale Dingli
gives for limiting the various provisions of the ABGB into just two
domestic provisions and for limiting the amount that could be claimed

multiplied by the percentage of disability caused to him or her (which must be
permanent). The percentage is determined by asking a medical professional how
far the disability has produced incapacity to generate an income and not how far
it has affected his overall health. Finally, all of this is multiplied by the so-called
“multiplier” (the number of years which the court predicts that the plaintiff
would have continued to work). Usually this is taken to be the national age of
retirement, but nonetheless a full multiplier is hardly ever given. This is the
basic formula but there have been numerous decisions that altered or refined it
(which go beyond the scope of this paper) including for example, deductions
made for “lump sum” payments.
64. Which is not stated explicitly, but can be inferred from the general
notions of tort.
65. See ALLGEMEINES, supra note 50, at art. 1323.
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under Article 752 dealing with lucrum cessans is found in his appunti
where he states:
I am including a limit of 100 (sterling) because
otherwise, it might cause the (financial) ruin of the
person causing the damage, whilst future earnings are
subject to probability and might be lost from one
moment to another for natural causes. The limit is a
norm for the Courts in this entirely new subject matter. 66
Although Adriano Dingli only described his rationale for limiting the
amount that could be claimed under lucrum cessans, one may infer his
more general concerns as well. The first concern exhibited by Dingli is,
“the (financial) ruin of the person causing the damage.” 67 Dingli was
hesitant to leave the amount of damages open-ended because this could
lead to the financial ruin of the person liable to compensate the injured
party. This is a fear that some bring to light to justify excluding openended compensation for moral damage even today. 68
His second concern relates to the fact that, “future earnings are
subject to probability and might be lost from one moment to another for
natural causes,” meaning that he feared cases of unjustified enrichment
taking place. 69 Since the future is uncertain, one could in theory,
compensate someone for future earnings which might never materialise,
thus going beyond the concept of restitutio in integrum. Of course, this
may trigger a wider discussion on whether or not the possibility of such
unjustified enrichment taking place should jeopardise the right to seek
justice by opting for alternative means of compensation.
The third comment to reflect upon is, “this entirely new subject
matter.” 70 It seems thus, that Dingli decided to start slow and impose
limits on this untested virgin law. Several years later, some cases would

66. Translated from the original Italian text: “Metto un limite di 100
perche` altrimenti si potrebbe cagionare la rovina del danneggiante, mentre il
guadagno futuro e` cosa di probabilita` e puo` mancare da un momento all’ altro
per cause naturali. Il limite e` una norma alla Corte in questa materia tutta
nuova.”
67. “ . . . la rovina del danneggiante . . .”
68. See Micallef-Grimaud, Excluding Moral Damages, supra starfootnote, at ch. 4.
69. “ . . . il guadagno futuro e` cosa di probabilita` e puo` mancare da un
momento all` altro per cause naturali.”
70. “ . . . questa materia tutta nuova.”
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quote Dingli and would even argue that he was correct in adopting such a
careful approach. 71
It is this author’s opinion that the omission of damages for “pain
and suffering”—which was clearly intentional—was not a decision based
on ideological incompatibility, but one based on practicality. In drafting
the “unique” provisions on damages, Dingli chose a system of law that
was similar to Malta’s at the time. Austrian law is fault-based just like
French law. It is also made up of Roman law concepts, which still
survive in Maltese legislation to this day. If Dingli felt that compensation
for moral damage would not be compatible with Maltese law, he could
have very easily excluded it explicitly. This author believes that Adriano
Dingli’s limitations were merely a manifestation of initial hesitation; and
that he probably expected further development of this dynamic branch of
law.
The references to the sources of law are there to aid the courts in
their interpretation of Dingli’s provisions. If the courts felt that
compensation for “suffering” (which was in the original source of law)
should have been interpreted in the words, “ . . . al guadagno che il fatto
impedisca al danneggiato di fare in avvenire, avuto riguardo al suo
stato. . . ,” 72 what was there to stop them? Where does it say in the
original law that moral damage should not be taken into account when
calculating what is owed to the injured party? Certainly, there was never
an explicit provision entitling such injured party to compensation for
moral damage on a separate basis, but this cannot be interpreted as a
defiant repulsion of the concept of moral damage.

III. THE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN RESPONSIBILITY IN TORT AND
DAMAGES UNDER MALTESE LAW
It may be argued that if compensation for moral damage was to
be explicitly excluded from Maltese law, then Adriano Dingli would
have worded the provisions relating to responsibility in tort differently.
There would not have been the possibility of interpreting “damage” (in
terms of harm done) to include also a moral damage. The problem
however, is that this remains a plausible interpretation even to this day. 73
Above, it was noted how a recent judgment (which has been appealed)

71. See Fenech v. Pace, supra note 48.
72. “ . . . to the future earnings which the fact (causing damage) prevents
the victim from receiving, taking into account his state.”
73. As explained in more detail infra.
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has proceeded to award compensation for moral damage on the basis of
such non-restrictive interpretation. 74
An important early case, which dealt with compensation for
moral damage specifically, was the 1908 judgment Cini v. Townsley. 75
Our scope here is to examine what was said in relation to moral damage
and its compatibility or otherwise with the wording of Ordinance No. VII
of 1868 (which was illustrated in the previous section). This case dealt
with an iniuria, which is a generic term derived from Roman law, usually
meaning a “harm done to one’s honour or reputation” as examined by the
author in other works. 76 There are actually various types of iniuria, some
of which were (and still are) regulated elsewhere in specific areas of
Maltese law, 77 and which also allow compensation for moral damage if
certain conditions are met. Here, however, the type of iniuria being
alleged was one caused by “parole ingiuriose e diffamanti all’indirizzo
dell’attore tendenti ed atti a gettare discredito sul detto Royal Hotel
(belonging to the plaintiff) e quindi a recare grave danno all’attore,”
which fell under the “general concept of iniuria.” 78 Since this type of
iniuria was not regulated by any specific law, the claim had to be based
on the general provisions of the Ordinance. 79
The case is interesting because the claim made by the plaintiff
explicitly lists moral damage before material damage in the demand for
compensation despite the fact that there is no mention of moral damage
anywhere in the Ordinance as drafted by Adriano Dingli. The Court of
First Instance, commenting on whether it could grant damages or not,
simply said that in addition to the fact that such moral damage was not
proven, the action could not succeed because “ . . . our laws do not
contemplate the ‘moral damage’ upon which the present case is based
(Ordinance VII of 1868 art. 739,751, 752).” 80

74. See supra note 40.
75. Michele Cini v. Ernest Townsley ed altri, First Hall (Civil Court
1908).
76. See Micallef-Grimaud, supra note 33; Micallef-Grimaud, Excluding
Moral Damages, supra star-footnote.
77. As for example, in the Promises of Marriage Law. LAWS OF MALTA,
supra note 31, at ch. 5.
78. Which seems to have never been regulated by specific provisions of
the Ordinance (or indeed the modern Civil Code).
79. Ordinance No. VII of 1868 arts. 739, 751, 752.
80. Translated from the original Italian text: “ . . . le nostre leggi non
contemplano il danno morale sul quale e` basata la presente istanza.” Ordinanza
VII del 1868 arts. 739, 751, 752.
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Thus, the courts more than one hundred years ago, adopting a
strict-interpretation approach, were citing the lack of a legal basis as the
main reason for not compensating for moral damage in general (and in an
explicit manner). Although the plaintiff’s claims were eventually rejected
by the Court, an appeal was filed and the case took a very interesting
twist when private international law was invoked by the Court of
Appeal. 81
At the appeal stage, the Court stated that the applicable law was
not Maltese law but French law since the incident took place in the
territorial waters of Tunisia. 82 What the Court had to say in respect of
French law is very important because it indicates to us whether Maltese
courts, at that particular moment in time, were ready to reject or accept
compensation for moral damage in general (not merely in cases of an
iniuria) based on laws very similar to those found in Malta. The Court
immediately pointed out that the applicable legal provision was Article
1382 of the French Civil Code. The reader will remember from what was
discussed above that this provision makes absolutely no reference to
moral damage and is, ironically enough, a reflection of the Maltese law
on responsibility in tort. Despite the similarities with the Maltese
provision on “fault” (even to this very day), the Court quoted Aubry &
Rau, and Laurent amongst others who state that “not only material
damage is compensable but also moral . . .” 83
The Court actually went on to determine the “extent of moral
damage” that could be compensated for in this case and said that in
calculating this, the Court had to carefully examine the gravity or
otherwise of the effect produced by the damage in question.84 Although
the Court decided that the moral damage in this case was not grave,
(owing to the fact that the plaintiff’s business was not negatively affected
by the comments made by the defendant), the Court nonetheless reversed
the first instance judgment and proceeded to award five shillings as
compensation for the moral damage suffered by the plaintiff.
This case is also noteworthy because the Maltese Court actually
adopted an interpretation given to a foreign provision which is similar to
81. Michele Cini vs. Ernest Townsley Court of Appeal (Civil 1909) (per
G. Carbone, G. Pullicino & A. Parnis).
82. Id.
83. “Secondo l’opinione piu` accreditata nella dottrina e nella
giurisprudenza di quella nazione non solo il danno materiale, ma anche il
morale e` risarcibile mediante un indennizzo pecuniario.”
84. “Nel calcolare l’estensione del danno morale devesi avere
specialmente riguardo all’effetto piu` o meno grave che la causa che ve diede
luogo e` atta a produrre e, nel caso, tali effetti sono minimi.”
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its counterpart in Malta. The only difference is that Maltese law does not
stop at regulating responsibility in tort. Maltese law, to this day, also
regulates the damages that can be awarded in what were then Articles
751 and 752. In other words, moral damage was accepted on the basis of
the French provision dealing with responsibility in tort because the
Maltese Court appreciated the fact that moral damage could be
reconciled with the wording thereof. So, the question is: “If Maltese law
did not contain the articles regulating liquidation of compensation but
merely those regulating responsibility in tort 85, would the Court of First
Instance have interpreted Maltese law in a similar fashion?”
In this regard, Professor V. Caruana Galizia believes that:
[D]amage may refer either to the person or to the
property, and according to the prevailing doctrine, which
is based on the juridical traditions of Roman law which
included defamation among private delicts, the damage
may also be moral. This principle has been implicitly
recognised by the judgment delivered by the Court of
Appeal in re Cini v. Townsley, on, the 10th November,
1909. 86
This brief statement, which was not removed in 1978 by
Professor J.M. Ganado in the revised edition of Caruana Galizia’s Notes
on Civil Law, is very important. Caruana Galizia argues that what the
Court of Appeal was saying in terms of French law, applies even to
Maltese law by inference. He even mentions the juridical traditions of
Roman law and indirectly cites the concept of iniuria as being applicable
to Maltese law as well. However, according to the findings of the thesis
upon which this paper is based, a moral damage (or harm to one’s
feelings more generally) only seems to be sufficient to give rise to
responsibility in tort. 87
When it comes to liquidation of damages, the Maltese courts are
faced with provisions that were included by Adriano Dingli but are not
found in French law. What is peculiar in Maltese law is that even though
there seems to be agreement on the issue of responsibility, there is no
corresponding provision in the Maltese Civil Code which explicitly
entitles the victims to claim compensation in tort for such harm if it is
purely a moral damage. In other words, a “moral harm” seems to be
sufficient to find the culprit directly responsible in tort under the Maltese
85. Being almost identical to the French provisions cited in this judgment.
86. V. CARUANA GALIZIA, NOTES ON CIVIL LAW 312 (J. M. Ganado ed.,
1978).
87. See supra star-footnote and accompanying text.
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Civil Code but “Danni Morali” in terms of compensation, cannot be the
sole basis of the claim–at least within the rigid confines of the law
currently in force.88 In theory, thus, this discrepancy means that a person
who causes a moral harm to someone, may be found responsible under
Maltese law of tort, but in all probability (subject to possible exceptions
as discussed above), 89 such person would not be forced to compensate
the victim(s) unless some sort of real or material damage is also caused
or unless the issue is regulated by a specific branch of Maltese law
outside the ambit of the Maltese Civil Code.90
In other words, it appears that the provisions regulating
compensation under Maltese law actually restrict the more general
provisions regulating responsibility in tort and actually prevent
compensation for moral damage from being claimed explicitly under the
former. The irony here is that French does not explicitly address
compensation for moral damage, but since the French provisions only
deal with responsibility, the problems that arise locally are non-existent
in France.
It appears thus, at least in theory, that had Adriano Dingli
omitted the provisions he modeled from Austrian law 91 the Maltese
courts might have been ready as early as 1909 to deem compensation for
moral damage as being part of Maltese tort law.

IV. SELECTED CASE LAW SEEMINGLY TAKING MORAL DAMAGE
INTO CONSIDERATION
Due to length constraints, it is only possible to comment on a
few cases here. These shall serve the purpose of illustrating certain
“liberal” mechanisms used by the Maltese courts when compensating in
tort.
The important 1952 case Victor Savona pro. et. noe. v. Dr. Peter
Asphar, dealt with the amputation of a boy’s leg as a result of the
88. The very recent case Linda Busuttil et v. Dr. Josie Muscat et which
was discussed above (see supra note 40) awarded compensation for moral
damage to the plaintiff, partially on the basis of Article 1033 of the Civil Code
(dealing with responsibility in tort) despite the content of Article 1045 (dealing
with damages). However, it remains to be seen whether or not this judgment will
be confirmed by the Court of Appeal.
89. Id.
90. See supra note 7.
91. And which the courts have applied in practice very much on a
common-law basis as described above and as shall be seen in the next subsection.
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negligent medical intervention carried out by the defendant and the
conclusions reached therein clearly indicate that every scenario has to be
judged on a case-by-case basis. The Court of First Instance 92 claimed that
apart from the damnum emergens due as a result of the erosion of the
injured party’s patrimony 93 the plaintiff was also entitled to lucrum
cessans. After several discussions relating to the percentage of disability
that applied (a deficiency that has always beleaguered the Maltese legal
system), 94 the Court of First Instance went on to make it clear that under
this category, one had to include also: “[T]hose damages due for the
psychological insult of the loss of the leg, the inability of Victor Savona
to go to school and his moral suffering when he sees, especially in the
future, that he is always going to depend almost entirely on others.”95
The Court of First Instance decided to award ₤650 as compensation
under lucrum cessans and in doing so, it is clear that moral damage was
taken into consideration. The fact that the Court could not award
compensation for moral damage explicitly is obvious for the reasons
stated above, but the Court nonetheless used the legal basis of lucrum
cessans, and particularly the guidelines in what is today Article 1045(2) 96
to award, at least in part, compensation for what it called “moral
suffering” and the “psychological insult” of losing a leg due to someone
else’s fault. 97
The Court of Appeal 98 argued that there was no need to go into
the issue of damnum emergens because these damages were clearly due.
Similarly to what had been taking place up until then (and what generally
happens today), the Court dealt with damnum emergens quite briskly and
without complicating its calculations by including any novel concepts.
The reasoning of this judgment is very important because the
Court of Appeal actually increased the amount of compensation due
under lucrum cessans, and it did so predominantly on the basis of the
92. First Hall (Civil Court 1952).
93. Amounting to 132 pounds and 6 shillings.
94. See Josephine Anne Cini, Traditional and New Approaches to the
Problem of the Assessment of Damages in Fatal and Personal Injury Claims
(LL.D. thesis, University of Malta, 1997) (on file with the author).
95. “[D]awk (id-danni) dovuti għall-insult psikiku tat-telfa tas-sieq, linkapaċita` ta` Victor Savona li jmur skola, u s-sofferenzi morali tiegħu meta
jara, wisq iżjed ‘il quddiem, li huwa dejjem u f’kollox irid kważi jiddependi
minn ħadd ieħor.”
96. Article 1088(2) at the time.
97. Through negligence.
98. Court of Appeal (Civil, Superior 1952) (per L. A. Camilleri, A. J.
Montanaro Gauci & W. Harding).
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moral injuries and the pain and suffering caused to the plaintiff. The
Court of Appeal started its reasoning by summarizing what is today
Article 1045. Among other things, the Court commented on the fact that
the maximum that it could now award as lucrum cessans was ₤1,200
because the act was not intentional (in which case there would have been
no capping). 99 The Court also said that in exercising its arbitrary
discretion, the Court should consider the circumstances of the case, the
nature and degree of the incapacity, and condition of the injured party. 100
This reflects the wording of Article 1045(2), which is very important
because these words served as the legal basis for taking into
consideration several circumstances which had nothing to do with
economic or material calculations.
The Court went on to trace the law’s development through time.
It commented on Adriano Dingli’s appunti and illustrated his fears in
respect of lucrum cessans. 101 The Court pointed out that the 1938
amendments were a reflection of the fact that times were changing and
that the legislator felt the need to modernise the laws drafted by Dingli.
The Court stated that this was justified due to the “augmented intensity
of life” and the great burden on incapacitated persons who will likely
lose more future earnings (and suffer a loss of their “purchase
power”). 102
The Court then invoked the maxim in probatione lucri cessante
sufficiunt praesumptiones and went on to refer to English case law. It
pointed out that in the case Philips v. London & South Western Rail
Co., 103 it had been stated that: “Such damages cannot be a perfect
compensation of the circumstances of the plaintiff and by making
allowances for the ordinary chances of life.” In relation to an argument
that rages on to this very day, 104 the Court opined that fixed scales are
not really possible in such situations. To give weight to this argument,
99. This capping was removed by the 1962 amendments. See supra note
59.

100. “Fl-eżerċizzju ta’ l-arbitriju diskrezzjonali tagħha l-Qorti għandha
tqis ċ-ċirkustanzi tal-każ, ix-xorta u grad ta` l-inkapaċita` u l-kondizzjoni ta`
parti li tbati l-ħsara.”
101. Which were only limited to those cases involving dolo and capped at
₤100.
102. “[I]ntensita` awmentata tal-ħajja, li minn naħa waħda timponi
eżiġenzi akbar u kwindi l-inkapaċi aktarx jitlef aktar qliegh futur, u stante l“purchase power” diminwit tal-flus.”
103. 5 Q.D. 78 (Court Appeal 1879).
104. See Micallef-Grimaud, Excluding Moral Damages, supra starfootnote, at ch. 4.
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the Court quoted Law Justice Scott in the English Court of Appeal case
Bailey v. Howard 105 who was of this same opinion. The Court then
moved on to assess the amount of lucrum cessans due to the injured
party in the case at hand, and determined that the defendant’s negligent
act left the boy with a stump that could not be improved by benefitting
from artificial limbs. Despite the fact that the boy had already been
slightly incapacitated from birth, the Court said that the act of the
defendant now rendered the boy a ‘hopeless cripple.’ The Court was
clearly angered by the state the boy was reduced to, and it moved on to
discuss the moral injuries at play by referring to the English case Heaps
v. Perrite Ltd. 106
According to what was common practice at the time (especially
prior to the 1938 amendments), it should come as a surprise to many that
a Maltese court would consider such things as “suffering,” both present
and future, and such concepts as “the joy of life” which is a non-material
consideration par excellence (not being easily quantifiable in monetary
terms). Despite this fact, the Court in this case was ready to take into
consideration the fact that the boy in question would no longer be able to
ride a bicycle or kick a football; these are undoubtedly moral
considerations.
It is also clear that the Maltese Court was not merely quoting a
foreign case. In its own reflections on the case at hand, the Court did not
focus on any economic losses per se or even the child’s earning capacity.
It adopted the spirit of English case law and focused on the child’s ability
to enjoy life. It said that following the defendant’s negligent intervention,
Savona would no longer be able to do certain things like “play with
105. December 14, 1938, where Justice Scott said the following:
. . . I see no means of arriving at any sort of quantitative scale
for the guidance of judges and juries, except the gradual
working out, chiefly through the common sense of juries, of
the amount that in the civilization of today is regarded as
reasonable for that particular head of damages.
106. Heaps v. Perrite Ltd., 2 All E.R. 60 (Eng. 1932), where it was stated
that:
We also have to take in consideration not only the suffering
which he had immediately after the accident, but the suffering
that he will have throughout his life in future, the constant
necessity of having assistance in the carious things that he has
to do for his own purposes, apart from earning money; also the
fact that the joy of life will have gone from him; he cannot
ride a bicycle, cannot kick a football, he cannot have any of
the forms of recreation which appeal to the healthy ordinary
man . . .
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children and keep up with whatever he wishes to do.” 107 Even in its
closing arguments, the Court did not swerve into any specific economic
considerations and made reference to the “ . . . opportunities which life
has to offer healthy persons and persons who can keep up with life’s
exigencies.” 108
The Court then said that it also considered the amounts given in
other local cases when the injury was of a far less severe nature.109 After
considering all those facts, it concluded that the amount awarded by the
Court of First Instance was too low and it therefore raised the amount
due from ₤650 to ₤900 pounds. The total sum awarded was ₤1,032.60 110
and was perhaps one of the largest sums awarded in similar cases up to
that moment in time. Subsequent cases would quote this judgment in
justifying similar awards. 111 The Court of Appeal used the legal basis of
the lucrum cessans heading to compensate the injured party for the moral
damage suffered. The Court also based its reasoning on Article 1088(2)
(the modern 1045(2)), 112 and it must have felt that the words contained
therein were wide enough to include even moral harm as being one of the
“relevant circumstances” which would help the Court reach an equitable
sum to be awarded.
Another case that was decided on similar grounds to the above is
the 1964 judgment Paolo D’Amato noe v. Joseph Ebejer. 113 This case
dealt with a “sfreġju,” or scar, caused to the face of the plaintiff’s
daughter. Whereas in cases of unlawful deaths, the injured parties were
being compensated almost exclusively on economic terms, 114 in cases of
this nature the Court stated explicitly that “one must not look (at the
107. “. . . jilgħab mat-tfal u jlaħħaq ma` dak li kien jixtieq jagħmel.”
108. “. . . l-opportunitajiet li toffri l-ħajja għal min hu b’saħħtu u jista`
jlaħħaq ma’ l-eżiġenzi tagħha . . . ”
109. See Coppola v. England Sant Fournier (1944); Borg v. Bonnici
(1948).
110. With relative interest payable at different rates.
111. See e.g., Carmela Fenech pr. et ne. pro et noe v. Antonio Galea
(1956) (confirming several points made in this judgment).
112. Article 1045(2) of the Maltese Civil Code, which, as already
illustrated above, states as follows: “The sum to be awarded in respect of such
incapacity shall be assessed by the Court, having regard to the circumstances of
the case, and, particularly, to the nature and degree of incapacity caused, and to
the condition of the injured party.” MALTA CIV. CODE, supra note 9 & 28, at art.
1045.
113. First Hall (Civil Court 1964) (per Edoardo Magri).
114. See among others, Emmanuela Galea pr. et. ne. pro et noe v. Paolo
Gatt net, Court of Appeal (Civil, Superior 1958) (per A. J. Mamo, A. J.
Montanaro Gauci & W. Harding).
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matter) merely from the level of incapacity to work but from the
complexity of the consequences which the burns left on her person.”115
The Court then went on to say that certain other moral injuries
must also be taken into consideration in such cases. The Court said that
the burns on her face “ . . . created and will create in the future
embarrassment and a sense of suspension and continual fear if she ever
marries and gets pregnant.” 116
The Court did not stop there. It further took into consideration
the fact that it would be very hard for this girl to find a husband anytime
in the future and, even if she did, she “ . . . would always be exposed to
mortification and to certain disappointments that she will inevitably
suffer when the poetry of matrimonial life is briskly interrupted with the
discovery of these defects.” 117
By mentioning such things as “the poetry of matrimonial life,”
the Court clearly took into consideration the fact that this girl suffered a
moral injury that would preclude her from enjoying such sentiments as
“matrimonial bliss.” Similar to the Savona v. Asphar judgment which we
saw above (dealing with the loss of a small boy’s leg), the Court went on
to say that such injuries would also lead to certain men feeling
“repulsed” by the image of the girl and that this certainly does not
contribute towards the pursuit (and obtaining) of happiness, which the
Court described as every human being’s prerogative. 118
The Court said that this impediment to “the pursuit of happiness”
or this “loss of enjoyment of life” would include also, a certain
“embarrassment in society” 119 and that all this “ . . . is an aspect of the
damage caused which cannot be compensated within money.” 120 The
Court itself made reference to the Savona v. Asphar case which clearly
dealt with a more incapacitating injury than a scar on one’s face. This
notwithstanding, the Court decided that this case still merited a higher
115. “Wieħed m’għandux iħares lejha biss mill-grad tal-inkapaċita` għaxxogħol, iżda mill-kompless tal-konsegwenzi deleterji li l-ustjonijiet ħallew fuq
il-persuna tagħha . . . ”
116. “ . . . ħolqu u aktar joħolqu ‘l quddiem motiv ta` mistħija u sens ta`
sospensjoni u ta` biża` kontinwu jekk tiżżewweġ u toħroġ gravida.”
117. “. . . l-għarusa tkun dejjem esposta għall-mortifikazzjonijiet u ċerti
delużjonijiet li immankabilment ikollha tgħaddi minnhom meta l-poesija talħajja matrimonjali tiġi bruskament interrotta bl-iskoperta ta` dawn id-difetti. . .”
118. “. . . dan żgur ma jikkontribwixxi xejn fit-triq tal-prerogattiva li kull
bniedem għandu versu r-riċerka u l-otteniment tal-feliċita` tiegħu fil-ħajja ta`
kuljum.”
119. “mistħija fis-soċjeta`.”
120. “. . . huwa aspett ta` danneġġjament li ma jistax jiġi risarċit bi flus.”
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amount of compensation than on that occasion! Commenting on the fact
that the two cases were different, the Court in this case awarded the
plaintiff ₤1,000 as compensation under the “lucrum cessans” heading,
which was ₤100 more than the Court had awarded in Savona v.
Asphar. 121
What must be duly noted in respect of the above is that it is
actually quite rare for the Maltese courts to use such colourful language
in referring to such moral considerations, especially post Butler v. Heard.
However, it must also be pointed out that facial scars on female victims
generally seem to trigger a sense of compassion which at times drives the
Maltese courts to award compensation on the basis of innovative
interpretations of Maltese law of tort. 122
The facts of the above-cited Butler v. Heard case are by now,
well-known to most local legal practitioners and scholars alike. The case
(as already mentioned above) dealt with a traffic collision between two
vehicles–a car driven by the defendant (Heard) and a motorcycle driven
by the plaintiff (Butler). As already mentioned above, the case is
important for the way in which it liquidates damnum emergens under
Article 1088 (today Article 1045), but more important when dealing with
lucrum cessans because it is here where the courts had previously
allowed themselves to be “liberal.” The interesting thing to note here is
that as soon as the Court moved on to discuss damages due under lucrum
cessans, which it defined as “by far the most important,” 123 the Court
started its reasoning by immediately referring to moral damage. As it
turns out, it did this to be very clear that compensation in the case at hand
was only due for pecuniary losses. This is how the Court interpreted
Article 1088 (today 1045) at the time–perhaps restricting certain
previous interpretations that might have included compensation for moral
damage as seen above. The reader should, however, bear in mind that
whilst the Court deemed the law not to grant the legal basis to award
compensation for moral damage explicitly, it was in no way opposed to
this ideologically. Actually, the Court went so far as to say that Maltese
law is inferior to other laws that specifically allow for compensation for
moral damage. To make it absolutely clear that the Court was not just
quoting a foreign source to illustrate the position abroad, it went on to

121. Taking into account certain considerations like inflation.
122. See the very recent judgment Linda Busuttil et v. Dr. Josie Muscat et
as discussed above, supra note 40, by way of example.
123. “bil-wisq l-aktar importanti.”
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express its hope that this branch of Maltese law would be reformed in the
near future. 124
In truth, the only reforms that were made since then were courtdriven developments in respect of breaches of human rights and
legislative innovations in the realms of consumer law and intellectual
property law more specifically. 125 In terms of the Maltese Civil Code, at
the time of writing, no legislative reforms have ever been made since
then. What can be inferred here is that those individuals who oppose the
introduction of compensation for moral damage (of whatever kind) in the
Maltese Civil Code cannot use Butler v. Heard to boost their arguments
because the Court made it quite clear that it favored its introduction.
The Court proceeded to comment on the relief felt by the courts
following the 1962 amendments (which removed the capping of
damages) and how the courts were at full liberty to attain justice in favor
of injured parties or their families. After creating what is now known as
the “Butler v. Heard formula” which the reader is advised to refer to, 126
the Court went on to reduce the amount awarded by the Court of First
Instance but it nonetheless awarded ₤5,100–one of the largest amounts
ever awarded at the time.
It must be noted that judgments delivered post Butler v. Heard
have tended to focus more on the intricacies of the calculations to be
made rather than introduce any new theories or novel interpretations.
Having said that, although many cases do in fact seem to take such
considerations into account when liquidating damages (some in a more
explicit manner than others), the usual practice is to “disguise” any moral
considerations by tweaking the formulae used127 for such calculations.
The following case is an example of such reasoning.
The 1997 case Paul Scerri et pro et noe v. Tancred Cesareo128
dealt with a serious permanent incapacity. The amount of compensation
awarded in this case for the serious disability caused to the plaintiff was
Lm80,888 (€188,418.35). As we find in other similar cases, the medical
expert appointed to determine the percentage of disability and its effect
on the victim’s “income earning capacity” in this case, drifted also into
other considerations which the Court was unable to compensate directly.
Among other things, the medical expert said that the injured party was:
124. “Ta’ min jawgura illi din il-fergħa tal-liġi tagħna ma ddumx ma tiġi
kif jixraq riformata.”
125. As mentioned above.
126. See supra note 63.
127. Michael Butler v. Peter Christopher Heard, Court of Appeal (Civil,
Superior 1967).
128. First Hall (Civil Court 1977) (per G. Valenzia).
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. . . grossly handicapped and will always have problems
with walking, going up and down stairs, ladders, etc. . .
he may find it difficult to find a partner and marry. His
body image of a disabled person may cause
psychological problems etc.
These words indicate a rational analysis of the case under examination.
Above, we have seen how in the past, such considerations were at times
even undertaken by the courts themselves. In this case however, we see
how difficult it is for the medical expert to determine what percentage of
the disability will affect one’s income-earning capacity (as opposed to
other areas of one’s life). Of course, philosophically speaking, one might
question the rationale for distinguishing these two concepts at all. Why
not compensate the victim for the effect the disability might have on
other areas of his life–like the damage to his love life as mentioned by
the medical expert here? Although the Court’s final calculations might
seem to be by-the-book, 129 it should be noted that it is always within the
Court’s discretion to determine the components of the “Butler v. Heard
formula” (which at the time of writing is still not legally binding on the
courts). In deciding the “multiplier” for example, the Court quoted
foreign commentators 130 and despite the fact that the future is uncertain
and includes various “vicissitudes of life,” the Court still came up with a
thirty-five year multiplier, which is partly responsible for the scale of the
amount due. It reached this figure “ . . . because of the circumstances of
the case and of the incapacitated person.” 131 This makes us understand
how the courts will ultimately determine whether the compensation due
is justified or otherwise depending on all the facts and circumstances of
the case.
At first glance, one might think that in this case, the fourteenyear-old boy struck by the defendant’s car (who suffered a serious
disability as a result of the accident), was treated like anyone else, but the
mathematics involved in the judgment should not distract us from the
fact that the Court was well aware of the seriousness of the case.
As Lord Scarman stated:
Knowledge of the future being denied to mankind, so
much of the award as is to be attributable to future loss
and suffering will almost certainly be wrong. There is
129. 80 (wage per week) x 52 (weeks in a year) x 35 (‘multiplier’) x 60%
(percentage of disability) x 20% (lump sum reduction) = Lm69,888 as lucrum
cessans + Lm11,000 as damnum emergens = Lm80,888 (€188,418,35).
130. W.V.H. ROGERS, THE LAW OF TORT 228 (2d ed. 1994).
131. “. . . minħabba ċ-ċirkostanzi tal-każ u tal-persuna inkapaċitata.”
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really only one certainty: the future will prove the award
to be either too high or too low. 132
The Maltese Court was willing to award quite a large sum of money
despite this “uncertainty of the future” which the Court itself cited in the
judgment. Can we confidently say therefore, that the boy’s suffering in
general was not taken into consideration?
Although the previous judgment is a typical example of how the
Maltese courts seemingly take moral injuries into consideration (i.e.,
indirectly), certain recent case law has re-ignited the discussion of
whether or not compensation for moral damage can be explicitly awarded
on the basis of Article 1045 of the Maltese Civil Code. The case Linda
Busuttil et v. Dr. Josie Muscat et, which was already discussed above, 133
merits particular attention in this regard. In this judgment (dealing with a
facial scar caused to a female victim as the result of an unsuccessful
medical intervention), the Court awarded the plaintiff €5,000 purely on
the basis of the moral injuries suffered by same. Above, it was already
mentioned that this judgment is important in the manner in which it
interprets the term “actual loss” found in Article 1045 to include also
“non-patrimonial damages”–despite the fact that the Maltese courts have
generally refused such interpretation. On this point, this author had
already previously expressed views similar to those found in the
judgment in question 134 and hopes that the same will be confirmed by the
Court of Appeal. 135
The judgment in question is also very creative in the manner in
which it resorts to EU law to obtain a remedy for the plaintiff. Very
innovatively, in its deliberations, the Court said that the female plaintiff
suffered a physical injury as well as an injury to her “psyche.” The Court
observed that the “physical and mental integrity” of the person is a right
enshrined in the Maltese Constitution, in the European Convention on
Human Rights as well as in Article 3 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union (the “Charter”). 136 The Court then argued
that since the Charter has the same legal status as the Treaties of the

132. Lim v. Camden & Islington A.H.A. (1980) A.C., 183.
133. See supra note 40.
134. See the author’s LL.D. thesis, supra star-footnote.
135. An appeal was registered on December 16, 2010.
136. European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union, December 7, 2000, Official Journal of the European Communities,
December
18,
2000
(2000/C
364/01),
available
at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3b70.html (Last Visited November
12, 2011).
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European Union in Malta, the Maltese courts are bound to interpret
Maltese law in conformity with the principles enshrined therein (despite
the fact that the provisions of the Charter are applicable only when Union
law is being implemented by Member States). 137 This author commends
the Maltese Court for entertaining such liberal interpretations in its
deliberations but believes that the judgment is on more solid ground
when discussing the interpretation of the terms “any damage” in Article
1033 and “actual loss” in Article 1045. 138
Very recently, there has been another interesting judgment 139
which has attracted considerable media attention.140 Although this
judgment (which has been appealed141) does not explicitly veer into
moral considerations per se, the fact that the Court awarded €1,250,000
in compensation to the victim of the traffic accident in question142 as well
as to the other plaintiffs (being members of the victim’s family), is
noteworthy to say the least.
These recent judgments (which are not yet res judicata) indicate
a certain willingness by the Maltese courts to compensate victims of torts
and quasi-torts in a more comprehensive manner. However, it remains to
be seen to what extent the above-cited Amendments will reflect such
views.

V. FINAL THOUGHTS
The uniqueness of Article 1045 emerges from the fact that unlike
the Maltese provisions modeled on the French legal system143 the
“damages” encompassed in the said Article were inspired by Austrian
law, and whether intended or otherwise, function very much on a
common law basis. Unless the damage inflicted (including moral harm)
is one which falls within the classes of compensable damage under
Article 1045 144 then, despite the responsibility of the tortfeasor, no
137. Id. at art. 51.1.
138. See supra note 9 & 41.
139. Alexander Caruana et pro et noe v. Daniel Bonnici, First Hall (Civil
Court 2011).
140. http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20110315/local/mandisabled-in-accident-awarded-1-25-million-in-damages (Last visited November
12, 2011).
141. An appeal was registered on April 4, 2011.
142. Who did not die but suffered one hundred percent disability.
143. In other words, the provisions relating to tort liability (which are
rooted in the civil-law tradition).
144. Or Article 1046 dealing with damages when death ensues.

512

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 4

compensation will usually be awarded to the victim. The nature of
Article 1045 itself 145 led to the Maltese courts’ hands being effectively
tied for well over a century. 146 It is only in certain instances that the
courts came up with liberal interpretations of Article 1045 that allowed
them to award compensation for moral damage. In such cases, a strict
interpretation of the law would seem to indicate that these are indeed
incompatible with the provisions on damages. 147 That said, without
entering into the complex mechanisms for liquidating such damages in
tort, 148 since the dawn of the Maltese Civil Code, the courts may not
have been explicit, but the pain and suffering of certain complainants
was clearly taken into account when calculating the amount of
compensation due. 149 Another thing to note is that certain cases are
generally dealt with in a particular manner. For example, cases involving
an iniuria (or harm to one’s honour or reputation) are generally treated
with added caution–perhaps owing to the serious damage such offense
may lead to in a small territory such as Malta. 150 Bodily harm inflicted on
children is also usually tackled in a more sensitive manner, and the basis

145. The legal rationale of which was examined above.
146. Despite the amendments that took place in 1938 and 1962.
147. That is, both article 1045 as well as article 1046 of the MALTA CIV.
CODE, supra note 28, at arts. 1045 & 1046.
148. Which is the subject of Fiona Cilia’s paper, included in this volume
of J. CIV. L. STUD.
149. A prime example being the case Paul Scerri et pro et noe v. Tancred
Cesareo discussed supra note 128.
150. See Perit Joseph Boffa v. John A. Mizzi, First Hall (Civil Court 2002)
(per P. Sciberras) which granted the plaintiff Lm300 (€698.81) as damages for
the iniuria against the memory of his late father. The Court reached this sum on
an ‘ex aequo et bono’ basis, which indicates that the claim was decided on
general principles of law rather than article 1045 of the Civil Code). The reader
should note that there have been recent developments regarding this case. On
November 22, 2011 in a Chamber judgment of the European Court of Human
Rights in the case John Anthony Mizzi v. Malta (application no. 17320/10), the
Court held (by a majority) that there had been a violation of Article 10 (freedom
of expression and information) of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The Court held that Malta was to pay Mr. Mizzi EUR700 in respect of
pecuniary damage, EUR4,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and
EUR5,300 for costs and expenses. More information on this is available at
http://www.codexonline.com/codex/contents.nsf/vWebAccessDocuments/CC29F5CFE5BFB1BB
C2257953004643FA/$file/Chamber+judgment+John+Anthony+Mizzi+v.+Malt
a+22.11.11.pdf (Last visited November 30, 2011).
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for compensation is often clearly based on moral considerations.151
Another category of injuries includes cases of scars or disfigurement on
young females which, as we have seen above, sometimes lead to rather
innovative ways of interpreting Maltese law on damages in tort. 152
It remains to be seen to what extent the above-cited Amendments
will alter Article 1045 (if at all), and whether the principles outlined
above will be solidified or else shaken at their core.

151. As seen in Savona v. Asphar discussed supra.
152. As seen in Paolo D’Amato noe v. Joseph Ebejer discussed supra. See
also, Peter Sultana v. Anthony Abela Caruana, Court of Appeal (Civil, Superior
2002) (per J. Said Pullicino, C. A. Agius & J. D. Camilleri), which dealt with
what the Court referred to as a “psychological injury” caused as a result of a
scar left on the plaintiff’s face.
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I. OVERTURE:
OF TIME AND PLACES
In Metaphysics, Aristotle told us that the whole is more
than the sum of its parts. He invited us to have a holistic view of
the world. Holism comes from the Greek holos meaning all, whole,
entire, total. Holism is the contrary to reductionism.
Comparative law exists in the middle, stretching between
holistic macro-comparison and reductionist micro-comparison. The
zoom is our optical device, and the accordion our musical
instrument.
In Malta, we are at the core, at the geographic center of a
whole region stretching on three continents. The Mediterranean
populated the cosmos with hundreds of gods and heroes before
discovering that there is only one God, and giving the world three
most influential monotheist religions. It developed the Talmud, the
Sharia, Roman and Canon Law. It exported these all over the
world and received other traditions, including the Common Law
here in Malta, Gibraltar, Israel, and at one time in Egypt.
The French historian Fernand Braudel wrote a most
impressive and influential fresco of the Mediterranean, showing
that there is no single Mediterranean Sea. 1 He views many seas in
it, and describes it as a vast, complex expanse within which men
operate. Braudel identified a first level of time, very slow, la
longue durée, which is the geographical time or time of the
environment. Braudel died in 1985, when time was about to
accelerate under the effect of climate change. The second level of
time comprises social and cultural history. It encompasses social
groupings, empires and civilizations. Change at this level was
much more rapid than that of the environment, at least in the days
when I discovered Braudel’s texts, and viewed magnificent
programs he presented on television, in the 1970s. The series was
called Méditerranée.
Braudel added a third level of time, that of events (histoire
événementielle). It includes the history of individuals with names.
1. FERNAND BRAUDEL, LA MÉDITERRANÉE ET LE MONDE MÉDITERRANÉEN
L’ÉPOQUE DE PHILIPPE II (1949); THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE
MEDITERRANEAN WORLD IN THE AGE OF PHILIP II (1972).
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For Braudel, this time of the courte durée is that of the surface. It
is deceptive.
We seem now to be in a time of confusion, where the
environment changes as rapidly as the second level of time by the
effect of global warming and climate change. Meantime, the third
level, the level of events, is not counted in years or generations but
days and minutes, conveyed by the most sophisticated
instantaneous technologies seemingly telling us things before they
happen. The latest news, or what will make the news tomorrow,
matters more than history. We live in an era of acceleration. Not so
long ago, we could watch and analyze the cooking pot of history
warm up and the contents simmer. Now we see it reach the boiling
point, the point of confusion, in which it gets difficult to analyze
and isolate the ingredients. In a sense, our Mediterranean Sea or
Mare Nostrum may be compared to a boiling cauldron.
Knowing that I was due to give this introductory lecture, 2
Jacques Vanderlinden sent me a Rêverie d’un alter ego solitaire.
He calls me his alter ego, which I view as my highest academic
honor, since the day he associated me to the drafting of a general
report on the Structure of Legal Systems, for the 16th World
Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law, in
Brisbane 3 in 2002.
Here it is, in the original French.
II. RÊVERIES D’UN ALTER EGO SOLITAIRE
Prenez un chaudron. Appelez-le Méditerranée (dite
aussi Mare nostrum).

2. This paper was presented as a keynote lecture at the Juris Diversitas
Symposium on Mediterranean Legal Hybridity: Mixtures and Movements in
Malta, June 11-12, 2010, organized and hosted by the Department of Civil Law
of the Faculty of Law and the Mediterranean Institute, both of the University of
Malta, and organized in conjunction with Juris Diversitas. I had the privilege of
speaking after Guido de Marco, former President of Malta (1999-2004) leading
his country into the European Union. He passed away two months after the
Symposium and this paper is dedicated to his memory.
3. LA STRUCTURE DES SYSTÈMES JURIDIQUES (O. Moréteau & J.
Vanderlinden eds., 2003).
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Enduisez son pourtour intérieur d’une couche de
graisse. Appelez-la HistoireS.
Parsemez la couche de graisse de quelques fortes
épices, par exemple christianismeS, islamS,
laïcitéS, modernitéS, traditionS, cultureS,
tous ingrédients délicieux qui donnent du goût au
bouillon,
mais aussi au nom desquels on commet bien des
crimes
Ajoutez-y quelques morceaux de choix,
comme un Khadafi, un Sharon, un Papadopoulos,
un Berlusconi, un Ben Ali, selon le prix du marché
Versez dedans un bouillon. non de culture, mais
d’attentes de millions de gens souvent jeunes,
pauvres, et ignorants
Laissez mijoter.
Vous ne savez pas ce que cela va donner,
Mais dans votre gros livre de recettes de maître (pas
en droit)-coq (pas gaulois)
Il y a celles des common lawyers, des rom(ah !non)-ano-germaniques,
des (si peu) coutumiers, des qui se croient (et le sont
encore moins) religieux,
des union-européens (tous experts) et unions-de-laméditerranéens (politiques)
Et aussi celles des empoisonneurs qui rendent fou à
Wall Street ou dans la City
Et qui sait-on encore ?
Peut-être quelques pluralistes radicaux, doublés
souvent d’incurables utopistes,
Qui pensent que le droit est ce que chacun pense
qu’il doit être
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Qui, face au chaudron souhaitent que cela ne bouille
pas « au dessus »
Qui ne croient plus aux « systèmes » (même pas le
D)
dans un monde en désordre (ce qui ne veut pas dire
chienlit)
Qui pensent que le dialogue inspiré d’un
« fondamental » (comme en CE et CM)
Doit tendre à rétablir l’harmonie entre les attentes
contradictoires
De moins en moins satisfaites au quotidien
A travers le vaste monde, mais aussi à notre porte
Des femmes et des hommes vivant en société. 4
Jacques Vanderlinden’s cauldron beautifully echoes the gumbo
that symbolizes the Group Juris Diversitas. The Louisiana gumbo
is a soup where ingredients of various origins remain solid and
visible but combine in a unique savor.
III. LOOKING INTO THE CAULDRON
The gumbo is a favorite dish in Louisiana, a remote region
in the United States Deep South, peopled by French and Spaniards,
Africans, Native Americans, Americans of Scottish or Irish
descent, Germans whose names are pronounced as if French, etc.
Much like gumbo, 5 this makes for a complex and rich environment
and culture, the Gulf of Mexico being to some extent comparable
to the Mediterranean, where so many different traditions meet and
mix. Louisiana has its mysteries and paradox. Christianity
recombines with Voodoo, everything is a matter of festival where
food and music are always major ingredients, often mixing with
4. Jacques Vanderlinden, Rêveries d’un Alter Ego Solitaire, unpublished,
on file with the author.
5. Here are the ingredients for the chicken-and-sausage gumbo: cut
andouille sausage, skinned bone-in chicken breasts, vegetable oil, flour, chopped
medium onion, chopped bell pepper, sliced celery ribs, hot water, garlic, bay
leaves, Worcestershire sauce, creole seasoning, dried thyme, hot sauce, sliced
green onions, hot cooked rice. Good recipes can be found on the web, but it is
recommended to enjoy gumbo just anywhere in South Louisiana. Seafood
gumbo is another favorite.
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the unexpected. Even in times of ecological disaster, after the 2010
explosion of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig and the BP oil spill, the
town of Morgan City not far from New Orleans and Baton Rouge
celebrated its “75th Shrimp and Petroleum Festival,” with the risk
of contaminating the gumbo with the wrong kind of oil.
Two of the initiators of Juris Diversitas have close links
with the Bayou State. 6 Juris Diversitas however did not originate
in the bayous. It was born in the back room of a tavern in the oldest
part of Edinburgh, at the end of the second Congress of the World
Society of Mixed Jurisdiction Jurists, in July 2007. While savoring
haggis and indulging beer or scotch, we discussed many possible
words that go beyond the idea of a mix. “Contamination”
happened to be the word of the night. P.G. Monateri had used it
once in the context of the law, in an article focusing on legal
discourse and the importance of legal cultures. 7 It is not a clean
and comfortable word like the floral “hybrid” or “transplant,” it
sounds less inviting than “reception” or “circulation,” and less law
and economics than the “import and export” speech. It has
unhealthy, dirty overtones. The announcement of a world
conference on Legal Contamination may not sound very appealing
and yet, as Monateri’s article points out (though without
elaborating on the meaning of the word), it focuses on the legal
system that borrows and on the impact of the import on its legal
culture. 8 Monateri singles out “two major aspects of
comparativism: the ‘culture and difference’ branch and the ‘import
and export’ branch.” 9 Contamination clearly belongs to the
“culture and difference” branch.
Contamination, the ‘C’ word as we called it in later
communication, is not a fully negative term. When taken out of the
medical sphere where it typically indicates that something is going
wrong, the word may return to its etymological sense.

6. Seán Donlan grew up in Louisiana and received his juris doctor at
Louisiana State University, and though I grew up in Lyon where I studied and
taught law, very close to the Mediterranean, I now teach and operate at
Louisiana State University.
7. P.G. Monateri, The Weak Law: Contaminations and Legal Cultures, 13
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 575 (2003).
8. Id. at 591.
9. Id. at 578.
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Here is how I defended the use of the term in an email sent
to the participants to of the Edinburgh dinner on May 31, 2008, 10
before another meeting in Lyon, this time around andouillettes: 11
Contamination means “to enter in contact with.”
The Latin tamen (taminare) is the fact of touching,
and is also connected to impure contact. Of course
we have the prefix cum, with.
From an anthropological viewpoint, this is a very
rich concept, inviting [us] to revisit mix[edness]
with a new and less conventional eye. In an
anthropological perspective, all contact includes the
risk of being soiled.
Lawyers use taxonomies as ways of putting things
in closed boxes and do not like to admit the
existence of grey zones or contact zones where torts
are polluted by contracts and contracts by torts etc.
to take a conventional example where I did some
work. Too many lawyers view law as being pure
(see Kelsen and his still formidable influence on
legal thinking in the most positivist countries, like
France).
Physics and biology show that there is nothing such
as hermetic boundaries to things. There is no life
without contamination, of course with mechanisms
to fight or protect.
What I propose here is a reflection on the ‘C’ word, in view of a
better understanding of the heuristic value of the concept of
contamination in comparative legal scholarship. Contamination
happens when, voluntarily or by imposition, one system borrows
legal rules or institutions from another, creating a mix that differs
from the originating system. In a sense it is what happens in the
cauldron, where the mix of the ingredients may sometimes produce
an unexpected result. The same happens with social groups that
mix or remix, binding or not (like the sauce in the cauldron), and
not always in expected ways.
10.
11.

On file with the author.
Ignazio Castelluci, Seàn Donlan, and Olivier Moréteau participating.
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Monateri described French and German influences on the
Italian legal system, 12 concluding that “the borrowing system
resulted in a unique mixture of French and German patterns that
would have been unthinkable to either of the donor countries. This
‘contamination’ is inherent in the particular selectivity of
borrowing. From a wider perspective I maintain that this kind of
contamination in legal cultures is the key feature of borrowings
and transplants of legal patterns.” 13
The author further writes: “the process of importing and
exporting rules and institutions is an almost unconscious process of
integrating them into the ideology of the borrowing system. Thus,
the meaning of the borrowed institutions depends solely on the
struggle among the formants of the receiving system, which almost
always will produce something different from the original.” 14
However, Monateri also takes into account the ideology of the
original system: “I also think that the ideology of a system is very
often not merely a local product, but a contamination of several
local traits by foreign ones,” 15 which leads him to conclude that
“the actual legal world is more a world of contamination than a
world split in different families.” 16
IV. UNDERSTANDING CONTAMINATION
The word contamination focuses on contact and its
consequences. The contact with others is an unavoidable necessity
in personal and social life. We get born by contact, we feed and are
fed by contact, and we may die by contact. To enter into contact
with another may be for good or for evil. Cum tangere and later
cum taminare: enter in contact with; originally the word was used
in a religious context, with a meaning of impure contact. 17
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Monateri, supra note 7, at Part II.
Id. at 591.
Id. (italics are mine).
Id.
Id.
My main source is the D ICTIONNAIRE HISTORIQUE DE LA LANGUE
FRANÇAISE (Alain Rey ed., 2006), tracing not only the etymology of words but
the evolution of their meaning over time. Religion abandoned the word. Alain
Rey shows that in the 17th century, contaminate meant “soil by an impure
contact” (souiller par un contact impur, Furetière) but was marked as an “old”
word. Medicine gave it a revival in 1863. Contagion had given the French
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Note that linguists use the word contamination in a
perfectly neutral way. The Maltese language is a good example,
combining or recombining Latin with Semitic and Arabic. There is
no value judgment in describing a linguistic contamination. It is
apparently the same in the musical world.
In comparative law we no doubt prefer the use of more
neutral terms, especially if they avoid the idea of a soiling physical
contact. Influencer, to “influence,” is a much cleaner word. 18
Influence has to do with a flow, fluere, fluent . . . taking us
back to the ‘C’ word, influence also gave influenza, or flu!
We certainly make much use of the word influence in our
comparative work. The word has a very convenient distance and
fluidity, to refer once more to etymology. We can describe all kind
of influences, positive or negative, internal or external, legislative
or jurisprudential, doctrinal or from practice.
The word influence is conveniently neutral, devoid of the
troubling, possibly judgmental, dimension of the word
contamination. It also has the advantage of allowing reverse flows,
cross-influences.
I used it recently in the title of a workshop series that I
organized at LSU, but combined it with other words: Civil Law
and Common Law: Cross Influences, Contamination and
Permeability. 19

contagionner, which disappeared and was replaced by contaminer. The word
was the connection to pathology. A figurative sense was changer la nature de
quelque chose, “change the nature of something,” altérer, “alter.” Remarkably,
the word altérer or “alter” which means to render other has developed a
negative connotation.
18. In the 13th century (1240), the Latin influentia marked the flux coming
from stars or celestial luminaries, and acting on human behavior and the course
of things. Influence is distant and invisible and suits perfectly the word of
concepts and ideas. One forgets however that the word originally referred to
astrology, to describe the action of stars on human destiny. The word
“influence” was later in the 13th century extended to a slow and continuous
action exerted on a person or on a thing. In 1780, at least in French, the word
describes the authority or prestige of a person, leading others to adjust to her
views. In the 19th century (1814), the word enters the scientific language, to
describe in French, un effet produit à distance or “a remote effect.”
(DICTIONNAIRE HISTORIQUE DE LA LANGUE FRANÇAISE, supra note 17).
19. Papers published in 3 J. CIV. L. STUD. (2010).
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What is it that the ‘C’ word expresses and that you cannot
find in the other words? Why not stick to the clean and neutral
language of influence?
There is always the risk of being changed or altered by the
contact with otherness. Alter means other but also gave alteration,
with its negative connotation. The same can be said of
contamination. Our identity, our multiple identities, are under a
constant threat of change or alteration at the contact of others. We
never are the same, we change, and this is the history of the
Mediterranean people, this is the history of all people on earth.
Rome exerted political, military, and later religious
influence over much of the Mediterranean world. This influence
still shapes public and private life in many Mediterranean
countries. Some of the Greek influence largely receded from
Athens to Constantinople and from there to Moscow, moving away
from the Mediterranean, when Islam took control of much of the
region. The Ottoman Empire later disappeared but Islamic
populations and their culture presently penetrate many of the
countries that were once strongholds of the Roman influence. All
these movements must have an impact on the law, if not always as
enacted, at least as applied, not applied, or perceived by the people,
in other words on legal culture.
From this comes my question:
What does the word contamination add to the more
conventional
language
describing
these
phenomena? Reception, transplants, migration,
circulation, and the like describe the visible.
Contamination refers to the less visible. Its effects,
good or bad, may appear later on. A transplant may
take place with all its visible effects, yet generating
some invisible or less visible changes in the system
of the recipient and its legal culture. This is where
contamination takes place. 20

20. Olivier Moréteau, An Introduction to Contamination, 3 J. CIV. L. STUD.
9 (2010).
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V. MOVING AWAY FROM SELF-CENTERED ATTITUDES AND
UNDERSTANDING THE CONTAMINATIVE EFFECT OF WESTERN
LEGAL TRADITIONS
Contamination goes many ways and can be reciprocal. Its
study is conducive of legal pluralism, even in its most radical
forms. In the Mediterranean world, it can be addressed within the
civil law tradition, or wherever the civil law and the common law
intersect, among themselves or with other traditions such as Islam,
the Talmud, Canon law, or any other societal model producing,
weakening, or destroying norms.
One may think of possible contamination of the western
legal traditions by exogenous elements, though we are more likely
to find examples going the other way around. However, imagining
the civil law tradition or any western legal model as a
contaminating factor is disturbing to many. We western scholars
think highly of our legal traditions and systems, which were
exported as models. We know they are borrowed from even in
those places where we did not impose them. In addition, they are
actively marketed by international institutions such as the United
Nations and its multiple agencies, the World Bank, and the
International Monetary Fund.
The use of contamination when studying non-western
systems invites us to open our minds to the cultural experience of
others, in order to identify the changes that are taking place in their
systems and cultures under western influence. Changes cannot be
identified unless we first have a genuine understanding of what
these systems and cultures were prior to western influence,
whether we address the changes that were brought at the time of
colonization or in post-colonial times.
One must adopt a broad approach embracing as many
social and cultural parameters as possible, also inviting world
history to set the proper perspective. World history is made of
invasions and colonization conducive of pervasive influences.
Invasions and colonization have oftentimes been the fact of
“western” political powers that developed around the
Mediterranean or were substantially influenced by it. These powers
exported their faith, culture, and legal systems, largely born on the
coasts of the Mediterranean or its hinterland. The fact that

526

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 4

“western” invasions and colonization caused millions of people to
die and empires and cultures to collapse is a historical fact that we
must be mindful of, especially when investigating our present neocolonial age.
The indigenous people of Central and South America died
of contamination also in the medical sense. The conquistadors
brought sicknesses and diseases that were unknown to indigenous
people and against which they had no protection. True, some
unknown diseases were also brought back to the old world. Germs
are among the first things human beings exchange when traveling
and trading. Talking about culture, much the same happened.
Flourishing cultures and civilizations such as the Inca or the Aztec
nearly completely disappeared, to which we give the generic name
of Pre-Colombian, categorizing them from our western viewpoint.
Similar phenomena occurred at the same or different times in
Africa, in Asia, in the Pacific Rim, hitting sophisticated and less
sophisticated cultures that we keep assessing according to our
western standards. So called “westerners” sometimes mean it well:
many were or still are convinced that they bring positive things,
such as wealth, better health, better infrastructure, and a great legal
tradition, not to mention the troubling word “civilization,” casting
a blind eye on selfish motives and greed that lead western nations
and corporations to plunder natural and human resources of
“underdeveloped” nations.
Signs that we are convinced of the superiority of our
model, be it political, economic, legal etc., appear in the language
we use, centering the world on us. Our vision was first
Mediterranean centric, everything remote being barbarian; it then
became Eurocentric leaving others as salvages, before turning
“western centric,” which truly does not mean anything, hence our
preference for the word “global,” which conveniently undermines
what is not purely western or western influenced, once relegated to
a “third world.” We hide our western contaminative influence
under the conveniently neutral “global” term.
Comparatists are nowadays blamed for an almost exclusive
focus on western legal traditions: we either ignore the others or
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marginalize them, relegating them to “otherness.” 21 A few
prominent scholars propose to go beyond the western conception
of law and order, giving better access to the understanding of
Asian and African systems. 22 This cannot be done without
revisiting our theories of law and legal order, 23 adopting pluralist
views, 24 which is the raison d’être of the group Juris Diversitas.25
The concept of contamination helps towards a better understanding
of otherness and different approaches to the law.
When presenting this paper orally in Malta, I proposed to
explore the effect of contamination in the context of
“sophisticated” and “less sophisticated” legal systems. I pointed
out that sophistication is not a positive term, indicating that I did
not think highly of sophist philosophers. I am not sure however
that this is a legitimate disclaimer. It keeps projecting a western
vision of legal systems, because I am and remain a western jurist,
despite my efforts to learn from anthropologists: they tell us that in
order to understand other cultures, we cannot afford to stay at the
center. 26 I have to abandon a value-based approach and prefer a
more neutral one. Speaking of “western” and “non-western”
systems is not any better, since it means we keep mapping the
21. “Other conceptions of law and the social order:” RENÉ DAVID & DAVID
BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY (3rd ed., 1985);
RENÉ DAVID & CAMILLE JAUFFRET-SPINOSI, LES GRANDS SYSTÈMES DE DROIT
CONTEMPORAINS (11th ed., 2002).
22. See the many publications of Jacques Vanderlinden on African legal
systems and legal anthropology, for instance JACQUES VANDERLINDEN, LES
SYSTÈMES JURIDIQUES AFRICAINS (1983); and JACQUES VANDERLINDEN,
ANTHROPOLOGIE JURIDIQUE (1996). See also WERNER MENSKI, COMPARATIVE
LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT, THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF ASIA AND AFRICA (2006);
H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD (4th ed., 2010).
23. This is the major project conducted by MENSKI, supra note 22.
24. See MENSKI, supra note 22; Jacques Vanderlinden, Trente ans de
longue marche sur la voie du pluralisme juridique, 2 CAHIERS
D’ANTHROPOLOGIE DU DROIT 21 (2004); Jacques Vanderlinden, What Kind of
Lawmaking in a Global World–The Case of Africa, 67 LA. L. REV. 1043 (2007).
25. See http://jurisdiversitas.blogspot.com/ (Last visited December 12,
2011).
26. As Maurice Godelier writes, it is our effort to decenter that legitimates
anthropology as a social science: “C’est le travail de décentrement qui fait de
l’anthropologie une science sociale. ” MAURICE GODELIER, AU FONDEMENT DES
SOCIÉTÉS HUMAINES : CE QUE NOUS APPREND L’ANTHROPOLOGIE 63 (2007). At
pp. 52-64, Godelier explains that it is necessary in ethnology to understand in
order to compare and to compare in order to understand, pages that should be
read by all social science scholars. Id. at 52-64.
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world from where we are, unless I insist that it is the
Mediterranean cauldron that I place at the center, with my being
located in a remote position. At least it decenters me a little bit,
hopefully enhancing my cognitive self.
Let us look into the cauldron or in the vicinity, first visiting
contamination within the western legal systems. Let us also
venture some exploration outside the western world, addressing
systems where the western influence invited itself or was later
invited. Brief concluding remarks will take us back to the mare
nostrum.
VI. CONTAMINATION WITHIN WESTERN LEGAL SYSTEMS
I will make the case that western legal systems (I mean
national or local legal systems) contaminate one another. Two
examples will be briefly discussed, one takings us far away from
the cauldron but in a region where its influence is largely felt, and
another one bringing us back to Europe.
A. The Case of Louisiana
After the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, the Territory of
Orleans, later to become the State of Louisiana, resisted political
attempts to impose the common law. 27 The civil law was
maintained 28 and the adoption of a Digest of the Civil Laws in
1808 and of a Civil Code in 1825 confirmed that Louisiana
belonged to the civil law world at least as far as private substantive
law was concerned. The State Constitution contains provision that
prohibits the adoption of the common law by reference, 29 as had
been done in a number of other states. The Civil Code in its revised

27. For a detailed account, see GEORGE DARGO, JEFFERSON’S LOUISIANA:
POLITICS AND THE CLASH OF LEGAL TRADITIONS (Rev. ed. 2009).
28. Act of March 2, 1805, 8th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 Stat. 331, sec. 4.
29. LA. CONST. art. III, §15B: “A bill enacting, amending, or reviving a law
shall set forth completely the provisions of the law enacted, amended, or
revived. No system or code of laws shall be adopted by general reference to it.”
This provision appeared in the first Louisiana Constitution of 1812, § 11, and is
to be found in all subsequent versions.
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version makes provisions regarding its interpretation. 30 These
provisions, like the rest of the Code, are of civil law fabric. 31
The Civil Code however does not contain the entire
legislation governing matters that fall within the realm of private
law. Many statutory rules affecting matters dealt with in the Civil
Code are found in the Revised Statutes. They form Title 9 of the
Revised Statutes, under the heading of Civil Code Ancillaries.
Title 9 is just one among 56 titles. The big bulk of
legislation in Louisiana is to be found in the Revised Statutes. The
Revised Statutes are arranged in Titles running in alphabetic order,
with General Provisions in Title 1 and running from Aeronautics
(Title 2) to Wildlife and Fisheries (Title 56). 32
But there is more to it. The General Provisions of Title 1
start with a Chapter 1, Interpretation of Revised Statutes, which
contains interpretative provisions that differ from the traditional
rules to be found in the Civil Code and are of a common law
facture. For instance, R.S. 1:7 and 8, providing that singular may
denote plural and one gender may denote others, sound like
Section 6 of the British Interpretation Act 1978 or similar
provisions of other states’ codes. 33
As indicated by the amount of detail found therein, the
length of the provisions, the lack of systematic organization, the
heavy legislative style, the Revised Statutes are of common law
fabric, 34 a style alas to be found in too many recently revised
articles of the Louisiana Civil Code. Even when local universities
take efforts to teach the civil law, not all Louisiana judges are
trained in the civil law, and are more likely than not to apply
common law methods of interpretation when applying the Revised
Statutes, moving away from the civilian idea that a code is a
system where provisions are to be interpreted by reference to one
another. This is a sign of common law contamination. As a
consequence, Louisiana resembles its models just like a child
resembles both parents, having features of both but being a very
30. Articles 9-13, revised by 1987 La. Acts No. 124, § 1.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Though examples of overly detailed and verbose legislation can also be
found in most civil law jurisdictions.
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different entity. It is said to belong to the “third” legal family of
mixed jurisdictions,35 but may also be described as a legal system
of its own in a world of contaminations.
In another article, I discussed a way to resist this
contamination in order to maintain a civil law attitude, 36 but this
paper so far did not generate comments, indicating that whether
they like it or not, Louisianans can live with this form of
contamination. I also indicated somewhere else that the use of the
case method in the Louisiana law schools lead students, attorneys,
and judges to focus on cases and somehow neglect the analysis and
interpretation of Civil Code articles. 37
This being said, examples of contamination of United
States law by the civil law are many, the Uniform Commercial
Code offering a powerful one. As suggested above, such
contamination produces a result very distinct from what we
observe in civil law jurisdictions, due to the blending with a
predominantly common law culture.

35. VERNON V. PALMER, MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE: THE THIRD
LEGAL FAMILY (2001).
36. In An Introduction to Contamination, supra note 20. I recommend the
addition of the preliminary provision tailored on the model of the Civil Code of
Quebec, which may say:
The Civil Code comprises a body of rules governing basic
obligations and rights of citizens regarding their person,
property, and relations between persons and property which,
in all matters within the letter, spirit or object of its provisions,
lays down the jus commune, expressly or by implication. In
these matters, the Code is the foundation of all other laws,
although other laws may complement the Code or make
exceptions to it. It must be interpreted in harmony with the
general principles of law and subject to norms having a
constitutional nature.
Id. at 14-15.
37. Olivier Moréteau, De revolutionibus, The Place of the Civil Code in
Louisiana and in the Legal Universe, in LE DROIT CIVIL ET SES CODES:
PARCOURS À TRAVERS LES AMÉRIQUES 1, 16 (Jimena Ando Dorato, JeanFrédérick Ménard & Lionel Smith eds., 2011).
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B. The Case of the European Union
Until the first enlargement in 1973, the European
Communities developed a legal system largely influenced by the
French and to a lesser extent the German model. Common law
influence developed with the membership of Ireland and the
United Kingdom. The presence of common law judges on the
European Court of Justice had an impact on its practice, a point I
had a chance to discuss with the late Lord Slynn of Hadley, who
before becoming Lord of Appeal in Ordinary (1992-2002), served
as Advocate General (1981-1988) and Judge (1988-1992) on the
European Court; he was impressed by how much his continental
colleagues delighted in engaging in the art of distinction,
regardless of the fact that traditional civil law interpretation
methods command that where the law does not distinguish, we
should not distinguish. Interestingly, common law contamination
increased with the addition of ten member States in 2004, due to
more extensive use of the English language. English being the
natural language of the common law, and Europeans (with the
notable exception of the Scots), not being used to the practice of
the civil law in English, conceptual contamination is taking place,
a phenomenon pointed out by Louisiana scholars, who give a
number of significant examples. 38 French and German are less
used than in the past as the language of drafting and more and
more, other linguistic versions of regulations and directives happen
to be translated from the English. 39
Contamination goes the other way as well, with English
courts (re)discovering the teleological or purposive approach in
interpreting the treaties and directives, consciously borrowing from
the civil law tradition and less consciously contaminating the
method of interpretation of purely domestic statutes. After showing
38. Alain Levasseur & Vincenç Feliú, The English Fox in the Louisiana
Civil Law Chausse-Trappe: Civil Law Concepts in the English Language;
Comparativists Beware, 69 LA. L. REV. 715 (2009); Olivier Moréteau, Les
frontières de la langue et du droit: vers une méthodologie de la traduction
juridique, 61 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 695 (2009).
39. The phenomenon and ways to solve the problem were described before
the enlargement of 2004: Olivier Moréteau, Can English become the Common
Legal Language in Europe?, in COMMON PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE
LAW 405 (R. Schulze & G. Ajani eds., 2003).
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embarrassment caused by the use of general language in the
European treaty and directives and yet understanding that some
adjustment had to be made, 40 English courts moved away from
literal interpretation to adopt continental methodology, at least as
long as community law was to be applied. 41 This eventually
permeated the approach to interpretation even on matters not
connected to community law, 42 until the House of Lords finally
abandoned the prohibition to cite the records of parliamentary
proceedings when interpreting statutes. 43 A formidable evolution
took place, contribution to a “civilization of the common law.” 44
This offers no example of a weak system contaminated by a
stronger one, but of a strong system that largely resisted the
cultural influence of Roman law (though it borrowed some Roman
law techniques), 45 contaminated by an equally strong system.
The impact of legal practice is also to be explored in this
perspective. Much could be said of the impact of the export of
large law American and English law firms on the European
continent. 46
Let us turn to contamination outside the western world,
where examples of the “strong” contaminating the “weak” (to

40. Macarthys Ltd. v. Smith, [1979] 3 All E.R. 325 (Court of Appeal),
where the opinions of Lord Justice Lawton reflecting the English embarrassment
is to be contrasted with that of Lord Denning who understood what adjustments
were to be made.
41. See Garland v. British Rail Engineering Ltd., [1983] 2 A.C. 751 (Lord
Diplock at 771); Pickstone v. Freemans Plc., [1989] A.C. 66 (Lord Templeman
at 123; Lord Oliver of Aylmerton at 126-127); Litster v. Forth Dry Dock &
Engineering Co. Ltd., [1990] 1 A.C. 546.
42. P. Kinder-Gest, Primauté du droit communautaire et droit anglais ou
comment concilier l’inconciliable, 4 REVUE DES AFFAIRES EUROPÉENNES 19
(1991). The whole evolution is discussed in OLIVIER MORÉTEAU, DROIT
ANGLAIS DES AFFAIRES 49-51 (2000).
43. Pepper v. Hart, [1992] 3 W.L.R. 1032. The ban had first been lifted
regarding texts implementing EC law in Pickstone v. Freemans Plc., supra note
39.
44. H. Patrick Glenn, La civilisation de la common law, 45 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 559 (1993).
45. David J. Seipp, The Reception of Canon Law and Civil Law in the
Common Law Courts Before 1600, 13 O.J.L.S. 388 (1993).
46. YVES DEZALAY, MARCHANDS DE DROIT. LA RESTRUCTURATION DE
L'ORDRE JURIDIQUE INTERNATIONAL PAR LES MULTINATIONALES DU DROIT
(1992).
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move back to Monateri’s terminology) 47 are expected to
predominate.
VII. CONTAMINATION OUTSIDE THE WESTERN WORLD
The less organized and sophisticated a legal system is, the
more it is likely to be contaminated by imports from other legal
traditions. Such systems may not be equipped with antibodies
limiting the impact of the import on their legal practice and culture.
During colonial times, the very existence of law in “primitive
societies” was simply denied, and this is particularly the case when
addressing Africa. 48 Negative views about Africa were expressed
long before colonization, by the ancient Greeks and later the
Romans. 49
There is much we can learn from anthropologists and a few
comparatists about laws in Africa, especially when they adopt
pluralist views. 50 One may safely write that the confrontation with
western culture has caused (colonialism by the western powers)
and is still causing (neo-colonialism by multinational companies)
much disruption and destruction in non-western cultures, proving
the dangers of contamination.
Two examples will take us far away from the
Mediterranean Sea.
A. The Example of Bhutan
Commenting on a short experience that I had in Bhutan, I
wrote:
One must beware not to impose an exogenous
western model to people who live under different
customs and a different view of what we call legal
order. Let us first check with them to determine

47.
48.
49.
50.

Monateri, supra note 7.
MENSKI, supra note 22.
Id.
See the writings of Jacques Vanderlinden.
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whether they really need what may look essential to
us. 51
In November 1999, I was invited to participate in a one-week
seminar sponsored by the United Nations Development Program in
the Himalayan Kingdom of Bhutan, one of the very few “third
world” countries having escaped western colonization. One US
judge, one US attorney, one Indian law professor and one Indian
attorney participated in addition to me, and the forty local
participants were legal professionals from the judiciary,
government ministries, the financial institutions and the private
sector. I chaired the seminar sessions, which had the overambitious project, in a very short period of time (one week) to
investigate the legal aspects of commercial practice in the
kingdom, and to disseminate some basic western knowledge in the
field. In my opening statements, I said:
I would also like to express my deep admiration for
Bhutan and the Bhutanese and your tradition to
solve disputes without resorting to the courts and
the law. You might have heard that there is a rather
recent movement, in western countries, to promote
informal justice, by way of mediation and
conciliation. We use the generic term of alternative
dispute resolution. We certainly have a lot to learn
from you in this respect and it would be very good
to invite you in our countries for seminars on the
subject. I do not know whether that could be
covered by the UNDP 52 . . . We should not forget
this tradition and it is our duty, we foreign experts,
to try to understand your culture and legal tradition.
If we want to bring you something and help, we
may only be efficient if listening to you and
understanding your problems and existing
solutions. 53
51. Olivier Moréteau, Post Scriptum to Law Making in a Global World:
From Human Rights to a Law of Mankind, 67 LA. L. REV. 1223, 1223 (2007).
52. Never again did the UNDP invite my contribution.
53. Olivier Moréteau, Remarks at the Seminar on Commercial Law,
Thimphu (Nov. 1999) (on file with the author). On Bhutan, see Alessandro
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During the fourth day of the seminar, secured transactions and
bankruptcy were discussed. The American lawyer leading the
debate recommended that the customary rule whereby a minimum
five acres of land is protected for each family be abandoned, so
that individual entrepreneurs could use such land as collateral. I
remember my efforts in having the resource persons and the local
participants think about the consequences of such a change, in a
country where 90% of the population make a living out of farming
and where famine is practically unknown. Such a change could
accelerate rural exodus with its flow of adverse consequences.
B. The Example of Vanuatu
When created in 1980 after the independence of the BritishFrench condominium of the New Hebrides, the Republic of
Vanuatu kept a complex legal system with colonial law remaining
in force unless changed by the legislature. It meant a mix of
English common law and French civil law, “wherever possible
taking due account of custom.” 54 French law was immediately
abandoned but the country remained multilingual, with English
and French retaining a special status of language of education. 55
Recent research on the interaction of norms in the Republic of
Vanuatu 56 reveals that judges tend to ignore and despise custom,
and that local chiefs are intimidated and do not manage to

Simoni, A Language for Rules, another for Symbols: Linguistic Pluralism and
Interpretation of Statutes in the Kingdom of Bhutan, in L’INTERPRÉTATION DES
TEXTES JURIDIQUES RÉDIGÉS EN PLUS D’UNE LANGUE 273 (Rodolfo Sacco ed.,
2002).
54. Constitution, art. 95(2) reads,
Until otherwise provided by Parliament, the British and
French laws in force or applied in Vanuatu immediately before
the Day of Independence shall on and after that day continue
to apply to the extent that they are not expressly revoked or
incompatible with the independent status of Vanuatu and
wherever possible taking due account of custom.
55. Constitution, art. 3(1) reads, “The national language of the Republic of
Vanuatu is Bislama. The official languages are Bislama, English and French.
The principal languages of education are English and French.”
56. Laurent Chassot, Juridicité et internormativité: Les défis des droits préeuropéens entre exception et globalisation, l’application au Vanuatu, (2009)
(unpublished doctoral dissertation, Université Paris 1).
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communicate adequately to make their custom known to the judge.
The inferiority complex of the local population causes its culture to
be contaminated by the dominating model, though the supreme law
of the land gives a special status to custom, especially regarding
the ownership of land. 57
This is a powerful example of contamination of local
practice by the western model. When traveling in Bhutan and
Vanuatu, I have discovered rich local legal traditions, and yet
always the shy deference to westerners who supposedly know
better and are expected to tell the locals how to do it. As Monateri
says in his article, 58 and Menski explains in his book, 59 we cannot
develop comparative law leaving rapports de force and culture on
the side. The concept of contamination proves to be a powerful
tool in our genuine efforts to go beyond the study of legal
techniques, rules, and institutions, in order to understand how legal
formants interplay and how they blend in unique legal cultures. 60
VIII. CODA:
OF KNOWLEDGE AND CONTAMINATION, BACK TO GENESIS
Bringing knowledge to man is a dangerous exercise. Our
Creator knows it, but did we understand his message? Let us revisit
the first book of the Bible. Genesis, Chapter 2, mentions the
forbidden fruit. As a human being and a scholar, I never
understood why God would restrict access to knowledge,
prohibiting man from eating the fruit of the tree of knowledge.
“And out of the ground made the Lord God to grow every
tree that is pleasant to the sight, and good for food; the tree of life
also in the midst of the garden, and the tree of knowledge of good

57. Constitution, art. 74 reads: “The rules of custom shall form the basis of
ownership and use of land in the Republic of Vanuatu.”
58. Supra note 7.
59. Supra note 22.
60. With a pastiche of the final verses of Hamlet, Jacques Vanderlinden (Is
the Pre-20th Century American Legal System a Common Law System? An
Exercise in Legal Taxonomy, 4 J. CIV. L. STUD. 1, 21 (2011)) invites us to leave
our dear little boxes or categories on the side: “Here cracks a noble scientific
process, Good night sweet taxonomy, And flights of angels sing thee to thy
rest.”
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and evil.” 61 A few verses down: “And the Lord God commanded
the man, saying, Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat:
But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou
shalt not eat of it: for in the day that thou eatest thereof
thou shalt surely die.” 62
Did our loving God mind our having access to the
knowledge of good and evil? After all, He created, “man in his
own image, in the image of God created He him; male and female
created He them?”63 May be He simply tried to protect us from the
danger of contamination, to those not prepared to contact with
some kind of knowledge. Beyond the risk of too much information
(a real threat in the present world) this points to the danger of not
being open-minded and placing too much reliance on officially
recognized sources.
The Sacred Book tells us that our ancestors were cursed
and expelled from the Garden of Eden. 64 Paintings and engravings
show them bending and suffering. They might have eaten too
much of the forbidden fruit, and were not prepared for it. They had
to run not to soil the Paradise God had given to them, and the angel
shows them the way out.
Let’s face it, Adam and Eve would have been better off
picking and mixing fruit from the many various trees God had
grown around them. He might have cast a blind eye on their using
one apple from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, diluting
its effect in a diversified fruit salad. 65
As the Book goes saying, Adam and Eve multiplied. Their
offspring populated the surface of the earth, experiencing wars,
famines, and epidemics. They cultivated the land, built cities, and
developed empires. Cities grew larger and larger; men
domesticated nature and the elements, tamed unknown energies. In
recent generations, human development ran out of control, like a
cancer that threatens the future of our species. This time we have

61. Genesis 2, 9:9, King’s James Version.
62. Genesis 2:16-17.
63. Genesis 1:27.
64. Genesis 3:9-24.
65. Back to the legal field, this contributes to a famous salad bowl: Esin
Örücü, Law as Transposition, 51 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 205 (2002).
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soiled the earth, but unlike Adam and Eve, we have no other place
where to go.
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ABSTRACT
This article 1 starts by critiquing two recent attempts to
sociologically account for court delays in Mediterranean societies.

∗ Senior Lecturer in Law & Anthropology, Head of Department of Civil
Law, University of Malta, Malta; Executive Editor, Mediterranean Journal of
Human Rights; LL.D., University of Malta; Ph.D. in Legal Anthropology,
University of Durham. His central research interest is the ethnographic study of
legal processes.
1. An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the European University
Institute’s 10th Mediterranean Research meeting held in Montecatini Terme
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The first account was produced by the sociologist David Nelken
and uses the concept of legal culture to explore the causes of court
delays in Italian criminal trials, while the second account was
produced by the anthropologist Michael Herzfeld, who sees court
delays in Crete as metonymically encapsulating a broader cultural
context. It is argued that both accounts omit an important
dimension of the issue, which is how such delays are produced and
justified at the level of legal practice itself. By referring to the
author’s fieldwork in the Maltese civil courts it is argued that court
delays are best explained with reference to the social relations
involved in legal practice, particularly those between lawyers and
clients. Delays must be related to the ways in which lawyers see
their role in litigation and these professional understandings are in
turn connected to the kinds of expectations that their clients have
of them.
In this article particular attention will be paid to discursive
invocations of these professional understandings by Maltese
lawyers in the mid-1990’s, while resisting administrative reforms
intended to streamline the procedures through which evidence is
compiled in court. Delays were justified as necessary
consequences of the lawyer’s professional role as locally
understood. This is possible as, although often considered as
synonymous with corruption, delay as a professional strategy is
capable of signalling an extraordinary range of meanings. In
particular, delay makes it possible for lawyers both to affirm and to
traverse the distance between everyday and legal concepts of
evidence, truth and reality. Delay is an intrinsic part of the
practical symbolism through which the specificity of “the legal” is
enacted. Through delay Maltese lawyers cope with the specific
demands of their clients by performing specific professional
understandings of legal representation as a matter of balancing
between patronage and professional detachment. The generative
matrix of these professional understandings can itself be located in
the colonial encounters which shaped Maltese legal history and its
mixed jurisdiction.

(March 25-28, 2009). I am grateful to the participants of the workshops for their
helpful feedback and advice.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Although it evokes orientalising scholarly tropes about
“weak states” in Southern Europe and “Mediterranean time,” the
issue of delays in Mediterranean court litigation appears as an
interesting target of ethnographic investigation. This is not only
because these delays feature so prominently within internal and
external discourses about corruption, the nature of the state and
(the lack of) efficient governance, but also because the study of
how they are created and justified in practice requires precisely the
sort of detailed examination of the practices of judges, advocates
and other court-room actors that is needed in order to overcome the
dichotomy between “law in the books” and “law in action.” 2
Recent research by the anthropologist Michael Herzfeld
and the sociologist David Nelken can serve to indicate why
researching court delays may produce a broad range of insights
into Mediterranean states and societies. Nelken 3 focuses on the
causes of court delays in Italian criminal trials. He seeks an
explanation in a range of factors drawn from both “internal legal
culture” (including the organizational structure of the courts and a
tendency to multiply procedural safeguards) and “external legal
culture” (including such factors as the general tempo of Italian
social life and the contested character of the state). By contrast,
Herzfeld 4 sees court delays in Crete as rooted in a broader cultural
context, where the accusatory rhetoric of clients and the attitudes
they bring to their dealings with state officials are matched by
various defensive responses on the part of the bureaucrats,
particularly delay. While these investigations consider court delays
as a sort of window capable of giving us glimpses into very diverse
aspects of Greek and Italian social and cultural organisation, they
can also be criticized for neglecting to examine an important
dimension of the phenomenon, which is that of legal practice itself.
2. This distinction originated in the work of Roscoe Pound’s distinction
and has now become the starting point of most research in the field of Law and
Society.
3. David Nelken, Using the Concept of Legal Culture, 29 AUSTRALIAN J.
OF LEG. PHIL. (2004), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/csls/lss/20 (Last
visited November 9, 2011).
4. MICHAEL HERZFELD, A PLACE IN HISTORY (Princeton University Press,
Princeton, 1991).
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Asking how delays are experienced and justified at the level of
legal practice means adopting an ethnographic perspective which
focuses our attention less on generic features of culture and social
structure, or even of legal culture, 5 and more on the practical
choices which must be made by the parties involved, particularly
the lawyers, in the course of the actual litigation when these delays
materialise and must be somehow justified or accounted for.
Using the ethnography of legal practice as a prism through
which to explore court delays requires a microscopic focus on the
social relationships through which the work of legal representation
is carried out, particularly those between lawyers, clients and
judges, and it also requires us to remember that each of the parties
involved is a “theorising agent” 6 in his/her own right. As court
litigation is largely controlled by legal professionals, such as
lawyers and judges, their theories concerning appropriate
professional practice must be interrogated in order to discover how
court delays can coexist with a professional self-image. Framing
the inquiry in this way follows the trend in the sociology of the
professions to view professionalism as primarily an “emic” or folkconcept and investigate it as such. 7 It has the added advantage that
it avoids making unwarranted and ethnocentric assumptions that
the content of professional ideals is the same in all European legal
systems, that the pursuit of these ideals necessarily leads lawyers
to promote the public interest, 8 or that delay is an inevitable result
of corruption and a failure of professionalism.
An ethnographic approach, which concentrates on the role
played by professional ideals in the daily practice of lawyers,
makes it possible to overcome what has been described as the:
5. That is, assuming that legal culture is conceived as a distinctive way of
structuring and organising the legal field. See, Nelken supra note 2.
6. MICHAEL HERZFELD, ANTHROPOLOGY THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS,
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989).
7. See, Pierre Bourdieu, Thinking about Limits, in CULTURAL THEORY
AND CULTURAL CHANGE 42 (Mike Featherstone ed., Sage, London, 1992);
TERRENCE JOHNSON, PROFESSIONS AND POWER (Macmillan, London, 1972);
Sarah Cant & Ursula Sharma, Reflexivity, ethnography and the professions
(complementary medicine). Watching you watching me watching you (and
writing about both of us), EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE SOC. REV. 246 (Oxford,
Blackwell Publishers 1998).
8. RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS, (Oxford University Press,
New York & Oxford, 1989).
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“arbitrary separation between the sociology of law and the
sociology of the legal profession.” 9 Such an approach makes
visible the complex inter-relationships between professional ideals
and the specific social and cultural contexts in which they are
implemented. At the same time a purely ethnographic, “presenttense” approach itself needs to be embedded within the broader
social and historical framework provided by social anthropology.
II. FIELDWORK IN MALTA
This paper will draw on my anthropological fieldwork,
carried out in the Mediterranean island-state of Malta, to examine
the ways in which Maltese lawyers interpret and invoke
professional ideals in the course of their legal practice and when
confronting recent administrative reforms to the court procedures
for compiling evidence. These themes will here be approached
from the standpoint of my fieldwork on legal practice in Malta.
Initial fieldwork was carried out for a total of twenty-two months
between April 1996 and May 1997, followed by shorter periods of
field research in 2002 and 2006. 10 It was based on participant
observation in the offices of four Maltese lawyers 11 and in the civil
courts. I had access to these offices because I have a law degree,
having trained in law before studying anthropology. My research
concentrated on the ways in which lawyers and clients negotiate
the “facts” of the case, the production of evidence during court
litigation and its assessment during adjudication. The aim was to
acquire a holistic understanding of Maltese legal representation in
civil litigation by exploring the social relations through which it is
carried out. Through focusing on legal practice, I tried to build on
my own legal background so as to carry out a more reflexive and
practice-orientated ethnography, of the sort that sociologist Pierre

9. Ruth Buchanan, Constructing Virtual Justice in the Global Arena, 31:2
L. & SOC. REV. 364 (1997).
10. I am grateful to the Universities of Malta and Durham for funding my
research. This was made possible through a staff scholarship by the University
of Malta and an ORS grant on the part of the University of Durham.
11. According to my calculations, there were during the period of my
research close to three hundred lawyers involved in court litigation.

544

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 4

Bourdieu has recommended. 12 In 2010, I expanded the scope of
my research to explore the historical development of court delays
in Malta by means, primarily of documentary research.
III. SCOPE OF THIS INVESTIGATION
This paper will initially focus on the pressures clients place
on their lawyers in office interviews. Against this backdrop, the
way Maltese lawyers interpret and invoke professional ideals in
their legal practice will be explored. This will be followed by an
ethnographically informed case study of the reforms attempted by
the Maltese government in 1996 to court procedures for compiling
evidence, which will attempt to account for the failure of these
reforms and in the process highlight the defensive and largely
obstructive responses of legal professionals and the role played by
professional ideals in legitimating these responses. This article will
then explore how Maltese legal practice was described by
practitioners in 1912 and relate this to the trends which were
observed during my fieldwork. Finally, some more general
conclusions about the character of the Maltese legal system will be
attempted.
IV. LAWYER/CLIENT INTERVIEWS
Office interviews with lawyers, in which clients
communicate the facts and receive legal advice and guidance, are
an indispensable starting point to explore the social uses of
professional ideologies. These interviews are central to
lawyer/client interaction as during their discussion of the case both
parties will also informally negotiate their relationship. During my
fieldwork, story-telling was the most prominent feature of the
interviews I observed. While my training in law had led me to
expect clients to state “facts” structured according to legal
categories, what I experienced was a more confused and contested
process. Rural and working class clients in particular would
smuggle stories stressing their own morally upright behaviour
12. PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE (Polity Press, Cambridge,
1997).
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within their narrative accounts of the facts. Such stories were told
despite the inattention of lawyers and even though they seemed
legally irrelevant. In one case, for instance, a small rural
businessman seeking his lawyers’ help in some financial
transactions, explained that he had always “walked straight,” (i.e.,
acted honourably) and that while he was prepared to give away
free gifts, he could not tolerate being robbed by others. Similarly, a
working-class widow who was trying to repatriate her husband’s
money kept insisting with her lawyer that she did not want this
money for herself, but so as to leave it to her children equally in
the event of her death. The persistence of clients in recounting
these personalised stories seemed even more paradoxical since
lawyers told me that their only aim was to get the facts straight and
disclaimed any interest in the moral qualities of their clients: “who
should only be judged once.”
Certain features of clients’ stories throw light on their
significance. These narratives create moral sympathy for clients
because they inject powerful cultural values into descriptions of
past actions. This can be illustrated by the story of the rural
businessman earlier mentioned. He talked about “walking
straight”, because in Maltese “walking” is used metaphorically to
morally evaluate the way in which a person relates to others. A
person who “walks straight” is one who avoids corrupting social
obligations which
deviate one’s life-walk, impeding
straightforward adherence to moral ideals. Consequently the
businessman endowed himself with an honourable autonomy,
which could be used to exert pressure on his lawyer, 13 authorising
him to express powerful emotions and thump on his desk in anger
at being robbed. Through these stories, moreover, clients also try
to translate their moral virtue into legal entitlement in their
lawyers’ eyes. This is made explicit in the businessman’s case,
since the expression: nimxi dritt, or “I walk straight” plays on the
way dritt in Maltese not only means straightness, but also a legal
right, or even the undifferentiated whole of legal and moral rules.

13. Analogously, by stressing her impartial concern for her children, the
widow sought to portray herself as a good wife and mother as the role was
traditionally conceived in Malta.
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This analysis indicates that clients’ narratives are best
understood not solely as ways of communicating the facts, but also
as attempts to control their relationships with their lawyers. They
operate as what linguist Deborah Tannen 14 has called:
“involvement strategies,” since they are a medium through which
clients can involve lawyers in personal relationships based on
shared moral values, obliging them to actively “advocate” their
interests. Anthropologists have observed such patronage
relationships in Malta 15 and elsewhere in the Mediterranean
region. 16 Their ideological structure has been aptly described as:
“the moral englobing of political asymmetry that allows the client
to maintain self-respect while gaining material advantage.” 17
Clients use various strategies to try to create these patronage
relationships. 18
These efforts to create patronage derive from complex
social causes, which can only be briefly indicated here. Some seem
to be common to other Mediterranean societies. Thus, Herzfeld 19
has related the need for mechanisms of social incorporation in
Greek society to the absence of a fully integrated capitalist
economy, the competitive and hostile character of extra-familial
social relations and the weakness and relative youth of the nationstate. 20 Other causes relate more specifically to Malta, such as the
14. DEBORAH TANNEN, TALKING VOICES: REPETITION, DIALOGUE AND
IMAGERY IN CONVERSATIONAL DISCOURSE (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1989).
15. JEREMY BOISSEVAIN, SAINTS AND FIREWORKS: RELIGION AND POLITICS
IN RURAL MALTA (Progress Press Co. Ltd, Valletta, Malta, 1993).
16. JOHN K CAMPBELL, HONOUR, FAMILY, AND PATRONAGE (Oxford
University Press, New York & Oxford, 1974).
17. Michael Herzfeld, ‘As In Your Own House:’ Hospitality, Ethnography
and the Stereotype of Mediterranean Society, in HONOUR AND SHAME AND THE
UNITY OF THE MEDITERRANEAN 86 (Gilmore ed., Princeton University Press,
Princeton, 1987).
18. For instance, I often observed Maltese clients give gifts to their lawyers
and trying to involve them in discussions about non-legal matters. Gifts ranged
from the proverbial bottle of whisky in Christmas to providing free access to a
beach resort owned by the client.
19. MICHAEL HERZFELD, THE SOCIAL PRODUCTION OF INDIFFERENCE:
EXPLORING THE SYMBOLIC ROOTS OF WESTERN BUREAUCRACY (Chicago
University Press, Chicago, 1993).
20. Herzfeld explains that consequently the Greek nation-state has not
absorbed into itself all the idioms of social identity; so that these can function
independently of and be employed to contest the state structure. Id.
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historically derived sense of alienation of the Maltese from a state
apparatus belonging to a foreign colonial power 21 or the modelling
of political power on Catholic religion with its stress on saintly
mediators between person and God. 22 In a small-scale society
impersonality can become a scarce (and valued) commodity. As
one Maltese proverb has it: “Malta is small and people are
known.” 23
Popular perceptions of lawyers and the court system may
also motivate clients to try to create patronage relationships.
Rampant delays in litigation have given a bad name to the Maltese
courts and clients may seek their lawyers’ patronage to ensure that
their cases are handled efficiently. The ambiguous social role of
lawyers as mediators between their clients and the state legal
system may make it difficult to discover whose side the lawyer is
on. If middle-class clients complained about the links between
lawyers and criminals, those coming from a rural or working-class
background saw lawyers as part of a dominating and exploitative
upper class. Significantly, it is the clients who were the most
socially distant from the urban professional classes who often
seemed to be trying hardest to involve their lawyers in patronage
relationships.
It seems clear, therefore, that Maltese lawyers often come
under intense pressure from clients, especially those coming from a
rural or lower-class background, who try to create personal
relationships with them in order to control the way they carry out
their work. Clients make indirect attempts to develop these
patronage ties, evoking moral sympathy through the way they
narrate the “facts” of the case. This strategy is difficult to rebuff,
given the “inescapably moral” 24 quality of the stories through
which the “facts” are communicated.

21. EDWARD L. ZAMMIT, A COLONIAL INHERITANCE: MALTESE
PERCEPTIONS OF WORK, POWER AND CLASS STRUCTURE WITH REFERENCE TO
THE LABOUR MOVEMENT (Malta University Press, Malta, 1984).
22. BOISSEVAIN, supra note 14.
23. In Maltese this reads: “Malta zghira u n-nies maghrufa.”
24. JEROME BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING 50 (Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA, 1990).
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V. THE SOCIAL USES OF PROFESSIONAL IDEALS
Lawyers’ professional ideals have here been approached
from the standpoint of their interviews with clients. This is because
these ideals are not simply abstract principles to which lawyers pay
lip-service. On the contrary, they have a direct practical
application, helping to equip lawyers to cope with the pressures
clients place on them. These social uses of professional ideals are
revealed by the way they are taught to new generations of lawyers.
Until recently professional ethics were not fully incorporated into
the standard academic curriculum of the University of Malta. They
are still mostly transmitted to young lawyers by practitioners
during the liminal period of transition from the University to legal
practice. 25 Moreover a Maltese code of professional ethics for
lawyers was only published in 1996. 26 Thus the transmission of
professional ideology is still largely seen as part of a process of
oral socialisation through which young lawyers learn to view
themselves as members of a professional community with its own
distinct interests.
An important practical use of professional ideals is that of
justifying lawyers’ non-response to their clients’ stories. During
my fieldwork, I often observed lawyers keeping a sceptical
distance based on the need to preserve their professional
detachment. This refusal to fully endorse clients’ narratives was
signalled by the ironical comments lawyers sometimes made, the
contextual absurdity of which showed they were not taken in. 27 A
sense of professional detachment could also be transmitted through
25. Generally professional ethics are taught in the final year of the LL.D.
course, which was until very recently perceived as a period when the academic
teaching of law was at an end, so that students concentrate on their
apprenticeship and on preparing their theses. Professional ethics are also
favourite subjects for speeches on such occasions as the granting of the
professional warrant, or in seminars organised by the law students’ society.
26. Reference is made to the Code of Ethics and Conduct for Advocates,
published in 1996 by the Commission for the Administration of Justice, The
Palace, Valletta, Malta.
27. For instance, in one case, a landlord kept telling his lawyer what a
gentlemanly relationship he enjoyed with his tenants, while he also sought
advice on how he could legally increase the rent. His lawyer calmly observed
that as the tenants were professional people, it was going to be difficult for the
landlord to make fools of them!
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formal clothing, the organisation of space in legal offices 28 and an
aloof attitude when interacting with clients. These invocations of
professional ideals clearly reflect attempts by lawyers to resist
entanglement in patron/client relationships.
The connection between the professional ideals upheld by
Maltese lawyers and their clients’ involvement strategies can be
perceived by exploring the way the task of legal representation is
described according to professional ideology. The comments of
one established and highly respected lawyer are typical in this
regard. When interviewed on this point, this lawyer made a
distinction between the “case,” which the lawyer is duty bound to
present to the court as effectively as possible, and “facts,” which
are “in the hands of the client” to prove. 29 He observed that the
stories clients tell under oath and in the courtroom context are
often very different from the ones they originally told their
lawyers. Consequently facts should emerge in the courtroom
setting of an oral hearing, which he termed a “search for truth”
undertaken before the judge. He therefore objected to the use of
written affidavits 30 as an alternative way of collecting evidence;
claiming that they tempted lawyers to write their clients’ stories for
them and risk perjuring themselves. He also observed that he had
never witnessed a signature in the absence of the person
concerned.
Thus, professional ideals portray legal representation as a
process where the lawyer’s concern with the issues at stake is
distinguished from that of her client. Lawyers are concerned solely
with the “case,” consisting of the legal arguments and claims to be
made. 31 It is the client’s primary responsibility to prove the “facts,”
on the basis of which these legal arguments are raised. This
distinction establishes a conceptual boundary between the domain
28. Professional detachment was conveyed by maintaining a spatial
demarcation between the ‘front office,’ where clients wait and their files are
located and the ‘inner office,’ where lawyers sit surrounded by law-books.
29. In Maltese this reads: “Il-fatti f’idejn il-kljent.”
30. An affidavit is a written statement of the client’s version of the facts.
They are supposed to be precise reproductions of their stories and clients must
confirm them on oath. Maltese judges are increasingly requesting the
presentation of affidavits instead of oral testimony.
31. Lawyers are prepared to accept more involvement with the facts in
criminal cases.
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of the client, which is one of potentially changeable oral stories of
dubious credibility, and the domain of the lawyer, which is one of
legally valid writing. By drawing such a boundary, lawyers escape
responsibility for proving their clients’ stories, confining their role
to legal argumentation. In fact, Maltese lawyers constantly assert
their detachment through expressions like: “trying to win the case
for the client,” which imply they have no personal interest in the
outcome. 32
This professional model of legal representation is
significant for two principal reasons. Firstly, it is almost
diametrically opposed to the way most clients would like to
construct their working relationships with lawyers. Whereas clients
would like to start from a moral consensus with their lawyers
concerning the facts of the case, the professional model requires
lawyers to base their court-room representation on a prima facie
assessment of the facts which is solely intended to clarify the legal
issues involved. Clients often believe that once they take on a case,
lawyers assume responsibility for ensuring a successful outcome in
the court-room. By contrast, the professional model places the
burden of producing convincing evidence firmly in the hands of
the client, restricting the lawyer’s role to “purely legal”
argumentation. 33 Consequently, although the client might feel that
this is unethical, the professional model authorises a lawyer to
institute a court case on behalf of an insistent client even if the
lawyer believes that he will lose the case because his evidence is
not sufficiently persuasive or credible. 34 Evidence belongs in the
clients’ hands and lawyers are distanced from any responsibility
for it.
Secondly and more importantly, it seems clear that
professional ideals which have the effect of distancing them from
32. Strictly speaking, lawyers have no financial interest in winning lawsuits. This is because their fees are calculated according to an official tariff,
according to such matters as the value of the object of the suit. Naturally,
however, lawyers who consistently lose suits will probably fail to attract as
many clients as others.
33. Thus, clients’ views on affidavits contrast to those of lawyers. In fact,
clients complained to me that their lawyers had barely glanced at the affidavits
they wrote. While clients expected their lawyers to take responsibility for the
evidence, this is precisely what the latter wanted to avoid.
34. Of course the lawyer has a recognised duty to inform his client that he
thinks he will lose the case.
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responsibility for the “facts” can be very useful to lawyers in a
social context where clients try to use their narration of the “facts”
to implicate them in patronage relationships. I suggest that Maltese
lawyers favour an extensive interpretation of the meaning of
professional detachment when representing clients in litigation
precisely because it allows them to escape the pressures which
clients exert through the medium of the “facts.” If this is correct,
then it shows how the interpretation of professional ideals is
influenced by the practical context in which it occurs.
This analysis is open to the objection that I have overemphasised the homogeneity of Maltese lawyers, ignoring the
occupational differentiation of the profession and possible
differences in style and approach which might lead to different
interpretations of professionalism. However, the internal
differentiation of the Maltese legal profession is not very great. My
statistics 35 show that when my ethnographic research commenced
in the mid 1990’s, 44% of lawyers were sole private practitioners,
28% were employed with law-firms and 13% with the
Government. The remainder was either non-practising or employed
with various private companies. Moreover, Maltese law-firms are
usually small partnerships where the type of work closely
resembles that of a sole practitioner. Indeed, only four of the lawfirms listed in 1994 had a membership of seven or more and the
largest of these grouped eleven lawyers. In the exercise of their
profession, most firm lawyers find that it is important to be flexible
and to be prepared to carry out different types of work, even if they
have specialised in certain fields. 36
Stylistic differences in handling clients exist and they do
seem to be broadly correlated to occupational status. Sole
practitioners are more likely to devote time to listening to their
clients and to provide some endorsement of their stories, while
firm lawyers tend to place a higher premium on efficient time
management. However most lawyers find it necessary to
35. Data was culled from the ‘Legal and Court Directory’ produced by the
Camera degli Avvocati, the Maltese lawyers’ association. The directory contains
a list of practising lawyers which can be considered as fairly exhaustive, given
that practically all practising lawyers are members. I consulted the 1994 and
1992 issues of this Directory.
36. This is due to the small size of Malta, which means that the number of
legal jobs available in any area of practice is necessarily limited.
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strategically balance between patronage and professionalism when
handling clients. The attractions of professionalism are obvious,
since it frees lawyers from clients’ pressures and allows greater
efficiency. Yet there are important reasons why even firm lawyers
find that they cannot avoid acting as if they were, to some extent,
their clients’ patrons. 37 Thus, as already observed, many clients
want to create patronage relationships and lawyers, who operate in
a very competitive market, are eager not to alienate them.
Moreover certain clients do not feel able to confide secrets to their
lawyers unless they have a personal relationship with them.38
Finally, as was previously argued, patronage relations are in a way
in-built into clients’ stories.
It follows that despite the existence of occupational and
stylistic differences among Maltese lawyers, they generally attempt
to strike a balance by providing limited endorsement of their
clients’ narratives while also trying to emphasise their professional
detachment from them. Few lawyers are willing to forego the
benefits of belonging to the “Professjoni Libera,” or “free
profession” as they call it, by wholeheartedly identifying
themselves with their clients in patronage relationships. Indeed,
one such case reported to me is highly instructive. The lawyer
concerned is criticised by some of his colleagues both because he
develops close patronage relations with his clients and because he
drafts long, verbose, affidavits on their behalf. This criticism
clearly shows how lawyers equate professional detachment, in the
sense of keeping the necessary distance from the client, with
professional legal representation, in the sense of confining oneself
to the legal issues and leaving ultimate responsibility for the
“facts” to the client. 39 Clearly, most Maltese lawyers believe their
37. By, for instance, occasionally waiving payment for legal advice and
giving more attention to clients.
38. JULIETTE DU BOULAY, PORTRAIT OF A GREEK MOUNTAIN VILLAGE
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1974).
39. A similar model of legal representation is found in the Maltese code of
ethics for lawyers (op. cit.). Significantly, this code prescribes that an advocate
representing clients in civil litigation: “is under a duty to say on behalf of the
client what the client should properly say for himself or herself if the client were
allowed to plead for himself or herself and possessed the requisite skill,
knowledge and legal training” (Rule 11, Part IV, Cap 1). By requiring advocates
to restrict their representation to what clients should “properly” say, this code
prevents their complete identification with clients.
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professional detachment requires them to performatively avoid
excessive involvement with the “facts,” viewed as a potential
source of “symbolic pollution,” in Mary Douglas’ terms. 40
VI. THE PROCEDURAL REFORMS OF 1996
Having explored the way lawyers interpret professional
ideals in the ordinary course of their legal practice, it is now
possible to reach a deeper understanding of the obstacles impeding
certain reforms which the Maltese Government carried out in 1996
to the system by which evidence is compiled in court. By focusing
on this particular case-study, the broader social effects of
professional ideals will be highlighted. Firstly, however, it is
necessary to explain the pre-1996 system for compilation of
evidence and the public discontent which motivated these reforms
in the first place.
Litigation before the Maltese civil courts occurs in two
successive phases. A preliminary written phase, in which the
litigants send each other their respective written legal claims and
statements of defence, is followed by an oral phase when the
parties and their witnesses testify and the lawyers question
witnesses and present their own arguments. During the written
phase and together with their legal claims, the litigants are obliged
to send each other a “declaration of facts” which should contain
their respective statements of the “facts” at stake. Together with
this, each of the litigants is also expected to file a list of the
documents and a list of the witnesses which s/he intends to
produce during the case. After the preliminary exchange of their
written claims, the case then shifts to the oral stage where each of
the litigants has a chance to testify and to produce any witnesses
mentioned in her list. Testimony is usually heard in a certain order:
starting from the plaintiff and continuing with his witnesses and
followed by the defendant and his witnesses. Witnesses are first
examined by the lawyer for the party who summoned them and
then cross-examined by the opposing lawyer. Their replies are
40. MARY DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
CONCEPTS OF POLLUTION AND TABOO (Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, London,
1988).
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transcribed by the court clerk. Often, important documents are
handed over to the court by witnesses in the course of testimony.
After all the witnesses have been examined, the .judge defers the
case so that he can pronounce his judgement.
What this account omits are all the delays which are caused
when this system is implemented in practice. These are due to
various causes. For instance, litigants often find it impossible to
summon all their witnesses to testify on the same day.
Consequently, cases are usually postponed for three months so as
to hear the testimony of new witnesses. Some litigants tend to
name fifty or sixty witnesses and expect to be allowed to summon
them all to testify! Additional problems are caused when particular
witnesses do not come to court or cannot be traced and the case is
normally put off to allow lawyers to try to contact these witnesses.
There are many other causes of delay which cannot be mentioned
here. It is important, however, to note that delays mostly arise
during the oral phase of litigation, when testimony is being
produced. Court delays had multiplied during the late 1990’s and
remain a persistent cause for concern today. 41 Thus, statistics given
by the Minister of Justice for 1997 42 indicate that by the end of
January 1997, there were a total of 22,861 cases pending before all
the Maltese courts, many of which were pending before the civil
courts. 43 By comparison, government statistics 44 indicate that at
the end of March 2011, there were a total of 23,133 pending cases
before all the Maltese courts. 45
41. See the report on the recent visit conducted in Malta by the Council of
Europe’s Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, Court Backlog under
Scrutiny, TIMES OF MALTA, Nov. 24, 2011 (Malta, Allied Newspapers Ltd.).
42. These figures were given by Justice Minister Charles Mangion in a
reply to a Parliamentary Question. They were reproduced in The Times of Malta
on March 5, 1997.
43. Of these, 1067 cases were pending before the Court of Appeal; 8318
before the Civil Courts, and 11,150 before the Magistrates’ Courts.
44. Statistics for 2011 were culled from the reports published on the Malta
Ministry of Justice’s website. Ministry for Justice and Home Affairs, available
at http://www.justiceservices.gov.mt/courtservices/Statistics/default.aspx (Last
visited November 11, 2011).
45. Of these, 1348 were pending before the Court of Appeal, 6450 before
the Civil Courts, 15,223 before the Magistrates’ Courts and there were 112
pending cases before the Criminal Court. In order to ensure comparability of this
data with the that given in 1997, I have added together the data for pending Civil
cases which was compiled on March 31, 2011 with the published data
concerning pending Criminal cases of March 2011. The figure for the total
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At the time increased media attention had begun to focus
on the issue of court delays, as is still the case today. It is
acknowledged as a serious problem which results in the denial of
justice and alienates people from the courts. 46 Partly in reaction to
this growing public concern and in order to enhance the efficiency
of the courts, the Maltese government in July 1996 enacted a law
to reform various procedural rules. 47 This law contained provisions
relating to the trial of law-suits which caused controversy. In
particular attention focused on the new procedure to be followed
by judges when compiling evidence in civil trials.
In terms of this new procedure, a pre-trial hearing was to be
held before the first sitting in the case. The aim of this hearing in
the words of the government minister, himself a lawyer, who
introduced the amendments, was to allow the court to “identify and
record the points of law and fact in contention and the proof to be
given by each witness.” 48 The second major innovation was that
after the pre-trial hearing, judges were given the option of
choosing the system by which evidence was to be heard.

pending Appeal cases was reached by adding together the data concerning
pending cases before the Constitutional Court, the Criminal Court of Appeal and
the Civil Court of Appeal in both Gozo and Malta in its Superior and Inferior
sections. The figure for the total pending Civil cases comprises cases pending
before the Family court apart from those pending before the First Hall of the
Civil court. The figure for the total pending cases before the Magistrates’ Court
was reached by adding together all the pending Civil cases before the
Magistrates’ Court together with all the Criminal cases for both Gozo and Malta
and excluding the statistics for cases pending before the Small Claims tribunal,
which did not exist in 1997.
46. A good example of the tone of the comments made by the Maltese
newspapers is represented by two newspaper editorials which both appeared
during June 1997, while I was writing up my research. While the editorial of the
conservative daily The Times emphasized the need to speed up court
proceedings, that of the left-wing weekly It-Torca claimed “In the
administration of justice, the citizen expects the legal process to be efficient
(emphasis added), comprehensible and really just. The citizen is not satisfied on
any one of these points.”
47. The law in question is Act 24 of 1996, which amended the Code of
Organisation and Civil Procedure. The provisions of this law which concern us
were brought into effect by means of a legal notice in 1996.
48. J. M. Fenech, Procedural Law and the Courts, THE SUNDAY TIMES,
Dec. 29, 1996 (Malta, Allied Newspapers Ltd.). See also J. M. Fenech, Justice
within a Reasonable Time, THE SUNDAY TIMES, Dec. 1, 1996 (Malta, Allied
Newspapers Ltd.); J. M. Fenech, Wake Up Minister, THE SUNDAY TIMES, May
11, 1997 (Malta, Allied Newspapers Ltd.).
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Previously the principle was that all testimony had to be heard
orally. Instead judges were now given the option of compiling all
evidence by means of written affidavits prepared by parties and
their witnesses and deposited in court. 49 However, even if this
“affidavit system” were to be chosen, the opposing lawyer was to
continue to enjoy the facility of conducting an oral crossexamination of parties and witnesses on the testimony contained in
their affidavits. Finally, the third innovation was that judges were
then to fix a date for a full hearing of testimony (if the evidence
was to be compiled viva voce) or for hearing by cross-examination
(if the affidavits system was selected). During this sitting all the
oral testimony to be presented in the case was to be heard
uninterruptedly. There were to be no adjournments except in very
special circumstances. This contrasted with the previous system, in
which witnesses were heard on several different sittings and
adjournments were frequently granted.
Before exploring these innovations further, it is important
to consider the way they were implemented. The collective
response of judges to the amendments was to introduce a new
judicial role: that of the Master, which was not contemplated in the
amendments. 50 By agreement among the bench, one of the judges
assumed this role and was entrusted with around 3,000 cases in
which, to quote the current Chief Justice “very little was being
done.” 51 His task was to be that of conducting a pre-trial hearing in
this case and in all new cases to be filed in the future. After he had
clarified the points in issue and the proof to be made by different
witnesses, he was to transfer these files to the other judges before
whom the actual court sittings would be held. Consequently while
the amendments had contemplated that all judges would hold a
pre-trial hearing in every law-suit they adjudicated, the effect of
the judges’ decision was that only one of the judges would conduct
the pre-trial hearings. Moreover this judge would not be the one
before whom these cases were actually heard. The Chief Justice
justified these changes on the grounds that:
49. Previously, the use of affidavits tended to be restricted to the testimony
of the litigating parties themselves.
50. The master system was modelled on English procedures.
51. Joseph Said Pullicino, Chief Justice on effectiveness of amendments to
the C.O.C.P, THE SUNDAY TIMES, Jun. 1, 1997 (Malta, Allied Newspapers Ltd.).
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[I]n a situation like ours where the administrative
infrastructure is lacking, where the number of
judges was inadequate and the culture of accepting
certain systems of control on the compilation of
evidence and the regulation of the cause by the
judge objected to, all these amendments, rigidly
applied, could not have the desired beneficial effect
without bringing about a traumatic experience.
There was, on the contrary, the danger that this
would bring about a total collapse of the system
(emphasis added). It was principally for this reason,
therefore, that through an administrative process–
which was not contemplated in the amendments and
introduced clandestinely (emphasis added)–the
system of the Master was introduced. 52
In November 1996, there was a change of Government. On
meeting with the new Minister of Justice, the President of the
Chamber of Advocates called for the abolition of the affidavits
system, which was the second plank of the newly introduced
reforms. He claimed that this worked against the conscience and
professional training of lawyers. He hoped, however, that the
Master system “would be operated more effectively.” 53 Following
this, there was mounting criticism of the new Master system from
various lawyers and judges, on the grounds that it had only served
to create another bottle-neck, since one judge could not possibly
hold pre-trial hearings in 3,000 cases together with all the new lawsuits that were being filed.
The next development occurred in April 1997, when a
seminar was organised to discuss the implementation of the new
amendments. Opening this seminar, the Chief Justice admitted that
the Master system was not working as well as originally planned. 54
Then, in June 1997, the Minister of Justice announced the setting
up of an Advisory Committee for the Law-Courts. The committee
was given an extensive brief, which included continuous
52. Id.
53. R. Cremona, Chamber of Advocates meets new Justice Minister: Call
for abolition of affidavits system, THE SUNDAY TIMES, Nov. 7, 1996 (Malta,
Allied Newspapers Ltd.).
54. Pullicino, supra note 51.
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monitoring of the situation and recommending changes to the laws,
administrative set-up and the Master system in order to increase
the efficiency of the courts. While I was unable to discover
whether this committee still exists and what recommendations it
might have made, the failure of the 1996 reforms to alter
significantly the mode of trial in Malta was already clear by
January 1999 when the President of the Chamber of Advocates
delivered a speech in which he called on the legal profession to
give the new Master system a proper try, asking them: “not to
discard the system before attempting to employ it in its entirety.” 55
VII. PROFESSIONALLY DISTANCING LAW FROM FACT
My reason for recounting the history of these failed reforms
to trial procedures is to highlight the relationship all the
protagonists drew between court delays and the manner in which
evidence is compiled. They argued that there is a Maltese culture,
or “ingrained mentality,” which resists greater control on the
process of compilation of evidence. 56 This mentality is so powerful
that it induced judges to introduce the Master system, so as to
avoid “a traumatic change [which could] lead to the total collapse
of the system.” 57 Moreover, this mentality had even subverted the
Master system itself. However, in the light of the preceding
discussion of the way Maltese lawyers interpret their professional
role, the repeated failure of these reforms does not seem so
surprising. If Maltese lawyers believe that professionalism is
asserted through avoiding excessive involvement with the facts of
the case by leaving them in the hands of their clients to prove, then
they might not be too keen about reforms which operate precisely
by obliging lawyers to take more responsibility for the factual
aspect of cases.
Taking more responsibility for the facts is the common
thread which links the various reforms proposed in 1996 to the
system of compilation of evidence of the Maltese courts. This is
55. R. Cremona, Call on legal profession to give master system a proper
try, THE SUNDAY TIMES, Jan. 21, 1999 (Malta, Allied Newspapers Ltd.).
56. J. Brincat, The Alarm Clock, THE SUNDAY TIMES, May 18, 1997
(Malta, Allied Newspapers Ltd.).
57. Pullicino, supra note 51.
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most evident in the case of the proposed system for compiling
evidence through affidavits, which provoked lawyers’ protests that
it obliged them to act unprofessionally. However even the
proposed “pre-trial” and Master systems function by requiring the
parties to state the facts as they see them at the start of the case in a
less formal arena than that of ordinary litigation. In such a setting,
lawyers would not have had such a clearly defined role as they
have during a court-room trial and it would be more difficult for
them to assert their detachment from the factual aspect of the case.
Lawyers would be more personally involved in telling and
validating their clients’ stories.
In resisting these reforms, lawyers followed a well
established tradition. As part of an attempt at reforming the
Maltese courts, the British Royal Commission of 1913 had
recommended that a written “declaration of facts” be submitted by
litigating parties at the start of their lawsuit. While this requirement
was incorporated into the law, it was negatively perceived by the
lawyers, who scented a threat to their professional detachment.
Their collective reaction was to draft these “declarations of facts”
in such an elliptical way as to turn them into what are effectively
summaries of the statements of the legal claims being made in the
case; thus leaving the “facts” to emerge in the course of the oral
court-room hearing. 58
Analogously, lawyers expressed resistance to the 1996
procedural reforms in both direct and indirect ways. As the earlierquoted extract from the Chief Justice’s speech made clear, it was
actually judges rather than lawyers who aborted the system of pretrial hearings by “clandestinely” 59 introducing the Master system.
However, as the Chief Justice also noted, they were anticipating
the objections lawyers would make; given their objections to
“certain systems of control on the process of compilation of
evidence.” 60 All Maltese judges are drawn from the pool of
practising lawyers, together with whom they constitute a tightly58. So as to explore this issue, I examined the first fifty law-suits filed in
February 1997. There were only three instances in which the ‘declaration of
facts’ filed by the plaintiff was substantially different from the ‘citazzjoni’ (the
statement of the plaintiff’s legal claims), containing additional details which
were not mentioned in it.
59. Pullicino, supra note 51.
60. Id.
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knit court community. Maltese judges are keen to uphold their
independence in the face of possible government interference.
They are therefore disinclined to rigidly apply administrative
reforms which could antagonise lawyers, especially if these
reforms appear to raise problems of professional ethics. These
attitudes seem also to have contributed to widespread noncompliance with the rule that all evidence be produced in one court
sitting and to a notable lack of enthusiasm for the new option of
compiling most of the evidence by means of affidavits.
Through their resistance Maltese lawyers managed to
safeguard their understanding of their professional role in the face
of administrative reforms which threatened to define it differently.
While the logical implication of this analysis is that the causes of
court delays are rooted in the way these lawyers have understood
their professional role in litigation, it is important to avoid an
overly idealistic account of these professional understandings. By
leading lawyers to avoid taking responsibility for the “facts” and to
insist that these must be proved by clients in the courtroom, they
create room for various lawyerly tactics through which the process
of producing evidence is made more elaborate and time
consuming. These tactics depend for their success on the increased
time it takes to produce oral, as opposed to written, evidence in
court. Written affidavits also take less time to read and make it
easier to establish the points of contrast and similarity between the
versions of the different parties and their witnesses. Conversely, if
the “facts” are orally produced, then it becomes possible to:
1. Produce irrelevant testimony or contest all the
evidence presented by one’s opponent in litigation.
This is because the relevant “facts in issue” remain
unclear for a longer time.
2. Summon many witnesses to testify to the same
“facts.”
3. Conceal valuable evidence from the opposing
party in litigation, until it becomes strategically
appropriate to disclose it.
The outcome of these tactics can be described as the
“problematisation
of
evidence.”
By
referring
to
“problematisation,” I want to highlight how difficult and
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problematic the process of compilation of evidence can be made
and to suggest that such an outcome may often be actively
intended. After all, it can be in the interest of both lawyers and
their clients to create delays. In this way, lawyers can gain more
control over the evolution of litigated cases and acquire more space
to manoeuvre in the interests of their clients. Moreover, a client
who looks set to lose a case may benefit from such delays. It
seems, in brief, that professional interests may easily fuse with
professional ideals in a powerful combination which explains the
perseverance with which lawyers have resisted attempts to reform
the system by which evidence is compiled.
This analysis leads to the conclusion that there is a clear
connection between the specific way in which Maltese lawyers
interpret their professional role, pervasive court delays and the
failure of Government efforts to reform the administration of
justice. Other implications stem from a deeper consideration of the
tactics through which the production of evidence is
“problematised.” As I have shown, the leitmotif behind these
tactics is that they create obstacles to the effort to bring “law” and
“fact” into some sort of facile correspondence with each other,
although creating such a correspondence is the central function of
court litigation. By expressing professional ideals which separate
“law” from “fact” and lawyer from client, these tactics also
reinforce a particular way of imagining Maltese law, which
constructs the legal domain in separatist, exclusive and selfreferential terms. 61 The production of delay and inefficiency in
court proceedings hence becomes invested with symbolic meaning.
In particular, delay makes it possible for lawyers both to affirm and
to traverse the distance between everyday and legal concepts of
evidence, truth and reality. Delay is an intrinsic part of the
processes by which the specificity of “the legal” is affirmed in
practice. This inverts Nelken’s analysis, as delay appears as a tool
by which lawyers themselves construct, in their own way and for
their own purposes, the distinction between “internal” and
“external” legal culture.

61. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN
INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 184 (Basic Books, New York, 1983).
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VIII. DELAY AND THE “COLONIAL ENCOUNTER”
Through delay Maltese lawyers cope with the specific
demands of their clients by enacting specific professional
understandings of legal representation as a matter of distancing
“law” from “fact” by balancing between patronage and
professional detachment. Yet these professional understandings
must themselves be explained against the backdrop of Maltese
legal history. In fact the resistance put up by the Maltese legal
profession in the past to legal and judicial interventions by the
British colonial authorities seems to have legitimised separatist and
exclusive ways of conceiving of Maltese law and the lawyer’s
professional role today. The emergence of such conceptions can be
seen as being partly a by-product of the very process of attempting
to describe the Maltese legal system in the context of unequal
discursive exchanges between Maltese legal professionals and
foreign colonial agents.
In this regard it is interesting to take a look at the
proceedings of a British Royal Commission which visited Malta in
1911 (henceforth the “Mowatt Commission”). 62 As part of its remit
covered reforms to Maltese judicial procedure, the Commission,
which was presided over by a British MP and two judges,
interviewed various prominent personalities from the Maltese legal
community, including the Chief Justice, the Crown Advocate
General, the Court Registrar and the President of the Lawyers’
Association. 63 These were questioned exhaustively on a range of
subjects, focusing understandably on procedural issues which
could be causally linked to delays in civil litigation. Most of the
questions dealt with the procedures for opening a court case,
giving testimony, conducting the hearing and appeals. Court
officials were asked to provide statistics on the time which various
proceedings took and on related costs. Yet these inquiries tended to
raise broader issues concerning the nature of the legal system and
key characteristics of Maltese law.
62. Francis R. Mowatt & Mackenzie Chalmers, Report of the Royal
Commission on the Finances, Economic Position and Judicial Procedure of
Malta, in PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (London, 1912).
63. In Malta this is called the “Chamber of Advocates,” originally the
“Camera degli Avvocati.”
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A good example of the way in which procedural questions
tended to evoke more substantive answers occurred when Sir
Mackenzie Chalmers, one of the Commissioners, asked Mr. Leo
Benjacar, the then Registrar of the Maltese Courts about a
particular case—Cini v. Townsley. He immediately launched into
an account of the facts of the case before being pulled up short by
Chalmers, who informed him that: “We are not concerned with the
merits of the claim, but with the length and nature of the
proceedings.” 64 More than a simple mistake, this exchange
suggests a lower sensitivity on the part of the Maltese respondent
to the distinction between procedural and substantive law, which is
prominent in the common law tradition. 65 Other answers are even
more telling. Questioned about the maximum amount of days
before an appeal can be put down for hearing in the list of the
Court of Appeal, Mr Benjacar observed that this would amount to
57 days, but that this period would apply “whether the amount is
only £5 or whether it is £500.” 66 He later attempted to justify the
way court processes did not distinguish cases on the basis of their
value:
I should like to remark that it is not always the
(financial) nature of the case that makes it a big
case; very often it is the nature of the exceptions
(legal pleas). Sometimes a case of a few pounds
becomes an important case because of the nature of
the exceptions. 67
What is being elaborated here is thus a conception of law as an
autonomous field of activity possessing its own internal criteria of
value and which ought not to be assessed in terms of external
monetary criteria. This conception was itself developed in reaction
to the Commissioners’ questions which were premised on the need
to assess the cost and financial importance of cases, reserving full
access to the legal process to those who had the means. Thus, in a
64. Mowatt & Chalmer, supra note 61, at 243.
65. Vivian Grosswald Curran, Romantic Common Law, Enlightened Civil
Law: Legal Uniformity and the Homogenization of the European Union, 7
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 63 (2001).
66. Mowatt & Chalmer, supra note 61, at 235.
67. Id. at 240.
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statement redolent of a Victorian subordination of legal process to
social hierarchy, Commissioner Chalmers suggested removing the
possibility of an appeal in minor cases before the Magistrates’
court:
We hold rather strongly that in these small cases
between small people, where everything is irregular,
the Judge ought rather to act as a judicial arbitrator
and to decide on substantial merits than to work out
points of law. The elaboration of points of law,
where everything is irregular, between small people,
is in fact, an injustice. 68
This picture of Maltese judicial proceedings as obeying an intrinsic
logic which cannot be reduced to the financial interests or social
hierarchies involved, is reinforced by another theme to which the
Commissioners gave a lot of attention, which is the actual temporal
schedule adopted by the courts to structure the hearing of cases.
Since the Mowatt Commission had been instructed to tackle what
the colonial authorities considered to be unacceptable delays in
Maltese court cases, they tried to follow up particular cases to find
out what caused these delays. They were clearly surprised to
discover that the system adopted for the hearing of civil cases
seemed to be based on the assumption that instead of a single
session in which the case would be tried, there would be a series of
hearings, which could reach thirty or forty over a number of years
and which were usually separated from each other by periods of
some three months or so. Each of these hearings was ostensibly
dedicated to tackling a particular aspect of the trial, such as the
examination of a particular witness, or a request for an
interlocutory degree. Often, however, even these issues were not
dealt with due to the failure of one of the witnesses or lawyers to
“appear” in court. In any case the court would then adjourn the
hearing to another date until all the aspects of the case had been
tackled. On any particular day, the judge would have a list of thirty
or forty cases scheduled to be tried in this piecemeal way by him.
Various aspects of this “system” were criticized by the
Commissioners, who observed that: “under that system a case of
68.

Id. at 278.
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any complication may last indefinitely, because every witness
suggests another.” 69 They therefore made many suggestions to
speed up this process, based on the way hearings were structured
before the English courts. Yet most of these suggestions were
rejected by their Maltese interlocutors, who tended to justify
existing delays and to imply that speeding up court processes
would be detrimental to justice. When asked whether Judges could
limit themselves to scheduling four or five cases per day (instead
of thirty or forty) and actually finish them, Mr. Benjacar objected
that “It would come to this: that if one of the lawyers reported
himself ill, the judge would lose a day.” 70 When the
Commissioners repeated this recommendation at a later stage, to
the Advocate General, Dr. Frendo Azzopardi, he observed: “The
question is whether a case can be disposed of in one or two
sittings.” 71 The way in which he justified this reluctance to even
consider changing the system is interesting for at least two reasons.
Firstly, he invoked the functional integrity and specificity of “the
system” to try to blunt the Commission’s unfavourable
comparisons of the Maltese hearings to those held before the
English courts, observing: “When you have a certain system, all
the details of that system work very well and correctly, but when
you have to alter the whole system, it is very difficult.” 72 Secondly,
the above quoted extract implies that trying to speed up the trial
unduly could lead to cases being “disposed of” in a way which is
legally unsatisfactory. As Mr Benjacar claimed, when rejecting the
idea that a case could be adjourned to the next day instead of three
months, “You must give the plaintiff or the defendant, or their
counsel, time to look up books or precedents.” 73
These quoted exchanges barely scratch the surface in terms
of the insights that could be gleaned from a careful reading of the
Mowatt Commission’s proceedings. But the above suffices to
make clear the apparent continuity which exists between colonial

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 241.
Id. at 240.
Id. at 280.
Id. at 281.
Id. at 240.
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and post-colonial reform projects for the Maltese courts 74 and the
discourses of resistance which they provoked. In both cases it is
clear that the specificity of law is insisted upon and any attempt to
reduce delays by changing the procedural rules relating to court
trials is depicted by Maltese legal professionals as simultaneously
threatening their professional identity and the integrity of the legal
system.
IX. CONCLUSION
The implications of this research appear in sharper relief if
it is placed in a comparative perspective. A touchstone is provided
by Sally Merry’s 75 study of the legal consciousness of working
class American clients. She showed how these clients often view
court proceedings as a way to escape the close and constricting
communities in which they are embedded. Litigation offers the
possibility of socially distancing oneself by asserting one’s rights
as a citizen of a bureaucratically organised nation-state. By
comparison, the present study focuses on the other side of the coin,
by showing how lawyers try to socially distance themselves from
their clients and invoke professional ideals for this purpose. Yet
this professional detachment cannot always be maintained. Maltese
lawyers cannot afford to excessively discourage their clients and
must therefore walk the tightrope between patronage and
professionalism. Paradoxically, this may create a situation where
the professional ideals of lawyers are themselves utilised to service
their patronage relationships with their clients; since they allow
lawyers to create delays by “problematising” the compilation of
evidence.
This article aims to demonstrate how particular
understandings of professional detachment represent practically
motivated attempts on the part of advocates to symbolically
separate law from fact and their role in litigation from that of their
74. Indeed, affidavits, pre-trial hearings and the introduction of the office
of the “Master of Rolls” were among the solutions considered by this
commission.
75. SALLY E. MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN: LEGAL
CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS (Chicago University
Press, Chicago, 1990).
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clients. It further argues that the association between delay and
professional detachment has a long history in Malta which is
rooted in the relationship of opposition between formal (colonial)
administration and informal (Maltese) law; an opposition which
has been maintained and reproduced for over two hundred years.
This may go some way towards explaining why Maltese law, a
hybrid product that still bears the marks of its colonial origin, is a
difficult and problematic medium of governance. The reasons why
this is so are clearly evidenced by the prophetic words of Sir
Adriano Dingli, drafter of the Maltese Civil Code, with which I
would like to end this article. In 1880, in a letter appended to the
Keenan report, which advocated the compulsory Anglicisation of
the Maltese educational system, Dingli objected to this reform as:
It would be the worst public course, for the
attainment of the desired consummation, to resort to
compulsory measures, in a place like Malta, where
the effects would be disastrous to the immediate
personal interests of the professional classes . . .
perseverance in this might engender an acrimonious
feeling, which the rising generation would share in,
and which might continue long after its origin
would be forgotten. 76

76. GEOFFREY HULL, THE MALTA LANGUAGE QUESTION: A CASE STUDY IN
CULTURAL IMPERIALISM 30 (Said International, Malta, 1993).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The notarial profession in the Netherlands is going through
difficult times. The media and professional journals warn that
Dutch notaries are on the brink of disaster, 1 speak of an ongoing
crisis in the profession, 2 and document the loss of the good
relations among notaries that have been carefully preserved and
cherished for so long. 3 Herman Tjeenk Willink, vice-president of
the Council of State, wrote in his last annual report that the
independence and impartiality of the notariat are showing signs of
strain. 4 Those who prefer a bolder turn of phrase have even used
the word ‘degeneration.’ 5 Dutch notaries feel under siege, and a
mantle of uncertainty has settled over them. What they feel
uncertain about, in essence, is the very future of their ancient
profession.
II. THE SEEDS OF UNCERTAINTY
It has a worrying ring: uncertainty among the very
professionals whose task it is to provide certainty. Without legal
1. L.C.A. Verstappen, De practycke van de notaris. Een notariële idylle en
haar nuchter slot, in 106 ARS NOTARIATUS 3 (Deventer, Kluwer, 2001)
(inaugural lecture Groningen).
2. At the conference “Marktwerking in het notariaat: droom of
nachtmerrie?” (“A free market system in the notariat: dream or nightmare?”),
which was organized on November 5, 2009 by the Stichting tot Bevordering der
Notariële Wetenschap in Amsterdam, L.C.A. Verstappen spoke about a “crisis”
in the Dutch notariat. The proceedings of this conference are published in H.J.C.
Isenee & Barbara Baarsma, Marktwerking in het notariaat: droom of
nachtmerrie?, in 143 ARS NOTARIATUS (Deventer, Kluwer, 2010).
3. Verstappen, supra note 1, at 3; J. de Gruiter, Help, de notaris brandt op.
Burn out: zorgwekkend nieuw fenomeen, 3:1 NOTARIAAT MAGAZINE 10-14
(2003); H.D. Tjeenk Willink, ‘De Raad in de staat–Algemene beschouwingen’,
in JAARVERSLAG 2008 VAN DE RAAD VAN STATE 15-38 (The Hague, Raad van
State 2009); and id. at 18.
4. Tjeenk Willink, De Raad in de staat 19; see also Politiek heeft volgens
de Raad van State oren te veel laten hangen naar de markt, HET FINANCIEELE
DAGBLAD, Apr. 9, 2009.
5. At the conference “Marktwerking in het notariaat,” M.-J. van Mourik
spoke about the “degeneration” which threatens the notariat. “Marktwerking in
het notariaat,” supra note 2. See also R. Didde, Broedertwist. Verloedert het
notariaat nu wel of niet?, MR. MAGAZINE VOOR JURISTEN, Aug. 8, 2008, at 94101. Id. at 94, page where one finds a quotation of Van Mourik with the same
qualification.
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certainty, for government and the public alike, creating a
reasonably well-ordered society would seem an impossible task.
By implication, this uncertainty may well be prejudicial to the
Dutch legal community. How can a profession described as being
of ‘vital importance’ to Dutch society have allowed such a
situation to develop? 6 Allow me to outline the steps that led to this
crisis with a few broad brushstrokes.
When the Dutch welfare state completely outgrew its
financial limits at the end of the 1970s, the reaction came in the
form of a fairly fundamental reorientation. Inspired by AngloAmerican economic theories and the policies derived from them by
Reagan and Thatcher, and stimulated by the challenge of European
cooperation, the Dutch government initiated a process of
deregulation in the 1980s, allowing market forces to come to the
fore. 7 The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 injected a powerful
forward thrust into this policy. Deregulation came to symbolize the
ultimate triumph of the principle of a market-led democracy. 8 This
policy, which has endured to the present day, has expanded not
only the power of the market, but also that of the state, which has
created instruments for itself to supervise those very freed-up
market forces. 9 In the course of the 1990s, this tended to
undermine the autonomy and self-regulatory powers of the legal
professions.
In those same decades, a sharp rise in the demand for
specialist services from government and the business community
led to the growth of large commercial offices offering a variety of
legal services such as advocacy and notariat working alongside
6. N.J.H. Huls & Z.D. Laclé, Het notariaat: Latijns, Angelsaksisch of
provinciaals?, 77 NEDERLANDS JURISTENBLAD 1408-1413 (2002). “De
maatschappelijke behoefte aan een onpartijdige deskundige jurist als notaris is
immense” (The public demand for an impartial, expert lawyer such as a notary is
enormous). Id. at 1409.
7. For the historical context and the political, philosophical and
economical motives for the wave of deregulation and the embrace of the free
market as a regulation mechanism in the Western world since the 1970s, read
the captivating article of the English historian Tony Judt, What is living and
what is dead in social democracy?, in LVI THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS
nr. 20, 86-96 (2009). The views set forth in this article are also to be found in a
broader context in Judt’s latest and last book ILL FARES THE LAND: A TREATISE
ON OUR PRESENT DISCONTENTS (London, Allen Lane, 2010).
8. Willink, supra note 3.
9. Id. at 18.
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each other and in some cases together. This trend was further
enhanced by the internationalization or Europeanization of
economic and administrative/political structures. Following the
example of the big law firms in the United States, cooperative
structures were created by British and Dutch firms, in some cases
culminating in mergers. 10 The Anglo-Saxon commercial mindset
gradually took possession of the top ranks of Dutch legal services.
Another profound influence, one that should not be
underestimated, has been the growth of communication and
information technology. Not only has the digital revolution
radically altered the nature of the work done by individual lawyers,
but it has also made cooperation among different legal professions,
in both national and international frameworks, virtually
indispensable, and has brought legal services, in a manner of
speaking, into the client’s home. The internet has turned
professional expertise into simple merchandise. That, in a nutshell,
is how the legal professions have developed in the Netherlands
over the past few decades. 11
III. THE NEW NOTARIES ACT
The Dutch notariat was not in the vanguard of these
developments in the period I have just described, but notaries
gradually became aware that ignoring them was not an option.
Starting in the 1970s, the Royal Dutch Notarial Society (KNB)
appointed one committee after another to formulate conclusions
regarding the future position and working methods of the
notariat. 12 These exercises produced little in the way of concrete
10. A.A. Van Velten, Het notariaat: inderdaad een elastisch ambt. Het
Nederlandse notariaat in de tweede helft van de twintigste eeuw, geschreven ter
gelegenheid van het vijftigjarige bestaan van de Stichting tot bevordering der
notariële wetenschap, 108 ARS NOTARIATUS 147-170 (Amsterdam, Stichting tot
Bevordering der Notariële Wetenschap, 2000).
11. W. ARTS ET AL., EEN KWESTIE VAN VERTROUWEN. OVER
VERANDERINGEN OP DE MARKT VOOR PROFESSIONELE DIENSTEN EN IN DE
ORGANISATIE VAN VRIJE BEROEPEN 13-15 (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University

Press, 2001) (the developments in the legal professions sketched in this
paragraph are more broadly described); Huls & Laclé, Het Notariaat: Latijns,
Angelsaksisch of provinciaals?, 2002 NETHERLANDS JURISTENBLAD (NJB) 1410
(2002) (for an abstract of this description).
12. Van Velten, supra note 10, at 110-114.
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results−until the Purple Coalition,13 driven by an old-fashioned
belief in progress based on the principle of economic rationalism,
took the initiative.
On May 3, 1994, the then state secretary for justice, Aad
Kosto, introduced into parliament a bill for a new Notaries Act, 14
to replace the Notaries Act of 1842. According to the explanatory
memorandum accompanying the bill, the pressing need for this
new legislation arose mainly from ‘the greatly increased
complexity of society,’ which had led to a proliferation of
legislation and to the ‘juridification’ of society. This in turn had
created a great need for scale expansion, said the state secretary.
To achieve this, the existing system in which practices were
established in fixed places should be replaced by one in which
notaries were free to set up business where they chose. 15
The state secretary had a second deregulation measure in
store: the scrapping of fixed fees. 16 Until then, the fees for notarial
services had been laid down in the 1847 Tariffs Act. 17 But these
fees had never been amended since then; 18 the fee for a notarial act
was nominally the same in 1994 as it had been in 1847: three
guilders. So this Act was of no practical significance. Since the
1930s, notaries had charged fees according to rates laid down by
their professional body, the KNB. In this respect, the Netherlands
was out of step with other European countries, where governments
set these fees by act of parliament. 19 But state secretary Kosto
argued that a system of uniform fees imposed centrally had no
13. The “purple coalition” consisted of Labour (PvdA), the conservative
liberal party VVD, and the liberal democrat party D66.
14. “Wetsvoorstel wettelijke regeling van het notarisambt. . . ,”
Kamerstukken II 1993-1994, 23.706, nr. 1-2.
15. “Memorie van toelichting bij het wetsvoorstel wettelijke regeling van
het notarisambt . . .” Kamerstukken II 1993-1994, 23 706, nr. 3, at 2; Huls &
Laclé, supra note 11, at 1409.
16. “Memorie van toelichting bij het wetsvoorstel wettelijke regeling van
het notarisambt. . .” Kamerstukken II 1993-1994, 23 706, nr. 3, at. 2, 10-11,4347 and the Nota naar aanleiding van het verslag, ontvangen op, Jun. 25, 1996,
Kamerstukken II 1995-1996, 23 706, nr. 6, at 12-14, 17.
17. Staatsblad 1847, nr. 12, at 5-6.
18. For notarial fees since 1847, see G. CHR. KOK, HET NEDERLANDSE
NOTARIAAT 74-76 (Deventer, Kluwer, 1971) (doctoral dissertation, Leiden
University).
19. “Memorie van toelichting bij het wetsvoorstel wettelijke regeling van
het notarisambt. . .” Kamerstukken II 1993-1994, 23 706, nr. 3, at 10-11, 43.
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place in a government policy geared towards encouraging market
forces. The fees for notarial acts should be determined by the
market. Tellingly, it was the ministry of economic affairs that had
added the operation of market forces to the bill at the last moment;
the justice ministry initially resisted the idea. 20
The passage of this bill through parliament took five years.
At the beginning, the House of Representatives balked at
introducing market forces into notarial services. Only the liberal
democrat party D66 was really enthusiastic. 21 After the
government made a number of concessions concerning the pace at
which market forces would be allowed to take over, the House of
Representatives finally passed the bill on April 16, 1998, with only
the two members of the Socialist Party voting against it.22 Then the
Bill went to the Senate, where it encountered opposition that was
based more on points of principle. The small Christian parties
rejected the notion that a notarial act should be seen as ‘a pure
economic product for which a price could be negotiated as if it
were a box of oranges at the market.’ 23 The Labour Party (PvdA)
saw the bill as ‘an example of confidence in the blessings of
market forces being taken to extremes.’ 24 And the conservative
liberal party VVD called the bill’s abandonment of standardized
fees ‘a serious flaw.’ 25 The Senate eventually passed the bill with

20. Zayènne Dyanirah Laclé, Notabelen vernieuwen. Gevolgen van
marktwerking in het notariaat (doctoral dissertation, Leiden University), 137
ARS NOTARIATUS 73-74 (Deventer, Kluwer, 2007).
21. See Verslag van de vaste Commissie van Justitie, vastgesteld op 14
oktober 1994, Kamerstukken II 1994-1995, 23.706, nr. 5; see id. at 12-14 (for
the position of D66).
22. Handelingen II 1997-98, at 5466-5472, 5646-5647. In the Nadere
memorie van antwoord which was sent to the Eerste Kamer (Senate) on
November 20, 1998, the state secretary of Justice M.J. Cohen summarized the
opinion in the Tweede Kamer (Lower House) in the following words: “Na het
wetgevingsoverleg van 8 april 1998 bleken de meeste fracties in de Tweede
Kamer, die aanvankelijk negatief stonden tegenover het vrijlaten van de
tarieven, uiteindelijk vóór het wetsvoorstel te stemmen, waardoor het voorstel
vrijwel unaniem door de Tweede Kamer is aangenomen” (i.e., the parties which
were negative about the bill in the beginning all voted in favour of it in the end).
Kamerstukken I 1998-1999, 23 706, nr. 25a, at 11.
23. Handelingen I 1998-99, 24ste vergadering, at 1012.
24. Id. at 1014.
25. Id. at 1017.
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35 votes in favour and 28 against. 26 Here too, political support for
the bill ended up trumping objections to its content.
IV. THE CIVIL-LAW OR LATIN NOTARIAT
Just how warranted were the misgivings expressed by many
members of the Senate has now become very clear, ten years on.
The introduction of freedom of establishment and of market forces
has precipitated the notarial profession into a crisis. There is
nothing incomprehensible here. Abandoning old certainties and
accepting radical change is difficult and takes time, especially
when the profession’s internal crisis is exacerbated by an economic
malaise in which notarial firms have been hit badly. 27 But does all
this also constitute sufficient reason to question the viability of the
notariat as an independent profession of public officers, as some
voices–not the least authoritative voices by any means−have
occasionally suggested? 28 I do not believe so.
26. Id. 1126.
27. The legal professions were hit hard by the credit-crunch of 2008-2009.
The Economist of January 21, 2010 published that 2009 was “the worst year
ever for law-firms lay-offs.” Laid-off lawyers, Cast-off consultants, THE
ECONOMIST, Jan. 21, 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/15330702 (Last
visited November 11, 2011). And while the Financieele Dagblad of February
18, 2010 said “Topadvocaten weerstaan recessive” [“Top-lawyers withstand
recession”] and “Na eerste schrik floreren advocaten aan de Zuidas ook tijdens
recessive” [“After the first shock the lawyers along the Amsterdam Zuidas
thrive again”], one could also read that the law firm Boekel de Nerée in 2009 let
12 of their 27 notaries go, among which three of the seven associates.
Topadvocaten weerstaan recessive, FINANCIEELE DAGBLAD, Feb. 18, 2010, at
13. In all fairness it should be noticed that this reorganization was not only due
to the credit-crunch. The positive coverage in the Financieele Dagblad met no
response in the NRC Handelsblad which said on March 26, 2010, “Grote
advocatenkantoren krimpen door crisis” (“Big law firms shrink as a result of the
crisis”). Grote advocatenkantoren krimpen door crisis, NRC HANDELSBLAD,
Mar. 26, 2010, at 13. Many law firms in the top fifty have reduced their number
of lawyers by ten to twenty percent. Especially the law firms with an AngloSaxon mother reduced their staff. The crisis in the notariat resulted in a decline
from 601 to 564 notaries at the fifty biggest law firms, according to NRC
Handelsblad. Id.
28. L. Hardenberg writes in his review of E.W.A. Henssen’s Twee Eeuwen
Advocatuur in Nederland: “De volgende eeuw zal dat afronden [d.i. het opgaan
van verschillende juridische professies in de advocatuur] en, naar ik vermoed,
ook het notariaat in de advocatuur zien versmelten” (i.e., Lawyers and notaries
will merge). L. Hardenberg, 67 LEGAL HIST. REV. 405-406 (1999) (reviewing
E.W.A. HENSSEN, TWEE EEUWEN ADVOCATUUR IN NEDERLAND 1798-1998
(Deventer: Kluwer 1998)). Ironically, van Velten writes that already in 1959,
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In one of six G.M. Trevelyan lectures delivered at
Cambridge University in 1961, the famous historian and historical
theorist E.H. Carr (1892-1982) said: ‘It is at once the justification
and the explanation of history that the past throws light on the
future, and the future throws light on the past.’ 29 In the spirit of the
first part of this aphorism, I shall take a closer look at the history of
the public notariat, a history that inspires me with confidence that
the profession will weather this storm too. It is a long and volatile
history, and one that is closely intertwined with the legal culture of
continental Europe. It can be encapsulated in a single phrase: the
civil-law or Latin notariat.
The term ‘Latin notariat’ is often used incorrectly. For
instance, in the course of the five-year parliamentary debate on the
new Notaries Act, the question was repeatedly raised of whether
the introduction of market forces did not amount to a break with
the tradition of the Latin notariat. From the numerous comments
made on this issue by ministers, state secretaries and MPs, it is
clear that those concerned were basing themselves on a narrow and
in some cases quite false definition of the Latin notariat. Take
André Rouvoet, who was the leader of the parliamentary party of
the Protestant RPF. At a meeting held to discuss the proposed bill
on April 8, 1998, he said: ‘The difference of opinion is limited to a
few points, and these are precisely the points which constitute
infringements of the Latin notariat: freedom of establishment and
the freedom to set fees.’ 30 So in Rouvoet’s view, fixed places of
establishment and fixed fees were characteristic features of the
Latin notariat. But this picture of the Latin notariat is actually
based on the notarial profession as it had existed in the Netherlands
since the Second World War. That is obviously a highly relevant

Nouwen (a Dutch notarial professor) foresaw that notaries would soon merge
with lawyers. A.A. van Velten, Het notariaat: Interdaad een ElastischAmbt, Het
Nederlandse Notariaat in de Tweede Helft van de Twintigste Eeuw, 70 LEGAL
HIST. REV. 164, n. 58. See also “Notarissen kraaien oproer,” MR. MAGAZINE
VOOR JURISTEN 5, 7, nr. 11 (2009) (In which notary H. Oosterdijk is quoted with
the words “De kwaliteit en het voortbestaan van het notariaat staan op het spel”
(“The quality and the survival of the notaries is at risk”)).
29. E.H. CARR, WHAT IS HISTORY? 117 (2d ed., Basingstoke, Palgrave
Macmillan, 2001).
30. Verslag van een wetgevingsoverleg, vastgesteld 16 april 1998,
Kamerstukken II 1997-1998, 23 706, nr. 32, at 22.
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context for a politician. But it is a narrow view of the term–too
narrow. If politicians had been better informed about the history of
the notarial profession, a great many discussions about ways in
which the new Notaries Act supposedly violated the essence of the
Latin notariat could have been pursued differently, or avoided
altogether. But it is not just politicians who sometimes have a
rather limited historical perspective. What is more worrying is
discovering inaccurate descriptions of the Latin notariat in doctoral
dissertations in law. In her 2007 dissertation at Leiden University
on the consequences of the introduction of market forces in the
notariat, Zayènne Laclé writes: “The Latin notariat was created by
the Napoleonic Ventôse Law that served as an example in many
European countries.” 31 Now Napoleon was certainly responsible
for numerous innovations in the spheres of law and administration,
but the Latin notariat is not one of them. So both among politicians
and law graduates, it appears that the Latin notariat is not always
fully understood. All the more reason to try to provide a little
clarity on this issue this afternoon. What is the Latin notariat?
What is its essence? And why does this very essence instil
confidence for the future?
V. THE RISE AND SPREAD OF THE LATIN NOTARIAT
The notariat as it is now known in the Netherlands, as a
profession of public officers who derive their income from
providing services to the public, is one of the creations of the
Italian legal genius that laid the foundations of our legal system
during the twelfth-century Renaissance, with some help from
31. Laclé, supra note 20. In a speech at the 11th International Congress of
the Latin Notariat in Athens on October 8, 1971, Adriaan Pitlo, the founder of
the notarial science in the Netherlands, asked “Why the designation Latin
notariat?” His answer: “I suppose for two reasons. Latin, because of the origin
of the Latin notary in Italy during the Middle Ages and because of the fact that
the Latin notary found its definite, official form in the Napoleontic legislation.”
Adriaan Pitlo, Le notariat et la culture européenne, in ATLAS DU NOTARIAT: LE
NOTARIAT DANS LE MONDE. HUIT SIÈCLES DE NOTARIAT LATIN–QUATRE
DÉCENNIES D’UNION INTERNATIONAL (E.M. van der Marck ed., Deventer,
Kluwer, 1989) (Essais édités par les soins de la Fondation pour la promotion de
la science notariale à l’occasion du XIXe congrès de l’Union Internationale du
Notariat latin, du 21 au 27 mai 1989 à Amsterdam); 42 ARS NOTARIATUS 367375, 369 (Deventer, Kluwer, 1989).
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Roman law. 32 The public notary was born from a symbiosis of
Northern Italian legal practice of the High Middle Ages and
Justinian ideas. 33 Although ancient Rome did not have a notariat in
the sense defined above, Roman law did help to shape this
institution, through the agency of the glossators, the first legal
scholars to devote Justinian’s Corpus Iuris Civilis to systematic
study. 34 The Corpus Iuris contained many of the terms and
concepts that mediaeval jurisprudence linked to the incipient
notarial profession. 35
32. The best synthesis of the origins of the European legal science is written
by F. Wieacker. WIEACKER, A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW IN EUROPE WITH
PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO GERMANY 28-46 (Tony Weir trans., Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1995). See also P. KOSCHAKER, EUROPA UND DAS RÖMISCHE
RECHT (4th ed., Munich, C.H. Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1966). Among
legal historians, some of Koschaker’s theses are considered a bit out of date.
33. “We hebben het notariaat van de elfde eeuw te danken aan een gelukkig
samengaan van rechterlijke instanties van het oude Rome en van de Lombarden”
(i.e., We owe the notariat of the eleventh century to a happy union of the legal
institutions of ancient Rome and of the Lombards). Pitlo, supra note 31, at 716.
C.M. Cappon, “Het notariaat in de late middeleeuwen (± 1250-± 1540),” in A.
Fl. Gehlen, Het notariaat in de Lage Landen (± 1250-1842). Opstellen over de
geschiedenis van het notariaat in de Lage Landen vanaf de oorsprong tot in de
negentiende eeuw, 117 ARS NOTARIATUS 3-29 (P.L. Nève ed., Deventer, Kluwer,
2005).
34. 2 A. de Boüard, L’acte privé, in MANUEL DE DIPLOMATIQUE FRANÇAISE
ET PONTIFICALE 163-181 (Paris, Auguste Picard, 1929); A. Wolf, Das öffentliche
Notariat, in HANDBUCH DER QUELLEN UND LITERATUR DER NEUEREN
EUROPÄISCHEN PRIVATRECHTSGESCHICHTE: ERSTER BAND, M ITTELALTER
(1100-1500). DIE GELEHRTEN RECHTE UND DIE GESETZGEBUNG, (hereinafter
“HANDBUCH DER QUELLEN”) 505-514 (Helmut Coing ed., Munich, C.H.
Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung 1973); M. Oosterbosch, “De fide
instrumentorum. De notariële oorkonde en haar bewijskracht in de
middeleeuwen,” in P.L. Nève, Instrumentum quantum pactum. Zes opstellen
over de kracht van de notariële akte vanaf de tijd van keizer Justinianus tot aan
het huidige recht, ARS NOTARIATUS 13-38 (Deventer, Kluwer, 1991).
35. In discussing the legislation of Justinian (529-534) concerning the
tabelliones and the probative value of the deeds made by them, Hans Ankum
shows that the concepts of the medieval public notariat owe very much to
Roman law. H.A. Ankum, ‘Les tabellions romains, ancêtres directs des notaires
modernes’, in ATLAS DU NOTARIAT: LE NOTARIAT DANS LE MONDE. HUIT
SIÈCLES DE NOTARIAT LATIN–QUATRE DÉCENNIES D’UNION INTERNATIONAL 5-44
(E.M. van der Marck ed., Deventer, Kluwer, 1989). The early history of the
public notariat is a very fine example of the early reception of Roman law.
Boüard, supra note 34, at 174; Oosterbosch, supra note 34, at 15-17; A.H.P.
Van den Bichelaer, Het notariaat in Stad en Meierij van ’s-Hertogenbosch
tijdens de late middeleeuwen. Een prosopografisch, diplomatisch en
rechtshistorisch onderzoek 11-13 (Amsterdam, Thela Thesis, 1998) (doctoral
dissertation, VU University Amsterdam).
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These developments took place in Lombardy in Northern
Italy. From the end of the eighth century onwards, this kingdom
witnessed a development that, in retrospect, was crucial to the
genesis of the public notariat. At this time, Lombardy had officials
who combined the roles of judges and notaries. When such a
judge-notary drew up an act for a private citizen, a purchase
agreement for instance, he did so in the form of a report of legal
proceedings, with claim, defence, and judgment. The judge-notary
essentially staged legal proceedings, and the legal transaction
therefore took the form of a judgment. This contentious
jurisdiction had great evidentiary advantages. Like any judicial
document, the notarial act too now constituted prima facie proof; it
was regarded as authentic. The formulation of a notarial act in the
form of a judgment handed down by a court was a decisive step in
the creation of the public notariat. Even when this judicial form
was abandoned in the eleventh century, the notarial act retained its
authentic character. 36
Two developments in Northern Italy in the eleventh and
twelfth centuries did much to help this Lombardic judge-notary
grow into a legal institution that would spread throughout Europe
in the course of the Middle Ages. Europe, and Northern Italy in
particular, enjoyed a marked economic and cultural revival in the
eleventh and twelfth centuries. 37 This greatly boosted the demand
for notaries’ services, and the number of notaries steadily
increased. At the same time, the study of jurisprudence was
developed at the University of Bologna on the basis of the study of
Justinian’s Corpus Iuris. 38 The glossators discovered in the
Justinian legislation scores of passages referring to public clerks

36. Boüard, supra note 34, at 166-174. G.R. Dolezalek, De kerkelijke
notaris in de middeleeuwen, in C.C.T.M. VAN HAREN ET AL. GEPASSEERD: DE
ROL EN POSITIE VAN NOTARISSEN IN HET VERLEDEN 316 (Nijmegen, Gerard
Noodt Instituut, 1987); Van den Bichelaer, supra note 35, at 10-11.
37. CH.H. HASKINS, THE RENAISSANCE OF THE TWELFTH CENTURY
(Harvard University Press, 1927); WIEACKER, supra note 32, at 28-30;
RENAISSANCE AND RENEWAL IN THE TWELFTH CENTURY (R.L. Benson & G.
Constable eds., Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1982).
38. KOSCHAKER, supra note 32, at 55-86; WIEACKER, supra note 32, at 3046.
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known as tabelliones. 39 As was customary among mediaeval
jurists, they interpreted these passages in the context of their own
times, in other words they related them to their own notariat. 40 In
so doing, they wove the notariat of Northern Italy into the
authoritative framework of Roman law and endowed it with a
sophisticated barrage of legal terminology. It is no exaggeration to
say that without this academization of law, the dissemination of the
notarial profession throughout Europe would not have been
possible.
Like the Roman tabellio, the mediaeval notary was a clerk
who offered his services to the public. To express this, they
referred to themselves more and more frequently in the course of
the eleventh and twelfth centuries as notarius publicus. The term
publicus also had a second meaning–it signified ‘public
confidence.’ A notarial act was therefore also known as an
instrumentum publicum, a document that inspired public
confidence, an authentic document. The notary owed this public
confidence to the fact that he was appointed by the public
authorities–something that was always strongly emphasized by
mediaeval legal scholars. Understandably so, since this was what
defined a notarial act as prima facie proof. 41
What was the public authority responsible for appointing
notaries? In Northern Italy, the right to appoint notaries initially
resided with the kings of Lombardy. When this monarchy fell to
the Holy Roman Emperor in the tenth century, this created the
conditions for the spread of the public notariat throughout the
known Western world. In theory the emperor’s authority was
absolute, 42 which meant that the notaries he appointed could work
39. See supra note 34. About the glossators, see H. LANGE, RÖMISCHES
RECHT IM MITTELALTER, BAND I, DIE GLOSSATOREN (Munich, C.H. Beck’sche
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1998).
40. For this method of the mediaeval jurists, see KOSCHAKER, supra note
38, at 87-91; see also P. STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 71-74
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999).
41. Dolezalek, supra note 36, at 7-9; Oosterbosch, supra note 34, at 17-22;
C.M. Cappon, De opkomst van het testament in het Sticht Utrecht. Een studie op
grond van Utrechtse rechtsbronnen van het begin van de achtste tot het midden
van de veertiende eeuw, 57 ARS NOTARIATUS 135-141 (Deventer, Kluwer,
1992).
42. H. KRAUSE, KAISERRECHT UND REZEPTION 14-15, 3640, 45, 49-50
(Heidelberg, Carl Winter, Universitätsverlag 1952). See ROBERT FEENSTRA,
FATA IURIS ROMANI: ETUDES D’HISTOIRE DU DROIT 27-39 (Leyde, Presses

2011]

DUTCH NOTARIES

581

wherever they chose. The other universal ruler in the Middle Ages,
the pope in Rome, had claimed the right to appoint public notaries
in the twelfth century. 43 They performed exactly the same duties as
the notaries who worked by imperial authority, and they too could
offer their services in any part of Christendom by virtue of the
pope’s universal authority. 44
How did this public notariat spread from Northern Italy to
the rest of Europe? 45 In answering this question, we must
distinguish between Southern and Northern Europe. In Italy,
Southern France, and Spain, after the fall of the Western Roman
Empire (AD 476) Roman law continued to exist but at a low ebb,
mainly in the form of customary law. 46 Jurists who had studied
Roman and canon law at university could set to work in that
system straight away. In these conditions, the public notariat,
which–thanks to the glossators−bore the clear imprint of Roman
law, spread easily. Its dissemination was facilitated by the great
value that the legal culture of Southern Europe, with its tradition of
Roman law, attached to written evidence. Around 1200, public
notaries appeared throughout the Southwest European part of the
Mediterranean region. 47 They worked there by authority of the

Universitaires de Leyde, 1974); LEIDSE JURIDISCHE REEKS XIII (Leyden, Presse
Universitaire de Leyde, 1974); J.PH. DE MONTÉ VER LOREN, HOOFDLIJNEN UIT
DE ONTWIKKELING DER RECHTERLIJKE ORGANISATIE IN DE NOORDELIJKE
NEDERLANDEN TOT DE BATAAFSE OMWENTELING 50-51, 85-86, 285-286 (7th
ed., J.E. Spruit ed., Deventer, Kluwer, 2000).
43. Oosterbosch, supra note 34, at 18-19.
44. Dolezalek, supra note 36, at 6-11. Van den Bichelaer, supra note 35, at
12-13.
45. Cappon, supra note 33, at 7-9.
46. W.J. ZWALVE, HOOFDSTUKKEN UIT DE GESCHIEDENIS VAN HET
EUROPESE PRIVAATRECHT. I, INLEIDING EN ZAKENRECHT 16-17 (3rd revised ed.,
The Hague, Boom Juridische Uitgevers, 2006).
47. Boüard, supra note 34, at 183-187; Dolezalek, supra note 36, at 7; Van
den Bichelaer, supra note 35, at 13-14; F. Roumy, Histoire du notariat et du
droit notarial en France, in HANDBUCH ZUR GESCHICHTE DES NOTARIATS DER
EUROPÄISCHEN TRADITIONEN 125-168 (M. Schmoeckel & W. Schubert eds.,
Rheinische Schriften zur Rechtsgeschichte, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2009)
(hereinafter “HANDBUCH ZUR GESCHICHTE”). Roumy states that in the South of
France the notariat makes his first appearance in the cities around the middle of
the twelfth century; only in the course of the thirteenth century it spreads over
the countryside of the Midi. At which moment the notariat really became a
public notariat, Roumy finds difficult to say, but at the end of the twelfth century
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emperor and/or the pope, and were appointed by city councils or
sovereign rulers; they could therefore only work within the borders
of the civic or sovereign territory. 48
Northern Europe had less favourable conditions for the
adoption of the public notariat. The law in Northern France, the
Netherlands, Britain, and Germany was of Germanic origin. An
essential feature of this law was the emphasis on oral proceedings
and evidence. 49 So in contrast to Southern Europe, this region had
no practice that linked up seamlessly to the services offered by a
public notariat. In consequence, the notariat did not penetrate this
region in a more or less spontaneous process, as it had in Southern
Europe, but instead entered through the channels of ecclesiastical
courts. 50 As a universal power, the Church had jurisdiction over
diverse areas of law throughout the Christian world. This
ecclesiastical justice, like the Roman law from which it derived,
was based on written proceedings. 51 Since 1215, it had been a
requirement of this Roman canon law that a written record must be
kept of the proceedings by a persona publica, that is, a public
notary, or by two other reliable persons. 52 So public notaries first
appeared in Northwest Europe around 1239, as clerks of
ecclesiastical courts. 53 But they had come to stay.

all notarial deeds have an authentic form. Roumy thus has the same period in
mind as Dolezalek and Van den Bichelaer.
48. Boüard, supra note 34, at 194-195; Van den Bichelaer, supra note 35, at
13-14; Roumy, supra note 47, at 131-132.
49. Boüard, supra note 34, at 229. R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, LA PREUVE DANS
LE DROIT DU MOYEN AGE OCCIDENTAL: RAPPORT DE SYNTHÈSE. STUDIA
HISTORICA GANDENSIA, reprint from La Preuve, IIe partie: RECUEILS DE LA
SOCIÉTÉ JEAN BODIN XVII 691-753 (Brussels, Université Libre de Bruxelles,
1965). D. Bieresborn, Klage und Klageerwiderung im deutschen und englischen
Zivilprozess. Eine rechtshistorische und rechtsvergleichende Untersuchung
unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Beeinflussung durch das römischkanonische Verfahren, 195 RECHTSHISTORISCHE REIHE 74 (Frankfurt am Main,
Peter Lang, 1999). A very clear introduction to the German procedural law is to
be found in C.L. Hoogewerf, Het Haarlemse stadsrecht (1245). Inleidende
beschouwingen, tekst, vertaling en artikelsgewijs commentaar 46-89
(Amsterdam, Cabeljauwpers, 2001) (doctoral dissertation, VU University
Amsterdam); Roumy, supra note 47, at 137.
50. Dolezalek, supra note 36, at 12.
51. Boüard, supra note 35, at 247-248.
52. Dolezalek, supra note 36, at 7-9; Oosterbosch, supra note 34, at 17-19;
Van den Bichelaer, supra note 35, at 14-17.
53. Dolezalek, supra note 36, at 12.
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VI. THE NOTARIAL PROFESSION
IN THE NORTHERN NETHERLANDS
Between 1250 and 1350 the public notariat was introduced
into the Netherlands and became an established profession there. 54
Just as in other parts of Europe, two factors played an important
role in this development. The first factor was the presence in the
country of itinerant notaries from Southern Europe, some of whom
operated independently while others worked in the retinues of
papal legates. The second was the influence of the ecclesiastical
courts: the ecclesiastical judges or Officials in the Netherlands
started hiring notaries around 1300. 55 These notaries worked under
the auspices of the imperial or papal authorities, but were also
permitted to offer their services independently. They were initially
appointed by the bishop, and in the late Middle Ages increasingly
by sovereign rulers. 56 Ecclesiastical and secular authorities alike
had a considerable stake in guaranteeing reliable legal transactions
within their jurisdictions. From this time on, the public notariat
was permanently entrenched in the Netherlands.

54. Van den Bichelaer, supra note 35, at 13-17; Cappon, supra note 33, at
9-15. Instructive for the Belgian history of the notariat is P.L. Nève, Schets van
een geschiedenis van het notarisambt in het huidige België tot aan de Franse
wetgeving. Rechtshistorische reeks van het Gerard Noodt Instituut nr. 34,
(Nijmegen, Gerard Noodt Instituut, 1995). P.L. Nève, “Het notariaat in de
Habsburgse Nederlanden,” “Het notariaat in het prinsbisdom Luik,” “Het
notariaat in het vorstendom Stavelot-Malmédy,” “Het notariaat in StaatsVlaanderen,” in Gehlen, supra note 33, at 37-89, 137-144; F. Stevens, Histoire
du notariat en Belgique, in HANDBUCH ZUR GESCHICHTE, supra note 47. 12
RHEINISCHE SCHRIFTEN ZUR RECHTSGESCHICHTE 361-373 (Baden-Baden,
Nomos, 2009). For a brief outline of the Dutch history of the public notariat
with an exhaustive bibliographie, see S. Roes, Geschichte und Historiographie
des niederländischen Notariats, in HANDBUCH ZUR GESCHICHTE, supra note 47.
12 RHEINISCHE SCHRIFTEN ZUR RECHTSGESCHICHTE 319-360 (Baden-Baden,
Nomos, 2009). Roes presents a survey of the first records of activities of public
notaries in the Northern Netherlands. Id. at 324.
55. J. KUYS, KERKELIJKE ORGANISATIE IN HET MIDDELEEUWSE BISDOM
UTRECHT 150-161 (Nijmegen, Uitgeverij Valkhof Pers, 2004); Van den
Bichelaer, supra note 35, at 25-26; A.Fl. Gehlen, Benelux. Le notariat aux PaysBas: perspective historique, in ATLAS DU NOTARIAT: LE NOTARIAT DANS LE
MONDE. HUIT SIÈCLES DE NOTARIAT LATIN–QUATRE DÉCENNIES D’UNION
INTERNATIONAL 127-142 (E.M. van der Marck ed., Deventer, Kluwer, 1989); 42
ARS NOTARIATUS (Deventer, Kluwer, 1989).
56. Van den Bichelaer, supra note 35, at 26.

584

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 4

VII. THE NOTARIAT IN THE TIME OF THE UNITED PROVINCES
In the sixteenth century, the Northern Netherlands severed
the universal, mediaeval ties that had bound it to Church and
Empire. 57 The Reformation and the Dutch Revolt naturally had
repercussions on an institution that owed its public confidence and
dissemination (though not, it should be recalled, its existence) to
the public heirs to the greatness of Rome. But these religious and
political convulsions did not induce any revolutionary change in
the notariat. Secular rulers had already taken a keen interest in the
notariat in the fifteenth century, and this trend became more
pronounced in the first half of the sixteenth century. Legislation
enacted by the country’s overlord Charles V established the
notariat definitively as a regional institution. From then on,
notaries were appointed by the regional overlord−that is, the
country’s sovereign ruler−and after the Act of Abjuration in 1581
they were appointed by the regional States.
The Reformation in turn had the effect of making it
impossible, in the long run, for notaries operating under papal
authority to work in the Netherlands. The profession became
secularized: clerics in lower orders were replaced by lay notaries.
Only those who belonged to the Reformed Church were admitted:
the notariat, as a public office, was not open to Catholics. 58 Still,
the essence of the profession was unaffected by these
developments: a notary remained a clerk who was certified and
appointed by the public authorities and who provided the public
with authentic documents.
VIII. FRENCH-STYLE NOTARIAT
To say that the French revolutionaries had little respect for
the legal system of the ancien régime is something of an
understatement. But the notariat formed an exception to this rule.
57. DE MONTÉ VER LOREN, supra note 42, at 249-268.
58. A. Pitlo, De zeventiende en achttiende eeuwse notarisboeken. Een
verhandeling over notarisboeken, notarisambt en notarieel recht onder de
Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden, 128 ARS NOTARIATUS 123, (2nd ed.,
A.Fl. Gehlen ed., Deventer, Kluwer, 2004). R. Huijbrecht, ‘Het notariaat in de
gewesten Holland en Zeeland’, in Gehlen, supra note 33, at 145-190.
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Its abolition was proposed, but never given serious consideration.
Quite the contrary, the revolutionaries found the notariat
indispensable, as a provider of legal services to the people and a
guardian of legal certainty. 59 Frequently quoted are the words of
the lawmaker Favard de Langlade in 1791: ‘the notariat stands firm
amid the ruins of the revolution;’ he was, after all, the son of a
notary to the king. 60 A legislative committee wrote in 1799 that the
notariat had been retained during the Revolution ‘parce qu’elle est
bonne en elle-même’−because it was good in itself; 61 a rare
quality, to be sure! And that same year, Favard de Langlade
remarked that the notary fulfilled ‘one of the most important
functions in society.’ 62 So to any Dutch notary who finds himself
troubled by doubts concerning the reputation of his profession, I
would say: do not go looking for a personal coach, but read the
legislative history of the Ventôse Law. You will start the next
day’s work brimming with self-confidence.
Certain changes did ensue from the Revolution, in
particular, as a result of that celebrated Ventôse Law of 1803,
which the French, true to their reputation for nationalist pride, see
as the foundation of the modern Latin notariat. 63 As I have already
noted, these changes were not revolutionary. True, the papal and
seigneurial notariats were abolished, but neither was very
significant, and the possibility of purchasing the office was
abolished in 1791; but royal notaries were subsequently appointed
for life. What is important, of course, is that the notary’s status as a
public officer, a status the profession had long enjoyed in France,
was retained. Notaries set fees for their services in consultation
59. F. Stevens, “Als een rots in de branding? Het notariaat en de Franse
revolutionaire wetgeving over het notarisambt (1791–1803),” in P.L. Nève,
J.A.E. Kuys & J.J. Verbeek, Quod notemus. Zes opstellen over de regelgeving
betreffende het notariaat van de middeleeuwen tot vandaag, 63 ARS
AOTARIATUS 39-57, (Deventer, Kluwer, 1993); B. Duinkerken, Notariaat in
overgangstijd 1796–1842, 40 ARS NOTARIATUS 34 (Deventer, Kluwer, 1988)
(doctoral dissertation, Leiden University).
60. Stevens, supra note 59, at 44. About Favard de Langlade, see P.
ARABEYRE ET AL., DICTIONNAIRE HISTORIQUE DES JURISTES FRANÇAIS (XIIEXXE SIÈCLE) 322 (Paris, Quadrige/Puf, 2007).
61. Stevens, supra note 59, at 50.
62. Id. at 51; Duinkerken, supra note 59, at 40.
63. F. STEVENS, LA LOI DE VENTÔSE CONTENANT ORGANISATION DU
NOTARIAT ET SA GENÈSE. DE VENTÔSE-WET OP HET NOTARISAMBT EN HAAR
GENESE (Brussels, Bruylant, 2004); see also Stevens, supra note 59, at 39.
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with the client. So the notion of standardized fees laid down by the
government was unheard of in 1803. 64
On March 1, 1811, following the Netherlands’ annexation
by the French Empire, the Ventôse Law entered into effect in this
territory, introducing uniformity into the notarial legislation.
Another consequence of this law was the introduction of the
notariat into parts of the Netherlands that were as yet unacquainted
with it. The Ventôse Law remained on the statute-books until it
was replaced on July 9, 1842 by the Notaries Act, a piece of
legislation to which many people now look back–ten years after its
demise−with a sense of nostalgia.
IX. THE DUTCH NOTARIAT UNDER THE 1842 NOTARIES ACT
Strictly speaking, of course, the 1842 Notaries Act was a
home-grown piece of legislation, but like the Civil Code that was
adopted in 1838, it was a revised version of a French law. 65 It
retained the notary’s status as a public officer appointed by the
Crown. Still, the Act did make certain changes. For instance, it
held out the prospect of the introduction of fixed fees. In this
respect, it included more government control than the Ventôse
Law, which provided that the fee should be agreed in consultation
between notary and client.
So was the notarial profession content with the new Act,
which introduced only minor changes–statutory fees–in
comparison to the Ventôse Law? Not a bit of it! From the moment
it entered into effect until the beginning of the twentieth century,
the 1842 Act was the butt of sometimes harsh criticism. 66 But
dissatisfaction with the Act and its perceived flaws was not the
only cause of the general mood of disgruntlement into which the
64. The changes brought about by the law of Ventôse are described by
Duinkerken, supra note 59, at 37-42.
65. B. Duinkerken, Het Nederlandse notariaat vanaf de Bataafse Republiek
tot de invoering van de Notariswet van 1842, in Gehlen, supra note 33, at 231261.
66. H.W. Heyman, Het ontwerp voor een nieuwe notariswet van de
Staatscommissie van 1867. Een blik op de problematiek van het notariaat rond
het midden van de negentiende eeuw, in Nève, Kuys & Verbeek, supra note 59,
at 69-104. R. de Jong, Tussen ambt en vrij beroep. Het notariaat tussen 1842 en
1999, 116 ARS NOTARIATUS 11-13 (Amsterdam, Stichting tot Bevordering der
Notariële Wetenschap, 2002).
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Dutch notariat slumped after 1842. Notaries were also incensed at
the competition they were facing from informal representatives
(zaakwaarnemers). 67 Such representatives performed numerous
tasks that lay within the notary’s working field but for which the
latter had not been granted exclusive competence–in other words,
legal transactions that did not require an authenticated deed.
Numerous people with a ready pen, from municipal officials and
court registrars to bailiffs, schoolmasters and former notary’s
clerks, discovered that drafting private documents could generate a
fine source of income. These informal representatives could charge
a lower fee and provided fierce competition, causing many notaries
to vent their indignation in writing. Some were unable to suppress
their rage, calling informal representatives ‘parasites’ and
comparing their actions to the spread of a fatal disease. The falling
income among notaries that resulted from the actions of informal
representatives heightened competition among notaries themselves,
triggering a new hunt for business; the notarial profession became
commercialized. This did not enhance the quality of the services
that were provided; ‘abuses’ were reported. 68 Browsing through
the notarial journals that were published in this period, one is left
with the impression that some notaries had succumbed to
existential doubt; they believed that the profession was in a state of
‘serious decline.’ 69 The doom-laden mood that took hold of the
notarial profession around 1870 exhibits striking parallels with the
situation at the present time. But around 1870, that same
disgruntled notariat–it is a historian’s privilege to point out−was in
fact standing on the threshold of a century of growth and
prosperity.
I started this historical excursion with the aim of clarifying
the essence of the Latin notariat. The principle of fixed places of
establishment is not, as Rouvoet suggested in 1998, a defining
feature of the Latin notariat. The early efforts of the notarial
profession to steer the establishment of notaries within its
jurisdiction in the right direction arose from a concern to
consolidate the profession’s reliability. It was a supervisory
67. Heyman, supra note 66, at 76-80. De Jong, supra note 66, at 22-26.
68. See, e.g. Heyman, supra note 66, at 73.
69. Id. at 77-78.
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measure that derived quite naturally from the government’s direct
responsibility for the public notariat. After all, it was the
government that certified and appointed each new notary. Fixed
fees are likewise not a defining feature of the Latin notariat. Not
until the mid-nineteenth century did a central system of standard
fees come into play for notaries’ diverse services. It was unknown
under the ancien regime, and the Ventôse Law did not provide for
any such mechanism. In the Netherlands, statutory, standard fees
for notarial services were not introduced until 1847. Clearly then, it
is completely wrong to say that the major innovations introduced
by the Notaries Act of 1999 constituted a break with the Latin
notariat. In fact, taking a historical view, one might well argue that
a public notariat with freedom of establishment and freedom to
charge fees is closer to the original model of the Latin notariat than
the Dutch notariat as it had existed since the Second World War.
The essence of the Latin notariat consists solely of the
power to issue self-authenticating documents, prima facie pieces of
evidence that lose their probative value only if they are proven to
have been forged or falsified. Since time immemorial, issuing selfauthenticating pieces of documentary evidence has been the
prerogative of the public authorities. And since time immemorial,
judgments handed down by a court of law and deeds drawn up by
authorized public officers have constituted prima facie proof. The
public notariat evolved from the office of judge in Lombardy and
has retained the character of a public office ever since. Indeed, it
could not be otherwise. Without government authority there would
be no authenticity. The unique characteristic of this public officer
is that he is not employed by the government. He works for a fee in
private practice. When I was preparing this address, the conviction
gradually took hold of me that a hybrid profession of this kind
could only have originated in Italy. For there is surely no other
European culture that can be so flexible and practical in its creative
solutions. No other European culture takes such an instrumental
view of the state as to legalize a combination of a public office
with a private income. In that respect too, the notariat is a true
Bartolian construct. 70
70. The fourteenth-century Italian school of the Commentators or Bartolists,
called after Bartolus de Sassoferrato (1313/14-1357), is known by a very free
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X. A FEW COMPARATIVE NOTES:
ENGLISH COMMON LAW SYSTEM
The central feature of the notariat, then, is the power to
draw up and issue authentic acts. A brief excursion into
comparative law will demonstrate the correctness of this
proposition. In England, the public notariat never developed into
full maturity. 71 It has always played a very modest, albeit not
unimportant, role. 72 The explanation for this should be sought in
English procedural and evidentiary law. English law, of course, is
so-called common law, which is a different legal system than that
of continental Europe. Common law is of Germanic origin, while
the civil law of continental Europe is rooted in Roman law. The
procedural law of the late Roman Empire that was introduced on
the continent, through the intervention of the Church, as the
Roman canon law of procedure, was based on written sources. 73
This system was based on written evidence, such as notarial acts.
The Germanic law of procedure was in principle based on oral
proceedings, and the common law system has held firm to this
emphasis over the centuries. The openness and public nature that
are characteristic of numerous legal transactions in Germanic law

and practical method of interpretation of the Corpus iuris civilis of the
Byzantine emperor Justinian (527-565). Partly due to the method of the
Commentators the Roman law of Justinian found its way into European society.
Of course I’m aware of the fact that the earliest history of the Latin notariat
dates from before the Commentators. However, already in the earliest Italian
legal science (twelfth century) one finds the tendency for a practical
interpretation of the Justinian legislation. The Latin notariat is at least partly a
product of a practical interpretation of the Corpus iuris too and in this broad
sense also to be seen as a bartolistic construct. The famous ars notariatus
(treatise about notarial deeds) of Rolandinus Passagerii (died 1300) has been
written after the golden age of the glossators (1100-1250) and is to be
considered as an early bartolistic work. N. Horn, Die legistische Literatur der
Kommentatoren und der Ausbreitung des gelehrten Rechts, in HANDBUCH DER
QUELLEN, supra note 34, at 354-355.
71. VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 49, at 59.
72. C.W. BROOKS ET AL., NOTARIES PUBLIC IN ENGLAND SINCE THE
REFORMATION 3 (London, The Erskine Press, 1991) (the origins of the notaries
public in England); C.R. CHENEY, NOTARIES PUBLIC IN ENGLAND IN THE
THIRTEENTH AND FOURTEENTH CENTURIES (Oxford, The Clarendon Press,
1972).
73. VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 49, at 37, 60-61.
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have always remained inherent to proceedings under common
law. 74 These qualities are reflected, for instance, in a strong
preference for oral rather than written testimony. 75 This preference
was strengthened by the introduction of the jury system, given that
many jurors, in the past, were partly or wholly illiterate.
This explicit preference for oral testimony explains why
common law courts have never accorded a special evidentiary
status to written legal instruments, including notarial acts. 76 In
common law, every legal instrument in principle possesses equal
probative value: in this system, no private legal instrument can
acquire the status of a self-authenticating act, that is, an act
regarded as prima facie proof; only acts of parliament and judicial
records have such probative force. The court will subject all other
written pieces of evidence, including acts drawn up privately, to
the same evidentiary procedure as any other kind of evidence. In
short, in countries such as England, in which written documents do
not possess any particular probative value, the public notariat has
only a very modest role to play.
XI. CONCLUSION
English law helps to highlight a contrario the defining
feature of the public notariat: it is the strong probative value of the
written forms of evidence that notaries issue to members of the
public. This essential quality of the notariat gives me confidence
for the future of this venerable institution. As long as the civil law
holds fast to written proceedings, to the centuries-old Roman
canon law of procedure, the public notariat will remain
indispensable.

74. Id. at 59.
75. M.T. CLANCHY, FROM MEMORY TO WRITTEN RECORD ENGLAND 10661307 97 (2d ed., Malden, Oxford and Carlton, Blackwell Publishing, 1993).
76. BROOKS ET AL., supra note 72, at 5-8. CHENEY, supra note 72, at 44, 5253.
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ABSTRACT
L’auteure souhaite, par cet article, présenter la
jurilinguistique comme une discipline en croissance pouvant
apporter une approche originale à la recherche. Afin d’illustrer son
propos, elle étudie les différentes étapes du processus de traduction
en espagnol du Code Civil du Québec ayant mené à la publication
d’un Code trilingue. Son analyse met en relief les difficultés
rencontrées en cours de route par les traducteurs et réviseurs et,
plus particulièrement, les spécificités de la traduction d’une loi
bilingue vers une tierce langue.
The author seeks, with this article, to introduce
jurilinguistics as a growing discipline that could contribute a new
and distinct approach to scholarly research. As an instance
supporting her remarks, the author studies the different stages in
the process of translating the Civil Code of Québec into Spanish,
leading to the publication of a trilingual Code. Her analysis
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highlights the difficulties encountered along the way by the
translators and revisers. It emphasizes in particular the aspects
which are specific to translating a bilingual law into a third
language.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2008, Wilson & Lafleur published a trilingual edition of
the Civil Code of Québec (the trilingual Code). 1 At first sight, the
rectangular “landscape” format of the book’s pages catches the
reader’s attention. This shape is due to the fact that a third column
with a Spanish version 2 has been added to the columns of the
French and English versions, so commonplace for any jurist
familiar with commercial editions 3 of the Civil Code of Québec.
The Spanish version makes up the left column, the French one the
middle column and the English one the column on the right. This
order is not followed for the index. The pages of the Spanish index
are placed last, those of the English placed in the middle, and those
of the French come right after the last article of the Code.
Another point worthy of notice is the existence of seventyeight translators’ notes. 4 This is almost the only piece of evidence
that the book is a translation. There is just another reference to
1. See JULIO CÉSAR RIVERA, CÓDIGO CIVIL DE QUEBEC: CODE CIVIL DU
QUÉBEC [CIVIL CODE OF QUÉBEC] (Wilson & Lafleur eds., Montreal, 2008).
In the spirit of this study, trilingualism is a fundamental point of this
essay. As it will become clear later, French and Spanish were predominant
during the research work of this essay. Consequently, English was the language
chosen for this essay. The second choice was to keep quotations in their original
language; they will be explained in English but not necessarily translated.
Similarly, titles will fluctuate from one language to another.
2. Following the Preface of the trilingual Code, the word “version” will
more often but not exclusively be used, in preference to the word “text,” to refer
to an instantiation of the Code in one or other of the three languages. For
nuances on the use of these terms, see Preface to the Original Critical Edition,
in CODE CIVIL DU QUÉBEC. ÉDITION CRITIQUE. CIVIL CODE OF QUÉBEC. A
CRITICAL EDITION (18th ed., Jean-Maurice Brisson & Nicholas Kasirer eds.,
Montreal, Yvon Blais, 2010) (hereinafter Preface).
3. This is not necessarily the case for non-commercial editions. See Note to
the 2007-2008 Edition, in CODE CIVIL DU QUÉBEC. ÉDITION CRITIQUE. CIVIL
CODE OF QUÉBEC. A CRITICAL EDITION XVI, XVIII (Jean-Maurice Brisson &
Nicholas Kasirer eds., Montreal, Yvon Blais, 2007) (hereinafter Note).
4. These translators’ comments are marked by an asterisk but not all of
them are presented as “N.T.” However, as will be further explained, for ease of
reading, they are called here translators’ notes.
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translation, in the words of thanks in the Note de l’éditeur.
Otherwise, the book’s presentation does not bear the marks of a
translation. All three columns on its pages have similar
characteristics (size of characters, paragraphs, etc.). Even the title
of the book does not include the word translation, nor does the
Preface. The title simply enunciates the content of the book in
three languages: “Código Civil de Quebec-Code Civil du QuébecCivil Code of Québec.” In the Preface, the Quebec Government
refers to the Spanish version of the Code “[qui] s’ajoute à celles de
langues française et anglaise.” 5
After this overview, the reader will probably wonder about
the use to which this work is destined. This query finds a
preliminary answer in the Preface, which proposes the trilingual
Code as a tool for legal practice in Quebec “dans l’espace
linguistique hispanophone.” The Preface also proposes a more
theoretical use, as an asset in comparative law, where the trilingual
Code “assurera à notre droit civil un rayonnement remarquable
dans les milieux juridiques hispanophones” and can serve as
“source d’inspiration pour plusieurs législateurs étrangers.” 6 But
there seems 7 to be another possible use, one not mentioned in the
Preface but which led to the present essay. This use, and hereafter
the goal of this essay, will be presented in the following two
sections: 2. A jurilinguistic study . . . 3. . . . of the trilingual Civil
Code of Québec. Each section will clarify a part of the paper’s title
as well as the methodological choices.
II. A JURILINGUISTIC STUDY
Set aside the practical uses and the comparative aspects of
the trilingual Code; this study takes a jurilinguistic approach. It is
5. MONIQUE GAGNON- TREMBLAY & JACQUES P. DUPUIS, Préface, in
CODE CIVIL DU QUÉBEC, supra note 1.
6. CLAUDE WILSON & HUBERT REID, Note de l’éditeur, in CODE CIVIL DU
QUÉBEC , supra note 1.
7. As the present text does not seek to be exhaustive, but rather to open
debates, the verb “seem” will be much used. For the use of the verb sembler
when exhaustiveness is not sought, see Jacques Vanderlinden, D'un paradigme à
l'autre. À propos de l'interprétation des textes législatifs plurilingues, in JEANCLAUDE GEMAR & NICHOLAS KASIRER, JURILINGUISTIQUE: ENTRE LANGUES ET
DROITS [JURILINGUISTICS : BETWEEN LAW AND LANGUAGE] 293, 304 (Éditions
Thémis/Bruylant, Montreal/Bruxelles, 2005).
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important to note that this is not a work on jurilinguistics theory. It
is not a paper on what jurilinguistics is but on presenting different
options of doing jurilinguisitcs. However, since jurilinguistics does
not yet have a well-developed and agreed-upon meaning, it seems
necessary to mention, mostly in footnotes, the theoretical ideas
behind the different possible research venues, here explored.
The methodology for this exploration follows another
jurilinguistic work: the Critical Edition of the Civil Code of
Québec, published every year by Éditions Yvon Blais (the Critical
Edition). 8 This work records conflicts in meaning between the two
official texts of the Code with a dagger symbol and notes
“infelicities of language” with an asterisk. 9 The authors of the
Critical Edition indicate conflicts but do not express a preference
between the alternatives. However, even pointing out the issue
implies an interpretative act and thus a jurilinguistic analysis. 10
The trilingual Code has a parallel to these asterisks: the
translators’ notes. By using an asterisk, the translators outline
difficult or controversial choices in translation. The comments the
translators made this way are called here translators’ notes,
whether they have the “N.T.” notation following the asterisk or
not. The reason for the existence of the majority of these notes will
become clear later.
In similarity with the Critical Edition, this essay seeks,
through the analysis of the translators’ notes, to open the way to a
different perspective but will not provide a definitive answer or
exhaustive study. It revisits each translators’ note and suggests a
jurilinguistic approach for the matter.
In this sense, in its guidelines, it proposes a notion of
jurilinguistics as a discipline fluctuating within/entre two main
pillars: linguistics and law, neither prevailing over the other.11
8. Preface, supra note 2.
9. See Preface, supra note 2, at XXXVI–XXXVIII.
10. See id.
11. For studies on law and language and the relevance of their close ties, see
generally JEAN-LOUIS SOURIOUX & PIERRE LERAT, LE LANGAGE DU DROIT
(Presses universitaires de France, Paris, 1975); JEAN-CLAUDE GÉMAR,
LANGAGE DU DROIT ET TRADUCTION : ESSAIS DE JURILINGUISTIQUE [THE
LANGUAGE OF THE LAW AND TRANSLATION : ESSAYS ON JURILINGUISTICS]
(Linguatech/Conseil de la langue française, Québec, 1982) (hereinafter
“LANGAGE DU DROIT ET TRADUCTION”); CARLES DUARTE & ANNA MARTÍNEZ,
EL LENGUAJE JURÍDICO (A-Z editora, Buenos Aires, 1995); Nicholas Kasirer,
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There is no neat border between them. On the contrary, there is an
ongoing communication between the two pillars. Jurilinguistics is
a two-way bridge where traffic never stops. 12 This makes for the
richness and particularity of the discipline.
Thus, the goal of this essay is to stay within/entre both
pillars. It is neither a comment on Quebec’s jus commune 13 nor a
study on a particular legal institution of the Code. It is not a
terminological analysis of the language of the Code or of particular

Dire ou définir le droit?, in GÉRARD SNOW & JACQUES VANDERLINDEN,
FRANÇAIS JURIDIQUE ET SCIENCE DU DROIT 165 (Bruylant, Bruxelles, 1995);
Jacques Vanderlinden, Du droit et de la langue ou de la langue et du droit?, in
GÉRARD SNOW & JACQUES VANDERLINDEN, FRANÇAIS JURIDIQUE ET SCIENCE
DU DROIT 23 (Bruylant, Bruxelles, 1995); Roderick A. Macdonald, Regards sur
les rapports juridiques informels entre langues et droit, 3 REVUE DE LA COMMON
LAW EN FRANÇAIS 137 (1997); ERIK JAYME, LANGUE ET DROIT. XVE CONGRÈS
INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT COMPARÉ, BRISTOL, 1998: COLLECTION DES RAPPORTS
(Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1999); Jacques Vanderlinden, Langue et droit, in JAYME
65; Nicholas Kasirer, Le real estate existe-t-il en droit civil? Un regard sur le
lexique juridique de droit civil de langue anglaise, in RODOLFO SACCO & LUCA
CASTELLANI, LES MULTIPLES LANGUES DU DROIT EUROPÉEN UNIFORME 89
(Torino/Paris, Harmattan Italia/Harmattan, 1999) (hereinafter “Le real estate
existe-t-il en droit civil?”); Rodolfo Sacco, Langue et droit, in SACCO &
CASTELLANI, 163; NICOLAS MOLFESSIS, LES MOTS DE LA LOI (Paris, Économica,
1999); Daniel Jutras, Énoncer L'indicible: Le Droit Entre Langues et Traditions,
4–2000 R.I.D.C. 781 (2000); EDUARDO ÁNGEL RUSSO & ALICIA C.
MOGUILLANES MEDINA, LA LENGUA DEL DERECHO. INTRODUCCIÓN A LA
HERMENÉUTICA JURÍDICA (Buenos Aires, Editorial Estudio, 2001); NICHOLAS
KASIRER, LE DROIT CIVIL, AVANT TOUT UN STYLE? (Éditions Thémis, Montreal,
2003); Nicholas Kasirer, Pothier from A to Z, in BENOÎT MOORE, MÉLANGES
JEAN PINEAU 387 (Éditions Thémis, Montreal, 2003) (hereinafter “Pothier from
A to Z”); DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW (Eugene, Resource
Pub., 2004); GÉRARD CORNU, LINGUISTIQUE JURIDIQUE (3rd ed, Paris,
Montchrestien, 2005); Pierre Lerat, Le vocabulaire juridique entre langue et
texte, in JEAN-CLAUDE GEMAR & NICHOLAS KASIRER, JURILINGUISTIQUE:
ENTRE LANGUES ET DROITS [JURILINGUISTICS : BETWEEN LAW AND LANGUAGE]
59 (Éditions Thémis/Bruylant, Montreal/Bruxelles, 2005).
12. The idea of movement is taken from Laplantine and Nouss’s thoughts
on the notion of entre as: “l’interstitialité métisse, qui est le contraire de
l’homogène et du compact, ne désigne pas un état situé dans un espace. Elle
introduit un devenir. Elle n’occupe pas une place intermédiaire entre deux pôles,
elle n’est pas un point situé à équidistance entre les deux, mais un mouvement
rythmique d’intermittence.” See, FRANÇOIS LAPLANTINE & ALEXIS NOUSS,
MÉTISSAGES : DE ARCIMBOLDO À ZOMBI 217 (Paris, Pauvert, 2001).
13. For the role of Quebec’s Civil Code as the foundational general law and
the use of ius commune or jus commune in English, see the Code’s Preliminary
provision comments. See, Preface, supra note 2, at XXXVI, 1. See also
Macdonald, Encoding Canadian Civil Law, supra star-footnote.
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formulations. It is not a study of the Spanish translation itself. It
was tempting to take only one of these better known paths and
develop it. However, the goal is to present the potential of
jurilinguistics as a broad discipline 14 whether autonomous or
auxiliary. As a result, there is no particular aspect fully developed
but an eclectic palette of research opportunities.
Through the analysis of the translators’ notes, this study
first focuses on aspects traditionally and largely developed by this
growing discipline. 15 It aims to provide the scholar, with new
research venues on legal translation, legal language and
comparative law (V.A. Necessary translators’ notes, V.A.1 Neutral
Spanish and V.A.2 Legal Institutions). Second, it presents
jurilinguistics as a tool to understanding law (V.B.3 Bilingualism
of the Code). 16
14. For new approaches that tend to overcome the exclusive terminological
approach that seems to reign in jurilinguistics, see MARCUS GALDIA, LEGAL
LINGUISTICS 21(Frankfurt am Main, Peter Lang, 2009).
15. Its main ideas are largely upheld in J.C. Gémar’s work. This author’s
term, jurilinguistics, is kept as a useful way to identify a blooming discipline as
well as the professionals practicing it. Also, following this author, legal
translation is considered to be at the core of any examination of jurilinguistics.
However, J.C. Gémar’s vision seems excessively limited to aspects drawn from
linguistics. Therefore, it seems useful to keep in mind the more juridical
approach upheld by Gérard Cornu, who preferred to use the term linguistique
juridique instead of jurilinguistics. It is relevant for the present essay that this
author pointed out jurilinguistics’s role as auxiliary to “la science fondamentale
du droit” and to comparative law, as well as its main role in language rights
issues. See JEAN-CLAUDE GÉMAR, LANGAGE DU DROIT ET TRADUCTION, supra
note 14; JEAN-CLAUDE GÉMAR, LES TROIS ÉTATS DE LA POLITIQUE
LINGUISTIQUE DU QUÉBEC: D'UNE SOCIÉTÉ TRADUITE À UNE SOCIÉTÉ
D'EXPRESSION (Québec, Gouvernement du Québec Conseil de la langue
française, 1983); JEAN-CLAUDE GÉMAR, TRADUIRE, OU, L'ART D'INTERPRÉTER
(Sainte-Foy, Presses de l'Université du Québec, 1995); Jean-Claude Gémar, Le
langage du droit au risque de la traduction. De l'universel et du particulier, in
GÉRARD SNOW & JACQUES VANDERLINDEN, FRANÇAIS JURIDIQUE ET SCIENCE
DU DROIT 123 (Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1995) (hereinafter “De l'universel et du
particulier”); Jean-Claude Gémar, Langage du droit et (juri)linguistique. États
et fonctions de la jurilinguistique, in JEAN-CLAUDE GEMAR & NICHOLAS
KASIRER, JURILINGUISTIQUE: ENTRE LANGUES ET DROITS [JURILINGUISTICS:
5
(Éditions
Thémis/Bruylant,
BETWEEN
LAW
AND
LANGUAGE]
Montreal/Bruxelles, 2005); GÉRARD CORNU, LINGUISTIQUE JURIDIQUE (3rd ed.,
Paris, Montchrestien, 2005); GÉRARD CORNU, VOCABULAIRE JURIDIQUE (8th
ed., Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 2007).
16. This is largely inspired in in the Honourable Nicholas Kasirer’s work
with respect to jurilinguistics. See Kasirer, Dire ou définir le droit?, supra
note11; Nicholas Kasirer, What is vie commune? Qu'est-ce que living together?,
in MÉLANGES OFFERTS PAR SES COLLÈGUES DE MCGILL À PAUL-ANDRÉ
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Accordingly, this essay aims to explore if and how jurilinguistics,
as an “empowered discipline,” 17 can provide the scholar in
disciplines with well acquired status with fresh and even new
lenses for analysis. It is important to insist that no example will be
fully developed but merely presented. The examples chosen
outline what can be called jurilinguistics opportunities based on the
aller-retour within both pillars of jurilinguistics. This aller-retour
reflects an “[état] d’esprit” which opens fresh avenues for research
and study. 18 This essay will ask whether a jurilinguist, as mediator
between law and language, could have reached different
conclusions when facing difficult choices. 19

CRÉPEAU [MÉLANGES PRESENTED BY MCGILL COLLEAGUES TO PAUL-ANDRÉ
CRÉPEAU] 487 (Éditions Yvon Blais, Cowansville, Centre de recherche en droit
privé et comparé du Québec, 1997) (hereinafter “What is vie commune?”);
Preface, supra note 2; Kasirer, Le real estate existe-t-il en droit civil?, supra
note 11; Nicholas Kasirer, François Gény's libre recherche scientifique as a
Guide to Legal Translation, 61 LA. L. REV. 331 (2001) (hereinafter “François
Gény”); Nicholas Kasirer, Portalis now, in LE DROIT CIVIL, AVANT TOUT UN
STYLE? 1 (Éditions Thémis, Montreal, 2003); Nicholas Kasirer, ‘Délit’ interdit!
No ‘Offence’!, in CENTRE DE RECHERCHE EN DROIT PRIVÉ ET COMPARÉ DU
QUÉBEC, COLLOQUE DU TRENTENAIRE. THIRTIETH ANNIVERSARY CONFERENCE:
1975-2005 203 (Éditions Yvon Blais, Montreal, 2005) (hereinafter “Délit’
interdit! No ‘Offence’!”); Kasirer, Pothier from A to Z, supra note 11; Nicholas
Kasirer, Postface/Afterword. Is the Canadian Jurilinguist – Living entre langues
et droits–A Middle Power?, in JEAN-CLAUDE GEMAR & NICHOLAS KASIRER,
JURILINGUISTIQUE: ENTRE LANGUES ET DROITS [JURILINGUISTICS : BETWEEN LAW
AND LANGUAGE] (Éditions Thémis/Bruylant, Montreal/Bruxelles, 2005)
(hereinafter “Postface/Afterword”); Nicholas Kasirer, L'outre-loi, in LYNNE
CASTONGUAY & NICHOLAS KASIRER, ÉTUDES OFFERTES À JACQUES
VANDERLINDEN : ÉTUDIER ET ENSEIGNER LE DROIT: HIER, AUJOURD'HUI ET
DEMAIN 239 (Yvon Blais, Cowansville/Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2006).
17. See Kasirer, Postface/Afterword, supra note 19, at 579.
18. This expression is used by J.C. Gémar when he refers to the different
professionals that can have a jurilinguistic approach. See Jean-Claude Gémar,
Avant-propos/Foreword, in JEAN-CLAUDE GEMAR & NICHOLAS KASIRER,
JURILINGUISTIQUE: ENTRE LANGUES ET DROITS [JURILINGUISTICS : BETWEEN LAW
AND LANGUAGE] XV (Éditions Thémis/Bruylant, Montreal/Bruxelles, 2005).
19. See the image of Hermes presented by François Ost. See François Ost,
Jupiter, Hercule, Hermès: trois modèles du juge, in PIERRE BOURETZ, LA FORCE
DU DROIT : PANORAMA DES DÉBATS CONTEMPORAINS 241 (Éditions Esprit, Paris,
1991). The legal theories of Ost largely coincide with the theoretical approach of
this essay.
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In this sense, the legal translator will find in the story of the
process of getting to the trilingual Code an interesting tool to
enrich the debate on the training required to translate legal texts. 20
The essay will also provide the legal terminologist with new
examples reflecting on the necessity or even possibility of a neutral
language, beyond vernaculars, as well as on other questions of
legal language. 21 Comparatists will find a most interesting
20. For general texts on the training required for legal translation and its
difficulties, see generally Kasirer, Portalis now, supra note 16; Rodolfo Sacco,
Langue et droit, in JAYME, supra note 11, at 223; SUSAN ŠARČEVIĆ, NEW
APPROACH TO LEGAL TRANSLATION (The Hague/Boston, Kluwer Law
International, 1997); Judith Lavoie, Faut-il être juriste ou traducteur pour
traduire le droit?, 48 META: JOURNAL DES TRADUCTEURS, XLVIII:3 (2003);
Roberto Mayoral Asensio, La traducción jurídica: un enigma para los
estudiosos, una tarea para los profesionales, 1 EL LENGUARAZ. REVISTA
ACADÉMICA DEL COLEGIO DE TRADUCTORES PÚBLICOS DE LA CIUDAD DE
BUENOS AIRES 15 (2001); Roberto Mayoral Asensio, ¿Cuánto derecho debe
saber el traductor jurídico?, in ESTHER MONZÒ NEBOT & ANABEL BORJA ALBI,
LA TRADUCCIÓN Y LA INTERPRETACIÓN EN LAS RELACIONES JURÍDICAS
INTERNACIONALES 107 (Barcelona, Castelló de la Plana, 2005); Alexandre
Covacs, La réalisation de la version française des lois fédérales du Canada, in
GÉMAR, LANGAGE DU DROIT ET TRADUCTION, supra note 11, at 83; Gémar, De
l'universel et du particulier, supra note 18; MOLFESSIS, supra note 11;
MARSHALL MORRIS, TRANSLATION AND THE LAW (Amsterdam, John Benjamins
Publishing Company, 1995); Susan Šarčević, Creativity in Legal Translation:
How Much is Too Much?, in ANDREW CHESTERMAN, NATIVIDAD GALLARDO
SAN SALVADOR & YVES GAMBIER, TRANSLATION IN CONTEXT: SELECTED
CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE EST CONGRESS, GRANADA, 1998 281
(Amsterdam/Philadelphia, J. Benjamins, 2000); Susan Šarčević, The quest for
legislative bilingualism and multilingualism: co-drafting in Canada and
Switzerland, in JEAN-CLAUDE GEMAR
& NICHOLAS KASIRER,
JURILINGUISTIQUE: ENTRE LANGUES ET DROITS [JURILINGUISTICS : BETWEEN LAW
AND LANGUAGE] 277 (Éditions Thémis/Bruylant, Montreal/Bruxelles, 2005);
Jean-Claude Gémar, L'interprétation du texte juridique ou le dilemme du
traducteur, in RODOLFO SACCO, L'INTERPRÉTATION DES TEXTES JURIDIQUES
RÉDIGÉS DANS PLUS D'UNE LANGUE 103 (Torino, L'Harmattan Italia, 2002)
(hereinafter “L'interprétation du texte juridique”).
21. For varieties of legal languages, even when using the same language,
see generally EMMANUEL DIDIER, LANGUES ET LANGAGES DU DROIT : ÉTUDE
COMPARATIVE DES MODES D'EXPRESSION DE LA COMMON LAW ET DU DROIT
CIVIL, EN FRANÇAIS ET EN ANGLAIS 209 (Montreal, Wilson & Lafleur, 1990);
Kasirer, Dire ou définir le droit?, supra note 11; Jacques Vanderlinden,
Exercice comparatif au départ d'un sujet convenu. Le droit sud-africain entre
principe et réalisme, in RODOLFO SACCO, L'INTERPRÉTATION DES TEXTES
JURIDIQUES RÉDIGÉS DANS PLUS D'UNE LANGUE 297 (Torino, L'Harmattan Italia,
2002); Nicholas Kasirer, Délit’ interdit! No ‘Offence’!, supra note 19, at 203.
Especially for English it is worth remembering the distinction between civil law
English and that of the common law. See Alain Levasseur & Vincenç Feliú, The
English Fox in the Louisiana Civil Law Chausse-Trappe: Civil Law Concepts in
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empirical work on the well-known relation between language,
culture, translation and comparison, not to mention the
comparative value of the trilingual Code itself.
But the jurilinguistic approach, as an opportunity for the
legal scholar to study legal institutions (in this case, provisions of
the Civil Code of Québec) from a different perspective, will be of
most interest. Thus, jurilinguistics may allow understanding and
interpreting both foreign and vernacular law in a way that they are
less foreign and vernacular. Accordingly, the “Other” (the third
language, the Spanish column and the foreign law prejudices) will
dialogue with and challenge the “Self” (the Civil Code of Québec
in its two official languages). 22 There is an aller-retour between
interpreting via legal translation and understanding via
comparison. This seems an innovative jurilinguistic approach to
study law.
It is time now to focus on the second part of the title of this
study and to better introduce the trilingual Code and its difficulties,
as well as other important methodological choices.
III. THE TRILINGUAL CIVIL CODE OF QUÉBEC
In order to better understand the process of preparing the
trilingual Code and the attendant difficulties, the strategy of the
present study is to let the main actors in the work serve as guides.
Their voices can be heard through two main sources: interviews
with the professionals involved in the process and the translators’
notes in the trilingual code.
The selection of interviewees was a natural choice as the
professionals involved are named in the Note de l’éditeur of the
trilingual Code. The main actors in the work can be divided into

the English Language; Comparativists Beware!, 69 LA. L. REV. 715 (2009). See
also supra note 11.
22. For the dialogue between the two official versions, see Preface, supra
note 4, at XXXIV; for the idea of dialogue between the translation and the
original text, see ANTOINE BERMAN, L'ÉPREUVE DE L'ÉTRANGER : CULTURE ET
TRADUCTION DANS L'ALLEMAGNE ROMANTIQUE, HERDER, GOETHE, SCHLEGEL,
NOVALIS, HUMBOLDT, SCHLEIERMACHER, HÖLDERLIN 13 (Paris, Gallimard,
1984).
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three classes: the translators, the revisers and the publisher. 23
Accordingly, twelve interviews were conducted in Montreal,
Quebec City, Sherbrooke and Buenos Aires between February and
May 2009. 24 They were done either in French or Spanish,
depending on the interviewee’s preference. The prominence of
these two languages led to choose English as the language used for
this article. This way, the presence of all three languages will allow
for reflection on a certain trilingualism.
Each interview lasted approximately one hour. They
addressed two main topics: the project’s background and then the
project’s methodology and challenges. The first topic was divided
between the personal background and goals of the interviewee, and
the history of the project itself. The second topic also had two subthemes: the dynamics of the work and the difficulties encountered
in the process. Questions were general and open-textured, in order
to give the interviewee the opportunity to freely develop his or her
thoughts.
Following the jurilinguistic focus of this study, the
legislative bilingualism of the Code 25 was a topic of discussion in
23. Following the expression lawyer-revisor/lawyer-reviser or translatorrevisor/translator-reviser used in Quebec, the professionals who revised the
Spanish version of the trilingual Code will be named revisers.
24. Interview with Robin Dejardin, in Montreal, Quebec (Feb. 26, 2009);
Roberto Godoy, in Montreal, Quebec (Apr. 29, 2009); Interview with Denis
L´Anglais, in Quebec, Quebec (Apr. 21, 2009); Interview with Rosgarys
Mercado-González, in Montreal, Quebec (Apr. 27, 2009); Interview with
Elizabeth Patterson, in Montreal, Quebec (Feb. 17, 2009); Interview with Hubert
Reid, in Quebec, Quebec (Apr. 21, 2009); Interview with Julio César Rivera, in
Buenos Aires, Argentina (Mar. 19, 2009); Interview with Juliana RodríguezAnido, in Sherbrooke, Quebec (May 15, 2009); Interview with María Alejandra
Tello, in Buenos Aires, Argentina (Mar. 19, 2009); Interview with Elyse
Turcotte, in Montreal, Quebec (Mar. 3, 2009); Interview with Marcela Rossana
Valdivia, in Montreal, Quebec (Apr. 29, 2009); Interview with Walter Viegas, in
Buenos Aires, Argentina (Mar. 19, 2009).
25. The Civil Code of Québec is an Act of the Legislature of Quebec so it
has to be printed and published both in English and in French. It is clearly a
bilingual legal text. See Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3. (U.K),
s. 133; Charter of the French language, R.S.Q., c. C-11, s. 7; Doré v. Verdun
(City), [1997] 2 S.C.R 862, at para. 24-26 (Can.) (hereinafter cited as Doré v.
Verdun); Kasirer, What is vie commune?, supra note 19, at 487; Pierre-André
Côté, La tension entre l'intelligibilité et l'uniformité dans l'interprétation des
lois plurilingues, in JEAN-CLAUDE GEMAR
& NICHOLAS KASIRER,
JURILINGUISTIQUE: ENTRE LANGUES ET DROITS [JURILINGUISTICS : BETWEEN LAW
AND LANGUAGE] 127-133 (Éditions Thémis/Bruylant, Montreal/Bruxelles,
2005); PIERRE-ANDRÉ CÔTÉ, THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATION IN CANADA
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every interview. This essay starts from the premise that both of the
official texts should be taken into account. There cannot be a
trilingual version of the Civil Code of Québec if the translation
comes exclusively from one official version. The
acknowledgement of a bilingual text seems a requirement to get to
the trilingual text. 26
Accordingly, the particularity of the Code’s bilingualism as
well as the influence of the common-law will guide this
jurilinguistic study. 27 From these interviews, it became clear that
the legislative bilingualism of the Civil Code of Québec, this
“distinctive feature of Quebec legal culture,” was not fully but only
partially considered. 28
The translators agreed on the usefulness of the English
version. During the interviews, they categorically affirmed that it
“ayudó mucho.” 29 The English version was for them an essential
tool in what they considered cases of ambiguity or lack of clarity.
However, the status of the English version is left unclear when it is
mentioned in the translators' notes. Some of them reflect the idea
of the English text as merely a translation of a French original and
some others simply refer to the English version, still not clear on

134 (3rd ed., Scarborough, Carswell, 2000); RÉMI MICHAEL BEAUPRÉ,
INTERPRÉTATION DE LA LÉGISLATION BILINGUE (Montreal, Wilson & Lafleur,
1986); RUTH SULLIVAN, SULLIVAN AND DRIEDGER ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF
STATUTES (4th ed., Markham, Butterworths, 2002); MICHEL BASTARACHE, THE
LAW OF BILINGUAL INTERPRETATION (Markham, LexisNexis, 2008).
26. It is not a trilingual text merely because of the presence of three
languages (having official status or not). It is not trilingual because one
unilingual text has been translated into two languages as is the case, for
example, of the trilingual Netherlands Code. The work under study here is
trilingual because a bilingual text was translated into a third language. However,
the challenges encountered in the case of the Netherlands Code can sometimes
be used as a tool for comparison, especially with respect to the role a jurilinguist
has to play in such a work. See Ejan Mackaay, La traduction du nouveau Code
civil néerlandais en anglais et en français, in JEAN-CLAUDE GEMAR &
NICHOLAS KASIRER, JURILINGUISTIQUE: ENTRE LANGUES ET DROITS
[JURILINGUISTICS: BETWEEN LAW AND LANGUAGE] 537 (Éditions
Thémis/Bruylant, Montreal/Bruxelles, 2005).
27. See MAURICE TANCELIN, DES OBLIGATIONS EN DROIT MIXTE DU QUÉBEC
(7th ed., Montreal, Wilson & Lafleur, 2009).
28. Preface, supra note 4, at XXXVI.
29. See Interview with Riviera, supra note 27; see Interview with Viegas,
supra note 27.
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its value as a version; only in a few cases is its official status
recognized.
The revisers, on the other hand, did not consider the
English version as useful. Some of them stated they had not used
the English version at all or only in a very few specific cases.
Besides, some of the revisers considered the French version to be
the only one with official status and disagreed with the use of the
English version by the translators and the inclusion of notes to that
effect. 30 The reviser’s attitude unfortunately reflects the general
approach that lawyers who are not sensitive to jurilinguistic
matters have towards bilingualism. These different approaches of
the two groups will become clearer in the next section: 4. The
interviews or la petite histoire d’un ouvrage de prestige en trois
actes.
IV. THE INTERVIEWS OR LA PETITE HISTOIRE D’UN OUVRAGE DE
PRESTIGE EN TROIS ACTES 31
This story presents the result of the interviews in an
Introduction, three Acts and an Epilogue. The introduction sets-out
the origins of the trilingual Code. The three Acts describe the three
stages in the process: the translation, the revision and the
publishing. The Epilogue is sort of a practical lesson drawn from
this story and opens the way for further study of the difficulties
encountered in the process.
A. Origins of the Trilingual Civil Code
The origins of the trilingual Civil Code of Québec go back
to 1998. At that time Argentina, intending to reform its Civil Code,
passed a bill 32 which was to a significant extent inspired by the
30. The priority accorded to the French version seems also present in the
publisher’s decision with respect to the page layout for the three texts and to the
order in which are placed the three indices. See infra Part IV, D.
31. Hubert Reid considered the trilingual Code “un ouvrage de prestige”
and this was his argument to overcome the reticence of Wilson & Lafleur
towards publishing a work which did not have a self-evident audience. See
Interview with Reid, supra note 27.
32. HÉCTOR ALEGRÍA ET AL., PROYECTO DE CÓDIGO CIVIL DE LA
REPÚBLICA ARGENTINA UNIFICADO CON EL CÓDIGO DE COMERCIO (Buenos
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Civil Code of Québec. Members of the reform commission saw the
latter as a modern Code, recently enacted, clearly written and an
excellent fusion between civil law and common law. 33 After the
launch of the text of the reform project, the commission was
approached by Denis L’Anglais, the Quebec delegate in Buenos
Aires at the time, and the idea of translating the Code into Spanish
was born. 34 It seemed a very interesting way to export Quebec
legal ideas into Spanish-speaking countries. The timing was
excellent since this was a decade of re-codification efforts in Latin
American countries. 35 The project started timidly when Julio César
Rivera, a member of the reform commission, began directing the
translation work. Rivera practices commercial law and teaches
civil law in two Buenos Aires universities. In his academic work,
he had translated scholarly articles from French and Italian into
Spanish. In this endeavour, he was usually assisted by María
Alejandra Tello and Walter Viegas. So when the idea of translating
the Civil Code became more concrete, having them assist him was
a natural choice. M. A. Tello and W. Viegas are both lawyers and
sworn translators, with academic and practical experience in the
legal field. 36 These three professionals were thus the main actors in
the First Act: the translation stage.

Aires, Abeledo-Perrot 1999). The Bill never came into force and Argentina still
has its original Civil Code from 1871, including of course the several
amendments introduced to it over the years.
33. It is worth pointing out that this view of the Civil Code of Québec is not
unanimous in Quebec’s doctrine, See John E. C. Brierley, The Renewal of
Quebec's Distinct Legal Culture: The New Civil Code of Québec, 42:4 U.T.L.J.
484, 498-499 (1992). But see supra note 32.
34. Contrary to the choice made by the publisher for the “Note de l’éditeur”
of the trilingual Code, all professionals participating in the trilingual Code are
designated here by their names, omitting any reference to their titles. This is
justified because what seem important here are their abilities and qualifications
as jurilinguists and not other training these professionals might have. Therefore,
in order to avoid confusion, only full names are used.
35. Some of these recodification efforts led to success, including those in
Paraguay (1985), Peru (1984) and, more recently, Brazil (2009); some, including
those of Argentina and Puerto Rico, never did.
36. It is worth noting that a traductor público in Argentina has a very solid
legal background. This is particularly the case in Buenos Aires, where Tello and
Viegas studied; the degree program there is taught in the Faculty of Law and
about 40% of the curricular credits are shared by both programs. The profession
is regulated by statute and a society of traductores públicos. See LEY
N° 20.305, COLEGIO DE TRADUCTORES PÚBLICOS DE LA CIUDAD
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B. Act I or Traduciendo el Derecho Común de Quebec
During the first stage, there was no funding and translation
fees were privately arranged between J. C. Rivera and the team of
M. A. Tello and W. Viegas. There was no official request from the
Quebec Government nor was there a publisher interested in the
work.
It took a year and a half to obtain a first draft of the Spanish
version. None of the professionals involved worked on it full time.
M. A. Tello and W. Viegas did the translation work. They divided
the articles of the Code equally between themselves and supervised
each other’s work in order to achieve a coherent result. Drafts were
sent to J. C. Rivera periodically, and he supervised the work. Then,
the three of them had fortnightly or weekly meetings to arrive at a
consensus on the translation. They deeply believed in this division
of tasks: it was necessary that the translation be done by the legal
translators and thus the role of J. C. Rivera was to supervise the
work with his experienced scholarly eye. He clearly expressed “yo
no soy traductor, sólo abogado.” 37 When they finished the first
draft, they allowed themselves another seven or eight months to
arrive at a second verified version, including some modifications
that the Code had undergone during this period. All along, D.
L’Anglais assisted them with his Quebecer’s perspective, none of
the others having had contact with the Quebec reality.
Once the Spanish version was completed, it gained the
interest of no publisher in Argentina. Hence, D. L’Anglais started
to “frapper à d’autres portes” in Quebec. 38 Even as D. L’Anglais
represented J. C. Rivera in the search for a publisher, the former
took on a new role as supervisor of the translation’s quality; he
imposed this role on himself as a condition for a Quebec printing.
He was convinced that supervision from a Quebecer’s perspective
was necessary to get an accurate Spanish version. 39 He thus

BUENOS
AIRES
(2010),
available
at
http://www.traductores.org.ar/nuevoorg/home/ley/?idruta=1&nivel2=8&nivel3=
9 (Last visited November 7, 2011).
37. Interview with Rivera, see supra note 27.
38. Id.
39. In the case of the Netherlands Code’s translation these two stages were
also present but in the other direction: the expertise in Dutch law was present in
DE
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gathered and led a group of ten Quebec lawyers, including himself,
with the mandate to supervise the Spanish translation: Jorge
Armijo, Robin Dejardin, Adelia Ferreira, Roberto Godoy,
Rosgarys Mercado, Elizabeth Patterson, Juliana Rodríguez,
Marcela Valdivia, and Elyse Turcotte. Voilà, the main actors of the
Second Act: the revision stage.
C. Act II or à la Recherche d’un Editeur-la Révision
The decision to gather ten revisers had a practical basis:
one for each of the ten Books of the Code. 40 It was not easy to find
ten lawyers fluent in Spanish, who were ready to do the work
almost pro-bono and on the side of their regular professional
activities. 41 Therefore, the team ended up being quite
heterogeneous, while not necessarily being interdisciplinary. They
were all members of the Quebec Bar (this was a condition for
participation), some of them from the private sector, practicing in
different areas of expertise, and others working for the
Government in law related areas but not necessarily practicing law.
Evidently, one feature they all had in common was skill in
Spanish, though their knowledge of Legal Spanish differed: only a
few of them had studied or practiced law in Spanish speaking
countries. Actually, even their reasons for speaking Spanish were
diverse. Some of them had had formal foreign language training,
others learned it from personal life experiences and for yet others it
was their mother tongue. Even here there were differences: some
learned it in childhood at home in an otherwise French speaking
environment, for others Spanish was their only language until they

the translators, and not in the revisors, who were experts in jurilinguistics, See
Mackaay, supra note 26, at 542.
40. In practice, the division did not follow the demarcations of the Code as
precisely as this, since some Books are longer than others. Approximately 300 to
350 articles were assigned to each revisor, while always keeping in mind the
subject-matter of the articles. Some of the participants said they chose their set
of articles with their area of expertise in mind while others, especially those who
joined the project later, were assigned their articles.
41. Even though Wilson & Lafleur covered the expenses for this stage, this
contribution was only a fixed amount which did not take into account hours
involved in the work and which was far from the fees which would standardly
have been charged by lawyers.
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immigrated to Canada as adults. In general, the Spanish of each
bore a strong influence from the Spanish speaking country related
to the source of their knowledge.
The background and experience of each in translating legal
texts or even revising legal translations was also very different;
none of them had any training in legal translation and only a few of
them had any experience in it at all. What they all definitely had in
common was that they endorsed the project.
At this stage, there was still no support from the Quebec
Government but there was a publisher. D. L’Anglais presented the
idea to Hubert Reid, of the legal publisher Wilson & Lafleur, who
was wholeheartedly enthusiastic. He had tried to initiate a project
along the same lines in the past, yet it was now on hold because of
the difficulties it involved. When he had discussed the idea with
some translators in the past, he was asked “comment les gens
pourraient s’entendre sur la traduction.” 42 But, at this point,
contrary to this apocalyptic vision of the impossibility of the
translation, he had in front of him a complete Spanish translation
of the Civil Code of Québec. 43
With Wilson & Lafleur’s support, the revisers set to work
on the assigned articles and they shared their comments in order to
arrive at a consensus about the suggestions to be sent to the
translators in Argentina. They had long phone conferences and
periodic e-mail exchanges. Once there was agreement on the
“problematic” terms, the latter were assembled by D. L’Anglais
and sent to the translators in Buenos Aires.
There were a couple of exchanges between the revisers—
always represented by D. L’Anglais—and the translators about the
suggestions. Some of them were accepted, others not. This was a
tense moment, natural to any joint effort, but the result had to be
published and this exchange could not go on forever. So the
publisher intervened and, as H. Reid said, there is one author, 44 J.

42. Interview with Reid, see supra note 27.
43. For the impossibility versus the possibility of translating, See DIDIER,
supra note 21, at 245-247; Gémar, L'interprétation du texte juridique, supra
note 20, at 110-115.
44. For a study on the translator’s role as the author, see FRANÇOIS OST,
TRADUIRE: DÉFENSE ET ILLUSTRATION DU MULTILINGUISME 179-191 (Paris,
Fayard 2009).
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C. Rivera, 45 so the final decision belonged to the latter. However,
the publisher asked J. C. Rivera to add notes describing some of
the divergences of opinion. 46 Once this discussion was closed, it
was time to enter the Third Act: the publishing stage.
D. Act III or the Código Civil de Quebec-Code Civil du QuébecCivil Code of Québec
After another year and a half of work, a Spanish version of
the Civil Code of Québec was waiting to appear in its first edition.
On the basis of the product of this work, Wilson & Lafleur
managed to secure support from the Quebec Government to help
cover the cost of preparing the book for publication. 47 It was
during this third stage that the Spanish translation of the Civil
Code of Québec metamorphosed into the trilingual Code.
After many experiments, and drawing from the experience
gained from prior publications, the format of the three columns
side by side was settled upon. As has been already mentioned, the
Spanish version formed the left column, the French version the
middle column, and the English version the column on the right.
Probably, the most logical place for the Spanish version would
have been the right column (the end of the direction of reading) or
the end of the book, since it has no official value. However, the
goal was to make it “aussi agréable à lire” as the French version,
given that the eye goes more easily from the center to the left side,
than to the right. 48 In the index, the Spanish text is placed last, with
the understanding that the Spanish speaking reader would
instinctively look for the Index at the end of the book; the English
index is kept in the middle and the French one is placed right after
the last article. 49
45. J. C. Rivera explained during the interview that he had obtained nonexclusive copyright to translate the Civil Code of Québec from the Quebec
Government. See supra note 27. This was confirmed by H. Reid during his
interview, see supra note 27.
46. This will be the main reason for the translators’ notes.
47. See Preface, supra note 4.
48. Interview with Reid, see supra note 27.
49. It is noteworthy that the Index was entirely translated by R. Mercado
and was not part of the translation directed by J. C. Rivera. In this case the
process took place in the opposite direction; the translation was done in Quebec
and supervised from Buenos Aires.
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The metamorphosis from translation to trilingual Code is
also emphasized by the title: “Código Civil de Quebec-Code Civil
du Québec-Civil Code of Québec.” There is no mention in it of a
translation, rather the Code presented in three languages.
The choices made at this moment offer interesting
analytical perspectives on the value of the trilingual Code, starting
from its physical appearance. 50 This is particularly the case when it
is taken into account that the publisher, in order to preserve the
value of the translation, consciously chose not to include an
indication of the lack of legal authority of the Spanish version.
This was contrary to the revisers’ request.
E. Epilogue
This petite histoire shows that both groups had different
approaches to legal translation. The relation between law and
language was of most importance during the first stage. On the
other hand, the translators did not have much experience with
respect to Quebec law and its context. Neither did they have access
to a lot of material consisting of Quebec scholarly works or cases.
At this point, traditional concerns with respect to understanding
law both in terms of its textual expression and of its context,
always present in legal translation and particularly brought to light
by comparative law’s struggles, seem somehow to have been a
little neglected. 51
These genuine concerns led, in the second stage, to the
requirement that the revisers be members of the Quebec Bar. At
this stage, the focus on Quebec juridical training seems to have
displaced the one on expertise in translation and on the relation
between law and language.
50. For the important influence of publishers’ formatting choices on
perception of a work, see Nicholas Kasirer, Si la Joconde se trouve au Louvre,
où trouve-t-on le Code civil du Bas Canada?, 46 C. DE D. 481 (2005).
51. For these concerns, see generally Gerard-René De Groot, Language and
Law, in JAYME, supra note 11, at 333; Erik Jayme, Rapport Général: Langue et
droit in JAYME 9, supra note 11; PIERRE LEGRAND, LE DROIT COMPARÉ (Paris,
Presses universitaires de France, 1999); Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A
Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1991); JACQUES
VANDERLINDEN, COMPARER LES DROITS (Bruxelles, E. Story-Scientia/Kluwer
éd. juridiques Belgique, 1995).
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These different approaches might have contributed to the
sometimes tense exchanges during the second stage. As has been
mentioned, in view of these divergences and following a request
from the publisher, the trilingual Code ended-up with seventyeight translators’ notes. It can be wondered whether the presence
of a jurilinguist, as a mediator between these two groups with
different approaches, might have led to a different outcome. This
question of a possibly different ending to the petite histoire leads
to the next section (5. The translators’ notes or los escollos en el
camino del Código civil trilingüe). The translators’ notes will
allow an analysis there of the difficulties of the process, by
employing the jurilinguistic perspective which is proposed here.
V. THE TRANSLATORS’ NOTES OR LOS ESCOLLOS EN EL CAMINO
DEL CÓDIGO CIVIL TRILINGÜE
As a consequence of their origin, the translators’ notes do
not conform to a common pattern. 52 The interviewees gave many
examples of issues that did not find their way into a translators’
note. Notwithstanding the interest of these examples, for
methodological reasons only the translators’ notes will be
examined here. However, the interviews helped in the choice of
which examples should receive the greatest attention in this paper.
Each of the seventy-eight translators’ notes is mentioned
here, at least in a footnote, and the most relevant examples are
briefly examined. Thus, this study is more oriented towards a
quantitative analysis than a qualitative one. The analysis will focus
on the two main questions driving this essay: one is whether the
participation of a jurilinguist would have led to a different
outcome; the other question is how this dialogue between the two
52. There are also some typos, e.g., art. 25’s footnote: “objecto” and, in
particular, art. 132’s footnote: “1er,” “esta mas,” “projectos,” “Québec.” From
the footnotes it is also possible to detect some typos in the text; e.g., where art.
27, when referring to a Quebec Act, does not write the word ley with capital “L”
as is done in the rest of the text. Since this is the only instance of this lack of
capitalization, compared to the many others where translators seem to have
chosen the use of the capital L, “ley” seems to have been a typo and not a
divergent choice. For the use of the capital in the word “Ley,” see MARÍA LUISA
OLSEN DE SERRANO REDONNET & ALICIA MARÍA ZORRILLA DE RODRÍGUEZ,
DICCIONARIO DE LOS USOS CORRECTOS DEL ESPAÑOL (Buenos Aires, Estrada
1997).
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official languages and a third language might provide useful
material and insights for future research. 53
The translators considered the translators’ notes to be
unnecessary and damaging to the translation because they
“debilitan la traducción.” 54 Therefore, the original idea was to limit
them to a minimum, and it was only due to their being required by
the publisher that the trilingual Code ended up with the notes, or at
least with so many of them.
They are a rich first hand source of information on the
difficulties encountered in the process. What seems unfortunate
about these translators’ notes is that they do not reflect the
particularities of the Quebec legal system. For instance, there is no
reference in the translators’ notes to the role of the common law in
Quebec. As for the Code’s bilingualism, even if the English
version had an important role, the French version seems to have
been considered the source text and the English version mostly as a
translation of it. The interpretation 55 should have passed between
both versions, in order to arrive at a Spanish text, but instead it
failed to follow the rules applicable to interpretation of the Code as
a bilingual text. 56
In view of the lack of methodology in the translators’ notes,
it is imperative to organize them. Therefore, the present study
53. See supra note 25.
54. Interview with Viegas, supra note 27.
55. For the link between translation and interpretation, see Ost, supra note
47, at 110-113; PAUL RICOEUR, SUR LA TRADUCTION (Paris, Bayard, 2004). See
GÉMAR, TRADUIRE, OU, L'ART D'INTERPRÉTER, supra note 18; Kasirer,
François Gény, supra note 19; Macdonald, supra note 7. It is particularly
interesting to note that the role as interpreter of the translator was nuanced
somewhat by Pierre-André Côté. This author distinguishes the role of the juristinterpreter from that of the translator-interpreter. See Pierre-André Côté, Le
traducteur et l'interprète, ou le double sens de la loi, in YVES POULLET,
PATRICK WÉRY & PAUL WYNANTS, LIBER AMICORUM MICHEL COIPEL 85
(Bruxelles, Kluwer, 2004). However, these nuances seem to refer exclusively to
what he calls interprétation operative, where the translator has no role, and to
translation from a monlingual source text or tocases of multilingual legal
drafting. The questions posed here do not arise from translation between the
languages of a bilingual text, but rather from translation of the bilingual source
text towards a third language. In this sense, the ideas presented here still seem
valid, since the translator of a bilingual text cannot ignore the equal authority of
each of the two languages if he is to provide a faithful translation of it as a legal
text.
56. For instruction on interpreting bilingual or multilingual legal texts in
Canada and in Quebec, see supra note 29.
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divides them into two groups. The first contains translators’ notes
which are necessary or at least very useful for any reader, not
reflecting the debate between the translators and the revisers (A.
Necessary translators’ notes). The second group contains notes
reflecting these debates (B. Explanatory translators’ notes).
These two groups of notes are also sub-divided: the first
one into two subgroups (1. Les intraduisibles and 2. Quebec Acts
and Governmental Agencies), and the second one into three (1.
Neutral Spanish, 2. Legal Institutions and 3. Bilingualism of the
Code). The borders in this classification are not self-evident. The
overlap increases with respect to the subgroups. Therefore, where a
given example should best be placed can be a matter for
discussion.
A. Necessary Translators’ Notes
This group contains translators’ notes that address
difficulties which can be encountered in any translation or legal
translation effort, apart from the debate between translators and
reviser. Even if it is good translation practice to minimize the
translators’ notes, sometimes these kinds of remarks are
imperative. There are, for instance, cases where translation is
impossible or ones that force the reader to look for information
outside the text, along the lines of what Denis Tallon calls a renvoi
externe. 57 The translator then has no choice but to add an
explanatory note. The following sections will present some
examples of this in the trilingual Code.
1. Les Intraduisibles
In a Code of three thousand one hundred sixty-eight articles
there is only one clear example 58 of impossibility of translation:
57. See the different renvois described in MOLFESSIS, supra note 11, at 58.
58. If we take the notion in a less technical sense, another example of
impossibility of translation is found in article 1161. As its translators' note
explains, this article could be included in the category of intraduisibles because
of the impossibility of translating troupeau with one word. The Spanish
language has a set of terms, each of which is specific to a grouping made-up one
of the types of animals (i.e., reabaño, piara). In a case of impossibility of
translation, a translators’ note is required. Thus, this note does not reflect the
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the word coroner at article 47 (repeated in articles 49, 93 and
127). 59 The Spanish version keeps the foreign word coroner.
Where translation is found to be impossible, a note is evidently
necessary.
The coroner is a typical example of the institutions of
common-law systems not usually present in civil law traditions. It
is thus easy to understand that a difficulty in translation appeared
when it was necessary make reference to a common-law institution
(coroner) in a language (Spanish) usually linked with civil law
traditions. This difficulty can be seen as an example of the wellknown debate concerning the relation between a language and a
legal system. 60
Unfortunately, the translators’ note does not explain the
difficulty itself. It does not mention the influence common law has
on Quebec’s civil law. It simply defines the office of coroner,
explains its function and names the professions whose members
can hold it.

exchanges between the two groups, but rather seems a necessary translators'
note. From a broader viewpoint, however, the necessity of the footnote is not all
that obvious; other choices could have been made, for instance translating the
term by “conjunto de animales” as explained in the note. Besides, it is possible
to question why only the French version, featuring troupeau, was examined, and
not also the English one, which uses two nouns: “herd or flock.” Apart from the
possibility of drawing from the English version, this difficulty will be more of
interest to a terminologist than to a jurilinguist.
59. Every time a translators' note is repeated with respect to one or more
subsequent articles, the number of the latter will be given within parentheses.
60. There are two highly interesting examples in Canada of the coexistence
of two languages and two legal traditions: la common-law en français and the
use of English in civil law. See generally Gérard Snow, Le style législatif :
question de droit ou de langue?, in MOLFESSIS, supra note 11, at 89; DIDIER,
supra note 21. The first example—la common-law en français—is one of the
main goals of the Faculty of Law of the Université de Moncton and its Centre de
terminologie et de traduction juridiques. An interesting tool, on this subject, is
the yearly publication of the Revue de la common-law en français, See
UNIVERSITÉ DE MONCTON. FACULTÉ DE DROIT, available at
http://www.umoncton.ca/umcm-droit/node/34 (Last visited November 2, 2010).
Also, see generally MICHEL DOUCET & JACQUES VANDERLINDEN, LA
RÉCEPTION DES SYSTÈMES JURIDIQUES: IMPLANTATION ET DESTIN (Bruxelles,
Bruylant, 1994). For the use of English in civil law, see generally John E. C.
Brierley, Reception of English Law in the Canadian Province of Quebec, in id.
at 103; Kasirer, Le real estate existe-t-il en droit civil?, supra note 14; Kasirer,
Portalis now, supra note 16; Levasseur & Feliú, supra note 21.
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2. Quebec Acts and Governmental Agencies
Three translators’ notes, those of articles 92, 123 (941 and
1464) and 366, seem a case of renvoi externe. 61 Without the note, a
Spanish reader might have to do further research to properly
understand an institution not described in the text itself. In this
sense, these notes seem necessary for the reader’s comprehension
and not related to the debate between translators and revisers.
Therefore, they belong to the first group.
The three notes define, respectively, Minister of Revenue,
peace officers and Superior Court. Contrary to the former case–
coroner–, a translation was found to be possible but doubts could
arise about its actual comprehensibility in Spanish. They are,
however, close to “coroner” in the sense that they refer to
difficulties in translating among different legal systems.
There are also other translators’ notes regarding
governmental agencies, services related to government 62 or Acts 63
that do not provide an explanation in the note but include an
agency or Act’s name in French and a citation to an Act’s official
publication. Even if the necessity of the notes might be arguable,
they seem useful to any reader. The French name does not seem all
that necessary, once the three versions were placed side to side and
a comparative reading became so easy. However, the citation could
indeed be relevant and useful in helping the Spanish reader to
locate those Acts or institutions. Thus, these notes are placed in the
first group, especially since they do not seem to reflect the debate
between translators and revisers.
But these notes fail to deal with the Code’s bilingualism
and Quebec’s particularities. Following Section 14 of the Charter
61. MOLFESSIS, supra note 11.
62. See art. 21 (564, 699, 2807, 3055) for GAZETTE OFFICIELLE DU QUÉBEC
and art. 2799 for LA FINANCIÈRE AGRICOLE DU QUÉBEC AND THE SOCIÉTÉ
D’HABITATION DU QUÉBEC.
63. These notes do not have the notation “N.T.”. An asterisk follows the
Spanish translation of the Act’s title, referring the reader to a footnote which
gives the Act’s title in French and citation. See arts. 27, 132.1 (with two
different entries), 415 (with two different entries, one of which is repeated for
art. 422), 563, 701, 1339 (with three different entries), 1619 (1883), 1749, 1888
(3042), 1899, 1984, 2714, 3021.6, 3028.1, 3055.
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of the French Language, the French name is kept in English with
reference to governmental agencies or services related to
government (Gazette officielle du Québec–art. 21 (564, 699, 2807,
3055), Société d’habitation du Québec and Financière agricole du
Québec–art. 2799). This is also true for Quebec governmental
agencies named in Acts, for instance in the Act respecting the
Régie du logement (art. 1899) or the Act respecting the Société
d’habitation du Québec (art. 1984). A methodical reading of both
versions would have probably led the translators to wonder why
the English text kept the French designations. From there, it would
seem relevant to raise a query as to the reach of Section 14 of the
Charter of the French Language when it requires designation of
the agencies “by their French names alone.” 64 Considering that the
trilingual Code is published in Quebec, even if the exception of
Section 15 of this Charter 65 were applicable, a point open to
debate, it seems appropriate that these names be kept in French in
the Spanish version. If the Government, its departments and other
agencies are to be designated by their French names alone, this
policy should apply in any foreign language and not just for French
and English texts.
Perusal of the trilingual text leads the reader to wonder if
employing a Spanish version when referring to governmental
agencies or services related to government, as well as when giving
the names of Acts, is not against the spirit of the Charter of the
French Language. Still, the reasonability of such an approach,
without even a clear exception for cases outside Quebec, can be
open to debate. Thus the three versions, as they are, place the
Spanish speaker in a better situation than the protected English
minority. The Spanish reader is provided with the name of the
institution in his language, but there is no such provision for the
English-speaking reader. A debate could be waged here with
respect to the appropriate way to designate these agencies and
services inside and outside of Quebec and with respect to minority
language rights.
64. “The Government, the government departments, the other agencies of
the civil administration and the services thereof shall be designated by their
French names alone.” Charter of the French language, supra note 28.
65. The use of French is not necessary when drawing up and publishing
texts and documents for relations with persons who are outside Québec. Id.
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B. Explanatory Translators’Notes
The notes grouped here reflect the exchange between
translators and revisers. Though not a necessity, they can be
extremely useful for a reader interested in receiving more
information from the translator than just the bare text.
Unfortunately, these notes, which could interest the reader, seem
incomplete. They usually only reflect a partial view of an issue.
It is worth recalling that the examples given here can have
features which lead to an overlap between one group or sub-group
and another. They are grouped by considering the main
explanation provided by the note. In this sense, if the note
mentions Latin American countries or raises issues of linguistic
variants (i.e., autorité parentale) the example belongs to the first
sub-group (1 Neutral Spanish) even if concerns a legal institution–
second subgroup–(2 Legal Institutions). On the other hand, if the
note mentions the English version, it is kept in the third sub-group
(3 Bilingualism of the Code), even if the matter it addresses
appears to be more of a linguistic issue (i.e., the examples
mentioned in footnote 84).
1. Neutral Spanish
It was during the second stage that the difficulties raised by
Spanish variants, that had not a priori been a concern, made their
appearance. 66 At that moment, the revisers’ different backgrounds
in the Spanish and Legal Spanish of particular regions were
confronted with the Argentine version of the translation. It was not
easy for anybody (neither the translators nor the revisers) to let go
of their Spanish, to “soltar nuestras expresiones y
regionalismos.” 67 This was the case as much for Spanish linguistic
66. It is interesting to remember that this was the first concern which was
raised with H. Reid, as a fundamental factor rendering a Spanish translation of
the Code impossible. Maybe the bold stroke of translating it into one variety of
Spanish (the Argentinean one), and then trying to internationalize the result, had
an important role in getting the work done.
67. See Interview with Gody, supra note 27.
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constructions as for expressions of Legal Spanish. None of the
former found their way into translators’ notes but some of the latter
did. 68
The Spanish “neutralization,” that appeared in the second
stage, seems to have been more a search for a neutral LatinAmerican Spanish than an international Spanish. 69 The notes
evidently reflect a choice of translation made between different
possible words or expressions. The revisers suggested
internationalizing the language and the translators agreed. A choice
of either possibility would have seemed justifiable, whether
keeping a regional Spanish or internationalizing it. The translators
were Argentines and they were visibly and expressly named in the
Preface. This could have led to keeping the Argentine language
and its particularities. 70 It is important to insist here that this is not
a case of dialects or errors, but rather of linguistic variants of the
same language or legal language. On the other hand, it also looks
like a reasonable choice to give a more neutral aspect to the
trilingual Code.
Fourteen translators’ notes got their way, in the process of
finding a Neutral Spanish. 71 The notes have an element of
68. In the first case, the use of the past participle inscrito/a-inscripto/a and
suscrito/a-suscripto/a was subject to discussion. Both are acceptable in Spanish.
The dictionary refers to inscrito when defining inscripto: “inscripto,ta: p. p.
irreg. inscrito,” “inscrito,ta: p. p. irreg. de inscirbir.” A similar reference is found
for suscripto “suscripto,ta: p. p. irreg. suscrito” and “suscrito,ta: p. p. irreg. de
suscribir.” See REDONNET & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 52 (“inscrito and inscripto”
and “suscrito and suscripto”). However, the first one is preferred. In this sense,
see REDONNET & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 52 (“inscribir and suscribir”). The
converse is the case in Argentina, where the second one is preferred, so
prevalently that a non-linguist could consider the first one a mistake. The
Argentine version was kept in the trilingual Code, i.e., in the Spanish version of
article 58 Civil Code of Québec. See CODE CIVIL DU QUÉBEC, supra note 3, at
23.
69. The varieties of Spanish present in Spain, and Spain’s Legal Spanish, do
not seem to have been taken into account much. However, the revisors may have
paid a little more attention to the studies and works on translation with respect to
Legal Spanish produced under the auspices of the European Union.
70. Even if the translators asked for a note in the trilingual Code mentioning
their Argentinean origin, in the end the Code has no note that acknowledges this
explicitly.
71. See translators' notes on articles 25, 50, 523, 597, Section II of Chapter
III, Title Two, Book Three (Section III of Chapter III, Title Two, Book Three)
878 (908, 910), 1012, 1041 (1052), 1053, 1470. These notes can also be
analyzed from the perspective of equivalence issues in translation. However,
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randomness. Sometimes, Argentina is mentioned; in other
instances, the note presents a synonym also used in Latin America
with no specific reference to Argentina; in still other cases the
translators explain that they chose a literal translation instead of the
better known Argentine or Latin American version. The first
approach is present in the note on article 1053, where cargas was
kept instead of the more Argentine expensas for charges/expenses.
The second approach is present in the choice to keep the more
neutral autoridad parental, instead of the probably more traditional
patria potestad, 72 for de l’autorité parentale/parental authority. An
example of the third approach, literal translation, is found in article
878 (908, 910). In this case, even if one word frutos would be
enough in Spanish (at least in Argentinean Legal Spanish) to
translate fruits and revenues, the translators chose to keep two
words frutos e ingresos.
This randomness in the notes leaves open at least two
questions. First, how strong is the link between the law or a legal
system and the language of its statues? 73 Second, is a “neutral legal
language” (in this case Spanish) possible or even necessary? 74
These questions are common in translation and do not imperatively
require a translators’ note. The notes are clearly the product of the
publisher’s requirement. But once they are joined to the text of the
Code, they seem partial and incomplete. There are no explanations
as to the criteria employed in the choice of notes. A reader eager to
obtain more information from the notes is bound to be
disappointed. The involvement of a jurilinguist might have led to a
more coherent and justifiable approach.

they are exclusively mentioned here in terms of the reflection on issues of
linguistic variants.
72. It is notable that while in many other cases the translators' note is
repeated for every occurrence, in this particular case the footnote is only present
with respect to Title Four of Book II and not with respect to prior articles where
the term is used (i.e., art. 14 et seq.).
73. Supra note 11, and particularly note 60.
74. Supra note 21.
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2. Legal Institutions
There is a subgroup of translators’ notes, referring to legal
institutions, which are clearly a product of the debate between the
translators and the revisers. In many cases, the reason for the
explanation, 75 synonymy 76 or source quotation 77 seems too vague
for a reader seeking information. None of these cases would have
merited a note if it were not for that debate. They could have been
considered choices of a standard term in a translation. Once again,
as a source of further information to the reader the notes seem too
partial and incomplete.
In this sense, fiducie is probably the best example found
throughout the translators’ notes. 78 It was repeatedly mentioned
during the interviews and it brings out many very interesting
aspects. Besides, fiducie has already been analysed in the
jurilinguistics literature in Quebec. 79 Here again the example is a
product of difficulties that arose in the translation of a French word
into Spanish, with no reference to the Code’s particularities.
Discussions as to the translation of fiducie are strongly
related to difficulties in receiving common law institutions, in this
case the trust, in languages usually more closely linked to civil law
traditions. The Quebec legislator decided to include the trust in the
75. See the literal translation of vérification in Chapter VI of Title Four,
Book Three. In art. 1145, why choose depositario among other possible options
and then explain the risk of confusion? In art. 2387, why explain the meaning of
collocation if the choice was accurate? In this case the choice made in the article
is not kept later, see art. 2658 and 2680.
76. See article 1719 that uses certificado de ubicación and has a footnote
which gives the synonym certificado de catastro. Article 2511 (2540) is even
more intriguing as the expression pérdida o no pérdida in the Spanish text is put
in inverted commas and the footnote gives as its synonym the English “lost or
not lost.” This could be explained by the fact that Argentinean Legal Spanish
employs many English terms for modern institutions. As an example, see Act nr
25.248 on leasing, B.O., June 14, 2000.
77. Section IV of Chapter XI, Title Two, Book Five Del secuestro de bienes
presents the only case (with perhaps the partial exception of article 1260) where
the source of the translation is presented. Why this sole instance?
78. Translators’ note for Chapter II of Title Six Book Four. Del
Fideiciomiso. De la fiducie. The trust.
79. On the linguistic aspects of fiducie and fideicommis, See Éric Labbé,
Fidéicommis, 109 R. DU N. 333, 337 (2007); Wallace Scwab, La fiducie en droit
québecois, in GÉMAR, LANGAGE DU DROIT ET TRADUCTION, supra note 11, at
243.
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Civil Code; thus this had to be done in English and in French.80
The legislator chose to dedicate Book Four, Title Six, Chapter II to
the fiducie and not to the fidéicommis. This way, the traditional
civil institution of fidéicommis was distinguished in an original
manner from the Quebec institution, which is closer to common
law ideas of fiducie/trust. This was the revisers’ strongest argument
to support their preference for the Spanish word fiducia, instead of
fideicomiso which had been the term chosen by the translators.
There were historical and linguistic reasons to prefer abandonment
of the most traditional civilian word. The reasons for the choice of
fiducie in French could have been taken into account mutatis
mutandi when choosing the word to use in Spanish.
However, the translators seem to have found themselves in
a well-known dilemma: they had to choose between their two
maîtres. 81 Respecting the source text by following the use of
fiducie/fiducia seemed like treachery against the target text. 82 In
this sense, fideicomiso seemed to the translators a better
description of the institution. According to the translators' note,
this latter term was used in other Latin American statutes inspired
by the common law trust and it reflected the distinction between
fiducia as generic and fideicomiso as a species. Choosing Spanish
as maître can be a justifiable choice in the painful art of
translation. 83 The mysterious phrase in the note “[d]e modo que
preferimos mantener la terminología propuesta en el original”
should probably be read as a justified response of the maître Legal
Spanish (the translators) to the genuine demands of the maître
Legal French (the revisers). But this debate remains open.
80. Historical, political and legal reasons ruled-out the option of keeping the
word trust in the French version, which would have thus categorized it among
the terms impossible to translate, even though the term trust could perfectly well
be considered an example of an intraduisible, see Kasirer, Dire ou définir le
droit?, supra note 11, at 192.
81. The idea that a translator has to serve two masters is found in RICOEUR,
supra note 55, at 9. See also Gémar, L'interprétation du texte juridique, supra
note 20.
82. On the well-known adage “Traduttore, Traditore,” see Alexis Nouss,
Éloge de la trahison 14 TTR: TRADUCTION, TERMINOLOGIE, RÉDACTION 167
(2001).
83. For the tristesse of translation see, id. at 179. For the difficulty of these
choices see, RICOEUR, supra note 55, at Section III, Un “passage:” traduire
l’intraduisable.
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There were strong arguments in defence of a preference
either for fiducia or for fideicomiso. The choice of fideicomiso, was
difficult but valid. It surely was not the only choice made in this
direction but it definitely was the most exhaustively explained one.
This reinforces the question of why there is a note for this case and
not for others, and supports the point concerning the
incompleteness of the translators’ notes as a source of information
to the reader. Unfortunately, the note only gives the justification
for the choice but does not present the doubts that led to it nor the
revisers opinion. Mention of the debate as to the choice of term
would have enriched the note. This example can inspire the
comparatist scholar, whether interested in the trust or in
comparative legal linguistics.
3. Bilingualism of the Code
As was explained, where the English version is mentioned
in the notes, they do not make clear what status the translators
attributed to it. The idea of a translation is clearly present in the
notes on articles 206 (222, 225, 267, 269), 339, 1534 (1570, 2959)
referring to the English version as “versión inglesa de la traducción
del Código” or “en su versión en inglés fue traducida.” In a
different sense, there are the notes on articles 1022, 1219, 1271,
1374, 1646, the heading to Subsection 3, Section III, Chapter I,
Title 2, Book Five and article 2368. 84 These notes explain the use
of the “versión en inglés del Código,” “término en ingles,”
“versión en ingles” “texto en inglés” in the choice of a Spanish
translation. They refer to the English text as a version, without any
reference to the notion of translation, but still do not imply that the
French and English would have the same status. The equivalence
of the French and English versions timidly appears in the note on
article 1470, which refers to “el original del francés . . . y en el del
84. The last three notes mentioned in the text (art. 1646; the heading to
Subsection 3, Section III, Chapter I, Title 2, Book Five and art. 2368) deserve a
few extra comments. In the note on art. 1646 there is also an issue of Neutral
Spanish, with a reference to Argentina. The note for article 2368 is particular to
that article, but it should be linked to the one for the heading of Subsection 3,
Section III, Chapter I, Title 2, Book Five. They both refer to enajenación contra
el pago de una renta/du bail à rente/alienation for rent. However, the note for
2368 explains the choice of Spanish translation with much more detail.
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ingles.” 85 But the note on article 3020 seems to be the only one
which expressly recognizes the official status of the English
version: “versión oficial en ingles.”
Some of these notes could be placed in other groups or
subgroups, yet they mention the English version, and so they are
all put in the second group, since they belong to the debate
between translators and revisers. A general comment on all these
notes can be made that if both versions were considered to have
equal status, an explanation of which version seemed more useful
would not seem necessary. On the other hand, if the notes were
meant to provide more information to the reader, the choice
whether or not to use expressions linguistically closer to English
does not seem to be given a sufficient justification in the short
comments which mention this issue. It is particularly difficult to
understand why some cases found their way into a note and others
did not. Also, in cases where the English version seemed to have
been ignored, a thorough and systematic reading of both versions
could have suggested alternatives when the translator and the
revisers encountered difficulties or divergences. 86 In short, the
85. This note also refers to the issue of Neutral Spanish with particular
reference to Argentina.
86. For instance, the case of the word notamment was repeatedly mentioned
during the interviews. The Spanish words principalmente or especialmente, used
indiscriminately in the Spanish translation, were not found to be very
satisfactory by the revisers. Their idea was that even if within common usage
notamment conveys the idea of giving special emphasis to one or number of
things, out of a larger set, in Quebec’s legal realm it means one thing among
others, given just as an example. In its ordinary use in French, notamment means
“d’une manière qui mérite être notée (pour attirer l’attention sur un ou plusieurs
objets particuliers faisant partie d’un ensemble précédemment désigné ou sousentendu),” see, Le Nouveau Petit Robert, in DICTIONNAIRES LE ROBERT
(Paris,1993). But, in accordance with the use prevalent in Quebec Legal French,
the word notamment should be translated in Spanish by entre otros. When we
look at the English version, from the nearly seventy articles pointed out by the
revisers, the idea of one among others is only expressed five times: by using the
expressions “such as” (art. 801 and 1270), “or otherwise” (art. 2586) and the
verb “include” (art. 366, 535.1). The vast majority of the remaining articles use
the expressions “particularly” or “in particular,” which seem closer to the
dictionary definition of notamment. Does this mean that the translators
interpreted the norms expressed in the articles by taking account of both
versions? It does not seem that this was the case. At least one of the words
chosen in Spanish, “principalmente,” conveys an even stronger idea of primacy
than “notamment,” “particularly” or “in particular.” Principalmente conveys the
idea of the first one, also of something “esencial o fundamental,” see
DICCIONARIO DE LA LENGUA ESPAÑOLA, XXI ed., s.v. principalmente. The
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notes refer to the English version but missed the opportunity to
properly address the bilingualism of the Code. Three examples of
this are particularly relevant for the present essay.
The first example is found in article 206´s translators’ note
for the corresponding terms alliés/persons connected by marriage.
Here, the translators explain that the English version helped them
to obtain a more precise translation. Once again, the concerns arose
from the translation of a French word: alliés. The translators’ note
explains that alliés “puede hacer alusión tanto a personas que son
‘allegadas’ como a ‘parientes afines.’” Parientes afines was chosen
as a translation by taking into consideration “persons connected by
marriage.” The English version helped to clarify for the translators
what class of persons were addressed by the article. “Persons
connected by marriage” does not include allegados but it doubtless
refers to parientes afines. The translators’ choice coincides with
the doctrinal interpretations and definitions in Quebec, as to the
meaning of alliés, that refer to “personne unie à une autre par
alliance.” 87
But, in their reading of both versions, the translators missed
a possible discrepancy flagged in the Critical Edition. 88 Reading
the article in English gives the impression that the quality of
closeness is only required of relatives and not of persons connected
by marriage. In French, both parents and alliés seem to have to be
proche or at least it is possible to argue this. The Spanish version

English version only uses the expression “especially” on one occasion (art.
1696). While in that case the Spanish version did choose the similar
“especialmente,” this appears to have been more of a chance choice than a
conscious one, considering that in those cases where the idea of one among
others is present in English, the Spanish version still used “especialmente” and
“principalmente.” If the English version of the Code had been followed, it might
have helped achieve a more faithful rendering to use “en particular” or
“particularmente,” which are closer to the terms most commonly used in the
English, but this only occurs in two articles (36 and 1269) with no explanation.
There may also be an error in the Spanish version of article 2814. The indication
furnished by “notamment” or “particularly” is lost there, since the Spanish
version of the article does not include a corresponding term; this might lead to
reading the list of documents mentioned there as exhaustive.
87. Centre De Recherche En Droit Privé Et Comparé Du Québec, in
DICTIONNAIRE DE DROIT PRIVÉ DE LA FAMILLE ET LEXIQUES BILINGUES (Editions
Yvon Blais, Cowansville, 1999) (hereinafter “Centre De Recherche”).
88. Note, supra note 5.
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expresses the same idea as the English one: los parientes cercanos
y afines where cercanos qualifies exclusively parientes and not
afines. But the note does not explain the reasons for this choice.
Thus, the English version only helped to clarify a doubt, and it did
so in a good way. However, the translators, while drawing on this
version, missed the opportunity to point out the divergence or even
to go further, reflect on the texts, propose an interpretation, and
integrate all this into the Spanish. 89
As the example shows, the translators’ approach to the
English version is not one which considers the Code as a bilingual
source text. They used the English version to clarify a vague term
but the note does not show that they engaged in a thorough parallel
reading. Besides, in this particular case, the ambiguity could have
been dealt with by means of a unilingual reading which relied on
Quebec jurilinguistics resources, such as the Dictionnaire de droit
privé de la famille et lexiques bilingues. 90 A jurilinguist at the first
stage would have used Quebec lexical resources. A jurilinguist at
the second stage would have highlighted the Code’s bilingualism
and probably analysed the possible discrepancy between the texts.
The second example is found in the translators’ note on
article 1534 (1570, 2959). The note points out a problem in the
correspondence between arrérages and periodic payments. There
is no explanation in the note, which only says: “Tener en cuenta
que la locución arrérages en su versión en inglés fue traducida por
periodic payments.” The translators chose to translate the
corresponding terms arrérages/periodic payments with the Spanish
term pagos atrasados. They briefly, and without much in the way
of comments, draw attention to those terms, but do not clarify
whether they relied on one or the other version, or on both. Neither
do they explain exactly what needs to be taken into account for a
comparison or contrast between the terms used in each language
version. As a departure point, this essay will conceive of the
translators’ note as a sign the third language makes to the two other
languages, in order to initiate a dialogue; the essay will use this
approach in an attempt to examine the sign itself, without aiming
to provide an exhaustive analysis.
89. Supra note 58.
90. Centre De Recherche, supra note 87.
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Entering upon this exercise requires some methodological
remarks. The translators’ note was not repeated in article 1573,
where the corresponding terms arrérages/periodic payments can
also be found. This oversight could have probably been avoided by
systematically reading both versions. The question of cross
reference between existing translators’ notes is more complex. In
article 2959 (the second article where the note is repeated) the
corresponding terms are not arrérages/periodic payment. In this
case, there are two different corresponding terms in two different
sentences: redevances/periodic payments (translated by ganancias)
and arrérages/arrears (translated by pagos atrasados). Thus, the
problem of correspondence between arrérages and periodic
payments was not present in this article; arrérages is made to
correspond to arrears, and periodic payments is made to
correspond with redevances. Therefore, the note does not seem
relevant. However, the choice of term for the Spanish version
seems to indicate that in article 1534 the translators relied on the
French arrérages when choosing pagos atrasados. In article 2959,
pagos atrasados corresponds to the term arrérages and not
periodic payments. This then was probably also the choice the
translators made with respect to article 1534.
On the topic of the French term arrérages, two other
articles without translators’ notes need to be mentioned. First, in
article 596, arrérages/arrears was translated into Spanish with the
term atrasos. Second, in article 2960, the same corresponding
terms were translated as pagos atrasados. A terminological
analysis would be possible with respect to the difference between
atrasos and pagos atrasados and the degree of equivalence of each
term to arrérages/arrears. But what seems beyond doubt, from the
repeated use of the term atraso, 91 is that the translators always
considered the idea to be present of a date that had expired, in
every case where arrérages appeared in the French text.
As a last element in this puzzle, another article, also
without a translators' note, opens the issue even more. Article 2933
abandons the correspondence of arrérages with either periodic
91. From the verb atrasar: “Fijar un hecho en época posterior a aquella en
que ha ocurrido,” see DICCIONARIO DE LA LENGUA ESPAÑOLA, supra note 86
(“atrasar” see also s.v. “atraso,” “ atrasado”).

626

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 4

payments or arrears; instead, the term “instalments” appears.
Considering the synonymy this establishes between periodic
payment and instalment, 92 it is permissible to ask why there is no
note pointing out the possible discordance, along the lines of the
note on article 1534. 93 In this last case–article 2933–in accord with
the other occurrences in the French text of arrérages, for example
article 596, the Spanish version uses the term atrasos.
The puzzle created by the exercise of translating these
terms into Spanish could help to show how greater precision is
required where the terms arrérages, arriérés, periodic payments,
arrears, and instalments appear in the Civil Code of Québec. 94
Indeed, the use of these terms seems a bit vague in light of the
Code’s Spanish translation.
In Quebec private law, both the term arrérages and the
term arrears have two meanings. Arrérages refers to “redevance

92. See QUEBEC RESEARCH CENTRE OF PRIVATE & COMPARATIVE LAW,
PRIVATE LAW DICTIONARY AND BILINGUAL LEXICONS: OBLIGATIONS (Editions
Yvon Blais, Cowansville, 2003) (“instalment”).
93. Following-up the term instalment can add even more pieces to this
puzzle and leads to another translators’ note mentioning the English version (art.
1374). In articles 411 and 2442, where instalment is made to correspond to
versement, the Spanish version reads cuota. The Spanish cuota is also present in
the Spanish version of article 1953, where arrears is made to correspond to
arriérés. Besides this, the word cuota appears in article 2933, where arrérages
is made to correspond with instalment, but it is not used there as a translation of
those French and English terms, instead this Spanish term is used to translate
quotité/amount. As if there were not enough pieces in this puzzle, the term
quotité leads to a mysterious translators’ note with respect to article 1374. In this
case cantidad was chosen for quotité/quantity. It is of note that the trilingual
Code makes an error in its French version of this article: it has “quantité”
instead of the “quotité” which is in the official French text. A reader who is not
aware of this error will find the translators' note mysterious since there can be
little confusion in a correspondence between cantidad-quantité-quantity.
However, if the reader is aware of the correct French text, the translator’s
preference for cantidad as a translation of the legal terms quotité/quantity seems
to be a too literal translation. Cuota could have been a better option as when it
was chosen for article 2933, where quotité was present. However, it seems that
monto would have been the best choice, in line with the idea of amount and
montant given by the dictionary in reference to quantity and quotité. See id.
(“quantity”); CENTRE DE RECHERCHE EN DROIT PRIVÉ ET COMPARÉ DU QUÉBEC,
DICTIONNAIRE DE DROIT PRIVÉ ET LEXIQUES BILINGUES: LES OBLIGATIONS,
(Editions Yvon Blais, Cowansville, 2003) ( “quotité”).
94. This could also be the case for versements and even quotité-amountquantity. QUEBEC RESEARCH CENTRE OF PRIVATE & COMPARATIVE LAW, supra
note 92.
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périodique d’une rente” and it is a synonym of “arriéré.” 95 In the
same sense, arrears are the “periodic payments of an annuity” or
“payments for which the due date has expired.” 96 These definitions
should not be confused with each other. 97 The first definition does
not necessarily include the notion of a date that has expired. These
two meanings, that could lead to ambiguity when translating in
Spanish, do not seem present in Legal French or Legal English
outside Quebec. 98 Consulting dictionaries from France and the US
shows that the idea of a period of time which has expired is always
present in their definitions of arrérages and arrears. In line with
these understandings of them, using these terms interchangeably
with periodic payments does not seem reasonable. So, the
translators might have detected a situation worth taking note of
between both versions, by taking into account the meanings of the
terms arrérages/periodic payments given by definitions from
outside Quebec.
This exercise shows that the Code’s use of terminology in
this area could be improved and that translation into the third
language, due to the difficulties which it brings out, could lead the
way for this task. The translation can bring ambiguities to light and
show the need for a more precise term.
The third example relates to the translators’ dilemma of
how to express fait/act or omission in Spanish. The note on article
3020 explains that the translators’ choice was acto u omisión
considering “como base su versión oficial en inglés.” The Spanish
95. See supra note 93 (“arrérages”).
96. QUEBEC RESEARCH CENTRE OF PRIVATE & COMPARATIVE LAW, see
supra note 92 (“arrears”).
97. In this sense, “la redevance est également désignée sous le nom
d’arrérages, lesquels ne doivent [pas] être confondus avec les arriérés, qui sont
des dettes dont l’échéance est passée” and “ the dues payable under an annuity
may also be called arrears, which must not be confused with another meaning of
arrears, debts whose due date has expired.” See supra note 93 (“rente -Rem.
3”); QUEBEC RESEARCH CENTRE OF PRIVATE & COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note
92 (“annuity” -Obs. 3-°).
98. In France arrérages implies the idea of “termes échu” and it is not
considered a synonym of arriéré. See CORNU, VOCABULAIRE JURIDIQUE, supra
note 18 (“arrérages”). In English, the idea of a time which has expired is present
in the three definitions of arrears. See BRYAN A. GARNER, BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (St. Paul, West Group, 7th ed., 1999) ( “arrear”). Thus this example
can also be included in the debate on differences between legal languages within
the same language, supra note 21.
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version followed the nuance of the English text, and the need it
revealed that there be a clarification of both positive and negative
aspects of the more generic French term fait. 99 Hence, the
inclusion of u omisión.
But, once again, the loneliness of this note reflects the lack
of systematic parallel reading. In another five articles (876, 889,
1151, 1462, 1624) where the same corresponding terms–fait/act or
omission–are present, the translators chose hecho(s) instead of acto
u omission. 100 The translations of these articles forget the nuance
between positive and negative.
Moreover, the discussion about including the positive and
the negative aspects of fait in the English version can be enlarged
to several other articles 101 where fait was mirrored by act and not
by act or omission. 102 Unfortunately, the note is only present for
one article, as opposed to the approximately thirty other cases
where this might have been considered an issue worth analyzing.
Reflecting on the need (or lack of need) to indicate in
Spanish the positive and the negative aspects of the concept
expressed in French by the term fait might have opened an
interesting dialogue among the three languages. Spanish could
have “prêté l’oreille” 103 and thus might have enriched the
interpretation of these provisions of the Civil Code of Québec.
Even if this exercise might be considered to exceed the legal

99. The French word fait can express either of two concepts, one of which
is expressed in English with the word fact, the other, “dans le droit de la
responsabilité civile,” with the expression act or omission, see CENTRE DE
RECHERCHE EN DROIT PRIVÉ ET COMPARÉ DU QUÉBEC, supra note 93 (“fait”).
The latter concept is what the English version is referring to in these examples.
100. This lack of uniformity, besides reinforcing an impression that the notes
are incomplete, can open up a discussion on the differences between hecho and
acto, which could itself be the subject of a study with respect to legal language.
In Quebec, See Benoît Moore, De l’acte et du fait juridique ou d’un critère de
distinction incertain, 31 R.J.T 277 (1997).
101. See Preface, supra note 2, art. 874, 1020 (this article is not mentioned in
the Critical Edition but the corresponding terms fait-doing seem subject to
similar considerations), 1457, 1459, 1460, 1461, 1465, 1480, 1514, 1531, 1562,
1732 (in this case the terms are “hechos personales,” “faits personnels”
“personal fault”), 1860, 2072, 2365, 2386, 2396, 2474, 2499, 2704, 2885, 3125,
3126, 3148.3, 3168.3.
102. See Preface, supra note 2, art. 1457.
103. Ost uses this expression when referring to the importance of translation.
See Ost, supra note 44. See also Levasseur & Feliú, supra note 21.
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translator’s task, 104 at least there should be an indication to the
reader that an issue exists, in a note for each article where the issue
arises, and not merely in an isolated note.

VI. CONCLUSION
It seems important not only to refer to the history of the
trilingual Code but also to its future. There are two aspects that
seem relevant when thinking of the future of this work: its
improvement and its updating.
Regarding the first aspect, D. L’Anglais called the
trilingual Code a “work in progress.” As becomes clear in light of
the examples, it is true that the Spanish version can be improved.
There is no concrete project to revise the published Spanish
version, but many interviewees considered this to be necessary and
expressed their willingness to participate in this work. They also
suggested ways to go further in the analysis by completing a
glossary or even a bilingual or trilingual civil law dictionary. Some
of the unpublished translators and revisers’ research could be a
solid start.
As for the second aspect, updating, J. C. Rivera is engaged
in translating into Spanish any changes to the Code. If the revision
work were in progress, future reforms or linguistic revisions 105
could present a good opportunity to enhance the Spanish version in
future, revised, editions.
Last, but not least, the idea of “to be continued” implied by
the present conclusion reinforces the goal of opening avenues for
research. The jurilinguistic approach proposed here showed how
ongoing debates could find new examples from the translation of a
bilingual legal text into a third language. Also, it presented in a
preliminary fashion some lenses for analysis and avenues for

104. Supra note 58.
105. It is of note that the Minister of Justice now has the power to make
“minor corrections [to legislation] with a view to reconciling, among other
things, the French and English versions,” if the corrections do not alter “the
substance of any text.” See An Act respecting the Compilation of Québec Laws
and Regulations, R.S.Q. c. R-2.2.0.0.2, S. 3(4).
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research which have yet to be pursued by professionals focused
either in the legal or the linguistic pillar.

BOOK REVIEW
GEORGE DARGO, JEFFERSON’S LOUISIANA: POLITICS AND THE
CLASH OF LEGAL TRADITIONS
(Rev. ed., The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., Clark, New Jersey, 2009)
Reviewed by Agustín Parise ∗
This work by George Dargo is unique in explaining the
political, legal, and above all, socio-historical events that took
place in Louisiana during the early nineteenth century. The events
Dargo brilliantly describes and analyzes help us better understand
the current legal system in Louisiana. Further, this revised edition
by The Lawbook Exchange shows that the celebrations of the
enactment of the Digest of 1808 1 did not end in the year of the
bicentennial. The new edition of this work originally published in
1975 by Harvard University Press, continues providing a useful
tool for a new generation of scholars on Louisiana legal history.
The book is divided into three parts. From the very
beginning, Dargo is able to reveal that the main debate in
Louisiana was between the adoption of legal traditions and not
between which Continental European or civil law system should be
adopted. Part One consists of one chapter, which makes readers
look into the diverse geography and demography of lower
Louisiana during the early 1800s. By doing so, readers are
provided with a background that is necessary for the understanding
of the remaining chapters. Dargo is able to highlight the “singular
attractions” 2 that the region provided to American immigrants after
the Purchase and how those attractions resulted in a melting pot of
cultures and interests. That melting pot reflected a bipolar product
formed by ‘ancient inhabitants’ and Anglo-Americans. As
expected, that melting pot also reflected a bipolar attitude in the
∗ Researcher, Faculty of Law, Maastricht University, The Netherlands;
LL.B., LL.D. (Universidad de Buenos Aires); LL.M. (Louisiana State University
Law Center).
1. Complete English title: A Digest of the Civil Laws Now in Force in the
Territory of Orleans; See the French and English texts of the Digest of 1808 at:
www.law.lsu.edu/digest (Last visited November 3, 2011).
2. GEORGE DARGO, JEFFERSON’S LOUISIANA: POLITICS AND THE CLASH OF
LEGAL TRADITIONS 9 (Rev. ed. 2009).
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inclinations towards the adoption of the civil or common law
systems. The author illustrates with examples how the substance of
the legal systems offered different solutions to legal matters,
assisting readers to quickly identify how the adoption of one
system could affect the ‘ancient inhabitants’ or the AngloAmericans. Here, the clash of legal traditions to which Dargo
refers throughout his book starts to be visible: a clash that
“encompassed the interests, the value system, and the very identity
of a diverse people who now, for the first time in their history, had
to unite in defense of the common elements of their heritage.” 3
Part Two, on the problems of colonial rule, starts in chapter
two, which is dedicated to the vicissitudes of William C. C.
Claiborne as governor of lower Louisiana, who due to the
importance of the region and his duties was “one of the most
important public officials in all of the United States.” 4 At that time,
Claiborne had been appointed by Thomas Jefferson to deal with
the vulnerability of New Orleans, a problem that the President
found acute and persistent during his presidencies. Jefferson felt
the ‘ancient inhabitants’ had an unclear allegiance to the Union.
Working with primary sources, and reflecting his skills as both a
historian and a jurist, the author then brilliantly highlights that
Claiborne had a position that was “great in theory but modest in
fact.” 5 Also in the second chapter, the initial isolation of the
governor and his gradual blending with the inhabitants is explained
by depicting his tension when facing federal and local requests and
by summarizing the different public controversies to which he was
associated (v.gr., opposition to early statehood, appointments of
officials, conflicts with local press, veto of bills). Among the most
relevant controversies of that time, is the one that developed
around the ‘reign of terror’ and successive events that surrounded
the conspiracy by Aaron Burr, which Dargo approaches clearly in
chapter three of the book. 6 The attitude of the governor in this
3.
4.
5.
6.
words:

Id. at 34.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 44.
Dargo explains the activities and motivations of Burr in the following
Historians have never finally established the meaning of
Burr’s movements in the southwest. His defenders have
argued that he intended nothing more than to revolutionize the
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aspect reflected that he had slightly inclined towards the interests
of locals. Another public controversy, which Dargo develops
extensively in chapter four of the book, mainly by looking again to
newspapers and epistolary records, is the one that took place with
the New Orleans Batture. 7 To the understanding of the reviewer,
that is the most important controversy and a key element to
understand the clash, because it formally ignited the debate on
which legal system would be applied in the region. The Batture
represented significant immovable property interests for Edward
Livingston, in opposition to the interest of the city of New Orleans,
and generated decades of litigation before courts in Louisiana and
in the East coast. In words of the author: “the questions raised by
the Batture stimulated a social awareness of the importance of
legal issues in general and a hostility to common law in particular.
The Batture controversy was crudely perceived as a conflict

Spanish colonies in West Florida and Mexico–ends which
most Jeffersonian Republicans would have applauded. Burr’s
critics have asserted that he purposed treason and subversion,
that he hoped to detach all of the southwest and Louisiana
from the Union and then establish an empire with Mexico and
Wet Florida as tributary states. Burr himself probably never
had a fix design. He had many brands in the flames and hoped
that at least one would catch fire.
Id. at 89-90.
7. One of the earliest works on the Batture, which also provides one of the
best and most elegant explanations, reads:
New Orleans is situated on an alluvial plain, evidently formed,
like the surrounding country for a great distance, by the
transporting and creating power of the Mississippi in the
course of centuries. This plain, which constitutes a portion of
the Delta of the Mississippi, contains a soil of incomparable
fertility, through which the current of the majestic river winds
its way with resistless impetuosity, sweeping along in large,
graceful and singularly regular curves, which mould its
channel, and make the shores, which limit and restrain its
water, conform to their meanderings. Hence the shores of the
Mississippi present every where bends or points, of which, the
bends, or curves, being exposed to the more immediate and
direct action of the current, are constantly excavated or
abraded, while the points, under the influence of the
countercurrent generally increase in extent by the alluvial
accretions formed around them. These alluvial deposites,
which are often of great extent and value, are called battures.
Gustavus Schmidt, The Batture Question, 1:2 LA. L.J. 84, 87-88 (1841).
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between two diverse legal traditions.” 8 This controversy would
pave the way for the awareness of a need to preserve the civil law
system, at least in the area of private law. The controversy
included not only the U.S. President and local officials, but also
those who would contemporarily or shortly after codified the laws
(i.e., Livingston, Moreau-Lislet, Derbigny). The Batture also
ignited early debate on the laws applicable in the region: were they
Spanish? Were they French? Dargo correctly sees the Batture as a
ground-leveler for the future adoption of the Digest of 1808.
Part Three of the book continues examining the clash of
legal traditions that took place at that time in the region. It focuses,
however, on the Digest of 1808 and the events that preceded its
adoption: perhaps the best exponents and most visible results of
that clash during the territorial period. Chapter five of the book
addresses a visible clash. Jefferson advocated for a Union with
“people speaking the same language, governed in similar forms,
and by similar laws,” 9 and thought he could find in Claiborne the
suitable person to help him achieve that objective. The chapter
relates specifically to the operation of the courts in the region and
the need to decide which system of law they would follow. The
author correctly indicates that the operation of courts in Louisiana
could not wait until matters on substantive law would be decided.
A solution to and facing of daily matters was paramount in order to
smoothly administrate the new territory. Procedure would have to
advance, while substance could be kept on hold. In addition, Dargo
reflects on the accounts he provides that it was clear that in the
area of criminal law the Spanish system was not well received by
local inhabitants. The latter found the Spanish system corrupt and
brutal. 10 Therefore, Claiborne faced again a debate: adoption of the
civil or the common law institutions and procedures. Who to
please? From this chapter, and from the reading of references by
Dargo to plays, pamphlets, memorials, newspapers, and essays, it
is made clear that the debate was not free of tension. In addition,
the ultimate adoption of common law institutions and procedures

8. DARGO, supra note 2, at 144.
9. Id. at 188 (emphasis added).
10. Id. at 192.
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seemed to indicate that the next expected step would have been the
adoption of substantive common law principles.
Chapter six proves the contrary. The advocates of the civil
law system found a threat in the recent events. Hence, in May
1806, the legislature adopted a bill, also referred to as the Project
of 1806, by which the pre-existing Spanish and Roman laws would
govern in the territory. Claiborne did not approve this initiative and
vetoed the bill, generating in the legislative body an immediate
claim for dissolution. Further, the local newspaper Le Telegraphe
published a manifesto, signed by members of the legislative body,
in which the latter explained the reasons why they preferred the
civil law system. In that same chapter Dargo clearly explains the
repercussions of the manifesto and the repealing movements that
arose from the defenders of the common law system. But that
aborted bill would not be the last stand of the advocates of the civil
law system: they would later appoint two counselors to draft a civil
code for the territory. This appointment would culminate in the
Digest of 1808, the main star of chapter seven and where the clash
of traditions is visible at its best. This chapter raises and answers
many questions that relate to the study of the Digest of 1808:
Firstly, was it a digest or a code? With our current understanding, a
digest would simply provide a recompilation of existing and
applicable Spanish laws, and solutions would be available outside
of the text, if answers were not provided therein. A code would
definitively produce a cut with previous Spanish legislation, would
be exhaustive, and all solutions would have to be looked for within
its articulation. Secondly, a wide array of questions related to
sources: which were the materials the drafters used when
completing the Digest of 1808? Were these materials of Spanish,
French, or Roman origin? What is the value of the edition of the
Digest of 1808 with manuscript notes entitled de la Vergne
volume? What is the Batiza-Pascal debate on sources of the Digest
of 1808 that has been ongoing in Louisiana since the 1970s? While
answering this set of questions, Dargo correctly states that the
debate in Louisiana did not limit to which civil law system would
be adopted (i.e., French or Spanish), but that it went further and
related to which legal tradition would prevail (i.e., Continental
European or Common Law). Accordingly, in that same chapter the

636

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 4

author informs the readers of the “gradual erosion” 11 that he sensed
in the civil law of Louisiana back in the 1970s, which is still a
valid feeling during the publication of this revised edition.
Corollary to this chapter, and to the book as a whole, Dargo sees
the Digest of 1808 as the political compromise by which the settled
‘ancient inhabitants’ accepted the dictates of the Union. 12
This revised edition includes several positive additions.
Firstly, the book includes illustrations, making them another useful
way of sharing information. The use of maps, reproductions of
book covers, and pamphlets help in the building of knowledge on
time and place. Secondly, the original endnotes have been
converted into footnotes, making access more user-friendly. Some
footnotes have been revised to attain a better pinpointing, while
few were updated with references to works published after the
publication in 1975. The best companions to this new edition of the
work of Dargo would be the studies by Richard Kilbourne 13 and
Alain Levasseur. 14 Both books, also recently republished, help in
understanding the events that relate to the clash of legal traditions.
The work by Kilbourne is precise in explaining the legal history of
the adoption of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825, successor of the
Digest of 1808. It picks up the developments of the clash of legal
traditions contemporaneously to the adoption of the Digest of
1808, and continues exploring that phenomenon in Louisiana,
bridging both legal bodies. The work by Levasseur provides a
better understanding of the life and work of Louis Moreau-Lislet,
the main drafter of both the Digest of 1808 and the Civil Code of
1825, and an important player in the clash of legal traditions.
The main addition to the revised edition of the work by
Dargo is the new introduction provided by the author. The
introduction excels in showing what Dargo summarizes by stating
that: “the history of Louisiana and its law is no longer a subject of
interest only to local legal scholars; it has broadened out to become
11. Id. at 300.
12. Id.
13. RICHARD H. KILBOURNE JR., A HISTORY OF THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE
(1987, reprint 2008).
14. ALAIN LEVASSEUR (with the assistance of Vicenç Feliú), MOREAU
LISLET: THE MAN BEHIND THE DIGEST OF 1808 (2008) (Rev. ed. of Alain
Levasseur, Louis Casimir Elisabeth Moreau-Lislet: Foster Father of Louisiana
Civil Law (1996)).
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a subject with profound implications toward an understanding of
American history and of America’s place in the world today.” 15
This expression of the author is supported by the compilation and
in-deep analysis that he makes of the main writings that were
published since the printing of the first edition in 1975. An
insider’s look is given to readers on the developments of the
modern historiography of Louisiana. The introduction also
provides a fresh and updated look into the debate on the sources of
the Digest of 1808. Above all, the author reflects that the debates
and studies on Louisiana law exceed the geographical boundaries
of the state and are studied by scholars from different corners of
the world who are interested in civil law or mixed jurisdictions.
The work of Dargo is able to position Louisiana as a treasure-trove
region for scholars interested in the steadily developing area of
comparative legal history.
Post Scriptum
George Dargo passed away on January 5, 2012. The
Editor-in-Chief of this Journal had the privilege of
attending a lunch organized in his honor by Ms.
Georgia Chadwick, Director of the Law Library of
Louisiana, and Mr. Greg Talbot, The Law Book
Exchange, on the occasion of the publication of the
revised edition of Jefferson’s Louisiana. This was at
Antoine’s, in New Orleans, in January 2010. The
reviewer could not attend but had met George
Dargo on a previous occasion.
The new edition of this book was indeed a great
event in Louisiana, where George Dargo will be
missed by friends and colleagues. He leaves us a
major contribution to the history of our state,
covering events that had a large significance for the
United States and other parts of the world.
O.M. and A.P.

15. DARGO, supra note 2, at xxvii.

